1	Thursday, 31 May 2012	1	a section on my website which is really there for the
2	(10.00 am)	2	benefit of my constituents, where I put up press
3	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, Mr Jay.	3	articles that have been about me, so that people can see
4	MR JAY: Today's witness is the Right Honourable	4	what I'm up to. That was a comment by a journalist from
5	Jeremy Hunt, please.	5	Broadcast magazine, but it's not how I would describe
6	MR JEREMY RICHARD STREYNSHAM HUNT (sworn)	6	myself.
7	Questions by MR JAY	7	Q. So why did you put it up on your website then, if it
8	MR JAY: Your full name, please?	8	didn't represent your view?
9	A. Jeremy Richard Streynsham Hunt.	9	A. Well, I think it's helpful to my constituents to put up
10	Q. Thank you. You provided us with a witness statement	10	all the comments about me, positive or negative. There
11	dated 4 May this year. It has three annexes, the	11	are comment sections on my website where constituents
12	standard statement of truth. Is this your formal	12	themselves put up comments, positive or negative.
13	evidence to the Inquiry?	13	Q. Okay. We know from material which Mr Rupert Murdoch
14	A. Yes, it is.	14	provided to us this is his exhibit KRM 40, it's in
15	Q. In terms of your career, Mr Hunt, you have been a Member	15	the PROP file at page 01962 that you had two meetings
16	of Parliament since 2005, Shadow CMS and then, since	16	with Mr James Murdoch in opposition, on 12 October 2009
17	11 May 2010, Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics,	17	and 12 February 2010. Hopefully that will come up on
18	Media and Sport; is that correct?	18	your screen. It's not available in the various files
19	A. That's correct.	19	you have.
20	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Mr Hunt, as I've said to everybody	20	One of the agenda items, according to
21	else, thank you very much for the effort that has	21	Mr James Murdoch, was reform of Ofcom. Can you remember
22	clearly been put into the statement and all the	22	what, if at all, was discussed on that occasion?
23	exhibits. I'm grateful to you, and of course the	23	A. Not particularly. I think James Murdoch has a general
24	assistance you've received from your staff.	24	hostility to Ofcom and the BBC, and he may have said
25	A. Thank you, sir.	25	that the burden of regulation from Ofcom was too
	Page 1		Page 3
1	MR JAY: Your approach generally to media ownership, you	1	onerous, that sort of general tenor. My focus in both
2	cover these in paragraphs 3 and 4 of your statement at	2	those meetings were my two policy priorities, which were
3	05597. Is there anything you wish to add to that?	$\begin{vmatrix} 2\\ 3 \end{vmatrix}$	superfast broadband and local TV, and I was unable to
4	A. No.	4	excite much interest in him in those two areas.
5	Q. You helpfully explain your reserve functions under the	5	Q. But did he try and excite interest in you on the issue
6	relevant legislation in relation to media plurality.	6	of reform of Ofcom?
7	This is paragraphs 8 to 14. Dr Cable gave us a similar		A. I think, apart from sort of generally expressing a view
8	explanation, and there are no specific points which	8	that the broadcasting market was too heavily regulated,
9	arise. You draw attention to the relevant guidance and	9	I don't think we got into much more substantive
10	the public interest test, which is under section 58 of	10	discussions than that.
11	the Act. When did you first become acquainted with	11	Q. Had you read by that stage his MacTaggart lecture, which
12	that, Mr Hunt?	12	was delivered on 28 August 2009?
13	A. I think I only really became acquainted with it when the	13	A. Yes, I had.
		14	Q. Did you share the views and opinions expressed in that
14	powers were transferred to me from the Department of		
14 15	powers were transferred to me from the Department of Business on 21 December.	15	lecture?
15	Business on 21 December.	15 16	lecture? A. There were some things that he talked about which
15 16	Business on 21 December. Q. Thank you. Can I deal with your period in opposition,	16	A. There were some things that he talked about which
15	Business on 21 December. Q. Thank you. Can I deal with your period in opposition, first of all. Your personal website said at one stage:		A. There were some things that he talked about which I thought were very important. He talked about the
15 16 17 18	Business on 21 December. Q. Thank you. Can I deal with your period in opposition, first of all. Your personal website said at one stage: "Like all good Conservatives, Hunt is a cheerleader	16 17 18	A. There were some things that he talked about which I thought were very important. He talked about the importance of having independent commercially viable
15 16 17 18 19	Business on 21 December. Q. Thank you. Can I deal with your period in opposition, first of all. Your personal website said at one stage: "Like all good Conservatives, Hunt is a cheerleader for Rupert Murdoch's contribution to the health of	16 17 18 19	A. There were some things that he talked about which I thought were very important. He talked about the importance of having independent commercially viable media operators as a very important element of plurality
15 16 17 18	Business on 21 December. Q. Thank you. Can I deal with your period in opposition, first of all. Your personal website said at one stage: "Like all good Conservatives, Hunt is a cheerleader for Rupert Murdoch's contribution to the health of British television."	16 17 18 19 20	A. There were some things that he talked about which I thought were very important. He talked about the importance of having independent commercially viable media operators as a very important element of plurality of news provision, and I completely agree with that.
15 16 17 18 19 20	Business on 21 December. Q. Thank you. Can I deal with your period in opposition, first of all. Your personal website said at one stage: "Like all good Conservatives, Hunt is a cheerleader for Rupert Murdoch's contribution to the health of British television." So that presumably represented and perhaps still	16 17 18 19 20 21	A. There were some things that he talked about which I thought were very important. He talked about the importance of having independent commercially viable media operators as a very important element of plurality of news provision, and I completely agree with that. There were other things that I disagree with.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Business on 21 December. Q. Thank you. Can I deal with your period in opposition, first of all. Your personal website said at one stage: "Like all good Conservatives, Hunt is a cheerleader for Rupert Murdoch's contribution to the health of British television." So that presumably represented and perhaps still represents your view; is that correct?	16 17 18 19 20	 A. There were some things that he talked about which I thought were very important. He talked about the importance of having independent commercially viable media operators as a very important element of plurality of news provision, and I completely agree with that. There were other things that I disagree with. I disagree with the general thrust of his views on the
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Business on 21 December. Q. Thank you. Can I deal with your period in opposition, first of all. Your personal website said at one stage: "Like all good Conservatives, Hunt is a cheerleader for Rupert Murdoch's contribution to the health of British television." So that presumably represented and perhaps still represents your view; is that correct? A. I would say it's not correct, and perhaps I could also 	 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 	 A. There were some things that he talked about which I thought were very important. He talked about the importance of having independent commercially viable media operators as a very important element of plurality of news provision, and I completely agree with that. There were other things that I disagree with. I disagree with the general thrust of his views on the BBC, in particular his description of the BBC as
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	Business on 21 December. Q. Thank you. Can I deal with your period in opposition, first of all. Your personal website said at one stage: "Like all good Conservatives, Hunt is a cheerleader for Rupert Murdoch's contribution to the health of British television." So that presumably represented and perhaps still represents your view; is that correct?	 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	 A. There were some things that he talked about which I thought were very important. He talked about the importance of having independent commercially viable media operators as a very important element of plurality of news provision, and I completely agree with that. There were other things that I disagree with. I disagree with the general thrust of his views on the
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	 Business on 21 December. Q. Thank you. Can I deal with your period in opposition, first of all. Your personal website said at one stage: "Like all good Conservatives, Hunt is a cheerleader for Rupert Murdoch's contribution to the health of British television." So that presumably represented and perhaps still represents your view; is that correct? A. I would say it's not correct, and perhaps I could also correct the impression that that statement gave, which 	 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	 A. There were some things that he talked about which I thought were very important. He talked about the importance of having independent commercially viable media operators as a very important element of plurality of news provision, and I completely agree with that. There were other things that I disagree with. I disagree with the general thrust of his views on the BBC, in particular his description of the BBC as state-sponsored journalism, and the suggestion that the

	rt Murdoch was also present for part of the event.
	you remember the date?
	n't remember the date off the top of my head, but
-	ak it was after I'd become Culture Secretary.
	nk that was the occasion where it was said you were
	g behind a tree to avoid being spotted by a Wall
	t journalist. Is that correct or not?
	What actually happened was I went to a dinner which
	ak was hosted by the master of UCL, it wasn't
	vate dinner with James Murdoch, and on my way to
	inner, I spotted a large group of media journalists
	thought this is not the time to have an impromptu
	view, so I moved to a different part of the
	rangle.
	re may or may not have been trees; is that right?
	re may or may not have been trees.
	USTICE LEVESON: All right, I think we've moved on.
	Y: Yes, I am.
19a particular option in the spring of 2008, but we never1915	June 2010, which was the day the bid was
	unced, Mr Hunt. When did you first learn that the
	as in the offing, as it were?
-	n't think I knew about the bid until getting a call
	Mr Murdoch on the day that it was announced.
24travel to New York to see executives of News24Q. You	don't think so or you're sure you didn't know about
	d before?
Page 5	Page 7
1 some research into local television and America has the 1 A. Wel	ll, I'm yes, I'm I'll say I'm sure, because
	't recall any conversation or knowledge about it,
	I think it was complete news to me, so I am sure.
	't be, you know, completely certain that at no
	e ever was it ever mentioned to me that one day they
	t buy the rest of it, but for the avoidance of
	ot, I don't believe I was ever told at any stage that
8 A. No, they didn't. 8 they	had any concrete plans.
	ause presumably it was your judgment, knowing the
10 you this, though: did you discuss anything else, other 10 comp	pany, that that was one of their aspirations in due
	se to acquire the remaining publicly owned shares in
	/B; is that correct?
	I would have thought they had lots of different
	ations and commercial ambitions, and I would have
15 particularly interested in talking about that to me, 15 thoug	ght they would be focusing on the growth of BSkyB.
	uldn't have particularly thought that the purchase
17 of local television in the US. That was my primary 17 of the	ose shares was a corporate objective.
18 purpose. They talked about I think one of the things 18 Q. But	on the occasion that Mr Murdoch called you, you deal
19 we talked about was the impartiality rules, which we 19 with i	it in paragraph 29 of your statement, are we to
- · · /	
	ce that you indicated broad sympathy to the proposed
20 have here under the Broadcasting Code, which they don't 20 deduc	ce that you indicated broad sympathy to the proposed isition at that stage?
20have here under the Broadcasting Code, which they don't20deduc21have in the US, so we had some discussion about that.21acqui	
20have here under the Broadcasting Code, which they don't20deduct21have in the US, so we had some discussion about that.21acquit22Q. Okay. In May 2010 there was another meeting it's22A. I do	isition at that stage?
20have here under the Broadcasting Code, which they don't20deduct21have in the US, so we had some discussion about that.21acquit22Q. Okay. In May 2010 there was another meeting it's22A. I do23more accurately described, I think, as you say in23imag	isition at that stage? on't remember exactly what I said, but I would
20have here under the Broadcasting Code, which they don't20deduc21have in the US, so we had some discussion about that.21acqui22Q. Okay. In May 2010 there was another meeting it's22A. I do23more accurately described, I think, as you say in23imag24annex B, 05624, as an evening reception and dinner,24Finan	isition at that stage? on't remember exactly what I said, but I would gine that I did. I also made a comment to the

2 (Pages 5 to 8)

1	shareholding, but I think most people felt that they	1	I remember my rather unsuccessful attempts to excite him
2	controlled the company. James Murdoch was the chairman	2	about superfast broadband and local TV, which continued
3	of BSkyB. And so I didn't think that there was	3	to be unsuccessful.
4	a significant change in plurality represented by them	4	Q. There was another meeting at the Conservative Party
5	purchasing the shares that they didn't own.	5	conference in that year in October 2010. We see that
6	Q. Do you think he phoned you to ascertain your view or for	6	from annex B again at 05626. This time it was
7	some other reason?	7	Rebekah Brooks and Frederic Michel. Can you recall
8	A. I think he phoned me as a courtesy. I do remember him	8	whether the BSkyB bid was discussed on that occasion?
9	saying that he was calling me and Vince Cable.	9	A. Yes, it was.
10	Vince Cable, obviously, is the person who had	10	Q. Was Mr Smith present on that occasion?
11	responsibility for the decision, and me as the Secretary	11	A. I believe he was.
12	of State responsible for the media sector.	12	Q. Can you remember anything about the content of the
13	Q. Did he say to you that he'd already spoken to Dr Cable	13	discussion which might assist us?
14	or not?	14	A. As I remember, I think they expressed some concern that
15	A. I think he did, yes.	15	they weren't getting a sympathetic hearing from
16	Q. So he had spoken to Dr Cable before speaking to you, is	16	Vince Cable, but not much more than that.
17	that the sequence of events?	17	Q. What response if any did you give to that concern?
18	A. He definitely mentioned talking to Dr Cable. Whether he	18	A. I would have said that my own view broadly speaking was
19	said, ''I am calling Dr Cable'', or whether he said, ''I've	19	that I didn't think there was a plurality issue, so
20	called Dr Cable'', I can't remember.	20	I would have probably expressed some surprise that
21	Q. Your general thinking at the time, paragraph 28 of your	21	Vince Cable may have thought there was more of
22	statement, 05602, you say:	22	a problem.
23	"I have always been open about the fact that I was	23	Q. How well did you know Mr Michel by that point? Of
24	broadly sympathetic to the proposed acquisition prior to	24	course we're October 2010.
25	taking responsibility for it."	25	A. Well, I knew Mr I mean, I didn't know Mr Michel
	Page 9		Page 11
1		1	
1	So that was your thinking then. Whether it changed,	1	particularly well full stop. I'd, you know, probably
2	of course, we will discuss.	2	had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as
2 3	of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end	2 3	had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media
2 3 4	of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in	2 3 4	had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary.
2 3 4 5	of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle,	2 3 4 5	had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the
2 3 4	of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember	2 3 4 5 6	had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born
2 3 4 5 6 7	of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that?	2 3 4 5 6 7	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials present who took minutes, and meetings where there 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles, under tab SS.Aa.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials present who took minutes, and meetings where there weren't officials present and minutes weren't taken and 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles, under tab SS.Aa. A. Which bundle is this, Mr Jay?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials present who took minutes, and meetings where there weren't officials present and minutes weren't taken and it was entirely my discretion and I had that meeting 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles, under tab SS.Aa. A. Which bundle is this, Mr Jay? Q. Second supplementary bundle.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials present who took minutes, and meetings where there weren't officials present and minutes weren't taken and it was entirely my discretion and I had that meeting with Mr Murdoch. I also had meetings with other 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles, under tab SS.Aa. A. Which bundle is this, Mr Jay? Q. Second supplementary bundle. A. If I don't need to see it, I'm happy to carry on.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials present who took minutes, and meetings where there weren't taken and it was entirely my discretion and I had that meeting with Mr Murdoch. I also had meetings with other officials, with the chairman of the BBC Trust, the head 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles, under tab SS.Aa. A. Which bundle is this, Mr Jay? Q. Second supplementary bundle. A. If I don't need to see it, I'm happy to carry on. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'd prefer that you had these
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials present who took minutes, and meetings where there weren't officials present and minutes weren't taken and it was entirely my discretion and I had that meeting with Mr Murdoch. I also had meetings with other officials, with the chairman of the BBC Trust, the head of ITV and a number of other people when I'd just become 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles, under tab SS.Aa. A. Which bundle is this, Mr Jay? Q. Second supplementary bundle. A. If I don't need to see it, I'm happy to carry on. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'd prefer that you had these documents in front of you, if you don't mind.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials present who took minutes, and meetings where there weren't officials present and minutes weren't taken and it was entirely my discretion and I had that meeting with Mr Murdoch. I also had meetings with other officials, with the chairman of the BBC Trust, the head of ITV and a number of other people when I'd just become 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles, under tab SS.Aa. A. Which bundle is this, Mr Jay? Q. Second supplementary bundle. A. If I don't need to see it, I'm happy to carry on. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'd prefer that you had these documents in front of you, if you don't mind. A. Right, I have supplementary folder 2. I think that's
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials present who took minutes, and meetings where there weren't officials present and minutes weren't taken and it was entirely my discretion and I had that meeting with Mr Murdoch. I also had meetings with other officials, with the chairman of the BBC Trust, the head of ITV and a number of other people when I'd just become Secretary of State. Q. Do you believe that the BSkyB bid was discussed on that 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles, under tab SS.Aa. A. Which bundle is this, Mr Jay? Q. Second supplementary bundle. A. If I don't need to see it, I'm happy to carry on. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'd prefer that you had these documents in front of you, if you don't mind. A. Right, I have supplementary folder 2. I think that's probably the one. That's it.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials present who took minutes, and meetings where there weren't taken and it was entirely my discretion and I had that meeting with Mr Murdoch. I also had meetings with other officials, with the chairman of the BBC Trust, the head of ITV and a number of other people when I'd just become Secretary of State. Q. Do you believe that the BSkyB bid was discussed on that occasion? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles, under tab SS.Aa. A. Which bundle is this, Mr Jay? Q. Second supplementary bundle. A. If I don't need to see it, I'm happy to carry on. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'd prefer that you had these documents in front of you, if you don't mind. A. Right, I have supplementary folder 2. I think that's probably the one. That's it.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials present who took minutes, and meetings where there weren't officials present and minutes weren't taken and it was entirely my discretion and I had that meeting with Mr Murdoch. I also had meetings with other officials, with the chairman of the BBC Trust, the head of ITV and a number of other people when I'd just become Secretary of State. Q. Do you believe that the BSkyB bid was discussed on that occasion? A. I would be very surprised if it wasn't discussed, 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles, under tab SS.Aa. A. Which bundle is this, Mr Jay? Q. Second supplementary bundle. A. If I don't need to see it, I'm happy to carry on. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'd prefer that you had these documents in front of you, if you don't mind. A. Right, I have supplementary folder 2. I think that's probably the one. That's it. MR JAY: If it's tabbed in the same way, you'll find a tab SS.Aa. It's the first document under that tab, 07905.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials present who took minutes, and meetings where there weren't officials present and minutes weren't taken and it was entirely my discretion and I had that meeting with Mr Murdoch. I also had meetings with other officials, with the chairman of the BBC Trust, the head of ITV and a number of other people when I'd just become Secretary of State. Q. Do you believe that the BSkyB bid was discussed on that occasion? A. I would be very surprised if it wasn't discussed, because obviously it would have been top of Mr Murdoch's 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles, under tab SS.Aa. A. Which bundle is this, Mr Jay? Q. Second supplementary bundle. A. If I don't need to see it, I'm happy to carry on. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'd prefer that you had these documents in front of you, if you don't mind. A. Right, I have supplementary folder 2. I think that's probably the one. That's it. MR JAY: If it's tabbed in the same way, you'll find a tab SS.Aa. It's the first document under that tab, 07905. A. No. Sorry, will it be on the screen now, Mr Jay?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 of course, we will discuss. There was another meeting, I think towards the end of June, which is mentioned both in your annex B and in a Guardian piece which is under tab 13 of your bundle, which I think took place on 28 June. Do you remember that? A. I don't have the Guardian piece in front of me, but yes, it did take place on 28 June. Q. Was it the case that there were no officials present and no written agenda or briefing? A. Yes. I was told by my officials that it was entirely proper to have meetings where there were officials present who took minutes, and meetings where there weren't officials present and minutes weren't taken and it was entirely my discretion and I had that meeting with Mr Murdoch. I also had meetings with other officials, with the chairman of the BBC Trust, the head of ITV and a number of other people when I'd just become Secretary of State. Q. Do you believe that the BSkyB bid was discussed on that occasion? A. I would be very surprised if it wasn't discussed, 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 had a few coffees with him in my time in opposition, as I would have met representatives from all media companies when I was Shadow Culture Secretary. I got to know him a little bit better because of the fact that that year we both had children born coincidentally in the same hospital on pretty much the same night, and by chance we bumped into each other in the maternity ward, but our families never socialised together, we never socialised together. Q. Thank you. If I can move forward now in time to October, we know that on 7 October 2010 this is page 07905, in the second of the supplementary bundles, under tab SS.Aa. A. Which bundle is this, Mr Jay? Q. Second supplementary bundle. A. If I don't need to see it, I'm happy to carry on. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'd prefer that you had these documents in front of you, if you don't mind. A. Right, I have supplementary folder 2. I think that's probably the one. That's it. MR JAY: If it's tabbed in the same way, you'll find a tab SS.Aa. It's the first document under that tab, 07905.

3 (Pages 9 to 12)

1	A Dight Loon soo it	1	account that I use is my personal one.
1 2	A. Right, I can see it.Q. We can see that you were sent in fact to know exactly	$\begin{vmatrix} 1\\2 \end{vmatrix}$	Q. So most of the contact we have, perhaps all of it, from
2 3	what you were sent we have to turn over the page, but	$\begin{vmatrix} 2\\ 3 \end{vmatrix}$	Mr Smith by email is obviously to your personal email
4	I'm sure you would accept what I say about this	4	account; is that the correct position?
5	a briefing document, which was addressed to you, which	5	A. That's correct.
6	relates, I think, to the plurality aspects of the bid.	6	Q. There are also some text messages at about this time
7	We know it was sent by Mr Michel to Mr Smith, and then	7	which are relevant, Mr Hunt. If you go to the section
8	Mr Smith forwarded it to you. That's demonstrated by		of this same file called TT, and look at 08147.
9	07905.	9	A. Yes.
10	Mr Smith's observation was:	10	Q. And we start, please, with the message timed at 19.25 on
11	"Obviously strictly commercially confidential but	11	2 November 2010. This is from Mr Michel to you:
12	very interesting."	12	"Just sent Adam our digital numbers."
12	And your comment appears to be:	12	Can you assist us as to what that might relate?
13	"Very powerful actually."	13	A. This is on 2 November?
15	So it follows that plainly you considered this	15	Q. It is, yes.
16	document and were expressing a positive view about it.	16	A. Yes. I don't think I can, actually. I'm not sure what
17	Is that fair?	17	their digital numbers would have been.
18	A. Yes. I think the document confirmed the view that	18	Q. Okay. On 9 November, the message is:
19	I already had that I didn't think there was a major	19	"Can you meet James tomorrow morning for a catch-up?
20	plurality issue with this acquisition.	20	Would be good. Even early morning."
21	Q. Did you know at the time that Mr Smith had obtained this	21	And then there's an email which relates to the
22	from Mr Michel?	22	organisation of it, but on 12 November at 19.25, FM to
23	A. I knew that he'd obtained it from News Corp. I don't	23	JH:
24	know if I knew that it had come from Mr Michel.	24	"James and I will see you Monday at 6.45."
25	Q. Did you deduce that he probably obtained it from	25	And you text back immediately:
	Page 13		Page 15
1	Mr. Michal?	1	"Creat "
1	Mr Michel?	1	"Great."
2	A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have	2	A. Yes.
2 3	A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person	2 3	A. Yes.Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe.
2 3 4	A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison	2 3 4	A. Yes.Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe.You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and
2 3 4 5	A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so	2 3 4 5	A. Yes.Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe.You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which
2 3 4 5 6	A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different	2 3 4 5 6	A. Yes.Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've
2 3 4 5 6 7	A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me.	2 3 4 5 6 7	A. Yes.Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. Q. Did anyone other than Mr Smith know that you'd received 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct number first time. It's in two places in our files,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. Q. Did anyone other than Mr Smith know that you'd received this? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct number first time. It's in two places in our files, I gave the incorrect one. 04248.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. Q. Did anyone other than Mr Smith know that you'd received this? A. I don't believe so. Nor do I believe I would have made 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct number first time. It's in two places in our files, I gave the incorrect one. 04248. A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. Q. Did anyone other than Mr Smith know that you'd received this? A. I don't believe so. Nor do I believe I would have made a secret of it. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct number first time. It's in two places in our files, I gave the incorrect one. 04248. A. Yes. Q. It's directed to you personally. We know it's dated
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. Q. Did anyone other than Mr Smith know that you'd received this? A. I don't believe so. Nor do I believe I would have made 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct number first time. It's in two places in our files, I gave the incorrect one. 04248. A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. Q. Did anyone other than Mr Smith know that you'd received this? A. I don't believe so. Nor do I believe I would have made a secret of it. Q. We know from other material that it went to your 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct number first time. It's in two places in our files, I gave the incorrect one. 04248. A. Yes. Q. It's directed to you personally. We know it's dated 12 November. You wanted to know what powers you had in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. Q. Did anyone other than Mr Smith know that you'd received this? A. I don't believe so. Nor do I believe I would have made a secret of it. Q. We know from other material that it went to your personal email account. Is anything to be inferred from 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct number first time. It's in two places in our files, I gave the incorrect one. 04248. A. Yes. Q. It's directed to you personally. We know it's dated 12 November. You wanted to know what powers you had in relation to media mergers generally. The recommendation
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. Q. Did anyone other than Mr Smith know that you'd received this? A. I don't believe so. Nor do I believe I would have made a secret of it. Q. We know from other material that it went to your personal email account. Is anything to be inferred from that? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct number first time. It's in two places in our files, I gave the incorrect one. 04248. A. Yes. Q. It's directed to you personally. We know it's dated 12 November. You wanted to know what powers you had in relation to media mergers generally. The recommendation is:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. Q. Did anyone other than Mr Smith know that you'd received this? A. I don't believe so. Nor do I believe I would have made a secret of it. Q. We know from other material that it went to your personal email account. Is anything to be inferred from that? A. No, that is the only email account I use. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct number first time. It's in two places in our files, I gave the incorrect one. 04248. A. Yes. Q. It's directed to you personally. We know it's dated 12 November. You wanted to know what powers you had in relation to media mergers generally. The recommendation is: "There is no role in the process for the DCMS so we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. Q. Did anyone other than Mr Smith know that you'd received this? A. I don't believe so. Nor do I believe I would have made a secret of it. Q. We know from other material that it went to your personal email account. Is anything to be inferred from that? A. No, that is the only email account within the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct number first time. It's in two places in our files, I gave the incorrect one. 04248. A. Yes. Q. It's directed to you personally. We know it's dated 12 November. You wanted to know what powers you had in relation to media mergers generally. The recommendation is: "There is no role in the process for the DCMS so we would recommend that you do not have any external
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. Q. Did anyone other than Mr Smith know that you'd received this? A. I don't believe so. Nor do I believe I would have made a secret of it. Q. We know from other material that it went to your personal email account. Is anything to be inferred from that? A. No, that is the only email account I use. Q. So you don't have an email account within the department; is that correct? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct number first time. It's in two places in our files, I gave the incorrect one. 04248. A. Yes. Q. It's directed to you personally. We know it's dated 12 November. You wanted to know what powers you had in relation to media mergers generally. The recommendation is: "There is no role in the process for the DCMS so we would recommend that you do not have any external discussions on the BSkyB media merger nor write to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 A. I would think that would be an intelligent guess to have made, if I'd been interested in who the precise person was. I mean, his role part of his role was liaison with external interest groups and stakeholders, and so he would have sourced information from lots of different people, but it wouldn't have been a surprise to me. Q. But from within News Corporation, the main point of contact from Mr Smith's perspective was Mr Michel, so it's not a massive deduction, is it, to state that the source must have been Mr Michel? A. I agree. It's not a massive deduction. Q. Did anyone other than Mr Smith know that you'd received this? A. I don't believe so. Nor do I believe I would have made a secret of it. Q. We know from other material that it went to your personal email account. Is anything to be inferred from that? A. No, that is the only email account I use. Q. So you don't have an email account within the department; is that correct? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 A. Yes. Q. So this is going to be Monday, 15 November, I believe. You then got some legal advice on 12 November, and that's to be found in the main file of documents, which is the primary evidence under tab 3, page 04248. We've seen this before in another place with Mr Stephens. He's also exhibited it. If you go to tab 3, I hope you'll be able to turn up this advice. It's dated 12 November. A. Could you give me the page number again? Q. Yes, 13573 no, 04248. Sorry, I gave the correct number first time. It's in two places in our files, I gave the incorrect one. 04248. A. Yes. Q. It's directed to you personally. We know it's dated 12 November. You wanted to know what powers you had in relation to media mergers generally. The recommendation is: "There is no role in the process for the DCMS so we would recommend that you do not have any external discussions on the BSkyB media merger nor write to Secretary of State BIS about it. If you want to

4 (Pages 13 to 16)

1	risks."	1	with me that Vince Cable had refused to have with them,
2	The reason being, in the middle of the page:	2	and that therefore to have that meeting would be to
3	"Secretary of State BIS is performing	3	create a parallel process where another government
4	a quasi-judicial role as the statutory decision-maker."	4	department is getting involved in the process in a way
5	So the advice was twofold, first of all not to have	5	that might not be seen to be appropriate.
6	any external discussions. Did you interpret that as not	6	Q. But wasn't the logic exactly the same, that the reason
7	to have discussions with someone like Mr Murdoch about	7	why Dr Cable shouldn't be meeting with people like
8	the bid?	8	Mr Murdoch would be exactly the same reason why you
9	A. The advice I was asking was what was my locus to express	9	should not be meeting people like Mr Murdoch, if I can
10	an opinion that might be taken into consideration by	10	put it in those terms. Do you accept that?
11	Dr Cable in making his quasi-judicial decision, and the	11	A. No. First of all, I don't know and I didn't know
12	advice I got was that essentially I didn't have a locus	12	whether Dr Cable was being advised whether or not he
13	of intervention and I shouldn't intervene, so	13	should meet Mr Murdoch. That would obviously be his
14	I interpreted that advice to mean that I shouldn't have	14	judgment and his legal advice. My perspective as
15	any contact with anyone if that was part of a process	15	Secretary of State responsible for the media sector was
16	that was going to be making an intervention with	16	that I thought I had an absolute duty to be across the
17	Dr Cable, because that might threaten the judicial	17	most important issue in that industry.
18	robustness of Dr Cable's solution.	18	Q. You asked for the matter to be further considered, if
19	I didn't interpret it to mean that I couldn't be in	19	I can put it in these terms, at 04250, which is the next
20	touch with people in the industry that I was responsible	20	page:
21	for and understand the issues around a merger that was	21	"SoS has noted the advice and asked to see the
22	the biggest merger the media industry had ever seen and	22	results of Jonathan's request to the legal advisers as
23	on which thousands of jobs depended. In fact, I thought	23	soon as possible."
24	it was my duty to understand the issues around that	24	The legal advice came on 19 November. We've seen it
25	merger and to be well across them.	25	before with Mr Stephens. It starts at 04254, and the
	Page 17		Page 19
1	Q. We'll come back to that second point fairly shortly. If	1	conclusion at 04256 at paragraph 16 was:
2	you look at the second page of this note, 04249, you'll	2	"Whilst there is nothing legally which precludes the
3	see that legal advisers have cleared the note and it was	3	Secretary of State CMS from making representations to
4	copied to the Minister of State and to the Permanent	4	the Secretary of State BIS to inform the latter's
5	Secretary. It was also copied to the special advisers.	5	decision as to whether to refer the public interest
6	Did you discuss its content with Mr Smith, do you think?	6	considerations in this merger to the Competition
7	A. I don't recall a conversation, but it's quite possible.	7	Commission, it would be unwise to do so."
8	Q. Did you indicate to him your frustration, if you had it,	8	Did you accept that advice?
9	about the content of this note?	9	A. Yes. I don't know if I saw this longer version of the
10	A. I think I had a concern about the situation where we had	10	advice or not, but I did accept it.
11	this very important, very significant merger in my	11	Q. On 7
12	sector where, as I had said, I didn't think there was	12	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just before you go on to the 7th,
13	a particular problem with it but the organisation	13	that advice contains within it a description of this
14	concerned said that they did feel that they were	14	concept of quasi-judicial decision:
15	encountering a number of obstacles, and so I wanted to	15	"By this, we mean a decision which is not driven by
16	be absolutely proper about the way I approached this	16	policy concerns, and has to be taken on the facts before
17	because I recognised that it was another department's	17	the decision maker. It is not a Cabinet decision, and
18	decision.	18	no collective Cabinet responsibility applies.
19	This was probably the first time that I heard the	19	Similarly, a decision on a planning application, or an
20	phrase quasi-judicial or had some kind of exposure to	20	application for a harbour revision order will be
21	what the implications of quasi-judicial meant, and we	21	characterised as quasi-judicial decisions."
22	had a meeting in the diary initially and I decided to	22	Did you have that understanding by this stage of the
		102	exercise that Dr Cable was involved in?
23	cancel that meeting not because I thought it was wrong	23	
23 24	to have contact with News Corporation, but because	24	A. I don't think I did. I don't actually recall seeing
23			

1	- defect the transferral are 12 Norman har Oberiansky Little	1	
1	advice that I received on 12 November. Obviously I did	$\begin{vmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$	" not to meet him today as it would be
2	become extremely familiar with what quasi-judicial	2	counter-productive for everyone, but you could have
3	meant.	3	a chat with him on his mobile which is completely fine,
4	MR JAY: The email which the legal director sent on	4	and I will liaise with his team privately as well."
5	7 December at 04257 says:	5	We know that there was a telephone call between you
6	"Thanks, I appreciate that the advice is not what JS	6	and Mr Murdoch that day. Was it by mobile phone?
7	[that's obviously the Permanent Secretary] and possibly	7	A. I believe it was, yes.
8	JH wanted to hear."	8	Q. Was it your view that that was appropriate?
9	Is that a correct deduction?	9	A. Yes. As I mentioned earlier, it was always made clear
10	A. I think it probably is a correct deduction in terms of	10	to me by my officials that it was entirely appropriate
11	myself. I don't know about the Permanent Secretary.	11	and proper to have contact with stakeholders at which
12	Q. The next stage is what happened on 15 November in	12	officials were present and minutes were taken, and
13	relation to the meeting which had been organised with	13	contact at which officials weren't present and minutes
14	Mr Murdoch. You have referred to it, but we have	14	weren't taken, that was at my discretion, and so I felt
15	separate evidence of it in the file KRM 18, which	15	in this situation I didn't want to get involved in the
16	contains, as you know, various emails largely from	16	quasi-judicial process and I thought that was the
17	Mr Michel back up to his superiors. It's page PROP and	17	intention of the meeting that News Corp wanted, but
18	then the last five numbers are 01667.	18	I thought it was entirely appropriate to hear what a big
19	A. Yes.	19	player in my industry was saying about a particular
20	Q. It's Mr Michel to Mr Murdoch:	20	situation. Indeed, I thought that was my duty to do so.
21	"Jeremy tried to call you. He has received very	21	I should perhaps say sort of in parentheses, if
22	strong legal advice not to meet us today as the current	22	I may, Mr Jay, that I think having been through the
23	process is treated as a judicial one (not a policy one)	23	BSkyB bid and the process that I've been through,
24	and any meeting could be referred to and jeopardise the	24	I would take a different view about the presence of
25	entire process."	25	officials in conversations that a Culture Secretary has
	Page 21		Page 23
1	Is that an accurate statement of what Mr Michel was	1	with media proprietors. I just wanted to be efficient
2	told by someone?	2	and I thought it was really a question of whether you
3	A. I don't believe I spoke to Mr Michel, so I couldn't tell	3	wanted someone present to take minutes, but given the
4	you if it was an accurate statement or not.	4	massive number of conspiracy theories that abound,
5	Q. I think the evidence was that it was Mr Smith who spoke	5	I think actually going forward I would always want to
6	to Mr Michel on this occasion, but it's whether Mr Smith	6	have officials present and taking notes.
7	has correctly understood what the very strong legal	7	Q. If a meeting is inappropriate, as this might tend to
8	advice was, which was that the meeting in effect had to	8	suggest, why is a telephone call appropriate?
9	be called off because this was a judicial process, as he	9	A. Well, I didn't see the telephone call as a replacement
10	puts it. Is that broadly speaking correct in your view?	10	for the meeting. My interpretation of the advice was
11	A. It may well have been the case that Mr Smith had seen	11	that I should not involve myself in a quasi-judicial
12	the advice that I'd received on 12 November and we had	12	process that's being run by another Secretary of State,
13	decided well, we did decide that the meeting	13	and that that was the purpose of the meeting that was
14	shouldn't go ahead, so it's possible that there was	14	requested by News Corp and that's why that wasn't
15	a discussion between Mr Michel and Mr Smith, but that's	15	appropriate. But I think it would have been perfectly
16	obviously something that they would have to say whether	16	appropriate to have had a meeting with News Corp with
17		17	officials present taking notes setting out the ground
		11	
	it happened or not.	18	rules Vou know "Jeremy Hunt cannot involve himself in
18 19	Q. Is Mr Smith correct when he says that you're very	18 19	rules. You know, "Jeremy Hunt cannot involve himself in Vince Cable's media plurality decision and we can't
19	Q. Is Mr Smith correct when he says that you're very frustrated about it?	19	Vince Cable's media plurality decision and we can't
19 20	Q. Is Mr Smith correct when he says that you're very frustrated about it?A. I may have been frustrated. I was worried about a bid	19 20	Vince Cable's media plurality decision and we can't discuss the rights and wrongs of that, but he's
19 20 21	 Q. Is Mr Smith correct when he says that you're very frustrated about it? A. I may have been frustrated. I was worried about a bid in my sector that could potentially mean that thousands 	19 20 21	Vince Cable's media plurality decision and we can't discuss the rights and wrongs of that, but he's Secretary of State for the media so he can hear if
19 20 21 22	 Q. Is Mr Smith correct when he says that you're very frustrated about it? A. I may have been frustrated. I was worried about a bid in my sector that could potentially mean that thousands more jobs would be created, and the main protagonist was 	19 20 21 22	Vince Cable's media plurality decision and we can't discuss the rights and wrongs of that, but he's Secretary of State for the media so he can hear if you've got other concerns or concerns about process or
19 20 21 22 23	 Q. Is Mr Smith correct when he says that you're very frustrated about it? A. I may have been frustrated. I was worried about a bid in my sector that could potentially mean that thousands more jobs would be created, and the main protagonist was concerned about the process they were having to go 	19 20 21 22 23	Vince Cable's media plurality decision and we can't discuss the rights and wrongs of that, but he's Secretary of State for the media so he can hear if you've got other concerns or concerns about process or anything else you want to express, he can hear them, but
19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. Is Mr Smith correct when he says that you're very frustrated about it? A. I may have been frustrated. I was worried about a bid in my sector that could potentially mean that thousands more jobs would be created, and the main protagonist was concerned about the process they were having to go through, so I may well have been worried. 	 19 20 21 22 23 24 	Vince Cable's media plurality decision and we can't discuss the rights and wrongs of that, but he's Secretary of State for the media so he can hear if you've got other concerns or concerns about process or anything else you want to express, he can hear them, but he can't involve himself or make representations with
19 20 21 22 23	 Q. Is Mr Smith correct when he says that you're very frustrated about it? A. I may have been frustrated. I was worried about a bid in my sector that could potentially mean that thousands more jobs would be created, and the main protagonist was concerned about the process they were having to go 	19 20 21 22 23	Vince Cable's media plurality decision and we can't discuss the rights and wrongs of that, but he's Secretary of State for the media so he can hear if you've got other concerns or concerns about process or anything else you want to express, he can hear them, but

6 (Pages 21 to 24)

1	Q. But what was discussed on the phone, then, Mr Hunt?	1	your point of contact with News Corporation, is that
2	A. I just heard Mr Murdoch out, and basically heard what he	2	fair?
3	had to say about what was on his mind at that time.	3	A. It's fair, but Mr Smith was my point of contact with
4	Q. But what you heard on the phone is exactly the same	4	pretty much every external state holder during my period
5	thing as you would have heard had there been	5	in both opposition and as Culture Secretary.
6	a face-to-face meeting, isn't that right?	6	Q. You also knew that News Corp would be intending to send
7	A. Well, it depends, because I think, as I say, if he had	7	you, in their words, "helpful arguments", didn't you?
8	wanted to have a face-to-face meeting in which he	8	A. Well, I suppose it's rather like Mr Smith said in his
9	expressed the arguments as to why he believed that there	9	evidence: if someone offers you to send something
10	was no media plurality decision, that was something to	10	send you something, you acknowledge it, but I don't
11	be decided by Dr Cable, and I think if we'd had	11	believe I'd have asked for it.
12	a face-to-face meeting, we'd have said, "Look, this is	12	Q. Okay. We move forward a few days to a private
13	something that's being considered quasi-judicially by	13	memorandum which went through a couple of drafts. It's
14	another Secretary of State and we can't involve	14	in this self-same file, the second supplementary bundle,
15	ourselves in that".	15	SS.Aa. The first draft, I think, is you can confirm
16	Q. Did you say that to Mr Murdoch during the course of the	16	this 07909. This is an email you send to Mr Smith
17	call, do you think?	17	timed at 13.14 hours on 19 November 2010.
18	A. I think it's likely that we explained it, because we	18	First of all, so we know where we are with this,
19	were you know, we'd cancelled the meeting, which we	19	Mr Hunt, if you go forward a couple of pages I think we
20	know from some of his evidence that he used some quite	20	see the second draft and then the final version is the
21	colourful language to express his frustration about.	21	same as the second draft but slightly differently
22	Q. The only evidence we have as to what was discussed is in	22	formatted. Is that a correct deduction I've made, first
23	the file of text messages, which is supplementary bundle	23	of all?
24	volume 2, tab TT, 01847. A text timed at 15.49 on	24	A. I think so, probably, yes.
25	16 November. Mr Michel to you. Do you see that one?	25	Q. Can we be clear about the first draft, which is 07909.
	Page 25		Page 27
1	A Ves	1	Is that something you drafted which you asked Mr Smith
1	A. Yes.	1	Is that something you drafted, which you asked Mr Smith to look at or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for
2	Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly	2	to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for
2 3	Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can	2 3	to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you?
2 3 4	Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred."	2 3 4	to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you?A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so
2 3 4 5	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: 	2 3 4 5	to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you?A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this.
2 3 4 5 6	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." 	2 3 4 5 6	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it
2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? 	2 3 4 5 6 7	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom."
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? A. Well, I wouldn't have given him any reassurance about 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct. Q. "He doesn't think he will get a fair hearing from Ofcom."
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? A. Well, I wouldn't have given him any reassurance about the media plurality decision that Vince Cable was taking 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct. Q. "He doesn't think he will get a fair hearing from Ofcom. I am privately concerned about this because News Corp
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? A. Well, I wouldn't have given him any reassurance about the media plurality decision that Vince Cable was taking because that was not my that was not anything I could 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct. Q. "He doesn't think he will get a fair hearing from Ofcom. I am privately concerned about this because News Corp are very litigious and we could end in the wrong place
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? A. Well, I wouldn't have given him any reassurance about the media plurality decision that Vince Cable was taking because that was not my that was not anything I could get involved with, and I would have made that clear to 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct. Q. "He doesn't think he will get a fair hearing from Ofcom. I am privately concerned about this because News Corp are very litigious and we could end in the wrong place not just politically but also in terms of media policy."
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? A. Well, I wouldn't have given him any reassurance about the media plurality decision that Vince Cable was taking because that was not my that was not anything I could get involved with, and I would have made that clear to him, so I probably gave him a sympathetic hearing, but 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct. Q. "He doesn't think he will get a fair hearing from Ofcom. I am privately concerned about this because News Corp are very litigious and we could end in the wrong place not just politically but also in terms of media policy." What did you mean by "the wrong place not just
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? A. Well, I wouldn't have given him any reassurance about the media plurality decision that Vince Cable was taking because that was not my that was not anything I could get involved with, and I would have made that clear to him, so I probably gave him a sympathetic hearing, but I wouldn't have said that I can get involved in that 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct. Q. "He doesn't think he will get a fair hearing from Ofcom. I am privately concerned about this because News Corp are very litigious and we could end in the wrong place not just politically but also in terms of media policy." What did you mean by "the wrong place not just politically"?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? A. Well, I wouldn't have given him any reassurance about the media plurality decision that Vince Cable was taking because that was not my that was not anything I could get involved with, and I would have made that clear to him, so I probably gave him a sympathetic hearing, but I wouldn't have said that I can get involved in that decision because I had taken and accepted the advice 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct. Q. "He doesn't think he will get a fair hearing from Ofcom. I am privately concerned about this because News Corp are very litigious and we could end in the wrong place not just politically but also in terms of media policy." What did you mean by "the wrong place not just politically"? A. Well, I think I took that phrase out of the final draft,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? A. Well, I wouldn't have given him any reassurance about the media plurality decision that Vince Cable was taking because that was not my that was not anything I could get involved with, and I would have made that clear to him, so I probably gave him a sympathetic hearing, but I wouldn't have said that I can get involved in that decision because I had taken and accepted the advice that I couldn't. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct. Q. "He doesn't think he will get a fair hearing from Ofcom. I am privately concerned about this because News Corp are very litigious and we could end in the wrong place not just politically but also in terms of media policy." What did you mean by "the wrong place not just politically"? A. Well, I think I took that phrase out of the final draft, so the first point I'd make is that that wasn't my
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? A. Well, I wouldn't have given him any reassurance about the media plurality decision that Vince Cable was taking because that was not my that was not anything I could get involved with, and I would have made that clear to him, so I probably gave him a sympathetic hearing, but I wouldn't have said that I can get involved in that decision because I had taken and accepted the advice that I couldn't. Q. The third sentence of the text: 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct. Q. "He doesn't think he will get a fair hearing from Ofcom. I am privately concerned about this because News Corp are very litigious and we could end in the wrong place not just politically but also in terms of media policy." What did you mean by "the wrong place not just politically "? A. Well, I think I took that phrase out of the final draft, so the first point I'd make is that that wasn't my primary concern. But I would imagine that I was saying
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? A. Well, I wouldn't have given him any reassurance about the media plurality decision that Vince Cable was taking because that was not my that was not anything I could get involved with, and I would have made that clear to him, so I probably gave him a sympathetic hearing, but I wouldn't have said that I can get involved in that decision because I had taken and accepted the advice that I couldn't. Q. The third sentence of the text: "Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct. Q. "He doesn't think he will get a fair hearing from Ofcom. I am privately concerned about this because News Corp are very litigious and we could end in the wrong place not just politically but also in terms of media policy." What did you mean by "the wrong place not just politically"? A. Well, I think I took that phrase out of the final draft, so the first point I'd make is that that wasn't my primary concern. But I would imagine that I was saying that, you know, we're a party that believes in the free
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? A. Well, I wouldn't have given him any reassurance about the media plurality decision that Vince Cable was taking because that was not my that was not anything I could get involved with, and I would have made that clear to him, so I probably gave him a sympathetic hearing, but I wouldn't have said that I can get involved in that decision because I had taken and accepted the advice that I couldn't. Q. The third sentence of the text: "Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments." 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct. Q. "He doesn't think he will get a fair hearing from Ofcom. I am privately concerned about this because News Corp are very litigious and we could end in the wrong place not just politically but also in terms of media policy." What did you mean by "the wrong place not just politically"? A. Well, I think I took that phrase out of the final draft, so the first point I'd make is that that wasn't my primary concern. But I would imagine that I was saying that, you know, we're a party that believes in the free market, in supporting enterprising companies, in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q. "Thanks for the call with James today, greatly appreciated. Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you helpful arguments. Warm regards, Fred." And your reply almost immediately is: "Pleasure." We can see that? A. Yes. Q. So it's reasonable to suppose that the call was successful to the extent that some reassurance was given by you to Mr Murdoch insofar as you could give it. Is that fair? A. Well, I wouldn't have given him any reassurance about the media plurality decision that Vince Cable was taking because that was not my that was not anything I could get involved with, and I would have made that clear to him, so I probably gave him a sympathetic hearing, but I wouldn't have said that I can get involved in that decision because I had taken and accepted the advice that I couldn't. Q. The third sentence of the text: "Will work with Adam to make sure we can send you 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 to look at, or is it a first draft Mr Smith prepared for you? A. I generally draft my own notes to the Prime Minister, so I would imagine that I drafted this. Q. You asked him to check it for typos and to format it nicely, but we'll see what if anything happened to it: "James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince's referral to Ofcom." That's what you learnt on 16 November during that phone call; is that right? A. Correct. Q. "He doesn't think he will get a fair hearing from Ofcom. I am privately concerned about this because News Corp are very litigious and we could end in the wrong place not just politically but also in terms of media policy." What did you mean by "the wrong place not just politically"? A. Well, I think I took that phrase out of the final draft, so the first point I'd make is that that wasn't my primary concern. But I would imagine that I was saying that, you know, we're a party that believes in the free

1	take risks, and I think that I felt that the approach	1	So you were seeking a high level policy meeting to
2	the government was taking felt inconsistent with that.	2	discuss wider media policy considerations, weren't you?
3	Q. Wasn't there also a question, though, that you would be	3	A. What I felt was that there was a very big issue that was
4	in confrontation, or might be, with News Corp, which	4	going to affect an industry sector that I was
5	could place the Conservative Party at least in the wrong	5	responsible for, a very important industry sector, and
6	place politically? Was that not an aspect of this?	6	I thought that it would be appropriate to have a meeting
7	A. I don't believe so. I didn't give it a huge amount of	7	to discuss policy and not the quasi-judicial decision
8	thought, but I think that on a situation like this, you	8	that Vince Cable was taking.
9	know, the politics actually in the sense that you're	9	I do now understand a lot more about quasi-judicial
10	talking about are actually very complex, because you had	10	positions, it's probably pretty much engraved on my
11	one Conservative-supporting newspaper group that was	11	brain because we've been thinking about it so hard, and
12	very strongly in favour of the bid and you had two	12	I think that I now realise that it would not have
13	Conservative-supporting newspaper groups that were very	13	been possible for Vince Cable to attend such a meeting
14	strongly against the bid. I'm not sure I don't think	14	and he would have been advised not to attend such
15	there's any political win in any possible outcome, as	15	a meeting.
16	far as a Conservative-led government is concerned.	16	Q. When we come to the second draft, 07911, which appears
17	Q. In terms of the media policy, which you then go on to	17	to be timed at 16.18, may I understand what had
18	explain in this, it would be fair to say that you were	18	occurred. Was it Mr Smith who had reworked it or was it
19	favouring the bid; is that correct?	19	you who had had second thoughts and sent a second draft?
20	A. As you can tell from the note, I could see I mean, my	20	A. I don't know, but I would imagine possibly either.
21	perspective on the media industry is that I am a very,	21	I may well have had a conversation with Mr Smith in that
22	very passionate supporter in having a free and vibrant	22	time.
23	press, and I actually think we have one of the freest	23	Q. There isn't a third possibility, but you're not sure
24	and most vibrant media industries and press in the	24	whether it was Mr Smith's hand which we see here in
25	world, and I think it's very good for our democracy, and	25	terms of the amendments or whether it was your further
	Page 29		Page 31
1	I had a concern and I have a concern, actually, that the	1	cogitations; is that right?
2	model of the newspaper industry is not financially	2	A. Well, I think
3	viable in the long term because of technology changes,	3	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It is an email from Mr Hunt to
4	and because of that I saw this bid and the potential of	4	Mr Smith.
5	this bid as an opportunity to help modernise the	5	A. Yes, I think it is, so I imagine it's me having
6	industry so that it could carry on playing that sort of	6	rethought it, is the answer, because he then replies at
7	free and vibrant role.	7	16.30:
8	Q. So for all the reasons you've given, you were supportive	8	"Much happier with this version."
9	of the bid; is that correct?	9	I think that probably suggests that I made the
10	A. I was sympathetic of the bid. The reason I hesitate	10	changes.
11	slightly on the word "supportive", because I wasn't	11	MR JAY: The changes you made, you removed the reference to
12	you know, apart from informing the Prime Minister of my	12	"not just politically", you shortened it. Arguably you
13	views, I wasn't actually going out and doing anything	13	beefed up the second paragraph where you say:
14	about it.	14	" I think it would be totally wrong to cave in to
15	Q. We can see from the last paragraph:	15	the" coalition, I paraphrase, as this "represents
16	"What next? Ofcom will issue their report saying	16	a substantial change of control given that we all know
17	whether it needs to go to the Competition Commission by	17	Sky is controlled by News Corp now anyway."
18	31 December. Much of what we do will be constrained by	18	That statement of opinion is a clear opinion, isn't
19	the absolute necessity to respect due process at every	19	it, in favour of the bid, would you agree?
20	stage."	20	A. Yes, I'm expressing my view, but I'm also recognising,
21	So you'd fully taken on board the note of	21	because I talk about due process, that this is not
22	12 November, where that point was made. Then you say:	22	a decision for either me or for the Prime Minister.
23	"But I think that you, I, Vince and the DPM should	23	Q. The final paragraph is slightly changed. It's no longer
24	meet to discuss our response to potential different	24	respecting due process, the language is "has to be
		1	
25	scenarios. May I arrange such a meeting?"	25	decided at arm's length", but the sense is fairly

8 (Pages 29 to 32)

		1	
1	similar, isn't it?	1	together what might have happened that day, but because
2	A. Yes.	2	I sent him a text that said "Sorry to miss ur call", I'm
3	Q. So you believed that this memorandum was probably the	3	presuming that he tried to call me and I had a missed
4	subject of private discussion between you and Mr Smith,	4	call on my mobile and so I sent him a text back. I may
5	is that correct?	5	have tried to call him back and not got a response and
6	A. Yes.	6	sent him a text back.
7	Q. So Mr Smith self-evidently knew your view on this	7	Q. We certainly know that by 12.57, a few minutes later,
8	critical issue, didn't he?	8	you were aware that DG in Brussels had, as it were,
9	A. Yes.	9	allowed the competition aspect of the bid to go through,
10	Q. We know from one document I didn't take Mr Smith to,	10	because you send a text message to Mr Murdoch:
11	it's in his diary, at 09203, that on 6 December it	11	"Great and congrats on Brussels, just Ofcom to go!"
12	appears that he had a meeting with Mr Michel in the	12	A. Yes.
12	SpAds' room, which is room 202. First of all, are you	12	Q. Would you agree that that is conveying a somewhat
13	able to assist us, is that the SpAds' room?	13	positive view on where the process had reached?
14	A. The SpAds' room I know, but I don't know what number it	14	A. Yes.
16	is.	15	Q. But you think at that point you were unaware of the
17		17	Dr Cable furore, if I can so describe it?
17	Q. Did you know at the time that Mr Smith and Mr Michel had met at DCMS?		
		18	A. I think we could probably find out as a matter of fact when the furore broke, but as I say, I don't believe it
19 20	A. I don't think so.	19	when the furore broke, but as I say, I don't believe it broke until the afternoon.
20	Q. You don't think so or you're sure?	20	······
21	A. Well, you're asking me did I know at the time. I have	21	Q. The best evidence we have as to the timing, but it's not
22	no recollection of being told the meeting happened.	22	conclusive, if you turn back through the bundle at tab
23	Mr Smith wouldn't tell me, as a matter of course, who he	23	SS.B, it's going to be page 08089.
24	was meeting. I mean, he met lots of people from	24	A. Yes.
25	different industry sectors.	25	Q. Your other special adviser, Sue Beeby, sends you an
	Page 33	<u> </u>	Page 35
1	Q. You were aware generally what Mr Smith was doing on your	1	emailed timed at 15.50 on 21 December.
2	behalf at this time, weren't you?	2	A. Yes.
3	A. Mr Smith's job was to be a contact point with all	3	Q. Setting out what she describes as Vince's comments. I'm
4	outside industry stakeholders, so he spent a lot of time	4	not sure whether this is the full transcript, it doesn't
5	talking to people from many different companies.	5	really matter. So certainly at the latest by 15.50 and
6	Q. Okay. I move forward then to 21 December 2010 and some	6	possibly earlier you got to hear about the furore; is
7	text messages, first of all. If you go to the TT part	7	that correct?
8	of this file, please, Mr Hunt, it's page 08155. We need	8	A. Yes. I don't know when I opened that email, but I would
9	to go through this quite carefully.	9	imagine I usually do open my emails fairly promptly.
10	We can see that at 12.46 in the afternoon on that	10	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: The probability is you'd heard
11	day you sent a text to Mr James Murdoch:	11	slightly earlier, because her email to you is:
12	"Sorry to miss ur call. Am on my mobile now	12	"Here are Vince's comments."
13	Jeremy."	13	So this isn't telling you actually something quite
14	Mr James Murdoch, six minutes later, texts you back:	14	odd has happened you ought to know about, so it may be
15	"Have to run into next thing. Are you free anything	15	you'd had some sort of conversation.
16	after two fifteen? I can shuffle after this."	16	A. I think that's likely, yes.
17	And then you fix on a time at about 4 pm. So first	17	MR JAY: At about 4 pm, I think it was shortly after but
18	of all, by 12.46, were you aware of if I can put it	18	we'll see from other evidence the exact time, you had
19	in these terms the remarks which Dr Cable was	19	a conversation with Mr Murdoch. Do you remember what
20	recorded as having made on 3 December?	20	was discussed?
21	A. I don't believe I was, because I think those remarks	21	A. Yes. We discussed Vince's comments. So I did know at
21	broke in the early afternoon.	22	that stage.
22	Q. So the purpose of the call then, if it wasn't related to	23	Q. The next relevant document is 08107, which is under tab
23	those remarks, was related to what?	23	SS.E, which is a not sure whether it's an email or
25	A. Well, I don't think that I I'm trying to piece	25	a text. Probably an email, Mr Hunt.
25	in the second se	1-2	a control i robuory un oniun, ter riunt.
	Page 34	1	Page 36

9 (Pages 33 to 36)

1	A. Probably an email because it says Gmail at the top.	1	this stage?
2	Q. Sorry, you're right. 16.10, so it's after the call you	2	A. No.
3	had with Mr Murdoch on this afternoon, 21 December, to	3	Q. At 16.58, Mr Osborne texts you:
4	Mr Coulson:	4	"I hope you like the solution!"
5	"Could we chat about this? Am seriously worried	5	What was that a reference to?
6	Vince will do real damage to coalition with his	6	A. Well, I think his well, first of all I think my text
7	comments"	7	to him was saying basically I'm worried this process
8	That speaks for itself, but the question is did you	8	doesn't look like it's being run fairly, and his
9	have a chat with Mr Coulson?	9	response was saying, "Well, we've got a solution", and
	A. I don't think I did talk to him, no.	10	I think in between me sending a text to him and me
	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm sorry, could we just go back so	11	getting that response, at official level we had an
12	that I understand. You chatted to Mr Murdoch at	12	inkling that Number 10 were thinking of transferring the
13	4 o'clock. What was that conversation?	13	responsibility to me as a way of dealing with the issue.
	A. That was Mr Murdoch expressing his concern that there	14	Q. Yes. But you were the solution, and that's what you
15	was bias in the process, the quasi-judicial process,	15	were being told at 16.58; is that correct?
16	because of what Dr Cable had said, and I think my email	16	A. Correct.
17	to Andy Coulson and text message to George Osborne were	17	Q. Can I be clear, though, that when Mr Osborne says,
18	my response to Mr Murdoch's call.	18	"I hope you like the solution!", does that mean that you
	MR JAY: Yes.	19	already knew what the solution was or was this the
	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Do you remember what you said to	20	revelation of the solution?
21	Mr Murdoch in response?	21	A. Well, I think my I think I knew that it was in the
	A. I think I I think we know it wasn't a long	22	offing, but I was worried about that being the solution
23	conversation because the call was at 4 o'clock and	23	because I knew that I had publicly made some comments
24	within ten minutes I was already sending an email, but	24	that were sympathetic to the bid and I wasn't sure
25	I think he was just saying he was totally horrified that	25	whether that would mean that I could handle the bid, so
	Page 37		Page 39
1	this seemed to show well, I used the phrase I think	1	I think by that stage we were making sure Number 10 knew
2	in a text to Mr Osborne of "acute bias" and I suspect	2	about those comments so that they didn't go ahead and
3	that was the phrase that he used to me.	3	announce me and then not knowing about those
4	MR JAY: The relevant texts to Mr Osborne are under the TT	4	comments, and then find out that actually I wouldn't be
5	file at 08159. You sent him two texts timed at 16.08;	5	able to do it as a result of those comments.
6	is that right?	6	Q. I think it's clear from that last answer that there were
7	A. Yes.	7	discussions internally involving the Permanent Secretary
8			
	Q. The first one says:	8	as to whether any of your public pronouncements might
9	Q. The first one says: "Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously	8 9	
9 10			as to whether any of your public pronouncements might
	"Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously	9	as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the
10	"Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy."	9 10	as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct?
10 11	"Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text:	9 10 11	as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct? A. Yes.
10 11 12	"Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text: "Just been called by James M. His lawyers are	9 10 11 12	as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct?A. Yes.Q. Were you asked, though, about anything which was not in
10 11 12 13	"Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text: "Just been called by James M. His lawyers are meeting now and saying it calls into question legitimacy	9 10 11 12 13	 as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Were you asked, though, about anything which was not in the public domain, but which might embarrass you should it enter the public domain? A. No.
10 11 12 13 14	"Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text: "Just been called by James M. His lawyers are meeting now and saying it calls into question legitimacy of whole process from beginning", and then the phrase	9 10 11 12 13 14	as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct?A. Yes.Q. Were you asked, though, about anything which was not in the public domain, but which might embarrass you should it enter the public domain?
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	"Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text: "Just been called by James M. His lawyers are meeting now and saying it calls into question legitimacy of whole process from beginning", and then the phrase you have remembered, "acute bias."	9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Were you asked, though, about anything which was not in the public domain, but which might embarrass you should it enter the public domain? A. No. Q. Do you feel that such matters should have been volunteered by you?
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	"Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text: "Just been called by James M. His lawyers are meeting now and saying it calls into question legitimacy of whole process from beginning", and then the phrase you have remembered, "acute bias." The inference is that the call with Mr James Murdoch	 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 	 as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Were you asked, though, about anything which was not in the public domain, but which might embarrass you should it enter the public domain? A. No. Q. Do you feel that such matters should have been volunteered by you? A. Are you talking about my memo to the Prime Minister?
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	"Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text: "Just been called by James M. His lawyers are meeting now and saying it calls into question legitimacy of whole process from beginning", and then the phrase you have remembered, "acute bias." The inference is that the call with Mr James Murdoch didn't last very long; is that right? A. Yes. Q. Did you have any discussions after 16.08 with anybody	 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 	 as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Were you asked, though, about anything which was not in the public domain, but which might embarrass you should it enter the public domain? A. No. Q. Do you feel that such matters should have been volunteered by you? A. Are you talking about my memo to the Prime Minister? Q. Well, the memo to the Prime Minister, the conversation
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 "Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text: "Just been called by James M. His lawyers are meeting now and saying it calls into question legitimacy of whole process from beginning", and then the phrase you have remembered, "acute bias." The inference is that the call with Mr James Murdoch didn't last very long; is that right? A. Yes. Q. Did you have any discussions after 16.08 with anybody else you can recall, Mr Hunt, about this issue? 	 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 	 as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Were you asked, though, about anything which was not in the public domain, but which might embarrass you should it enter the public domain? A. No. Q. Do you feel that such matters should have been volunteered by you? A. Are you talking about my memo to the Prime Minister? Q. Well, the memo to the Prime Minister, the conversation with Mr Murdoch and the text message we've looked at
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 "Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text: "Just been called by James M. His lawyers are meeting now and saying it calls into question legitimacy of whole process from beginning", and then the phrase you have remembered, "acute bias." The inference is that the call with Mr James Murdoch didn't last very long; is that right? A. Yes. Q. Did you have any discussions after 16.08 with anybody else you can recall, Mr Hunt, about this issue? A. I may well have talked about it internally to my 	 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 	 as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Were you asked, though, about anything which was not in the public domain, but which might embarrass you should it enter the public domain? A. No. Q. Do you feel that such matters should have been volunteered by you? A. Are you talking about my memo to the Prime Minister? Q. Well, the memo to the Prime Minister, the conversation with Mr Murdoch and the text message we've looked at about the congratulations for Brussels, just Ofcom to
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 "Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text: "Just been called by James M. His lawyers are meeting now and saying it calls into question legitimacy of whole process from beginning", and then the phrase you have remembered, "acute bias." The inference is that the call with Mr James Murdoch didn't last very long; is that right? A. Yes. Q. Did you have any discussions after 16.08 with anybody else you can recall, Mr Hunt, about this issue? A. I may well have talked about it internally to my officials and special advisers. I imagine it was a sort 	 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 	 as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Were you asked, though, about anything which was not in the public domain, but which might embarrass you should it enter the public domain? A. No. Q. Do you feel that such matters should have been volunteered by you? A. Are you talking about my memo to the Prime Minister? Q. Well, the memo to the Prime Minister, the conversation with Mr Murdoch and the text message we've looked at about the congratulations for Brussels, just Ofcom to go. It's the accumulation of pieces of evidence. It's
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 "Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text: "Just been called by James M. His lawyers are meeting now and saying it calls into question legitimacy of whole process from beginning", and then the phrase you have remembered, "acute bias." The inference is that the call with Mr James Murdoch didn't last very long; is that right? A. Yes. Q. Did you have any discussions after 16.08 with anybody else you can recall, Mr Hunt, about this issue? A. I may well have talked about it internally to my officials and special advisers. I imagine it was a sort of hot breaking issue, so I probably talked about it to 	 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	 as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Were you asked, though, about anything which was not in the public domain, but which might embarrass you should it enter the public domain? A. No. Q. Do you feel that such matters should have been volunteered by you? A. Are you talking about my memo to the Prime Minister? Q. Well, the memo to the Prime Minister, the conversation with Mr Murdoch and the text message we've looked at about the congratulations for Brussels, just Ofcom to go. It's the accumulation of pieces of evidence. It's that material, Mr Hunt, basically.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 "Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text: "Just been called by James M. His lawyers are meeting now and saying it calls into question legitimacy of whole process from beginning", and then the phrase you have remembered, "acute bias." The inference is that the call with Mr James Murdoch didn't last very long; is that right? A. Yes. Q. Did you have any discussions after 16.08 with anybody else you can recall, Mr Hunt, about this issue? A. I may well have talked about it internally to my officials and special advisers. I imagine it was a sort of hot breaking issue, so I probably talked about it to a few people internally. 	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Were you asked, though, about anything which was not in the public domain, but which might embarrass you should it enter the public domain? A. No. Q. Do you feel that such matters should have been volunteered by you? A. Are you talking about my memo to the Prime Minister? Q. Well, the memo to the Prime Minister, the conversation with Mr Murdoch and the text message we've looked at about the congratulations for Brussels, just Ofcom to go. It's the accumulation of pieces of evidence. It's that material, Mr Hunt, basically. A. I think that all that material is entirely consistent
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 "Cld we chat about Murdoch Sky bid? I am seriously worried we are going to screw this up. Jeremy." And then at the same time you sent another text: "Just been called by James M. His lawyers are meeting now and saying it calls into question legitimacy of whole process from beginning", and then the phrase you have remembered, "acute bias." The inference is that the call with Mr James Murdoch didn't last very long; is that right? A. Yes. Q. Did you have any discussions after 16.08 with anybody else you can recall, Mr Hunt, about this issue? A. I may well have talked about it internally to my officials and special advisers. I imagine it was a sort of hot breaking issue, so I probably talked about it to 	 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	 as to whether any of your public pronouncements might preclude you from acquiring responsibility under the Enterprise Act for this bid; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Were you asked, though, about anything which was not in the public domain, but which might embarrass you should it enter the public domain? A. No. Q. Do you feel that such matters should have been volunteered by you? A. Are you talking about my memo to the Prime Minister? Q. Well, the memo to the Prime Minister, the conversation with Mr Murdoch and the text message we've looked at about the congratulations for Brussels, just Ofcom to go. It's the accumulation of pieces of evidence. It's that material, Mr Hunt, basically.

10 (Pages 37 to 40)

1	sympathetic to the bid and I didn't think there was	1	a responsibility for a quasi-judicial decision with your
2	a media plurality issue, I didn't think we should	2	brain wiped clean. The point about a quasi-judicial
3	second-guess the regulators and I thought that due	3	role is that you set aside any views that you have and
4	process should be followed.	4	you decide objectively on the basis of, in this case,
5	Q. Isn't there a difference, though, between what was	5	media plurality and not on the policy considerations
6	stated publicly at interview with the Financial Times	6	that had been my preoccupation to that point.
7	and the sort of material we've been looking at? Do you	7	Q. Your text message went beyond the wider policy
8	see there as being possibly any difference?	8	considerations. Arguably it went into the merits of the
9	A. I don't think there's a substantive difference because	9	issue. When one couples it with the memorandum you sent
10	substantively my position in all those communications is	10	to the Prime Minister, you were setting out a clear
11	the same: I, broadly speaking, had the view that BSkyB	11	position, I'm sure it was defeasible, but a clear
12	was already controlled by the Murdochs so I didn't think	12	position as to where you stood in relation to this bid.
13	there was a change in plurality, but I believed that due	13	Would you not agree?
14	process had to be respected, so I do not think there's	14	A. I wouldn't agree, no. I think I was expressing my
15	a particular difference.	15	sympathy for the fact that I thought this bid could be
16	Q. Would you have sent that text message of congratulations	16	very important in terms of the UK media sector. I was
17	after 16.58 that afternoon? This is the text:	17	giving a view that I'd expressed publicly that I didn't
18	"Great and congrats on Brussels, just Ofcom to go!"	18	think that there was a plurality concern and I was also
19	A. No, I don't think I would have sent that text. But	19	talking about due process, but the moment that I was
20	actually, I don't think that I had been appointed at	20	given responsibility, I think my suitability in the
21	16.58. I think that they were still I think that it	21	role, if I can put it this way, is demonstrated by the
22	was being mooted as a possible solution then, but	22	actions I took when I did take responsibility for the
23	I don't think there had been a final decision.	23	role, because I believe I did totally set aside all
24	Q. When do you think the final decision was taken?	24	those sympathies. Indeed, I set up a process explicitly
25	A. When the Prime Minister got legal advice that it would	25	to make sure that I couldn't express any of those
	Page 41	-	Page 43
		1	
1	be okay for me to take responsibility for the	1	sympathies or use any of those sympathies to inform my
1 2	be okay for me to take responsibility for the quasi-judicial process.	$\begin{vmatrix} 1\\2 \end{vmatrix}$	sympathies or use any of those sympathies to inform my decision.
2	quasi-judicial process.	2	decision.
2 3	quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think?	2 3	decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E,
2 3 4	quasi-judicial process.Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think?A. An hour or so later.	2 3 4	decision.Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department,
2 3 4 5	quasi-judicial process.Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think?A. An hour or so later.Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's	2 3 4 5	decision.Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with
2 3 4 5 6	quasi-judicial process.Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think?A. An hour or so later.Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to	2 3 4 5	decision.Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt?
2 3 4 5 6 7	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired 	2 3 4 5 6 7	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the right person? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. And it's that that you forwarded to Mr Edward Llewellyn
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the right person? A. I don't believe so, because I don't think there's 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. And it's that that you forwarded to Mr Edward Llewellyn at Downing Street; is that correct?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the right person? A. I don't believe so, because I don't think there's anything substantively different in my texts to 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. And it's that that you forwarded to Mr Edward Llewellyn at Downing Street; is that correct? A. Yes. I don't know if I personally forwarded it, but we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the right person? A. I don't believe so, because I don't think there's anything substantively different in my texts to Mr Murdoch. It just shows that I was broadly 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. And it's that that you forwarded to Mr Edward Llewellyn at Downing Street; is that correct? A. Yes. I don't know if I personally forwarded it, but we made sure that Downing Street was aware of that.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the right person? A. I don't believe so, because I don't think there's anything substantively different in my texts to Mr Murdoch. It just shows that I was broadly sympathetic to the bid and that was the issue that was being considered by government lawyers. Q. To put it bluntly, Mr Hunt, Dr Cable had just lost the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. And it's that that you forwarded to Mr Edward Llewellyn at Downing Street; is that correct? A. Yes. I don't know if I personally forwarded it, but we made sure that Downing Street was aware of that. Q. It looks as if it's come from your email to Mr Llewellyn at the top there, do you see that? A. I haven't got that, but if it did, then I sent it.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the right person? A. I don't believe so, because I don't think there's anything substantively different in my texts to Mr Murdoch. It just shows that I was broadly sympathetic to the bid and that was the issue that was being considered by government lawyers. Q. To put it bluntly, Mr Hunt, Dr Cable had just lost the role through the appearance of bias in one direction. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. And it's that that you forwarded to Mr Edward Llewellyn at Downing Street; is that correct? A. Yes. I don't know if I personally forwarded it, but we made sure that Downing Street was aware of that. Q. It looks as if it's come from your email to Mr Llewellyn at the top there, do you see that? A. I haven't got that, but if it did, then I sent it. Q. Given all the flurry of activity that day and the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the right person? A. I don't believe so, because I don't think there's anything substantively different in my texts to Mr Murdoch. It just shows that I was broadly sympathetic to the bid and that was the issue that was being considered by government lawyers. Q. To put it bluntly, Mr Hunt, Dr Cable had just lost the role through the appearance of bias in one direction. Doesn't it emerge from a fair reading of this text that 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. And it's that that you forwarded to Mr Edward Llewellyn at Downing Street; is that correct? A. Yes. I don't know if I personally forwarded it, but we made sure that Downing Street was aware of that. Q. It looks as if it's come from your email to Mr Llewellyn at the top there, do you see that? A. I haven't got that, but if it did, then I sent it. Q. Given all the flurry of activity that day and the expression of private view which that activity
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the right person? A. I don't believe so, because I don't think there's anything substantively different in my texts to Mr Murdoch. It just shows that I was broadly sympathetic to the bid and that was the issue that was being considered by government lawyers. Q. To put it bluntly, Mr Hunt, Dr Cable had just lost the role through the appearance of bias in one direction. Doesn't it emerge from a fair reading of this text that you shouldn't acquire the role for the equal and 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. And it's that that you forwarded to Mr Edward Llewellyn at Downing Street; is that correct? A. Yes. I don't know if I personally forwarded it, but we made sure that Downing Street was aware of that. Q. It looks as if it's come from your email to Mr Llewellyn at the top there, do you see that? A. I haven't got that, but if it did, then I sent it. Q. Given all the flurry of activity that day and the expression of private view which that activity evidences, don't you feel that that should have been
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the right person? A. I don't believe so, because I don't think there's anything substantively different in my texts to Mr Murdoch. It just shows that I was broadly sympathetic to the bid and that was the issue that was being considered by government lawyers. Q. To put it bluntly, Mr Hunt, Dr Cable had just lost the role through the appearance of bias in one direction. Doesn't it emerge from a fair reading of this text that 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. And it's that that you forwarded to Mr Edward Llewellyn at Downing Street; is that correct? A. Yes. I don't know if I personally forwarded it, but we made sure that Downing Street was aware of that. Q. It looks as if it's come from your email to Mr Llewellyn at the top there, do you see that? A. I haven't got that, but if it did, then I sent it. Q. Given all the flurry of activity that day and the expression of private view which that activity evidences, don't you feel that that should have been placed into the melting pot for consideration?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the right person? A. I don't believe so, because I don't think there's anything substantively different in my texts to Mr Murdoch. It just shows that I was broadly sympathetic to the bid and that was the issue that was being considered by government lawyers. Q. To put it bluntly, Mr Hunt, Dr Cable had just lost the role through the appearance of bias in one direction. Doesn't it emerge from a fair reading of this text that you shouldn't acquire the role for the equal and opposite reason? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. And it's that that you forwarded to Mr Edward Llewellyn at Downing Street; is that correct? A. Yes. I don't know if I personally forwarded it, but we made sure that Downing Street was aware of that. Q. It looks as if it's come from your email to Mr Llewellyn at the top there, do you see that? A. I haven't got that, but if it did, then I sent it. Q. Given all the flurry of activity that day and the expression of private view which that activity evidences, don't you feel that that should have been placed into the melting pot for consideration? A. No, because I don't think there was anything different
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the right person? A. I don't believe so, because I don't think there's anything substantively different in my texts to Mr Murdoch. It just shows that I was broadly sympathetic to the bid and that was the issue that was being considered by government lawyers. Q. To put it bluntly, Mr Hunt, Dr Cable had just lost the role through the appearance of bias in one direction. Doesn't it emerge from a fair reading of this text that you shouldn't acquire the role for the equal and opposite reason? A. No, because, as I understand it, the point about a quasi-judicial role is not that you acquire 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. And it's that that you forwarded to Mr Edward Llewellyn at Downing Street; is that correct? A. Yes. I don't know if I personally forwarded it, but we made sure that Downing Street was aware of that. Q. It looks as if it's come from your email to Mr Llewellyn at the top there, do you see that? A. I haven't got that, but if it did, then I sent it. Q. Given all the flurry of activity that day and the expression of private view which that activity evidences, don't you feel that that should have been placed into the melting pot for consideration? A. No, because I don't think there was anything different in the private view to what I'd expressed publicly.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 quasi-judicial process. Q. Approximately when was it that evening, do you think? A. An hour or so later. Q. So if we move the time forward an hour, I think it's clear you wouldn't have sent that text message to Mr Murdoch after you had formally acquired responsibility; is that correct? A. Um, yes. Q. But doesn't it follow from that answer that this is something that you should have volunteered for consideration by the lawyers as to whether you were the right person? A. I don't believe so, because I don't think there's anything substantively different in my texts to Mr Murdoch. It just shows that I was broadly sympathetic to the bid and that was the issue that was being considered by government lawyers. Q. To put it bluntly, Mr Hunt, Dr Cable had just lost the role through the appearance of bias in one direction. Doesn't it emerge from a fair reading of this text that you shouldn't acquire the role for the equal and opposite reason? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 decision. Q. There was some legal advice, we know, from tab SS.E, again from the legal director within your department, timed at 17.30. It's 08108. We've seen it before with Mr Stephens. Have you found that one, Mr Hunt? A. Yes, I have. Q. It's clear looking at this that this is a reference to your Financial Times interview, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. But to nothing else, would you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. And it's that that you forwarded to Mr Edward Llewellyn at Downing Street; is that correct? A. Yes. I don't know if I personally forwarded it, but we made sure that Downing Street was aware of that. Q. It looks as if it's come from your email to Mr Llewellyn at the top there, do you see that? A. I haven't got that, but if it did, then I sent it. Q. Given all the flurry of activity that day and the expression of private view which that activity evidences, don't you feel that that should have been placed into the melting pot for consideration? A. No, because I don't think there was anything different

11 (Pages 41 to 44)

1 0.1 was consistent but it was additional in the sense 1 16.88, subject to any legal active. The final decision 2 that in quantitative terms were are that you've expressel 3 comments is it were broke araller that afternoon. 4 a view about the bid itself. Do you see that? 4 1 know it was foor days before Christmas, but it was 6 thick there is a substantive difference. I thick that 6 - Well, I think the situation demanded the government 7 the bid and 1d sids on, and P d also talked about my 8 - acted quickly because that as very important merger 8 the bid and 1d sids on, and P d also talked about my 8 - acted quickly because that as very important merger 9 belief that due process was extremely important and that 9 Dr Colde's comments, which if m sure be vould 10 vas the substantive issue that had to be considered. 10 - Risk on dipendent advice every film 11 0. Was it your view that adherence in due process and the 11 Prime Minister acted dickively. 12 12 the indipendent advice were that difference to due process 13 the high process 13 13 the result of the casons I diff that was preckeption 14 14 the high process	1			
3 quintrafive terms we can see that you've expressed 3 cumments as it were broke entifter that afternom. 4 a view about the bid itself. Do you see that? 4 I know it was four days before Christmas, but it was 6 1 Well, Lam not a lawayer, but it would say that I don't 5 made quickly, wasn't it? 6 1 Well, Think the Si attation demanded the government 7 7 I' was well wash trait by some observation in the bid and I'd said so, and I'd also talked about my 8 decision. There was a very serious issue created by 9 belief that due process was extremely important and thu 9 D C table's comments, which I'm sure he would 10 was the solutative issue at all material intense. 13 the greater the delay, the greater the uncertainty, and 14 intight have arisen? 13 the greater the delay. the greater the uncertainty, and 15 A. Well, the two are separate. Atherence to due process 15 the thing that new shows on son. Concoment 16 didn't require me to seek independent advice every time 16 A. That was the government's responsibility. 17 Had to make a critical decision. That was my choice. 18 the t	1	Q. It was consistent but it was additional in the sense	1	16.58, subject to any legal advice. The final decision
4 a view about the bid itself. Do you see that? 4 I know it was for days before Christmas, but it was 5 A. Well, I am not a lawyer, but I would say that I don't 5 made gidekly, waard 10? 6 thick there is a substantive difference. 1 hink that 7 acted gidekly exasset it was a very incoments 7 the bid and I's aid So. and I'd also called about may 9 Dr Cable's comments, which I'm sure very errors issue created by 9 belief that due process and the 10 active of independent advice at all material times 12 taking of independent advice at all material times 10 Prime Minister acted decisively. 14 might have arisen? 14 the bigher the risk that the bid might not go through. 15 A. Well, Iten was a treacy proper gint process. 15 Is that correct? 16 that the ore say are arisen and decision. That was ny choice 10 A transmit the procecupation of any of us. Our concern 17 thad to make a critical decision. That was ny choice 10 A transmit the provessital difference to the protess 16 that O.or of the reasons I diff that twas precisely 0 A treas a consoletration. A would <td< td=""><td>2</td><td>that in quantitative terms there's more of it, and in</td><td>2</td><td>was made within about an hour of that. The Cable</td></td<>	2	that in quantitative terms there's more of it, and in	2	was made within about an hour of that. The Cable
5 A. Well, 1 am not a lawyer, but I would ay that I on't 5 made quickly.wash'if? 6 think there is a substantive difference. I think that 6 A. Well, I think the situation demanded the government 7 th vas widdy known that I was broady sympathetic to 7 action diptic d	3	qualitative terms we can see that you've expressed	3	comments as it were broke earlier that afternoon.
6 A. Well, 1 think there is a substantive difference. I think that 6 A. Well, 1 think the situation demanded the government. 7 it was widely known that I was broadly sympathetic to 7 acted quickly because it was a very serious issue created by 9 belief that due process was extremely important and that 9 Dr Cable's comments, which I'm sure the would 11 Q. Was it your view that adherence to due process and the 11 Prime Minister acted decisively. 12 taking of independent advice at all material times 12 0. I's also right that there shouldh 'the dub because 13 would, as it were, cure may preception of hiss which 13 the greater the delay, the greater the uncertainty, and 14 might have arisen? 14 the bighter the risk, that the bid might not go through. 15 I bad to make a critical decision. That was my choice 17 was to make sare that there was a propring. Fire process. 16 didard require me to seek independent advice every time 13 A transart the procecupation of any of us. Our concern 17 I had to so to watted the public to know that I was 20 a delay would create uncertainty, which might imperil 20 bid and so I watted the public to know that I was 20 a delay would create	4	a view about the bid itself. Do you see that?	4	I know it was four days before Christmas, but it was
7 it was widdy known that I was broadly sympathetic to 7 acted quickly because it was a very important merger 8 the bid and I d asid so, and I d also talked about my 8 decision. There was a very serious issue created by 9 belief that due process was externeyl important and that 9 Dr Chick's comments, which I m sure he would 10 was the substantive issue that had to be considered. 10 acknowledge, so I think it was aboutley right the 11 vould, ai were, cure any perception of hiss which 13 the greater the delay, the greater the unertaint, and 12 taking of independent abrice every finit 16 A. That wasn't the procecupation of any of us. Our concern 13 would, ai were, cure any perception of hiss which 15 Is that correct? 14 that the two are suparste. Atherence to the process 15 Is that wasn't the precocupation of any of us. Our concern 15 to do that. One of the resons I did that was precisely 18 That was the government's responsibility. 10 beta carter 10 Q. But as a numerivig of background consideration. 21 take the solut discipant of that would be 2 as that wasn't the precocupation of any of us. Our connano 22 the bid b	5	A. Well, I am not a lawyer, but I would say that I don't	5	made quickly, wasn't it?
8 the bild and I d suid so, and I d also talked about my 8 decision. There was a very serious issue created by 9 belief that due process was extremely important and that 9 Dr Cable's comments, which I''s sure the would 11 Q. Was it your view that adherence to due process and the 11 Partice was a very serious issue created by 12 taking of independent advice at all material times 12 Q. I's also right that the work of the process and the site was a proper failed process and the site was a proper failed process. 14 might have arisen? 14 the higher the risk that the bid might not go through. 15 A. Well, the two are segnarte. Adherence to due process. 16 A. That was and the procecupation of any of us. Our concern 17 I had to make a critical decision. That was my choice 17 was the agenerative that was precisely 18 That was the government's responsibility. 19 because Thad copressed these public s nown that twas a prover fail proces. 18 That was the government's responsibility. 21 approaching this completely even-handedly, and so 21 the bid. Do you accept that as a proposition of common 22 the was a consideration. As far as the Prime Minister 23 A. I mane, you know, obviously any delay might imperit	6	think there is a substantive difference. I think that	6	A. Well, I think the situation demanded the government
9 belief that due process was extremely important and that 9 Dr Cable's comments, which T m sure he would 10 Was the substantive issue that had to be considered. 10 acknowledge, so 1 think it was shouldby right the 12 taking of independent advice at 11 material times 12 Q. Kis also right that there should'h to delay because 13 would, as it were, cure any perception of bias which 13 the greater the delay, the greater the uncertainty, and 14 might have arisen? Q. Kis also right that there should'h to delay because 15 A. Well, the two are separate. Adherence to due process 14 the higher the risk that the bid might not go through. 15 A. Well, the two are separate. Adherence to due process 16 A. That was the government's responsibility. 16 didat so I wanted the public to know that T was 10 Q. But as a nuderlying or beckground consideration. 20 bid and so I wanted the public to know that T was 20 a delay would create uncertainty, which might imperil 21 bid not so a runnounced that decision, It would hou to 2 sere? 22 bid and so I wanted the public to know that T was 2 A. Toreany van kow, obviowaly any day mi	7	it was widely known that I was broadly sympathetic to	7	acted quickly because it was a very important merger
10 was the substantive issue that had to be considered. 10 acknowledge, so I think it was absolutely right the 11 0. Was it your view that adherence to due process and the might have arisen? 12 0. It is also right that there shouldn't be delay because 13 would, as it were, cure any perception of bias which 13 13 it is bias oright that there shouldn't be delay because 14 might have arisen? 14 the higher the risk that the bid might not go through. 15 it A. Well, the two are separate. Adherence to due process 16 6 16 didn't require me to seek independent advice very time 16 A. That was the procecupation of any of us. Our concern 18 to do that. One of the reasons I did that was procisely 18 That was the government's responsibility. 19 because I had expressed these public sympathies for the 10 0 10 adadry would create uncertainty, which might imperil 21 approaching this completely even handelly, and so 21 the bid. Do you accept that as a proposition of common 22 when there was a critical decision, that at the same 23 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil 23 when there was as on it owy 1 was differing from 24 <	8	the bid and I'd said so, and I'd also talked about my	8	decision. There was a very serious issue created by
11 Q. Was it your view that adherence to due process and the 11 Prime Minister acted decisively. 12 taking of independent advice at all material times 12 Q. It's also right that there should be delay because 14 might have arisen? 14 the brigher the risk that the bid might not go through. 15 A. Well, the two are separate. Adherence to due process 16 A. That vasn't the procecupation of any of us. Our concern 17 I had to make a critical decision. That was ny choice 16 A. That wasn't the procecupation of any of us. Our concern 18 to do that. One of the reasons I did that was precisely 19 Q. But as an underlying or background consideration, 10 bid and so I wanted the public to know that I was 20 abd any or wanted the public vern handedly, and so 23 when there was a critical decision, that at the same 11 Ithe bid. Do you accept that as a proposition of common 24 time as a nanounced that decision, though publish the 25 that wasn't the priority. I don't even think 25 differ from that independent advice, but if I wanted to 3 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil 26 differ from that independent advice, for 1 was concerned, he had a proprinte for him to co	9	belief that due process was extremely important and that	9	Dr Cable's comments, which I'm sure he would
12 taking of independent advice at all material times 12 Q. It's also right that there shouldn't be delay because 13 would, as it were, cure any perception of bias which 13 the transmitter the delay, the greater the uncertainty, and 14 might have arisen? 14 the higher the risk that the bid might not go through. 15 A. Well, the two are separate. Adherence to due process 15 Is that correct? 16 didn't require me to seek independent advice every time 16 A. That wasn't the proceupation of any of us. Our concerner 18 to do that. One of the reasons I did that was procisely 18 That was the government's responsibility. 19 because I had expressed these public sympathies for the 10 Q. But as an underlying or background consideration. 21 approaching this completely even-handedly, and so 21 the bid. Do you accept that as a proposition of common 22 Ibelieve that the best discipline for that would be 25 that was a consideration. As far as the Prime Minister 24 time as a annoneed that decision, thould publish the 25 that was a consideration. As far as the Prime Minister 25 differ from that independent advice, J would have to 3 was not going to be aproporintef for hin to continu	10	was the substantive issue that had to be considered.	10	acknowledge, so I think it was absolutely right the
13 would, as it were, cure any perception of bias which 13 the greater the delay, the greater the uncertainty, and 14 might have arisen? 14 the higher the risk that the bid might not go through. 15 A. Well, the two are separate. Adherence to due process 15 15 15 15 16 didn't require me to seek independent advice every time 16 A. That wasn't the proceupation of any of us. Our concern 17 I had to make a critical decision. That was my choice 17 That was the government's responsibility. 19 because I had expressed these public sympathies for the 19 Q. But as an underdying or background consideration, 21 adelay would create uncertainty, which might imperil 21 the bid. Do you accept that as a proposition of common 22 sense? 3 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil 24 23 when there was a critical decision, thould publish the 24 bid. Dut that wasn't the priority. I don't even think 24 time as I announced that decision, thould publish the 25 that was a consideration. As far as the Prime Minister 25 offfer from that independent advice, but if I wanted to 2 Cabinet ministers had made commenest that meant that if </td <td>11</td> <td>Q. Was it your view that adherence to due process and the</td> <td>11</td> <td>Prime Minister acted decisively.</td>	11	Q. Was it your view that adherence to due process and the	11	Prime Minister acted decisively.
14 might have arisen? 14 the higher the risk that the bid might not go through. 15 A. Well, the two are separate. Adherence to due process 15 Is that correct? 16 didn't require me to seek independent advice every time 16 A. Tau wasn't the procecupation of any of us. Our concern 17 I had to make a critical decision. That was my choice 17 That was the government's responsibility. 19 because I had expressed these public sympathies for that was the government's responsibility. 0. But as an underlying or background consideration, 21 believe that the bast discipline for that would be the mast an proposition of common a delay would create uncertainty, which might imperil 23 when there was a critical decision, that at the same 21 the bid. Do you accept that as a proposition of common 24 imdependent advice, but if I wanted to differ from that independent advice, I would have to 23 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil the bid, but that wasn't the priority. I don't even think 25 endifier for mit in independent advice, I would have to 2 a was not going to be appropriate for him to continue 26 impartially, which indee I was. 1 was not going to be appropriate for him to continue 37 review proceedings,	12	taking of independent advice at all material times	12	Q. It's also right that there shouldn't be delay because
15 A. Well, the two are separate. Adherence to due process 15 Is that correct? 16 didn't require me to seek independent advice every time 16 A. That wasn't the proccupation of any of us. Our concern 18 to do that. One of the reasons I did that was precisely 16 A. That wasn't the proccupation of any of us. Our concerns. 19 because I had expressed these public sympathies for the 20 But as an underlying or background consideration, 20 bid and so I wanted the public to know that I was a propaching this completely even-handedly, and so 21 the bid. D or out accept that as a proposition of common 21 believe that the best discipline for that would be 22 sense? 3 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil 22 baund by that independent advice, but if I wanted to 21 was concerned, he had a problem because one of his 2 differ from that independent advice, I would have to 1 was concerned, he had a problem because one of his 3 confidence that I was approaching it in davice, I would have to 1 was not going to be appropriate for him to continue 4 it, and I thought that was the government responsibility to solve that problem. 7 7 Q. Because by approachi	13	would, as it were, cure any perception of bias which	13	the greater the delay, the greater the uncertainty, and
16 A. That wasn't the proccupation of any of us. Our concernent 17 I had to make a critical decision. That was my choice 17 18 to do that. One of the reasons 1 did that was precision. That wasn the proccupation of any of us. Our concernent 19 because I had expressed these public sympathies for the 19 Q. But as an underlying or background consideration, 20 abid and so I wanted the public to know that I was 20 a delay would create uncertainty. which might imperil 21 approaching this completely even-handedly, and so 21 the bid. Do you accept that as a proposition of common 22 I believe that the best discipline for that would publis the 23 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil the 23 when there was a critical decision, I would publis the 24 that was a consideration. As far as the Prime Minister 23 indipendent advice, thu if I wanted to 1 was to concerned, he had a problem because one of his 2 offfer from that independent advice, I would bave to 2 Cabiner ministers had made comments that meant that it 3 give a pretry goor reason as to why I was differ fing 3 was to concing to bay sportaction find 4 it, and I thought that was proceating which ingresumably what y	14	might have arisen?	14	the higher the risk that the bid might not go through.
17 I had to make a critical decision. That was my choice 17 was to make sure that there was a proper, fair process. 18 to do that. One of the reasons I did that was projective 19 Q. But as an underlying or background consideration, a delay would create uncertainty, which might imperil 19 bid and so I wanted the public to know that I was 20 But as an underlying or background consideration, a delay would create uncertainty, which might imperil 21 I believe that the best discipline for that would be 22 Sense? 23 when there was a critical decision, I would publish the 24 bid, but that was ar onsideration. As far as the Prime Minister 24 time as I announced that decise, but if I wanted to 21 the bid. Do you accept that as a proposition of common 25 offfer from that independent advice, I would have to 22 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil the 24 bid, but that was the best way of giving peopt 5 Cabinet ministers had made comments that meant that it 3 give a pretty good creason as to why I was differing from 3 was not going to be appropriate for him to continue 4 bidi, and i thought that was the best way of giving peopt 5 Cabinet ministers had made comments that meant that it 7 Q	15	A. Well, the two are separate. Adherence to due process	15	Is that correct?
18 to do that. One of the reasons I did that was precisely 18 That was the government's responsibility. 19 because I had expressed these public sympathies for the 19 Q. But as an underlying or background consideration, 20 bid and so I wanted the public to know that I was a delay would create uncertainty, which might imperil 21 believe that the best discipline for that would be 22 sense? 23 when there was a critical decision, that at the same 23 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil 25 independent advice, that I had received. I wouldn't be 23 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil 26 that independent advice, but if I wanted to 11 was concerned, he had a problem because one of his 2 differ from that independent advice, I would have to 3 give a pretty good reason as to why I was differing from 6 impartially, which indeed was. 7 responsibility to solve that problem. 7 Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also 7 responsibility to solve that problem. 7 Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also 7 responsibility to solve that problem. 8 protect yourself and your department f	16	didn't require me to seek independent advice every time	16	A. That wasn't the preoccupation of any of us. Our concern
19 because I had expressed these public sympathies for the 19 Q. But as an underlying or background consideration, 20 bid and so I vanted the public to know that I vas 20 a delay would create uncertainty, which might imperil 21 approaching this completely even-handedly, and so 21 a delay would create uncertainty, which might imperil 23 when there was a critical decision, that at the same 21 sense? 23 when there was a critical decision, that at the same 23 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil the 24 time as I announced that decision, I would publis the 25 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil the 25 independent advice, I would have to 3 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil the 26 differ from that independent advice, I would have to 3 was concerned, he had a problem because one of his 2 cabinet ministers had made comments that meant that it 3 was not going to be appropriate for hin to continue 3 time at 1 had recernation wanted by now of wing peoplet 4 is and I thought that was the best way of giving peoplet 5 4 it, and 1 thought that way you would also responsibilititits, so that was a government <td< td=""><td>17</td><td>I had to make a critical decision. That was my choice</td><td>17</td><td>was to make sure that there was a proper, fair process.</td></td<>	17	I had to make a critical decision. That was my choice	17	was to make sure that there was a proper, fair process.
20 bid and so I wanted the public to know that I was 20 a delay would create uncertainty, which might imperil 21 approaching this completely even-handedly, and so 21 the bid. Do you accept that as a proposition of common 22 I believe that the best discipline for that would be 22 the bid. Do you accept that as a proposition of common 23 when there was a critical decision, it would publish the 23 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil the 24 time as I announced that decision, it would publish the 24 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil 25 independent advice, but if I wanted to 24 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil 26 differ from that independent advice, I would have to 3 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil 3 give a pretty good reason as to why I was differing from 1 was concerned, he had a problem because one of his 5 confidence that I was approaching this decision totally 5 another Cabinet Minister who could take on those 7 Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also 7 responsibility to solve that problem. 8 protect yourself and your department from judicial 7 responsibility to	18	to do that. One of the reasons I did that was precisely	18	That was the government's responsibility.
21 approaching this completely even-handedly, and so 21 the bid. Do you accept that as a proposition of common 22 I believe that the best discipline for that would be 22 sense? 23 when there was a critical decision, that at the same 23 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil the 25 independent advice that I had received. I wouldn't be 23 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil the 26 bound by that independent advice, but if I wanted to 24 that was a consideration. As far as the Prime Minister 26 differ from that independent advice, I would have to 3 was concerned, he had a problem because one of his 27 differ from that independent advice, I would have to 3 was not going to be appropriate for him to continue 4 it, and I though that was the best way of giving people 5 confidence that I was approaching it in dut way, you would also 7 Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also 7 responsibility to solve that problem. 8 protect yourself and your department from judicial 8 Q. We know there was a meeting the following day when BIS 9 retainly wanted it to be a legally robust decision, the vas a gone evidence as to that. Under this 11	19	because I had expressed these public sympathies for the	19	Q. But as an underlying or background consideration,
 I believe that the best discipline for that would be when there was a critical decision, that at the same time as I announced that decision, it at at the same time as I announced that decision, it would publish the head as a consideration. As far as the Prime Minister Page 45 J bound by that independent advice, but if I wanted to 2 differ from that independent advice, it would have to 3 give a pretty good reason as to why I was differing from 4 it, and I thought that was the best way of giving people confidence that I was approaching this decision totally 6 impartially, which indeed I was. Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also 7 responsibilities, so that was a government responsibilities, so that was a government 7 responsibilities, so that responsibility to solve that problem. Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also 7 responsibility to solve that problem. Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was made over hastily without proper regard to whether you 7 a brifting note. M. I certainly wanted it to be a legally robus decision to transfer to you was made over hastily without proper regard to whether you 9 a difficult task? Q. Do you think that the dec	20	bid and so I wanted the public to know that I was	20	a delay would create uncertainty, which might imperil
23 when there was a critical decision, that at the same 23 A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil the 24 time as I announced that decision, I would publish the 24 bid, but that wasn't the priority. I don't even think 25 independent advice that I had received. I wouldn't be Page 45 Page 47 1 bound by that independent advice, but if I wanted to 1 was concerned, he had a problem because one of his 2 differ from that independent advice, but off I wanted to 1 was not going to be appropriate for him to continue 4 it, and I thought that was the best way of giving people 5 confidence that I was approaching it in that way, you would also 6 protect yourself and your department from judicial review proceedings, which is presumably what you were 10 advised; is that right? 8 Q. We know there was a meeting the following day when BIS 15 no legal requirement to seek independent advice, for 1 it were. There's some evidence as to that. Under this 16 same file in tab INB, you'll find, I hope, at page 07896 1 it were. 16 but I didn't have to seek that independent advice, for 15 Q. Which I think it was more about persuading the public that 17	21	approaching this completely even-handedly, and so	21	the bid. Do you accept that as a proposition of common
24time as I announced that decision, I would publish the independent advice that I had received. I wouldn't be Page 4524bid, but that wasn't the priority. I don't even think that was a consideration. As far as the Prime Minister Page 471bound by that independent advice, but if I wanted to differ from that independent advice, i would have to give a pretty good reason as to why I was differing from it, and I thought that was the best way of giving people confidence that I was approaching this decision totally impartially, which indeed I was.1was concerned, he had a problem because one of his Cabinet ministers had made comments that meant that it was not going to be appropriate for him to continue being responsible for the bid, so he needed to find a onther Cabinet Minister who could take on those responsibilities, so that was a government responsibility to solve that problem.7Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also protect yourself and your department from judicial review proceedings, which is presumably what you were advised; is that right?8Q. We know there was a meeting the following day when BIS officials came to DCMS to advise as to where they were in relation to the process and to bequeat the bid, as it were. There's some evidence as to that. Under this same file in tab INB, you'll find, I hope, at page 07896 a briefing note.18Q. Do you think that the decision tortansfer to you was made over hastily without proper regard to whether you were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive and difficult task?124A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and legal	22	I believe that the best discipline for that would be	22	sense?
25 independent advice that I had received. I wouldn't be Page 45 25 that was a consideration. As far as the Prime Minister Page 47 1 bound by that independent advice, but if I wanted to 2 1 was concerned, he had a problem because one of his 2 differ from that independent advice, I would have to 3 1 was concerned, he had a problem because one of his 2 differ from that independent advice, I would have to 3 1 was concerned, he had a problem because one of his 2 confidence that I was approaching this decision totally i inpartially, which indeed I was. 1 was not going to be appropriate for him to continue being responsibilities, so that was a government 7 Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also protect yourself and your department from judicial exit; is that right? 8 Q. We know there was a meeting the following day when BIS officials came to DCMS to advise as to where they were in it were. There's some evidence as to that. Under this same file in tab INB, you'll find, I hope, at page 07896 13 example, on the suitability of the UILs in order to protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely no legal requirement to seek that independent advice, for a but I think it was more about persuading the public that 14 A. Yes. 16 But I think it was more about persers fairly. 16 O. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS	23	when there was a critical decision, that at the same	23	A. I mean, you know, obviously any delay might imperil the
Page 45Page 471bound by that independent advice, but if I wanted to 2 differ from that independent advice, I would have to 3 give a pretty good reason as to why I was differing from 4 it, and I thought that was the best way of giving people 5 confidence that I was approaching this decision totally 6 impartially, which indeed I was.1was not going to be appropriate for him to continue being responsible for the bid, so he needed to find a another Cabinet Minister who could take on those 6 responsibilities, so that was a government7Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also 8 protect yourself and your department from judicial 9 review proceedings, which is presumably what you were 10 advised; is that right?8 Q. We know there was a meeting the following day when BIS 9 officials came to DCMS to advise as to where they were 10 a abriefing note.11 14 15 16have to seek independent advice, for 13 a abriefing note.9 a briefing note.14 17 17 18 18 19protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely 14 1414 A. Yes.15 16 17 19 17 18 14Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was 18 18 20 20 20 20 20 20 2115 20 20 20 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 22 2116 22 21 22 21 21 21 22 2117 22 22 21 22 22 22 2318 24 25 24 25 2419 25 26 24 25 25 2611 24 25 26 2412 25 26 25 2612 25 26 2412 25 26 <td>24</td> <td>time as I announced that decision, I would publish the</td> <td>24</td> <td>bid, but that wasn't the priority. I don't even think</td>	24	time as I announced that decision, I would publish the	24	bid, but that wasn't the priority. I don't even think
1bound by that independent advice, but if I wanted to2differ from that independent advice, I would have to3give a pretty good reason as to why I was differing from4it, and I thought that was the best way of giving people5confidence that I was approaching this decision totally6impartially, which indeed I was.7Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also8protect yourself and your department from judicial9review proceedings, which is presumably what you were10advised; is that right?11A. I certainly wanted it to be a legally robust decision,12but I din't have to seek independent advice, for13example, on the suitability of the UILs in order to14a briefing note.15no legal requirement to seek that independent advice,16But I think it was more about persuading the public that17I was approaching the process fairly.18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18Q. Wo think that de decision to transfer to you was19made over hastily without proper regard to whether you20were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive21A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for22Q. We know that the decision had been made in principle by25Q. We know that the decision had been made in principle by	25	independent advice that I had received. I wouldn't be	25	that was a consideration. As far as the Prime Minister
2differ from that independent advice, I would have to2Cabinet ministers had made comments that meant that it3give a pretty good reason as to why I was differing from3was not going to be appropriate for him to continue4it, and I thought that was the best way of giving people4being responsible for the bid, so he needed to find5confidence that I was approaching this decision totally5another Cabinet Minister who could take on those6impartially, which indeed I was.6responsibilities, so that was a government7Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also7responsibilities, so that was a government8protect yourself and your department from judicial8Q. We know there was a meeting the following day when BIS9review proceedings, which is presumably what you were9officials came to DCMS to advise as to where they were10advised; is that right?10in relation to the process and to bequeath the bid, as11A. I certainly wanted it to be a legally robust decision,11it were. There's some evidence as to that. Under this12but I didn't have to seek independent advice, for13a briefing note.13no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.14A. Yes.14Hawa approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from BIS,18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over hastily without proper regard		Page 45		Page 47
2differ from that independent advice, I would have to2Cabinet ministers had made comments that meant that it3give a pretty good reason as to why I was differing from3was not going to be appropriate for him to continue4it, and I thought that was the best way of giving people4being responsible for the bid, so he needed to find5confidence that I was approaching this decision totally5another Cabinet Minister who could take on those6impartially, which indeed I was.6responsibilities, so that was a government7Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also7responsibilities, so that was a government8protect yourself and your department from judicial8Q. We know there was a meeting the following day when BIS9review proceedings, which is presumably what you were9officials came to DCMS to advise as to where they were10advised; is that right?10in relation to the process and to bequeath the bid, as11A. I certainly wanted it to be a legally robust decision,11it were. There's some evidence as to that. Under this12but I didn't have to seek independent advice, for13a briefing note.13no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.14A. Yes.14Hawa approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from BIS,18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over hastily without proper regard	1	hound by that independent advice, but if I wanted to	1	was concerned he had a problem because one of his
3give a pretty good reason as to why I was differing from3was not going to be appropriate for him to continue4it, and I thought that was the best way of giving people4being responsible for the bid, so he needed to find5confidence that I was approaching this decision totally5another Cabinet Minister who could take on those6impartially, which indeed I was.6responsibilities, so that was a government7Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also7responsibility to solve that problem.8protect yourself and your department from judicial8Q. We know there was a meeting the following day when BIS9review proceedings, which is presumably what you were9officials came to DCMS to advise as to where they were10advised; is that right?10in relation to the process and to bequeath the bid, as11A. I certainly wanted it to be a legally robust decision,11it were. There's some evidence as to that. Under this12but I didn't have to seek independent advice, for13a briefing note.13no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.15Q. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS,14protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely14A. Yes.15no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.15Q. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS,18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over h				
4it, and I thought that was the best way of giving people confidence that I was approaching this decision totally impartially, which indeed I was.4being responsible for the bid, so he needed to find another Cabinet Minister who could take on those7Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also 				
5confidence that I was approaching this decision totally impartially, which indeed I was.5another Cabinet Minister who could take on those responsibilities, so that was a government7Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also protect yourself and your department from judicial eview proceedings, which is presumably what you were advised; is that right?8Q. We know there was a meeting the following day when BIS officials came to DCMS to advise as to where they were in relation to the process and to bequeath the bid, as11A. I certainly wanted it to be a legally robust decision, but I didn't have to seek independent advice, for rexample, on the suitability of the UILs in order to to legal requirement to seek that independent advice.11in relation to the process and to bequeath the bid, as a briefing note.14protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.15Q. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS, but if it doesn't, could you assist us?17I was approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be a composite note that was done by BIS and my own officials.19made over hastily without proper regard to whether you made over hastily without proper regard to whether you and difficult task?20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet point:21A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for 2312The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the merits of the case, ie it is not a collective Cabinet24he made his decis				
6impartially, which indeed I was.6responsibilities, so that was a government7Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also7responsibility to solve that problem.8protect yourself and your department from judicial8Q. We know there was a meeting the following day when BIS9review proceedings, which is presumably what you were9officials came to DCMS to advise as to where they were10advised; is that right?10in relation to the process and to bequeath the bid, as11A. I certainly wanted it to be a legally robust decision,11it were. There's some evidence as to that. Under this12but I didn't have to seek independent advice, for12same file in tab INB, you'll find, I hope, at page 0789613example, on the suitability of the UILs in order to13a briefing note.14protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely14A. Yes.15no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.15Q. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS,16But I think it was more about persuading the public that16but if it doesn't, could you assist us?17I was approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over hastily without proper regard to whether you20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet21and difficult task?				
7Q. Because by approaching it in that way, you would also7responsibility to solve that problem.8protect yourself and your department from judicial8Q. We know there was a meeting the following day when BIS9review proceedings, which is presumably what you were9officials came to DCMS to advise as to where they were10advised; is that right?10in relation to the process and to bequeath the bid, as11A. I certainly wanted it to be a legally robust decision,11it were. There's some evidence as to that. Under this12but I didn't have to seek independent advice, for12same file in tab INB, you'll find, I hope, at page 0789613example, on the suitability of the UILs in order to13a briefing note.14protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely14A. Yes.15no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.15Q. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS,16But I think it was more about persuading the public that16but if it doesn't, could you assist us?17I was approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be18Q. Do you think that the decision to ransfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over hastily without proper regard to whether you19officials.21and difficult task?20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet21and difficult task?21point:22 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>				
8protect yourself and your department from judicial review proceedings, which is presumably what you were advised; is that right?8Q. We know there was a meeting the following day when BIS officials came to DCMS to advise as to where they were in relation to the process and to bequeath the bid, as11A. I certainly wanted it to be a legally robust decision, but I didn't have to seek independent advice, for example, on the suitability of the UILs in order to no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.11it were. There's some evidence as to that. Under this same file in tab INB, you'll find, I hope, at page 0789613example, on the suitability of the UILs in order to no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.14A. Yes.15no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.15Q. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS, but if it doesn't, could you assist us?16But I think it was more about persuading the public that made over hastily without proper regard to whether you were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive and difficult task?17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be a composite note that was done by BIS and my own20were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive and difficult task?20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet21and difficult task?21point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and 2423decision accordingly.25Q. We know that the decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it				
9review proceedings, which is presumably what you were advised; is that right?9officials came to DCMS to advise as to where they were10advised; is that right?10in relation to the process and to bequeath the bid, as11A. I certainly wanted it to be a legally robust decision, but I didn't have to seek independent advice, for protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely1114protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely 1512same file in tab INB, you'll find, I hope, at page 0789615no legal requirement to seek that independent advice. 1613a briefing note.17I was approaching the process fairly.15Q. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS,18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was made over hastily without proper regard to whether you 2019officials.21and difficult task?20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for 2323decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the each is decision accordingly.23Q. We know that the decision had been made in principle by 2525decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of	8		8	
10advised; is that right?10in relation to the process and to bequeath the bid, as11A. I certainly wanted it to be a legally robust decision,11it were. There's some evidence as to that. Under this12but I didn't have to seek independent advice, for12same file in tab INB, you'll find, I hope, at page 0789613example, on the suitability of the UILs in order to13a briefing note.14protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely14A. Yes.15no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.15Q. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS,16But I think it was more about persuading the public that16but if it doesn't, could you assist us?17I was approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over hastily without proper regard to whether you19officials.20were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet21and difficult task?21point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for22"The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the23legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and23decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the24he made his decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is importan			9	
11A. I certainly wanted it to be a legally robust decision,11it were. There's some evidence as to that. Under this12but I didn't have to seek independent advice, for12same file in tab INB, you'll find, I hope, at page 0789613example, on the suitability of the UILs in order to13a briefing note.14protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely14A. Yes.15no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.16UWhich I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS,16But I think it was more about persuading the public that16but if it doesn't, could you assist us?17I was approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over hastily without proper regard to whether you19officials.20were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet21and difficult task?21point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for22"The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the23legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and23decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the24he made his decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of			10	-
12but I didn't have to seek independent advice, for12same file in tab INB, you'll find, I hope, at page 0789613example, on the suitability of the UILs in order to13a briefing note.14protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely14A. Yes.15no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.15Q. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS,16But I think it was more about persuading the public that16but if it doesn't, could you assist us?17I was approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over hastily without proper regard to whether you19officials.20were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet21and difficult task?21point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for23decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the23legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and24merits of the case, ie it is not a collective Cabinet24Me wade this decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of		-		
13example, on the suitability of the UILs in order to13a briefing note.14protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely13a briefing note.15no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.14A. Yes.16But I think it was more about persuading the public that15Q. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS,17I was approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over hastily without proper regard to whether you19officials.20were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet21and difficult task?21point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for23decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the23legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and24merits of the case, ie it is not a collective Cabinet24p. We know that the decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of				
14protect myself from judicial review. There's absolutely14A. Yes.15no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.15Q. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS,16But I think it was more about persuading the public that16but if it doesn't, could you assist us?17I was approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over hastily without proper regard to whether you19officials.20were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet21and difficult task?21point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for22"The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the23legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and23decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the24he made his decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of		-		
15no legal requirement to seek that independent advice.15Q. Which I think is a briefing note which comes from BIS,16But I think it was more about persuading the public that16but if it doesn't, could you assist us?17I was approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over hastily without proper regard to whether you19officials.20were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet21and difficult task?21point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for22"The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the23legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and23decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the24he made his decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of		- <i>·</i>		-
16But I think it was more about persuading the public that16but if it doesn't, could you assist us?17I was approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over hastily without proper regard to whether you19officials.20were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet21and difficult task?21point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for22"The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the23legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and23decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the24he made his decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of			15	
17I was approaching the process fairly.17A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own19made over hastily without proper regard to whether you19officials.20were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet21and difficult task?21point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for22"The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the23legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and23decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the24he made his decision accordingly.24merits of the case, ie it is not a collective Cabinet25Q. We know that the decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of				
18Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was made over hastily without proper regard to whether you were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive and difficult task?18a composite note that was done by BIS and my own20were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive and difficult task?20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet point:21and difficult task?21point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and he made his decision accordingly.23decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the merits of the case, ie it is not a collective Cabinet24Q. We know that the decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of		but I think it was more about persuading the public that		
20were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive and difficult task?20Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet point:21and difficult task?21point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and he made his decision accordingly.22"The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the 2324he made his decision accordingly.23decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the merits of the case, ie it is not a collective Cabinet25Q. We know that the decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of	16		17	A. I'm afraid I don't know who it comes from, but it may be
21and difficult task?21point:22A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for22"The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the23legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and23decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the24he made his decision accordingly.24merits of the case, ie it is not a collective Cabinet25Q. We know that the decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of	16 17	I was approaching the process fairly.		
 A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and he made his decision accordingly. Q. We know that the decision had been made in principle by We know that the decision had been made in principle by Method Secretary of State will now take the "The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the merits of the case, ie it is not a collective Cabinet decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of 	16 17 18	I was approaching the process fairly. Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was	18	a composite note that was done by BIS and my own
23legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and he made his decision accordingly.23decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the merits of the case, ie it is not a collective Cabinet24Q. We know that the decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of	16 17 18 19	I was approaching the process fairly.Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was made over hastily without proper regard to whether you	18 19	a composite note that was done by BIS and my own officials.
24he made his decision accordingly.24merits of the case, ie it is not a collective Cabinet25Q. We know that the decision had been made in principle by25decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of	16 17 18 19 20	I was approaching the process fairly. Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was made over hastily without proper regard to whether you were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive	18 19 20	a composite note that was done by BIS and my own officials.Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet
25 Q. We know that the decision had been made in principle by 25 decision, and it is important to avoid any appearance of	16 17 18 19 20 21	I was approaching the process fairly. Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was made over hastily without proper regard to whether you were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive and difficult task?	18 19 20 21	a composite note that was done by BIS and my own officials.Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet point:
	16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 I was approaching the process fairly. Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was made over hastily without proper regard to whether you were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive and difficult task? A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for 	18 19 20 21 22	a composite note that was done by BIS and my own officials.Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet point:"The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the
Page 46 Page 48	 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	 I was approaching the process fairly. Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was made over hastily without proper regard to whether you were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive and difficult task? A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and 	 18 19 20 21 22 23 	a composite note that was done by BIS and my own officials. Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet point: "The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the
	 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	 I was approaching the process fairly. Q. Do you think that the decision to transfer to you was made over hastily without proper regard to whether you were truly the right person to undertake this sensitive and difficult task? A. I don't believe so, no. The Prime Minister asked for legal advice, he got it from the government lawyers, and he made his decision accordingly. 	 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	 a composite note that was done by BIS and my own officials. Q. The only reference to the process is the first bullet point: "The DCMS Secretary of State will now take the decision. Legally, it is important he does so on the merits of the case, ie it is not a collective Cabinet

12 (Pages 45 to 48)

1	his independence being compromised."	1	you to undertake frequent interactions; is that correct?
2	But there's no other explanation, is there, of what	2	A. No. What I felt was that in terms of the decision
3	the quasi-judicial process entails, would you agree?	3	I took, the quasi-judicial role meant that I had to be
4	A. No. Just looking through it, I can't see anything else.	4	fair to both sides. So we had to be very careful in
5	Q. Mr Stephens exhibited an email on 22 December which also	5	terms of treating each side equally. That didn't mean
6	recorded the advice, at least from the DCMS perspective.	6	the same amount of meetings with each side, because at
7	It's page 13583.	7	certain moments in the bid process it was going to be
8	A. In the same file?	8	necessary to have more meetings, principally because
9	Q. No. I'm not sure you have it, unfortunately.	9	News Corp decided to go the UIL route and there was
10	Mr Stephens when he gave his evidence referred us to it.	10	a period of negotiation of the contents of the UILs, but
11	It is quite short. It's going to come up on the screen.	11	what I'm really saying in paragraph 37 is that because
12	A. It's on the screen, yes.	12	of my other duties as Secretary of State, I was going to
13	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's on the screen.	13	be bumping into people who had views on the bid.
14	MR JAY: It's timed at 17.44. We know the meeting was in	14	I think during that period I spoke at the Oxford Media Convention where the whole media world would be
15	the afternoon. The first bullet point:	15	
16	"BIS officials outlined the secretary of State's	16	gathered and I gave a speech and answered questions and there would have been coffee afterwards, and so there
17 18	role in the process and the various legal considerations."	17 18	would have been but they were brief interactions, and
18 19	So it looks as if that was a reference to the	10	I interpreted that to mean there might be a casual
20	quasi-judicial aspect of the decision?	20	comment about the bid, but they weren't part of my
20 21	A. Correct.	20	consultation process.
21	Q. Do you think that term was used on that occasion?	21	Q. So putting aside de minimis interactions, which you've
22	A. I'm sure it was.	23	just discussed, can we see if this works, that any
23 24	Q. I think it's clear that you yourself had not previously	24	communication you had would have to be transparent,
25	exercised a quasi-judicial function, had you?	25	preferably documented within the Parliament and if
23	Page 49		Page 51
1	A. No.	1	necessary placed in the public domain if need arose.
2	Q. Your witness statement at paragraph 35 and following	2	Would you agree with that formulation?
	deals with your understanding of what this function		
3	•	3	A. I would agree with that formulation with respect to
4	amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our	4	anything that was material to my decision.
4 5	amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make	4 5	anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which
4 5 6	amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the	4	anything that was material to my decision.Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that?
4 5 6 7	amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence	4 5 6 7	anything that was material to my decision.Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that?A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of
4 5 6 7 8	amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidenceA. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay?	4 5 6 7 8	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having
4 5 6 7 8 9	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. 	4 5 6 7 8 9	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not
4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. 	4 5 7 8 9 10	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same
4 5 7 8 9 10 11	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality 	4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was impartial, unbiased, and that I decided it on the basis
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality and not on other policy considerations" and you 	4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was impartial, unbiased, and that I decided it on the basis of the evidence in front of me, and so that was where
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality and not on other policy considerations" and you take it alone. 	4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was impartial, unbiased, and that I decided it on the basis of the evidence in front of me, and so that was where the transparency was important, but if there was
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality and not on other policy considerations" and you take it alone. A. Yes. 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was impartial, unbiased, and that I decided it on the basis of the evidence in front of me, and so that was where the transparency was important, but if there was something that was, you know, a trivial not trivial,
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality and not on other policy considerations" and you take it alone. A. Yes. Q. Paragraph 37: 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was impartial, unbiased, and that I decided it on the basis of the evidence in front of me, and so that was where the transparency was important, but if there was something that was, you know, a trivial not trivial, that's the wrong word, but it wouldn't necessarily apply
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality and not on other policy considerations" and you take it alone. A. Yes. Q. Paragraph 37: "Unlike a judge, whilst I needed to be careful, 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was impartial, unbiased, and that I decided it on the basis of the evidence in front of me, and so that was where the transparency was important, but if there was something that was, you know, a trivial not trivial, that's the wrong word, but it wouldn't necessarily apply to every single matter of process.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality and not on other policy considerations" and you take it alone. A. Yes. Q. Paragraph 37: "Unlike a judge, whilst I needed to be careful, I was not incommunicado and continued to exercise my 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was impartial, unbiased, and that I decided it on the basis of the evidence in front of me, and so that was where the transparency was important, but if there was something that was, you know, a trivial not trivial, that's the wrong word, but it wouldn't necessarily apply to every single matter of process. Q. We can put to one side minimal interactions, certainly,
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality and not on other policy considerations" and you take it alone. A. Yes. Q. Paragraph 37: "Unlike a judge, whilst I needed to be careful, I was not incommunicado and continued to exercise my duties as Secretary of State" 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was impartial, unbiased, and that I decided it on the basis of the evidence in front of me, and so that was where the transparency was important, but if there was something that was, you know, a trivial not trivial, that's the wrong word, but it wouldn't necessarily apply to every single matter of process. Q. We can put to one side minimal interactions, certainly, but can I be clear, would such interactions have to be
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality and not on other policy considerations" and you take it alone. A. Yes. Q. Paragraph 37: "Unlike a judge, whilst I needed to be careful, I was not incommunicado and continued to exercise my duties as Secretary of State" And that obviously entailed appearing in Parliament. 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was impartial, unbiased, and that I decided it on the basis of the evidence in front of me, and so that was where the transparency was important, but if there was something that was, you know, a trivial not trivial, that's the wrong word, but it wouldn't necessarily apply to every single matter of process. Q. We can put to one side minimal interactions, certainly, but can I be clear, would such interactions have to be through official channels?
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality and not on other policy considerations" and you take it alone. A. Yes. Q. Paragraph 37: "Unlike a judge, whilst I needed to be careful, I was not incommunicado and continued to exercise my duties as Secretary of State" And that obviously entailed appearing in Parliament. The third full sentence of this paragraph: 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was impartial, unbiased, and that I decided it on the basis of the evidence in front of me, and so that was where the transparency was important, but if there was something that was, you know, a trivial not trivial, that's the wrong word, but it wouldn't necessarily apply to every single matter of process. Q. We can put to one side minimal interactions, certainly, but can I be clear, would such interactions have to be through official channels? A. All the interactions which related to the decision that
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality and not on other policy considerations" and you take it alone. A. Yes. Q. Paragraph 37: "Unlike a judge, whilst I needed to be careful, I was not incommunicado and continued to exercise my duties as Secretary of State" And that obviously entailed appearing in Parliament. 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was impartial, unbiased, and that I decided it on the basis of the evidence in front of me, and so that was where the transparency was important, but if there was something that was, you know, a trivial not trivial, that's the wrong word, but it wouldn't necessarily apply to every single matter of process. Q. We can put to one side minimal interactions, certainly, but can I be clear, would such interactions have to be through official channels?
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 amounted to. It's paragraph 36, really. Our page 05603. You set aside your personal views, make your decision objectively and impartially on the evidence A. Sorry, which page are we, Mr Jay? Q. It's your paragraph 36, page 05603. A. Yes. Q. "I should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality and not on other policy considerations" and you take it alone. A. Yes. Q. Paragraph 37: "Unlike a judge, whilst I needed to be careful, I was not incommunicado and continued to exercise my duties as Secretary of State" And that obviously entailed appearing in Parliament. The third full sentence of this paragraph: "They involved frequent interactions with many 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 anything that was material to my decision. Q. Or anything which was material to the process by which your decision was taken, would you agree with that? A. No. I think what I interpreted my interpretation of quasi-judicial, I think, you know, obviously having completed this process, one learns lessons, and I'm not saying I would necessarily make exactly the same interpretation now, but my interpretation at the time was that what was important was that the decision was impartial, unbiased, and that I decided it on the basis of the evidence in front of me, and so that was where the transparency was important, but if there was something that was, you know, a trivial not trivial, that's the wrong word, but it wouldn't necessarily apply to every single matter of process. Q. We can put to one side minimal interactions, certainly, but can I be clear, would such interactions have to be through official channels? A. All the interactions which related to the decision that I was going to take would be through official channels,

13 (Pages 49 to 52)

1	I didn't think that was off limits.	1	that out from what he heard at meetings; is that
2	Q. Yes. Putting those to one side, we're talking about	2	correct?
3	matters of greater substance, but are we agreed that	3	A. Yes.
4	those interactions would have to be through official	4	Q. Did you give him any instructions as to what not to do?
5	channels?	5	A. No. As I say, he heard in the way that I heard all the
6	A. Any formal interactions with respect to my decision,	6	things that we needed to be careful about.
7	yes.	7	Q. His ordinary function as special adviser was to
8	Q. And official channels included Mr Smith, didn't they?	8	represent you and to communicate your view, is that not
9	A. Yes.	9	correct?
10	Q. And you were aware that he was, as it were, your channel	10	A. That is one of the things that special advisers do, but
11	out to News Corp in the personification of Mr Michel; is	11	that isn't that isn't the only thing they do. A lot
12	that correct?	12	of the things that special advisers do is they are
13	A. Well, I think it's important to be clear about what we	13	a contact point for industry stakeholders, they are
14	mean by "channel". I didn't see Mr Smith in this	14	understanding policy issues, and giving me advice as to
15	process as being someone who would be telling me what	15	what policy I should have with respect to a particular
16	News Corp thought or telling News Corp what I thought.	16	issue that's bubbled to the surface, so they have
17	I saw him as a point of contact, an official point of	17	a number of different functions.
18	contact in the process, so that News Corp had someone	18	Q. Yes, but in their interactions with third parties, they
19	that they could call if they had concerns about the	19	are representing you, aren't they?
20	process, and someone who was there to you know,	20	A. I think they would be seen by third parties as someone
21	I mean the situation in which we inherited	21	who had a good understanding of what I thought.
22	responsibility for a bid was one in which News Corp felt	22	Q. But they would be expected to communicate your view and
23	they had not been fairly treated, and so I wanted to	23	no one else's, would you agree with that?
24	make sure that there was someone there who could answer	24	A. Well, I think they because they worked closely with
25	questions about how the process was going in a helpful	25	ministers, and I doubt there's a minister who worked
	Daga 52		Dama 55
	Page 53		Page 55
1	way.	1	more closely with a special adviser than I worked with
2	way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would	2	more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for
2 3	way.Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between	2 3	more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that
2 3 4	way.Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do	2 3 4	more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues.
2 3 4 5	way.Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that?	2 3 4 5	more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me,
2 3 4 5 6	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers 	2 3 4 5 6	more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would
2 3 4 5 6 7	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but 	2 3 4 5 6 7	more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as to what his special role was? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we have at Westminster Adam was one of the more political
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as to what his special role was? A. Well, he was present at all the meetings where we had 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we have at Westminster Adam was one of the more political ones. I would say he was politically fairly neutral.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as to what his special role was? A. Well, he was present at all the meetings where we had advice from lawyers and officials in the department, so 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we have at Westminster Adam was one of the more political ones. I would say he was politically fairly neutral. I mean, I for me, Adam's primary role I had
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as to what his special role was? A. Well, he was present at all the meetings where we had advice from lawyers and officials in the department, so he heard that advice, and it was understood that he 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we have at Westminster Adam was one of the more political ones. I would say he was politically fairly neutral. I mean, I for me, Adam's primary role I had certain policy priorities and, you know, superfast
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as to what his special role was? A. Well, he was present at all the meetings where we had advice from lawyers and officials in the department, so he heard that advice, and it was understood that he would be a point of contact for News Corp in the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we have at Westminster Adam was one of the more political ones. I would say he was politically fairly neutral. I mean, I for me, Adam's primary role I had certain policy priorities and, you know, superfast broadband is just by way of an example, and Adam knew
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as to what his special role was? A. Well, he was present at all the meetings where we had advice from lawyers and officials in the department, so he heard that advice, and it was understood that he would be a point of contact for News Corp in the process. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we have at Westminster Adam was one of the more political ones. I would say he was politically fairly neutral. I mean, I for me, Adam's primary role I had certain policy priorities and, you know, superfast broadband is just by way of an example, and Adam knew what I wanted to do and I only had the time to have one
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as to what his special role was? A. Well, he was present at all the meetings where we had advice from lawyers and officials in the department, so he heard that advice, and it was understood that he would be a point of contact for News Corp in the process. Q. But what express instructions was he given as to the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we have at Westminster Adam was one of the more political ones. I would say he was politically fairly neutral. I mean, I for me, Adam's primary role I had certain policy priorities and, you know, superfast broadband is just by way of an example, and Adam knew what I wanted to do and I only had the time to have one meeting a week on superfast broadband, but I wanted
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as to what his special role was? A. Well, he was present at all the meetings where we had advice from lawyers and officials in the department, so he heard that advice, and it was understood that he would be a point of contact for News Corp in the process. Q. But what express instructions was he given as to the role he would undertake? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we have at Westminster Adam was one of the more political ones. I would say he was politically fairly neutral. I mean, I for me, Adam's primary role I had certain policy priorities and, you know, superfast broadband is just by way of an example, and Adam knew what I wanted to do and I only had the time to have one meeting a week on superfast broadband, but I wanted things to be happening every day, so Adam would be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as to what his special role was? A. Well, he was present at all the meetings where we had advice from lawyers and officials in the department, so he heard that advice, and it was understood that he would be a point of contact for News Corp in the process. Q. But what express instructions was he given as to the role he would undertake? A. I don't think he was given any express instructions 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we have at Westminster Adam was one of the more political ones. I would say he was politically fairly neutral. I mean, I for me, Adam's primary role I had certain policy priorities and, you know, superfast broadband is just by way of an example, and Adam knew what I wanted to do and I only had the time to have one meeting a week on superfast broadband, but I wanted things to be happening every day, so Adam would be someone who could go to other meetings behind the scenes
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as to what his special role was? A. Well, he was present at all the meetings where we had advice from lawyers and officials in the department, so he heard that advice, and it was understood that he would be a point of contact for News Corp in the process. Q. But what express instructions was he given as to the role he would undertake? A. I don't think he was given any express instructions other than how I've described it. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we have at Westminster Adam was one of the more political ones. I would say he was politically fairly neutral. I mean, I for me, Adam's primary role I had certain policy priorities and, you know, superfast broadband is just by way of an example, and Adam knew what I wanted to do and I only had the time to have one meeting a week on superfast broadband, but I wanted things to be happening every day, so Adam would be someone who could go to other meetings behind the scenes with officials and they knew that he would know what
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as to what his special role was? A. Well, he was present at all the meetings where we had advice from lawyers and officials in the department, so he heard that advice, and it was understood that he would be a point of contact for News Corp in the process. Q. But what express instructions was he given as to the role he would undertake? A. I don't think he was given any express instructions which had 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we have at Westminster Adam was one of the more political ones. I would say he was politically fairly neutral. I mean, I for me, Adam's primary role I had certain policy priorities and, you know, superfast broadband is just by way of an example, and Adam knew what I wanted to do and I only had the time to have one meeting a week on superfast broadband, but I wanted things to be happening every day, so Adam would be someone who could go to other meetings behind the scenes with officials and they knew that he would know what I was thinking and they could get more details. I might
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 way. Q. Any communication between Mr Michel and Mr Smith would be no different, would it, to communication between Mr Michel and you, because Mr Smith was your agent. Do you agree with that? A. Not in this process. I think sometimes special advisers have a role which is about speaking for their boss, but in this situation Mr Smith's role was a different one. He was a point of contact in a very complex process, and there to advise News Corp about the questions they had about the process and I think also to reassure them that the process was fair. Q. What express instructions, if any, was Mr Smith given as to what his special role was? A. Well, he was present at all the meetings where we had advice from lawyers and officials in the department, so he heard that advice, and it was understood that he would be a point of contact for News Corp in the process. Q. But what express instructions was he given as to the role he would undertake? A. I don't think he was given any express instructions other than how I've described it. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 more closely with a special adviser than I worked with Adam Smith, I really did work very closely with him for the best part of six years, I think it was a given that he would know what I thought on different issues. I don't think that's quite the same as speaking for me, which is a different thing, but I think people would have expected him to know my views. Q. Yes, he knew your thinking on any significant issue. That was part of his job. He would acquire that through his familiarity with working with you. Would you agree that he's not just able, but also politically astute? A. I think he's politically astute, but I wouldn't have said amongst the different type of characters that we have at Westminster Adam was one of the more political ones. I would say he was politically fairly neutral. I mean, I for me, Adam's primary role I had certain policy priorities and, you know, superfast broadband is just by way of an example, and Adam knew what I wanted to do and I only had the time to have one meeting a week on superfast broadband, but I wanted things to be happening every day, so Adam would be someone who could go to other meetings behind the scenes with officials and they knew that he would know what

		1	
1	sentence and he might be able to elaborate on that	1	(11.29 am)
2	because he knew me well. That was, I think, his main	2	(A short break)
3	role.	3	(11.39 am)
4	Q. You appreciated that your departmental lawyers were in	4	MR JAY: Mr Hunt, why involve a special adviser at all in
5	contact with their opposite numbers, as it were in	5	this quasi-judicial process?
6	News Corp and BSkyB. You also appreciated that your	6	A. Well, he was an absolutely key and trusted aide. He is
7	officials were in contact, but Mr Smith's role	7	highly intelligent, highly able, and I believed that he
8	specifically was to be the point of contact with	8	would have a very positive role to contribute in terms
9	Mr Michel. Is that agreed?	9	of making sure that the process was run robustly and in
10	A. No, I don't think that was how it was decided. I think	10	the right way generally. He's a very talented person
11	Mr Smith's role was to be a point of contact amongst	11	and he's amongst the officials who are closest to me, so
12	a number of official points of contact, but I do not	12	it would have been quite a natural thing; indeed,
12	think we said, "Adam, you're going to look after	12	I think as Mr Stephens said, entirely proper and
13 14	Mr Michel." I don't think we had that kind of	13	appropriate for special advisers to be involved in
			decisions that their ministers or issues that are
15	conversation.	15	
16	Q. But in terms of who was going to look after Mr Michel in	16	very important to their ministers.
17	the ordinary course of things, that would be Mr Smith	17	Q. In paragraph 38 of your statement you make it clear that
18	because that's what he'd been doing before 21 December,	18	the most important way you could demonstrate objectivity
19	would you agree?	19	in your decision-making was to commission independent
20	A. It's certainly true that Mr Smith would be the person	20	advice, and of course you had a panoply of expert advice
21	that Mr Michel would naturally want to contact.	21	within the department and you had legal advice, but why
22	Q. And the text message which Mr Michel sent you on	22	have this extra layer of contact between a special
23	Christmas Eve under the TT file, page 08147, states	23	adviser and, to put it bluntly, a lobbyist?
24	you probably remember this one:	24	A. There wasn't an extra layer of contact. Adam Smith's
25	"Hi, James has asked me to be the point of contact	25	role was to be an official point of contact. It was
	Page 57		Page 59
1	with you and Adam throughout the process on his behalf."	1	absolutely essential in a process like that that there
2	A. Yes.	2	should be someone who News Corp would be able to contact
3	Q. So that's making it clear what role Mr Smith might be	3	at the department if they had questions about process,
4	attaining. And then your reply is:	4	and it was agreed Adam Smith would be an appropriate
5	"Thanks Fred. All contact with me now needs to be	5	person to do that.
6	through official channels until decision made."	6	Q. But it was an extra layer in the sense that the lawyers
7	But in context that means that "for these purposes	7	and the department would be the primary layer of formal
8	Mr Smith is my official channel", would you agree?	8	contact, they could provide detail as to process, as to
9	A. I wasn't specifying that it had to be Mr Smith. I was	9	
10	in i wush especinging that it had to be fill similar i was	1 1	timetable, but this was superadded. This was Mr Smith
	saving that all contact had to be go through the	10	timetable, but this was superadded. This was Mr Smith in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's
	saying that all contact had to be go through the official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part.	10 11	in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's
11	official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part.	11	in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate?
11 12	official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient?	11 12	in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate?A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set
11 12 13	official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand	11 12 13	in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate?A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact.
11 12 13 14	official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand writer a rest, but just before we do, if I just ask one	11 12 13 14	 in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate? A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact. The context of our approach on this was that we had
11 12 13 14 15	official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand writer a rest, but just before we do, if I just ask one question: it was abundantly clear to you, wasn't it,	11 12 13 14 15	 in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate? A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact. The context of our approach on this was that we had inherited responsibility for a deal where we believed we
11 12 13 14 15 16	official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand writer a rest, but just before we do, if I just ask one question: it was abundantly clear to you, wasn't it, that enormous care had to be exercised? One of the	11 12 13 14 15 16	 in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate? A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact. The context of our approach on this was that we had inherited responsibility for a deal where we believed we were at serious risk of judicial review by News
11 12 13 14 15 16 17	official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand writer a rest, but just before we do, if I just ask one question: it was abundantly clear to you, wasn't it, that enormous care had to be exercised? One of the things in the note from BIS was a reference to the fact	11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate? A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact. The context of our approach on this was that we had inherited responsibility for a deal where we believed we were at serious risk of judicial review by News Corporation over the way that the government had handled
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand writer a rest, but just before we do, if I just ask one question: it was abundantly clear to you, wasn't it, that enormous care had to be exercised? One of the things in the note from BIS was a reference to the fact that the Secretary of State for BERR the decision to	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate? A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact. The context of our approach on this was that we had inherited responsibility for a deal where we believed we were at serious risk of judicial review by News Corporation over the way that the government had handled the bid, and I was absolutely determined to make sure
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand writer a rest, but just before we do, if I just ask one question: it was abundantly clear to you, wasn't it, that enormous care had to be exercised? One of the things in the note from BIS was a reference to the fact that the Secretary of State for BERR the decision to intervene in the Lloyds HBOS merger was judicially	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate? A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact. The context of our approach on this was that we had inherited responsibility for a deal where we believed we were at serious risk of judicial review by News Corporation over the way that the government had handled the bid, and I was absolutely determined to make sure that it was an open and transparent process and
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand writer a rest, but just before we do, if I just ask one question: it was abundantly clear to you, wasn't it, that enormous care had to be exercised? One of the things in the note from BIS was a reference to the fact that the Secretary of State for BERR the decision to intervene in the Lloyds HBOS merger was judicially reviewed on the basis that his discretion had been	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate? A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact. The context of our approach on this was that we had inherited responsibility for a deal where we believed we were at serious risk of judicial review by News Corporation over the way that the government had handled the bid, and I was absolutely determined to make sure that it was an open and transparent process and a process that was fair to them. It had to be fair to
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand writer a rest, but just before we do, if I just ask one question: it was abundantly clear to you, wasn't it, that enormous care had to be exercised? One of the things in the note from BIS was a reference to the fact that the Secretary of State for BERR the decision to intervene in the Lloyds HBOS merger was judicially reviewed on the basis that his discretion had been fettered by comments by the Chancellor, so great	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate? A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact. The context of our approach on this was that we had inherited responsibility for a deal where we believed we were at serious risk of judicial review by News Corporation over the way that the government had handled the bid, and I was absolutely determined to make sure that it was an open and transparent process and a process that was fair to them. It had to be fair to everyone, but the context that we inherited
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand writer a rest, but just before we do, if I just ask one question: it was abundantly clear to you, wasn't it, that enormous care had to be exercised? One of the things in the note from BIS was a reference to the fact that the Secretary of State for BERR the decision to intervene in the Lloyds HBOS merger was judicially reviewed on the basis that his discretion had been fettered by comments by the Chancellor, so great sensitivity around all these decisions?	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate? A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact. The context of our approach on this was that we had inherited responsibility for a deal where we believed we were at serious risk of judicial review by News Corporation over the way that the government had handled the bid, and I was absolutely determined to make sure that it was an open and transparent process and a process that was fair to them. It had to be fair to everyone, but the context that we inherited responsibility for the bid was a question mark over
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand writer a rest, but just before we do, if I just ask one question: it was abundantly clear to you, wasn't it, that enormous care had to be exercised? One of the things in the note from BIS was a reference to the fact that the Secretary of State for BERR the decision to intervene in the Lloyds HBOS merger was judicially reviewed on the basis that his discretion had been fettered by comments by the Chancellor, so great sensitivity around all these decisions? A. Absolutely right. 	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate? A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact. The context of our approach on this was that we had inherited responsibility for a deal where we believed we were at serious risk of judicial review by News Corporation over the way that the government had handled the bid, and I was absolutely determined to make sure that it was an open and transparent process and a process that was fair to them. It had to be fair to everyone, but the context that we inherited responsibility for the bid was a question mark over whether the government was being fair to them.
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand writer a rest, but just before we do, if I just ask one question: it was abundantly clear to you, wasn't it, that enormous care had to be exercised? One of the things in the note from BIS was a reference to the fact that the Secretary of State for BERR the decision to intervene in the Lloyds HBOS merger was judicially reviewed on the basis that his discretion had been fettered by comments by the Chancellor, so great sensitivity around all these decisions? A. Absolutely right. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. All right, we'll just take 	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate? A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact. The context of our approach on this was that we had inherited responsibility for a deal where we believed we were at serious risk of judicial review by News Corporation over the way that the government had handled the bid, and I was absolutely determined to make sure that it was an open and transparent process and a process that was fair to them. It had to be fair to everyone, but the context that we inherited responsibility for the bid was a question mark over whether the government was being fair to them. So I said we want to be open and transparent and we
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 official machinery of which Mr Smith was a part. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that convenient? Mr Hunt, we take a break to give the shorthand writer a rest, but just before we do, if I just ask one question: it was abundantly clear to you, wasn't it, that enormous care had to be exercised? One of the things in the note from BIS was a reference to the fact that the Secretary of State for BERR the decision to intervene in the Lloyds HBOS merger was judicially reviewed on the basis that his discretion had been fettered by comments by the Chancellor, so great sensitivity around all these decisions? A. Absolutely right. 	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 in contact, with your agreement, with News Corp's lobbyist. Why was that appropriate? A. I don't accept that it was an additional layer. We set up Mr Smith to be one of a number of points of contact. The context of our approach on this was that we had inherited responsibility for a deal where we believed we were at serious risk of judicial review by News Corporation over the way that the government had handled the bid, and I was absolutely determined to make sure that it was an open and transparent process and a process that was fair to them. It had to be fair to everyone, but the context that we inherited responsibility for the bid was a question mark over whether the government was being fair to them.

1	and Mr Smith was one of those.	1	didn't was because we didn't predict this barrage of
2	Q. In what way were Mr Smith's contacts open and	2	contact from Mr Michel. We thought he was perhaps
3	transparent, given that they could never have emerged	3	a little pushy, yes, I suppose we would have said that
4	had there not been this Inquiry or, heaven forbid,	4	he was at that end of the spectrum, but we weren't
5	a judicial review application against the department	5	expecting 542 text messages to Mr Smith, including,
6	when the department would have been obliged to have	6	I think to my total astonishment, I think it was 35
7	disclosed them?	7	text messages in just two days at one point in the
8	A. Mr Smith's contacts in that respect were, in terms of	8	process, and however many, 140 or so, phone calls.
9	what they were not the content of the contact but in	9	I think when you do the analysis, and it's slightly back
10	terms of the fact of the contact was no different to	10	of the envelope analysis, Mr Michel looks like he was
11	contact by Mr Zeff, one of my departmental officials,	11	trying to contact Mr Smith about five times every
12	who also had text message exchanges with Mr Michel and	12	working day, which is an extraordinary amount of
13	email exchanges with Mr Michel, so the fact of his	13	contact, and we didn't anticipate that at all.
14	contact wasn't different.	14	Q. Was Mr Smith given equivalent instructions to be the
15	Q. Wasn't there at least a risk that in the absence of an	15	point of contact with lobbyists, public relations
16	express instruction or warning as to what he couldn't	16	experts, whoever, for the coalition?
17	do, Mr Smith would as it were revert to the default	17	A. He would have fulfilled that role as being a point of
18	position, which was to act as your representative?	18	contact for the department, but for large parts of the
19	A. I didn't believe there was a risk of that because	19	process it was only appropriate to have contact with
20	Mr Smith is extremely able, bright. He's dedicated,	20	News Corporation, and so the vast majority of his
21	he's hard-working, and he was new to the process as	21	contact would have been with News Corporation.
22	I was new to it and he was party to all the advice that	22	Q. Do you accept that Mr Smith interpreted his role, at the
23	I was hearing and he was hearing.	23	very least, to reassure News Corp during the process?
24	Q. You were, of course, aware that Mr Michel was an	24	A. Yes. I think they had felt that they had not been
25	extremely effective lobbyist, weren't you?	25	fairly treated by the government, and we all wanted to
	Page 61		Page 63
1	A. I think we are all aware of that now.	1	reassure them that they were going to get no favours,
~			
2	Q. You were aware of that at the time, weren't you, from	2	but they were going to be fairly treated.
3	your interactions with him?	3	but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding?
3 4	your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs	3 4	but they were going to be fairly treated.Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding?A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special
3 4 5	your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation.	3 4 5	but they were going to be fairly treated.Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding?A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were
3 4 5 6	your interactions with him?A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation.Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be	3 4	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid
3 4 5 6 7	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly 	3 4 5 6 7	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he
3 4 5 6 7 8	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? 	3 4 5 6 7 8	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. Q. Didn't you think he's someone whose personal text 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes. Q. Why not to keep them on board overall, since you had
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. Q. Didn't you think he's someone whose personal text messages to you were evidence of a degree of pushiness? 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes. Q. Why not to keep them on board overall, since you had a concern that the wheels might fall off if there were
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. Q. Didn't you think he's someone whose personal text messages to you were evidence of a degree of pushiness? A. There was a bit of pushiness, yes, I think that was 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes. Q. Why not to keep them on board overall, since you had a concern that the wheels might fall off if there were excessive delay?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. Q. Didn't you think he's someone whose personal text messages to you were evidence of a degree of pushiness? A. There was a bit of pushiness, yes, I think that was apparent, and you can probably sense my responses were 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes. Q. Why not to keep them on board overall, since you had a concern that the wheels might fall off if there were excessive delay? A. I didn't have that concern. I was responsible for
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. Q. Didn't you think he's someone whose personal text messages to you were evidence of a degree of pushiness? A. There was a bit of pushiness, yes, I think that was apparent, and you can probably sense my responses were often sort of one word. I do as a point of principle 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes. Q. Why not to keep them on board overall, since you had a concern that the wheels might fall off if there were excessive delay? A. I didn't have that concern. I was responsible for a quasi-judicial process. I had put aside my policy
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. Q. Didn't you think he's someone whose personal text messages to you were evidence of a degree of pushiness? A. There was a bit of pushiness, yes, I think that was apparent, and you can probably sense my responses were often sort of one word. I do as a point of principle always try and reply to text messages as a courtesy, but 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes. Q. Why not to keep them on board overall, since you had a concern that the wheels might fall off if there were excessive delay? A. I didn't have that concern. I was responsible for a quasi-judicial process. I had put aside my policy priorities in this area. I'd actually put them aside
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. Q. Didn't you think he's someone whose personal text messages to you were evidence of a degree of pushiness? A. There was a bit of pushiness, yes, I think that was apparent, and you can probably sense my responses were often sort of one word. I do as a point of principle always try and reply to text messages as a courtesy, but they got pretty brief. 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes. Q. Why not to keep them on board overall, since you had a concern that the wheels might fall off if there were excessive delay? A. I didn't have that concern. I was responsible for a quasi-judicial process. I had put aside my policy priorities in this area. I'd actually put them aside willingly because of course it's important that the
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. Q. Didn't you think he's someone whose personal text messages to you were evidence of a degree of pushiness? A. There was a bit of pushiness, yes, I think that was apparent, and you can probably sense my responses were often sort of one word. I do as a point of principle always try and reply to text messages as a courtesy, but they got pretty brief. Q. Didn't you see risks here in relation to Mr Smith that 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes. Q. Why not to keep them on board overall, since you had a concern that the wheels might fall off if there were excessive delay? A. I didn't have that concern. I was responsible for a quasi-judicial process. I had put aside my policy priorities in this area. I'd actually put them aside willingly because of course it's important that the media industry is successful, but media plurality is
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. Q. Didn't you think he's someone whose personal text messages to you were evidence of a degree of pushiness? A. There was a bit of pushiness, yes, I think that was apparent, and you can probably sense my responses were often sort of one word. I do as a point of principle always try and reply to text messages as a courtesy, but they got pretty brief. Q. Didn't you see risks here in relation to Mr Smith that he was the point of contact with Mr Michel, Mr Michel 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes. Q. Why not to keep them on board overall, since you had a concern that the wheels might fall off if there were excessive delay? A. I didn't have that concern. I was responsible for a quasi-judicial process. I had put aside my policy priorities in this area. I'd actually put them aside willingly because of course it's important that the media industry is successful, but media plurality is a much, much higher order decision. It's about the
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. Q. Didn't you think he's someone whose personal text messages to you were evidence of a degree of pushiness? A. There was a bit of pushiness, yes, I think that was apparent, and you can probably sense my responses were often sort of one word. I do as a point of principle always try and reply to text messages as a courtesy, but they got pretty brief. Q. Didn't you see risks here in relation to Mr Smith that he was the point of contact with Mr Michel, Mr Michel wasn't exactly one who would push back, he would push 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes. Q. Why not to keep them on board overall, since you had a concern that the wheels might fall off if there were excessive delay? A. I didn't have that concern. I was responsible for a quasi-judicial process. I had put aside my policy priorities in this area. I'd actually put them aside willingly because of course it's important that the media industry is successful, but media plurality is a much, much higher order decision. It's about the health of the democracy and it's about making sure that
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. Q. Didn't you think he's someone whose personal text messages to you were evidence of a degree of pushiness? A. There was a bit of pushiness, yes, I think that was apparent, and you can probably sense my responses were often sort of one word. I do as a point of principle always try and reply to text messages as a courtesy, but they got pretty brief. Q. Didn't you see risks here in relation to Mr Smith that he was the point of contact with Mr Michel, Mr Michel wasn't exactly one who would push back, he would push forward, you were exposing him to danger, weren't you? 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes. Q. Why not to keep them on board overall, since you had a concern that the wheels might fall off if there were excessive delay? A. I didn't have that concern. I was responsible for a quasi-judicial process. I had put aside my policy priorities in this area. I'd actually put them aside willingly because of course it's important that the media industry is successful, but media plurality is a much, much higher order decision. It's about the health of the democracy and it's about making sure that many generations of Brits go on to be able to choose
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 your interactions with him? A. I just thought he was, you know, a public affairs specialist at News Corporation. Q. Yes, but the job of such an individual is to be charming, charismatic, try and push doors open, frankly to be pushy. Are we agreed about that? A. I think different organisations do their lobbying in different ways, and he was certainly a character. I didn't mark him out as being more effective or less effective than people representing organisations that I've come across. Q. Didn't you think he's someone whose personal text messages to you were evidence of a degree of pushiness? A. There was a bit of pushiness, yes, I think that was apparent, and you can probably sense my responses were often sort of one word. I do as a point of principle always try and reply to text messages as a courtesy, but they got pretty brief. Q. Didn't you see risks here in relation to Mr Smith that he was the point of contact with Mr Michel, Mr Michel wasn't exactly one who would push back, he would push 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 but they were going to be fairly treated. Q. What other value then was Mr Smith adding? A. Well, he was adding immense value to me as a special adviser in lots of other policy areas. I mean, we were doing lots of other things at the same time as this bid was happening, but for the bid process this was what he was doing. Q. But his role was to keep News Corp reassured, some would say happy, during a process which became increasingly protracted and difficult. Is that not fair? A. Well, it was certainly to keep them on board with the fairness of the process, yes. Q. Why not to keep them on board overall, since you had a concern that the wheels might fall off if there were excessive delay? A. I didn't have that concern. I was responsible for a quasi-judicial process. I had put aside my policy priorities in this area. I'd actually put them aside willingly because of course it's important that the media industry is successful, but media plurality is a much, much higher order decision. It's about the health of the democracy and it's about making sure that

16 (Pages 61 to 64)

1	desiries as that may are a init.	1	any home is factually compare to construct a factor
1	decision so that was my priority. Q. Do you feel, looking back on this, that Mr Smith	$\begin{vmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$	say here is factually correct, so we're not going to look at underlying material.
2		$\begin{vmatrix} 2 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$	
3	reasonably drew the inference that you would wish him to	3	30 December 2010, you received advice from the OFT,
4	communicate to your private view to Mr Michel?	4	which was to the effect that you had jurisdiction to
5	A. I don't believe he did communicate any private views to Ma Michael I think the views of mine that he will have	5	make a reference to the CC. That was a limited decision
6 7	Mr Michel. I think the views of mine that he will have	6	under the 2002 order.
7	communicated to Mr Michel were views that I had	7	Then the following day, more importantly, you
8	expressed in meetings with News Corp, and anyway, my	8	received advice from Ofcom on the plurality issue, and
9	private view was the same as my public view: I needed to	9	their advice was this is paragraph 1.57 at 04385 that there was a need for a fuller review by the
10 11	make a decision about plurality. That was the decision	10 11	-
11	and it needed to be done objectively and impartially and that was what I did.	11	Competition Commission. Is that correct? A. Correct.
12	Q. In that sense, you had two private views. You had the	12	Q. There are two documents we should look at. There was
13 14	private view that you needed to undertake the process	13	a meeting on 6 January 2011 with representatives of
14	according to law, but at the same time you had a private	14	News Corp.
16	view, see the memorandum to the Prime Minister of	15	A. Yes.
10	19 November, which was favourable to this particular		
17	view. It's that private view to which I'm referring.	17 18	Q. That is in the bundle of primary materials under tab 18. The Inquiry has seen this document before. It's
18 19	Do you see that, Mr Hunt?	18	page 04536. May we note in relation to this meeting,
20	A. But I set that private view aside, I knew that	20	once you've found it in the bundle, who was present?
20	I couldn't make this decision on the basis of that	20	A. Well
21	private view, and I had a view that I felt more	21 22	Q. We can see who was present. Mr Smith was there, amongst
22	private view, and I had a view that I fet more passionately the more I thought about the decision about	22	others on your side, and Mr Michel was there on behalf
23 24	plurality that actually a decision about plurality is	23	of News Corp.
24 25	a public interest decision. It's an absolutely	24	A. Yes.
25	Page 65		Page 67
1		1	
1	fundamental and important decision. Far, far more	$\begin{vmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$	Q. When you had a meeting with the coalition on 24 March
2	important than even something as important as the	$\begin{vmatrix} 2\\ 3 \end{vmatrix}$	2011, their public relations advisers, who I think were Weber Shandwick
3	commercial viability of the UK media industry, and that was my focus.	4	A. Weber Shandwick.
4 5	Q. Okay, we may come back to that issue, but can we deal	5	Q. They weren't invited, were they?
6	now fairly economically, Mr Hunt, with the way the bid	6	A. Mr Michel was an employee of News Corp, so he had a role
_	was handled in terms of process after 22 December? You	7	as Mr Murdoch's aide, and that's why it was appropriate
7 8	set out a general narrative in your witness statement in	8	for him to be there.
9	paragraph 39 and following.	9	Q. But the coalition's public relations advisers then were
10	The key messages we can read are that you took	10	independent contractors and you felt that that made
11	expert advice at all material times, you went further	11	a material difference; is that the argument?
12	than the statute strictly speaking required although you	12	A. I don't think it was my decision, but that was the
12	had power under the statute to obtain advice from Ofcom	13	decision that was communicated to them.
14	and the OFT on the UILs, which is what you did. When	14	Q. The message you put across on this occasion was that the
15	the UILs were put out for consultation first on 3 March,	15	Ofcom advice was that there should be a reference to the
16	then consideration was given subsequently to revision,	16	CC. You were considering the matter but were likely to
17	following advice from Ofcom. Then finally, at the end	17	conclude, given the low threshold, that that's what
18	of June the second version of the UILs were put out for	18	would happen, but the possibility of accepting
19	short consultation, a period closing on 8 July. That's	19	undertakings in lieu of a referral were mentioned at
20	the broad message. But the detail is to be found in	20	this meeting. Do you see that?
21	annex A, which is under tab 2.	21	A. Yes. They weren't mentioned by us. What actually
22	May we spend just a little time looking at the	22	happened, to my recollection, was that I arrived back in
23	highlights because I'm sure you would wish to bring the	23	the office on 5 January, I believe, that year, and I had
24	points out, but I've been able to cross-reference this	24	this introductory meeting with News Corp and I said that
25	with three lever-arch files of detail and everything you	25	I had read the Ofcom report, basically accepted it,
1	Page 66		Page 68

17 (Pages 65 to 68)

1	I was going to refer it to the Competition Commission.	1	You acknowledged they had supplied UILs "aimed at
2	The process was that we sent them a letter saying	2	addressing any potential impact on the sufficiency of
3	that we were minded to refer it to the Competition	3	plurality from the proposed merger. The legal framework
4	Commission because they are an adversely affected party.	4	was clear that undertakings were permissible at this
5	They then had the opportunity to make representations	5	stage"
6	back, and so that was what I told them. I don't think	6	So you had received advice internally to that effect
7	they had seen the Ofcom report at that point so we let	7	presumably, Mr Hunt; is that right?
8	them see the Ofcom report and make representations back,	8	A. Well, what had happened at that stage was that we had,
9	but they knew that I basically planned to refer it to	9	if you like, concluded the first part of the process,
10	the Competition Commission.	10	which is that I had said that I was minded to refer it
11	Q. We know that the first version of the UILs were sent to	11	to the Competition Commission, I had a duty to consult
12	you as early as 18 January, but before then I should	12	News Corp. They had given me their objections to the
13	make reference to a meeting you had with Mr Ed Richards	13	Ofcom report. I had also spoken to Ed Richards and
14	of Ofcom on 10 January which is under tab 24.	14	asked him some questions that had arisen in my mind
15	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just before we do, if we just go	15	about the report, but I was after that process, I had
16	through because I think it may be important to see the	16	still decided that it met the low threshold necessary
17	sense of this. You opened this meeting on 6 January,	17	for referral to the Competition Commission. So that was
18	and you spoke about a fair and legally robust process,	18	my decision.
19	that you were minded to send to the Competition	19	Then they said in fact, they indicated on
20	Commission. You identified the timeframe for them to	20	6 January in their meeting that were that to be the
21	respond. Then they came back to say they had concerns	21	case, they would want to offer undertakings, so we had
22	about the analysis and they wanted to explore remedies.	22	an inkling, and I was advised that I had a duty under
23	And then you said there were areas where you wanted to	23	public law to consider any undertakings, if I thought
24	seek clarification of the Ofcom report; is that right?	24	they were merited consideration. And I think on
25	A. Yes.	25	18 January, I don't think we were sent the UILs in final
	Page 69		Page 71
1	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And you were going to share both the	1	form, but they may have been the final form that
2	questions and the answers, and then they responded to	2	News Corp wanted, but really that was just to give us an
3	that?	3	indication of what the undertakings were, and they were
4	A. Yes.	4	a pretty big offer. I mean, they were basically
5	MR JAY: The meeting with Mr Richards is under tab 24 at	5	saying this was a decision I had about news
6	page 04553. Its purpose was to seek clarification on	6	plurality, and they were saying that they would exclude
7	aspects of the report, and you asked five specific	7	the one news organisation that's part of BSkyB from the
8	questions of Mr Richards, as we can see from this.	8	whole deal.
9	A. Yes.	9	So prima facie, it seemed to be an offer that
10	Q. Mr Smith was present. You said under item 3:	10	I needed to consider, and I was also advised that I was
11	"He had agreed to provide News Corp with the minutes	11	obliged to consider it as a public law duty, so we then
12	of today's meeting with Ofcom, Ofcom would be able to	12	had that meeting.
13	agree the minutes in advance."	13	Q. You also received advice which News Corp had obtained
14	Do you happen to know when the minutes became	14	from Lord Pannick Queen's Counsel, which was precisely
15	available? This is relevant to one of the emails in KRM	15	to the same effect, namely that you did have not merely
16	18.	16	the power but a public law duty to consider any
17	A. I don't.	17	substantial UIL offers to remedy at this stage. That
18	Q. Okay. The next meeting is the one of 20 January, which	18	was sent to you at about this time, wasn't it?
19	is item 31 in this bundle at page 04626. The same	19	A. Yes. There were two additional points that I think it's
20	personnel who attend, save I think that this time junior	20	worth mentioning. The first is that News Corp in their
21	counsel is present, just before he took silk, actually.	21	submission objecting to the Ofcom report said that I did
22	A. Right.	22	have the option to not to refer it to the Competition
23	Q. But by then you'd got the UILs in, perhaps not in draft,	23	Commission and I would have to do that by challenging
24	in final form, and your opening remarks were that you	24	certain assumptions that were made in the Ofcom report
25	were still minded to refer.	25	that they thought were not fair, and I rejected that
	Page 70		Page 72
L		ð	

Important Important <t< th=""><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></t<>				
3 minutes because evil servants	1	advice.	1	because we got lots of letters from Slaughter & May
4 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not advice, you rejected the submission; correct. I rejected their is admission; admission; correct. I rejected their is legal view that that was a way that I could proceed. 4 spin off Sky News, but if in fact in practical terms it was totally dependent on News Corp, they image to exercise the submission; correct. I rejected their is received the submission; correct. I rejected their is received the submission; sourced. 4 spin off Sky News, but if in fact in practical is contract and its revenue, then in practical is contract and its revenue, the in practical is contract and its revenue, then in practical is contract and its revenue, the intervenue is practical is contract and its revenue, then intervenue is practical is contract and its revenue is contract and its revenue is contract and its revenue is practical is contrect and is practical is contrect is practical is contract and its		_		
5 submission: 5 was totally dependent on News Corp for its single 6 A. I rejected the submission; correct. I rejected their ibigost contract and its revenue, then in practical 7 legal vew that that was a way that I could proceed. ibigost contract and its revenue, then in practical 8 And then the second significant thing that happened its wouldn't be independent of News Corp, they 9 at data meeting, so we go into a statudion where they its wouldn't be independent of News Corp, they 10 to remove the one aws organisation that's part of BSNB 11 terms its wouldn't be independent of News Corp, they 11 to remove the whole bid, so I thooght, you know, this does 12 Turt in place two processes to make sure that every 12 address plarality considerations, whice des 13 the sing to be able to decide it on a totally impartial 13 address plarality consideration, this could potentially 13 address plarality consideration of the ULLs came through on 14 them effigit. It says nothing about going to a stat of WI consider these 11 11 11 13 address plarality. Consenses of an a totally dependent of the account and advice the following day. The advice came back on 11 12 14 masset the				
6 A. I rejected the submission; correct. I rejected their 6 bigget contract and its revenue, then in practical legal view that that was a way that I could proceed. 7 legal view that that was a way that I could proceed. 7 terms it wouldn't be independent of News Corp, they 9 and then the second significant thing that happened 8 nhough tri the independent of News Corp, they 9 independent of the way to repair the independent of News Corp, they merit scriptions considerations were 10 how the bid, so I thought you know, this does 10 incredibly important, and plurafity considerations were 11 row repairs conscriptions, this ould potentially address plurafity considerative; and 11 12 leave Sky News exactly as it was, that was the sort of 15 and unbiased basis. 13 leave Sky News exactly as it was, that meeting as you 11 24 January, OFT and Ofcom were commissioned to provide and unbiased basis. 14 was going to be able to decide it on a totally impartial and unbiased basis. 12 14 was going to be able to decide it on a totally impartial and unbiased basis. 15 was on the following day. The were dimeting base, which 17 24 January. OFT and Ofcom were commissioned to provide and unbiased basis. 16				
7 legal view that that was a way that I could procect. 7 terms if wouldn't be independent of News Corp, they 8 And then the second significant thing that happend 7 terms if wouldn't be independent of News Corp, they 9 at that meeting, so we got into a situation where they 9 So I hought financial and commercial viability was 10 had put if this very substantial undertaking, which is 10 10 11 form the whole bid, so I thought, you know, this does 12 I put in place two processes to make sure that every 13 address plurality concerns because they regist play plut 13 decision I had I was in possession of the ULs came through on 14 To sure regulator, but was, that was the sort of 16 MRIAY: Yes. The final version of the ULs came through on 15 laws in possession of expert advice and 11 Formary, cas mareX A demonstrates, and they had 16 madertakings, but I'm poing to pet independent advice 11 Formary, cas mareX A demonstrates, and they had 17 the meeting, because I way the dimersion to to get advice 11 Formary, cas mareX A demonstrates, and they had 18 advice the following day. The advice are boad of the new company <				
8 And then the second significant thing that happened and that meeting, so we got into a significant thing, which is so I thought financial and connercial viability was 9 at that meeting, so we got into a significant thing, the moment was a planality consideration, this could potentially so I thought financial and planality considerations were very important, and that was, I think, the moment when 11 to remove the one news organisation that's part of BSkyB 11 Form the whole bid, so I thought, you know, this does 12 from the whole bid, so I thought, you know, this does 12 I pure in place two processes to make sure that every 16 gist of it. I was: I required to do, which Mr Murdoch was very cross 16 MR IAY: Yes. The final version of the UILs came through on 17 But then I decided to do something else, which 11 14 address planality input the else or else and they had 18 I waser yer difficult meeting in terms of the tone or else independent advice 10 point conters, some of the are else independent advice 19 about. In fact, I would describe that meeting as you 11 Page 73 20 the meeting in terms of the tone or of the areas you'we mentioned, but one 11 21 the entering in terms of the tone or of the areas you'we mentioned, but one 11				
9 at that meeting, so we got into a situation where they 9 So I thought financial and commercial viability was 10 had put in this very substantial undertaking, which is incredibly important, and plurality considerations were 12 from the whole bid, so I thought, you know, this does 1 required to the was event that every important, and moment when moment when 13 merit serious consideration, this could potentially 1 was going to be able to decide it on a totally impartial 14 was going to be able to decide it on a totally impartial and unbiased basis. 1 15 leave Sty News exactly as it was, that was the sort of 16 MR IAYY. Yes. The final version of the UILs came through on 16 gist of it. 17 24 January. OFT and Ofcom were commissioned to provide advice and basis. 17 awas required to do, which MY Murdoch was very rens 18 10 11 14 Na's in four sort advice and back on 10 hemeting, because I's aid I will consider these 12 15 12 15 10 not just from one regulator, but two. The 2 15 Some of fhose areas you'N emaintoned, but one 11 12 opticre frait				
10 had put in this very substantial undertaking, which is to remove the one news organisation that's part of BSRys 11 incredibly important, and had was, I think, the moment when 12 true the whele hid, so I thought, you know, this does 12 true the whele hid, so I thought, you know, this does 14 intracedibly important, and that was, I thou, the moment when 14 thought, you know, this does 14 thought, you know, this does 14 thought, you know, this does 14 thought, you know, this does 15 thought, you know, this does 16 thought, you know, this does 16 thou had you had yo				5
11 to remove the one news organisation that's part of BSkyB 11 very important, and that was, I think, the moment when 12 from the whole bid, so I thought, you know, this does 11 I puring lace two processes to make sure that every 14 address plurality concerns because they're just going to 13 decision I had I was in possession of expert advice and 15 leave Sky News exactly as it was, that was the ort of 14 was going to be able to decide it on a totally impartial 16 gist of it. 16 MI AY: Yes. The final version of the UILs came through on 17 ment fract, I would describe that meeting as, you 19 11 February, as annex A demonstrates, and they had 10 batto it not is used and will consider these 11 you identify on page 05619, the entry there for 22 undertakings, but I'm going to get independent advice 21 you uidentify on page 05619, the entry there for 23 not just from one regulator, but two. The 23 Some of those areas you've mentioned, but one 24 in avery is printing about going to 1 A. Yes. 25 from the Office of Fair Trading and I said I wag going to ask for Ofform's 2 Q. In other words, it wouldn't he Mr James Murdoch? 3 <	9	· ·		
12 from the whole bid, so T thought, you know, this does 12 I put in place two processes to make sure that every 13 merit serious consideration, this could potentially address plurality concerns because they're just going to 14 14 address plurality concerns because they is two set of 15 and unbiased basis. 16 gist of it. 16 MR JAY: Yes. The final version of the UILs came through on 17 To then I decided to do something else, which 17 24 January. OTT and Ofcom were commissioned to provide 18 advice the following day. The advice came back on 19 11 February, as annex A demonstrates, and they had 19 not just from one regulator, but two. The 20 concerns, OfCom in particular, in four key areas, which 21 the meeting, hecause I said I will consider these 21 you identify on page 05619, the entry there for 22 not just from one regulator, but two. The 23 Som of those areas you've mentioned, but one 24 Enterprise Act allows me; if I want to, to get advice 24 important one was that the board of the new company 25 Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? <tr< th=""><th></th><th>had put in this very substantial undertaking, which is</th><th></th><th></th></tr<>		had put in this very substantial undertaking, which is		
13 merit serious consideration, this could potentially 13 decision 1 had I was in possession of expert advice and 14 address plurality concerns because they're just going to 13 address plurality concerns have and they field in a totally imparital 16 gist of it. 16 man unbiased basis. 16 17 But then I decided to a something else, which 16 MR JAY; Yes. The final version of the UILs came through on 18 twaser required to do, which MF Murdoch was very cross 18 advice the following day. The advice came back on 19 about. In fact, I would describe that meeting as you 10 11 February, as annex A demonstrates, and they had 20 know, a very difficult meeting, in terms of the tone of 20 concerns, Ofcom in particular, in four key areas, which 21 not just from one regulator, but two. The 23 Some of those areas you've mentioned, but one 23 not just from one regulator, but two. The 23 Some of those areas you've mentioned, but one 24 important one was not welcome to MF Murdoch, because, as 5 is primary functions is what it says on the fin, is 3 independent advice as well. 1 A. Yes. 2 4 Ufcom, but I shoi				
14 address plurality concerns because they're just going to 14 was going to be able to decide it on a totally impartial 15 leave Sky News exactly as it was, that was the sort of 15 16 gist of it. 16 17 But then I decided to do something else, which 16 MR JAY: Yes. The final version of the ULLs came through on 18 advace the following day. The advice came back on 11 12 19 about. In fact, I would describe that meeting as, you 19 11 16 MR JAY: Yes. The final version of the ULLs came through on 20 know, a very difficult meeting in terms of the tone of 20 concerns. Ofcom in particular, in four key areas, which 21 undertakings, but Trong ont oge it independent advice 21 15 February. 23 not just from one regulator, but two. The 23 Some of those areas you've mentioned, but one 24 Enterprise Act allows me, if T want to, to get advice 24 Important on evas flat the board of the new company 25 offoem, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's 1 A. Yes. 2 2 Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's 1 A. That was a very, very signifcant thing for Mr Murdoch.				
15 leave Sky News exactly as it was, that was the sort of gist of it. 15 and unbiased basis. 16 gist of it. 16 MR JAY: Yes. The final version of the ULLs came through on about. In fact, I would describe that meeting as, you about. In fact, I would describe that meeting as, you indertakings, but Tm going to get independent advice undertakings, but Tm going to get independent advice 2 17 24 January. OFF and Ofcom were commissioned to provide advice the following day. The advice came back on 11 February, as annex A demonstrates, and they had you identify on page 05619, the entry there for 20 20 undertakings, but Tm going to get independent advice 2 15 February. 21 not just from one regulator, but two. The 2 23 22 independent advice as well. 24 23 from the Office of Fair Trading and I said I was going 2 26 24 Ofcom, but I said I was going to 3 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? 3 A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch, 2 4 This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as 5 9 5 you'l see from some of his exchanges, he considered 6 6 6 Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the 16 16 9 plurality concerns, and they liste				
16 gist of it. 16 MR JAY: Yes. The final version of the UILs came through on 17 But then I decided to do something else, which 24 January. OFT and OfCom were commissioned to provide 19 about. In fact, I would describe that meeting as, you 14 advect the following day. The advice came back on 20 know, a very difficult meeting in terms of the tone of 10 11 February, as annex A demonstrates, and they had 20 undertakings, but I'm going to get independent advice 11 February, as annex A demonstrates, and they had 21 undertakings, but I'm going to get independent advice 15 February, as annex A demonstrates, and they had 23 not just from one regulator, but two. The 23 Some of those areas you'we mentioned, but one 24 Enterprise Act allows me, if I want to, to get advice You identify on page 05619, whe entry there for 24 Intore was that the board of the new company woold need to be independently chaired. 25 from the Office of Fair Trading and t said I was going to ask for OfCom's 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? 2 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? 34 This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as mess. He				
17 But then I decided to do something else, which 17 24 January. OFT and Ofcom were commissioned to provide advice the following day. The advice came back on 18 I wasn't required to do, which Mr Murdoch was very consistioned to provide advice the following day. The advice came back on 19 about. In fact, I would describe that meeting as, you 11 10 know, a very difficult meeting in terms of the tone of 10 21 undertakings, but I'm going to get independent advice 21 21 undertakings, but I'm going to get independent advice 22 22 undertakings, but I'm going to get independent advice 22 24 Enterprise Act allows me, if I want to, to get advice 24 25 From the Office of Fair Trading and I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's 3 1 to exercise that right. It says nothing about going to 1 A. Yes. 2 Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's 1 A. Yes. 3 independent advice as well. 1 I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is 6 Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's 1 I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is			15	
18 I wasn't required to do, which Mr Murdoch was very cross about. In fact, I would describe that meeting as, you know, a very difficult meeting in terms of the tone of the meeting, because I said I will consider these undertakings, but I'm going to get independent advice 2 undertakings, but I'm going to get independent advice 2 from the Office of Fair Trading and I said I was going 2 Page 73 15 February. 2 Ofcom, but I said I was going to 3 independent advice as well. 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? 3 independent advice as well. 1 I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of 1 its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is 1 mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of 1 its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is 1 mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of 1 its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is 1 mean very thorough report - I didn't agree with every 1 in a very thorough report - I didn't agree with every 1 im portant to test the ULs against the experts who had 15 told me that they did have plurality concerns with the 16 original shape of the deal. 10 10 plurality concerns, and I thought it was very 11 the was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because 13 the believed thet du Ofcom. So that was ther for 14 Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was ther 15 told me that they did have plurality concerns with the 16 original shape of the deal.		gist of it.	16	MR JAY: Yes. The final version of the UILs came through on
19 about. In fact, I would describe that meeting as, you 19 11 February, as annex A demonstrates, and they had 20 know, a very difficult meeting in terms of the tone of 20 concerns, Ofcom in particular, in four key areas, which 21 the meeting, because I said I will consider these 21 you identify on page 05619, the entry there for 23 not just from one regulator, but two. The 23 Some of those areas you've mentioned, but one 24 Enterprise Act allows me, if I want to, to get advice 24 important one was that the board of the new company 25 from the Office of Fair Trading and I said I was going Page 73 Page 75 11 to exercise that right. It says nothing about going to 1 A. Yes. 2 2 Ofcom, but I said I was going to sat for Ofcom's 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? 3 independent advice as well. 1 mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of 1 6 Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the 6 news. He first of all didth't think he should have to 7 simportant to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in 9 this resport -1 didn't agree with every			17	
20 know, a very difficult meeting, in terms of the tone of 20 concerns, Ofcom in particular, in four key areas, which 21 undertakings, but I'm going to get independent advice 21 you identify on page 05619, the entry there for 22 undertakings, but I'm going to get independent advice 22 15 February. 23 Some of those areas you've mentioned, but one 24 Enterprise Act allows me, if I want to, to get advice 24 25 from the Office of Fair Trading and I said I was going 23 26 Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's 2 3 independent advice as well. 1 A. Yes. 2 Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the 2 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? 3 independent advice as well. 1 A. Yes. 2 4 This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as 5 90 of Base changes, he considered 6 6 Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the 1 an terms of this sexchanges, he considered 1 7 interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very 1 is primary functions is what it says on the in, is 8		- · ·		
21 the meeting, because I said I will consider these 21 you identify on page 05619, the entry there for 22 not just from one regulator, but two. The 22 15 February. 23 not just from one regulator, but two. The 23 Some of those areas you've mentioned, but one 24 Enterprise Act allows me, if I want to, to get advice 24 important one was that the board of the new company 25 from the Office of Fair Trading and I said I was going Page 73 Page 75 1 to exercise that right. It says nothing about going to 20. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? 3 independent advice as well. 1 A. Yes. 4 This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as 5 its primary fluctions is what it says on the fin, is 6 Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the 6 news. He first of all didn't think he should have to 7 spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and 9 their report delivered on 31 December that they had 10 pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would – he wanted to continue to be 11 ina very thorough report – I didn't agree with every	19		19	
22 undertakings, but I'm going to get independent advice 22 15 February. 23 not just from one regulator, but two. The 23 Some of those areas you've mentioned, but one 24 Enterprise Act allows me, if I want to, to get advice 24 Some of those areas you've mentioned, but one 25 from the Office of Fair Trading and I said I was going Page 73 Page 75 Page 75 1 to exercise that right. It says nothing about going to independent advice as well. 1 A. Yes. 2 Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. 3 A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. 4 This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as important to be cause it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had 10 news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at alb because he didn't believe there was a plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail 10 pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of Sky News, 12 14 important to test these UILs against the experts who had 15 their report delivered on 31 December that they inportant to him. 14 important to test these UILs against the experts who had 16 There were other things that Ofcom here were 17 Now, from Mr Murdoch's po	20	know, a very difficult meeting in terms of the tone of	20	· · · ·
23 not just from one regulator, but two. The 23 Some of those areas you've mentioned, but one 24 Enterprise Act allows me, if I want to, to get advice 24 important one was that the board of the new company 25 from the Office of Fair Trading and I said I was going 24 important one was that the board of the new company 26 Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's 1 A. Yes. 2 Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's 3 A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. 3 independent advice as well. 4 This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as 5 you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered 5 its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is 6 Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the 6 mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of 9 their report delivered on 31 December that they had 9 this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of 10 plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail 10 pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman 11 in a very thorough report I didn't agree with exery 10 BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, 12 word, but they list	21	the meeting, because I said I will consider these	21	you identify on page 05619, the entry there for
24 Enterprise Act allows me, if I want to, to get advice 24 important one was that the board of the new company 25 from the Office of Fair Trading and I said I was going Page 73 Page 75 1 to exercise that right. It says nothing about going to Page 73 Page 75 1 to exercise that right. It says nothing about going to Page 73 Page 75 1 to exercise that right. It says nothing about going to Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's A. Yes. 3 independent advice as well. A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. 4 This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as First of all didn't think to end of the new company 5 you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Iman, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of 6 Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the Iman, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of 7 interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very Iman, you know, News at all because he didn't believe there 8 important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in puurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman 11 in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every Ima	22	undertakings, but I'm going to get independent advice		15 February.
25 from the Office of Fair Trading and I said I was going Page 73 25 would need to be independently chaired. Page 75 1 to exercise that right. It says nothing about going to 2 0fcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? 3 Independent advice as well. 3 4 This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as 5 you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered 6 6 Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the 7 interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very 7 8 important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in 9 9 was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and 9 11 in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every 11 in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every 12 11 of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, 12 14 important to test these ULLs against the experts who had 15 15 then presented to me. 16 original shape of the deal. 16 There were other things that Ofcom there were 17 17 Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered 18 18 have very strict measures in place to stop News 19 19	23	not just from one regulator, but two. The		Some of those areas you've mentioned, but one
Page 73Page 751to exercise that right. It says nothing about going to 21A. Yes.2Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's 31A. Yes.3independent advice as well.3A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch.4This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered 63A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch.6Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the 7interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in 9mews. He first of all din't think he should have to 77spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and 9this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman 1011in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every 11for BSky B, and that included being chairman of Sky News, 1212word, but they listed in a lot of detail 11pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman 1213told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal.for Murdoch's point of view, he considered 1414that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, beccause 15have very strict measures in place to stop News14that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, beccause 16have very strict measures in place to stop News15told me that they did have plurality concerns of the bif, eom Murdoch's point of	24	Enterprise Act allows me, if I want to, to get advice		important one was that the board of the new company
1 to exercise that right. It says nothing about going to 1 A. Yes. 2 Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's 3 A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. 4 This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as 3 A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. 5 you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered 5 is primary functions is what it says on the tin, is 6 Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the 6 news. He first of all didn't think he should have to 7 interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very 5 spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there 8 important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in 9 this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of 10 plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail 10 pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman 11 in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every 11 chairman. I think that was protent to be 12 word, but they listed in a lot of detail 10 pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman 11 in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every 11 chairman. I think that was pretty important to be	25		25	
2Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well.2Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch?3independent advice as well.3A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch.4This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very3A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch.6Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very7spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there8important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail urality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very11of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him.14important to test these UILs against the experts who had 1515And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me.17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered 1616There were other things that Ofcom there were other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at 1919Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of 2020Jamees Murdoch was very concer		Page 73		Page 75
2Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well.2Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch?3independent advice as well.3A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch.4This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal.9Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal.10Pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him.14important to test these UILs against the experts who had 1514And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me.17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered 1617There were other things that Ofcom there were other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at 1919Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of 2020Jamees Murdoch was very concerned, for ex				
4This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered of com to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very4I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is6Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very5is primary functions is what it says on the tin, is7interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very7spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there8important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail8was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and10plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail10pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman11in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every11of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News,13plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very13chairman. I think that was pretty important to him.14important to test these UILs against the experts who had14And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was15told me that they did have plurality concerns with the15then presented to me.16original shape of the deal.16There were other things that Ofcom there were17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered18have very strict measures in place to stop News18that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because </th <th>1</th> <td>to exercise that right. It says nothing about going to</td> <td>1</td> <td>A. Yes.</td>	1	to exercise that right. It says nothing about going to	1	A. Yes.
5you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered5its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is6Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the6news. He first of all didn't think he should have to7interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very7spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there8important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in8was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and9their report delivered on 31 December that they had9this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of10plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail10pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman11in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every11of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News,12word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their12and he though the would he wanted to continue to be13plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very13chairman. I think that was pretty important to him.14important to test these UILs against the experts who had14And Ofcom did not want that, and so theys ot hat was15told me that they did have plurality concerns with the15then presented to me.16original shape of the deal.16There were other things that Ofcom there were17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered18have very strict measures in place to stop News18that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because18have very str				
6Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very6news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there8important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in 98was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and9their report delivered on 31 December that they had 109this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be11in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very limportant to test these UILs against the experts who had to do me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal.14And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me.17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered the believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at 1916There were other things that Ofcom there were the redisposal you see a sense of this from some of 202021Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first 2121a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other23Then the second thing which was very important 2223lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was a concersion there that there was a dispute.24was and this was a concern that was regularly raised 2424a concession there that there was a dispute. <th>2</th> <th>Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's</th> <th>2</th> <th>Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch?</th>	2	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's	2	Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch?
7interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very7spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there8important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in8was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and9their report delivered on 31 December that they had9this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of10plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail10pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman11in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every11of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News,12word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their12and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be13plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very13chairman. I think that was pretty important to him.14important to test these UILs against the experts who had14And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was15told me that they did have plurality concerns with the15then presented to me.16original shape of the deal.16There were other things that Ofcom there were17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered17other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to18that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because18have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at19Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of20J	2 3	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well.	2 3	Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch?A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch.
7interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very7spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there8important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in8was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and9their report delivered on 31 December that they had9this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of10plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail10pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman11in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every11of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News,12word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their12and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be13plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very13chairman. I think that was pretty important to him.14important to test these UILs against the experts who had14And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was15told me that they did have plurality concerns with the15then presented to me.16original shape of the deal.16There were other things that Ofcom there were17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered17other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to18that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because18have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at19Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of20J	2 3 4	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as	2 3 4	Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch?A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch.I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of
9their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail9this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and het hought he would he wanted to continue to be11in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every11of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be12word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their12and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be13plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very13chairman. I think that was pretty important to him.14important to test these UILs against the experts who had14And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was15told me that they did have plurality concerns with the15then presented to me.16original shape of the deal.16There were other things that Ofcom there were17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered17other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to18that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because18have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at19Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of20James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that21Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first21a contercial r	2 3 4 5	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered	2 3 4 5	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is
10plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail10pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman11in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every11of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News,12word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their12and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be13plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very13chairman. I think that was pretty important to him.14important to test these UILs against the experts who had14And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was15told me that they did have plurality concerns with the15then presented to me.16original shape of the deal.16There were other things that Ofcom there were17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered17other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to18that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because18have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at19Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of20James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that23Then the second thing which was very important23lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was24was and this was a concern that was regularly raised24a concession there that there was a dispute.25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was p	2 3 4 5 6	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the	2 3 4 5 6	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to
11in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every11of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News,12word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their12and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be13plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very13chairman. I think that was pretty important to him.14important to test these UILs against the experts who had14And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was15told me that they did have plurality concerns with the15then presented to me.16original shape of the deal.16There were other things that Ofcom there were17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered17other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to18that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because18have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at19Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of20James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that21Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first21a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other23Then the second thing which was very important23lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was24was and this was a concern that twas regularly raised24a concession there that there was a dispute.25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This wa	2 3 4 5 6 7	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very	2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there
12word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their12and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be13plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very13chairman. I think that was pretty important to him.14important to test these UILs against the experts who had14And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was15told me that they did have plurality concerns with the15then presented to me.16original shape of the deal.16There were other things that Ofcom there were17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered17other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to18that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because18have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at19Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of20James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that21Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first21a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other23Then the second thing which was very important23lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was24was and this was a concern that was regularly raised24a concession there that there was a dispute.25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and
13plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very13chairman. I think that was pretty important to him.14important to test these UILs against the experts who had14And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was15told me that they did have plurality concerns with the15then presented to me.16original shape of the deal.16There were other things that Ofcom there were17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered17other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to18that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because18have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at19Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of20James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that21Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first21a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other23Then the second thing which was very important23lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was24was and this was a concern that was regularly raised24a concession there that there was a dispute.25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of
14important to test these UILs against the experts who had told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal.14And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me.16original shape of the deal.16There were other things that Ofcom there were17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because16There were other things that Ofcom there were19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at 2019Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of 2120James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that21Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first thing.21a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other23Then the second thing which was very important 2423lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was a concession there that there was a dispute.24was and this was a concern that this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman
15told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal.15then presented to me.16original shape of the deal.16There were other things that Ofcom there were17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because16There were other things that Ofcom there were18that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because18have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at their disposal you see a sense of this from some of 2120James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that 2121Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first thing.21a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other 2223Then the second thing which was very important 2423lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was 2424was and this was a concern that twas regularly raised 2524a concession there that there was a dispute.25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News,
16original shape of the deal.16There were other things that Ofcom there were17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered17other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to18that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because18have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at19Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of20James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that21Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first21a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other22thing.2261 per cent of the shares and that might mean that he23Then the second thing which was very important23lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was24was and this was a concern that was regularly raised24a concession there that there was a dispute.25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be
17Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at 2017other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at 2019Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of 2120James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that21Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first 2221a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other22thing.2261 per cent of the shares and that might mean that he23Then the second thing which was very important 2423lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was a concession there that there was a dispute.24by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him.
18that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because18have very strict measures in place to stop News19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at19Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent.20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of20James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that21Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first21a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other22thing.2261 per cent of the shares and that might mean that he23Then the second thing which was very important23lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was24was and this was a concern that was regularly raised24a concession there that there was a dispute.25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very important to test these UILs against the experts who had	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him. And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was
19he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at their disposal you see a sense of this from some of 2119Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent. James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other 61 per cent of the shares and that might mean that he lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was a concession there that there was a dispute.25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very important to test these UILs against the experts who had told me that they did have plurality concerns with the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him. And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me.
20their disposal you see a sense of this from some of20James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that21Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first21a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other22thing.2261 per cent of the shares and that might mean that he23Then the second thing which was very important2324was and this was a concern that was regularly raised2425by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very important to test these UILs against the experts who had told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him. And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me. There were other things that Ofcom there were
21Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first thing.21a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other 61 per cent of the shares and that might mean that he lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was a concession there that there was a dispute.23Then the second thing which was very important was and this was a concern that was regularly raised by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,21a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other 61 per cent of the shares and that might mean that he lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was a concession there that there was a dispute.25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very important to test these UILs against the experts who had told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal. Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him. And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me. There were other things that Ofcom there were other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to
22thing.2261 per cent of the shares and that might mean that he23Then the second thing which was very important23lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was24was and this was a concern that was regularly raised24a concession there that there was a dispute.25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very important to test these UILs against the experts who had told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal. Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him. And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me. There were other things that Ofcom there were other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to have very strict measures in place to stop News
23Then the second thing which was very important23lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was24was and this was a concern that was regularly raised24a concession there that there was a dispute.25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very important to test these UILs against the experts who had told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal. Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him. And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me. There were other things that Ofcom there were other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to have very strict measures in place to stop News Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent. James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that
24was and this was a concern that was regularly raised24a concession there that there was a dispute.25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very important to test these UILs against the experts who had told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal. Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at their disposal you see a sense of this from some of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him. And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me. There were other things that Ofcom there were other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to have very strict measures in place to stop News Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent. James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that
25by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage,25This was presented to me, and I wrote to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very important to test these UILs against the experts who had told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal. Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at their disposal you see a sense of this from some of Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him. And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me. There were other things that Ofcom there were other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to have very strict measures in place to stop News Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent. James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other
	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very important to test these UILs against the experts who had told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal. Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at their disposal you see a sense of this from some of Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first thing.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him. And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me. There were other things that Ofcom there were other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to have very strict measures in place to stop News Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent. James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other 61 per cent of the shares and that might mean that he
Page 74 Page 76	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very important to test these UILs against the experts who had told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal. Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at their disposal you see a sense of this from some of Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first thing. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him. And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me. There were other things that Ofcom there were other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to have very strict measures in place to stop News Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent. James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other 61 per cent of the shares and that might mean that he lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was
	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Ofcom, but I said I was going to ask for Ofcom's independent advice as well. This was not welcome to Mr Murdoch, because, as you'll see from some of his exchanges, he considered Ofcom to be an organisation that was hostile to the interests of News Corp, but I thought it was very important to do so because it was Ofcom who had said in their report delivered on 31 December that they had plurality concerns, and they listed in a lot of detail in a very thorough report I didn't agree with every word, but they listed in a lot of detail what their plurality concerns were, and I thought it was very important to test these UILs against the experts who had told me that they did have plurality concerns with the original shape of the deal. Now, from Mr Murdoch's point of view, he considered that was tantamount to wanting to kill the deal, because he believed that Ofcom would use every mechanism at their disposal you see a sense of this from some of Mr Michel's comments about Ofcom. So that was the first thing. Then the second thing which was very important was and this was a concern that was regularly raised by opponents of the bid, even at this early stage, 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. In other words, it wouldn't be Mr James Murdoch? A. That was a very, very significant thing for Mr Murdoch. I mean, you know, News Corporation thinks that one of its primary functions is what it says on the tin, is news. He first of all didn't think he should have to spin off Sky News at all because he didn't believe there was a plurality issue with the original proposal, and this was going to cost him hundreds of millions of pounds more; but secondly, he was at the time chairman of BSkyB, and that included being chairman of Sky News, and he thought he would he wanted to continue to be chairman. I think that was pretty important to him. And Ofcom did not want that, and so they so that was then presented to me. There were other things that Ofcom there were other concerns. There was a concern that they wanted to have very strict measures in place to stop News Corporation buying additional shares above 39 per cent. James Murdoch was very concerned, for example, that a commercial rival would come in and purchase the other 61 per cent of the shares and that might mean that he lost control of Sky News forever, and so there was a concession there that there was a dispute. This was presented to me, and I wrote to

19 (Pages 73 to 76)

1	James Murdoch with all the outstanding areas of	1	issues, but it takes time to go through all those
2	disagreement between himself, Ofcom and the OFT, and	2	responses and that's what my officials were doing. Then
3	I gave him 24 hours to back down on every single one of	3	they were discussing with Ofcom and the OFT whether they
4	them. So I said, you know, I support Ofcom, I support	4	felt there was substance to any of the points that were
5	the OFT, and if we're going to accept these UILs, we're	5	raised, and then when they did find there was substance
6	going to consider them and start the consultation,	6	to some of them, they then went back to News Corporation
7	I need to know that you will back down. I think I sent	7	to ask for further safeguards.
8	that on 15 February.	8	One of the original in the original UILs, one of
9	Q. You did, and within your 24-hour deadline on 16 February	9	the safeguards in terms of editorial independence was
10	they came back with further revisions to the UILs which	10	that the Broadcasting Code, which includes political
11	met the four concerns, or which at least purported to.	11	impartiality, and there was a big worry about political
12	You sought further advice from Ofcom and OFT on that.	12	impartiality being preserved at Sky News if News
13	The advice came back on 1 March and that advice was	13	Corporation owned 100 per cent of it, so the
14	generally speaking that the plurality concerns were now	14	Broadcasting Code was going to be written into the
15	met. Is that fair?	15	Articles of Association. That was a very significant
16	A. Yes. In fact, I think I had legal advice as early as	16	point.
17	14 February that in principle I could accept the UILs if	17	But in the consultation responses, people suggested
18	I wanted to and allow the deal to go through, but Ofcom	18	we should go further than this and so we decided that we
19	and the OFT still had these concerns, and I said I want	19	would suggest that the Secretary of State had to approve
20	to get to the bottom of these concerns and I want them	20	the Articles of Association for the new company. We
21	to be addressed, and so we didn't get the final advice	21	made the point that there had to be a monitoring trustee
22	from Ofcom until just before 3 March.	22	who would check that in the process of being spun off
23	Q. After overnight work on 2 and 3 March, which we know	23	the spirit of the undertakings was being observed, and
24	about from material in KRM 18 when the UILs were tweaked	24	we also insisted on some kind of protection for the new
25	and more importantly redactions were made to them on	25	company because we recognised that Sky News gets a lot
	Page 77		Page 79
1	grounds of commercial sensitivity, you gave an	1	of cross-marketing on other Sky channels and we wanted
1		1	of cross-marketing on other 5ky channels and we wanted
2	approvement to Parliament that you were minded to	2	to make sure that that continued under the new
2	announcement to Parliament that you were minded to accept the LILLs on 3 March, but that there was going to	$\begin{vmatrix} 2\\ 3 \end{vmatrix}$	to make sure that that continued under the new arrangement.
3	accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to	3	arrangement.
3 4	accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on	3 4	arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in
3 4 5	accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March.	3	arrangement.
3 4 5 6	accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March.A. I think 21 March.	3 4 5 6	arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now.
3 4 5 6 7	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the 	3 4 5	arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on
3 4 5 6 7 8	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 	3 4 5 6 7	arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now.
3 4 5 6 7	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the 	3 4 5 6 7 8	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you,
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. 24 March there was also a meeting with the coalition. 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm afraid it's in the second volume.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. 24 March there was also a meeting with the coalition. You asked Ofcom and the OFT to provide further advice on 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm afraid it's in the second volume. A. Is it on the screen, because I can perhaps have a look
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. 24 March there was also a meeting with the coalition. You asked Ofcom and the OFT to provide further advice on the carriage and brand licence agreements, but that took 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm afraid it's in the second volume. A. Is it on the screen, because I can perhaps have a look at it there, because I can't find it
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. 24 March there was also a meeting with the coalition. You asked Ofcom and the OFT to provide further advice on the carriage and brand licence agreements, but that took a period of time before it arrived. Indeed, it didn't 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm afraid it's in the second volume. A. Is it on the screen, because I can perhaps have a look at it there, because I can't find it Q. Yes, it's come up. This is from your PPS, isn't it?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. 24 March there was also a meeting with the coalition. You asked Ofcom and the OFT to provide further advice on the carriage and brand licence agreements, but that took a period of time before it arrived. Indeed, it didn't arrive, I think, until 22 June, so there was a period of 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm afraid it's in the second volume. A. Is it on the screen, because I can perhaps have a look at it there, because I can't find it Q. Yes, it's come up. This is from your PPS, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. So expressing your view. Your two special advisers are copied in. It gives us some flavour of where you are at
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. 24 March there was also a meeting with the coalition. You asked Ofcom and the OFT to provide further advice on the carriage and brand licence agreements, but that took a period of time before it arrived. Indeed, it didn't arrive, I think, until 22 June, so there was a period of apparent delay, without seeking to apportion any blame 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm afraid it's in the second volume. A. Is it on the screen, because I can perhaps have a look at it there, because I can't find it Q. Yes, it's come up. This is from your PPS, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. So expressing your view. Your two special advisers are
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. 24 March there was also a meeting with the coalition. You asked Ofcom and the OFT to provide further advice on the carriage and brand licence agreements, but that took a period of time before it arrived. Indeed, it didn't arrive, I think, until 22 June, so there was a period of apparent delay, without seeking to apportion any blame for it, between March and June. Is that the picture? 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm afraid it's in the second volume. A. Is it on the screen, because I can perhaps have a look at it there, because I can't find it Q. Yes, it's come up. This is from your PPS, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. So expressing your view. Your two special advisers are copied in. It gives us some flavour of where you are at
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. 24 March there was also a meeting with the coalition. You asked Ofcom and the OFT to provide further advice on the carriage and brand licence agreements, but that took a period of time before it arrived. Indeed, it didn't arrive, I think, until 22 June, so there was a period of apparent delay, without seeking to apportion any blame for it, between March and June. Is that the picture? A. Yes. The reason for that principally was the 40,000 responses, it was a genuine consultation. We were 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm afraid it's in the second volume. A. Is it on the screen, because I can perhaps have a look at it there, because I can't find it Q. Yes, it's come up. This is from your PPS, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. So expressing your view. Your two special advisers are copied in. It gives us some flavour of where you are at this time because it may be relevant to one of the KRM 18 documents: "Sorry for keeping you hanging on earlier. SoS has
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. 24 March there was also a meeting with the coalition. You asked Ofcom and the OFT to provide further advice on the carriage and brand licence agreements, but that took a period of time before it arrived. Indeed, it didn't arrive, I think, until 22 June, so there was a period of apparent delay, without seeking to apportion any blame for it, between March and June. Is that the picture? A. Yes. The reason for that principally was the 40,000 responses that we had. I mean, we had a lot of responses, it was a genuine consultation. We were looking through those responses to see whether there 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm afraid it's in the second volume. A. Is it on the screen, because I can perhaps have a look at it there, because I can't find it Q. Yes, it's come up. This is from your PPS, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. So expressing your view. Your two special advisers are copied in. It gives us some flavour of where you are at this time because it may be relevant to one of the KRM 18 documents: "Sorry for keeping you hanging on earlier. SoS has read the covering letters and advice from OFT and Ofcom,
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. 24 March there was also a meeting with the coalition. You asked Ofcom and the OFT to provide further advice on the carriage and brand licence agreements, but that took a period of time before it arrived. Indeed, it didn't arrive, I think, until 22 June, so there was a period of apparent delay, without seeking to apportion any blame for it, between March and June. Is that the picture? A. Yes. The reason for that principally was the 40,000 responses that we had. I mean, we had a lot of responses, it was a genuine consultation. We were looking through those responses to see whether there were relevant comments. A lot of the responses were 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm afraid it's in the second volume. A. Is it on the screen, because I can perhaps have a look at it there, because I can't find it Q. Yes, it's come up. This is from your PPS, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. So expressing your view. Your two special advisers are copied in. It gives us some flavour of where you are at this time because it may be relevant to one of the KRM 18 documents: "Sorry for keeping you hanging on earlier. SoS has read the covering letters and advice from OFT and Ofcom, but not the amended documents in full yet which he is
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. 24 March there was also a meeting with the coalition. You asked Ofcom and the OFT to provide further advice on the carriage and brand licence agreements, but that took a period of time before it arrived. Indeed, it didn't arrive, I think, until 22 June, so there was a period of apparent delay, without seeking to apportion any blame for it, between March and June. Is that the picture? A. Yes. The reason for that principally was the 40,000 responses that we had. I mean, we had a lot of responses, it was a genuine consultation. We were looking through those responses to see whether there were relevant comments. A lot of the responses were about competition issues, which I wasn't allowed to 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm afraid it's in the second volume. A. Is it on the screen, because I can perhaps have a look at it there, because I can't find it Q. Yes, it's come up. This is from your PPS, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. So expressing your view. Your two special advisers are copied in. It gives us some flavour of where you are at this time because it may be relevant to one of the KRM 18 documents: "Sorry for keeping you hanging on earlier. SoS has read the covering letters and advice from OFT and Ofcom, but not the amended documents in full yet which he is keen to do Monday so I've scheduled him some time for
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 accept the UILs on 3 March, but that there was going to be a public consultation, which would expire on 27 March. A. I think 21 March. Q. 21 March, pardon me, that's correct. We know what the fruits of that consultation were. There were 40,000 responses. Most of them were hostile to the UILs; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. 24 March there was also a meeting with the coalition. You asked Ofcom and the OFT to provide further advice on the carriage and brand licence agreements, but that took a period of time before it arrived. Indeed, it didn't arrive, I think, until 22 June, so there was a period of apparent delay, without seeking to apportion any blame for it, between March and June. Is that the picture? A. Yes. The reason for that principally was the 40,000 responses that we had. I mean, we had a lot of responses, it was a genuine consultation. We were looking through those responses to see whether there were relevant comments. A lot of the responses were 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 arrangement. So it was a further strengthening of these UILs in a way that made Sky News massively more independent of James Murdoch than it was then or indeed is now. Q. Thank you. The advice came back from OFT and Ofcom on 22 June. By 24 June, you'd given some preliminary consideration to it. There's one email I'd like you, Mr Hunt, to look at, please. It's in the file of primary documents under tab 120, page number 05121. I'm afraid it's in the second volume. A. Is it on the screen, because I can perhaps have a look at it there, because I can't find it Q. Yes, it's come up. This is from your PPS, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. So expressing your view. Your two special advisers are copied in. It gives us some flavour of where you are at this time because it may be relevant to one of the KRM 18 documents: "Sorry for keeping you hanging on earlier. SoS has read the covering letters and advice from OFT and Ofcom, but not the amended documents in full yet which he is

20 (Pages 77 to 80)

1	"SoS talked to Jon"	1	consequence that you then indicated you would refer to
2	That's Jon Zeff, of course, who is the lead policy	2	the CC and then on 13 July the bid was withdrawn.
3	adviser on this, isn't he?	3	A. Yes.
4	A. Yes.	4	Q. In the circumstances of which we're all aware.
5	Q. " and I briefly on his way out of the building. In	5	A. Yes.
6	principle SoS would like to aim for an announcement on	6	Q. That is the formal process. We've taken it quite
7	Thursday next week"	7	quickly, in about 20 minutes, but can I give you this
8	So this is an announcement which would be to	8	opportunity. Is there any aspect, Mr Hunt, that you
9	Parliament, would it?	9	would like to draw out particularly from this formal
10	A. Yes.	10	process which we haven't, you feel, properly covered?
11	Q. " subject to giving further thought to Ofcom and	11	A. Well, I think the bit that we haven't touched on, which
12	OFT's advice and studying the docs in more detail on	12	I think is relevant to these considerations, is the way
13	Monday. He understands the challenges with that	13	the phone hacking issue was developing, sort of in
14	specifically in agreeing redacted docs but thinks we	14	parallel to decisions about this bid.
15	should push News Corp to have redactions done for Tues	15	I sort of think the phone hacking happened, as far
16	night. He's also not minded to give more than the	16	as I was concerned, in three stages. The first stage
17	statutory 7 days for further consultation."	17	was on 26 January, when Operation Weeting started, so we
18	These are your preliminary views, which as it	18	had a moment there where we were having a proper, full
19	happened did not depart much from your final views, once	19	police investigation into these issues and there had
20	we see what happened on 30 June.	20	been lots of discussion prior to that as to whether this
21	The last paragraph has been either cut off or	21	had been investigated properly or not, and Assistant
22	redacted off, it's not altogether clear:	22	Commissioner Sue Akers was starting that very rigorous
23	"I think you were going to take up with colleague	23	process.
24	and News the viability of this. If there are any show	24	So my perspective at this point is: this is a police
25	stoppers [again I can't read what follows] it might	25	matter.
	Page 81		Page 83
1	be good to discuss at/in the margins of the Monday	1	Then, I think, on if I remember rightly, on
2	morning coms meeting."	2	8 April, News International announced that phone hacking
3	Was the idea that Mr Smith would speak to News about	3	had gone much more widely than was suggested in the
4	the viability of this?	4	Clive Goodman case and that potentially thousands of
5	A. I don't think it was particularly that Mr Smith should,	5	people had been affected by it, and what I wanted to
6	but I think the sense of that is that someone should.	6	know at that stage was: should that impact on my
7	Q. Thank you. On 30 June you make your announcement to	7	consideration of media plurality?
8	Parliament. Because we were only now looking at amended	8	We sought legal advice I think the same day,
9	UILs and there had already been a consultation on the	9	actually we didn't get it for about ten days, but we
10	first version, the statutory consultation period could	10	sought legal advice about whether phone hacking was
11	be very short, and you indicated that it could close, as	11	relevant. The general advice we'd been getting was:
12	it did, on 8 July; is that correct?	12	just as I shouldn't allow policy issues to impinge on my
13	A. That's correct, yes.	13	decision-making on media plurality, so phone hacking
14	Q. And you received in that short period of time 156,000	14	shouldn't impinge on it either. This was an extraneous
15	responses. Virtually all were, again, anti, weren't	15	matter.
16	they?	16	But the advice we got on 18 April did say that the
17	A. Yes.	17	one way that phone hacking could impinge was if they
18	Q. What happened thereafter is well known, but we're going	18	thought there was an issue of trust, so that accepting
19	to have to look at underlying documents as well. On	19	undertakings basically meant that you had to be
20	11 July you wrote to OFT and Ofcom asking them whether	20	confident that you could trust the people that you were
21	the responses to the second consultation led them to	21	doing a deal with over those undertakings.
22	reconsider any part of their advice, but on that	22	So at that stage it was a matter about
23	self-same day, News Corp withdrew the UILs	23	News International. It wasn't a matter that there was
		24	any evidence at all that it affected News Corporation
24	A. Mm.		
24 25	Q probably with the intention but certainly with the	25	executives that we were dealing with. We thought they

21 (Pages 81 to 84)

1	had a problem with a company that was part of News	1	contingently when the UILs were being considered in the
2	Corporation group, but there was no evidence, and we	2	context of whether you could trust the company to be
3	didn't think we'd have any legally robust basis to	3	loyal to the UILs.
4	suggest at that stage there was an issue of trust.	4	Your view was in April there was insufficient
5	Then I'm sorry to be a bit lengthy, but I just	5	evidence, but your view changed in July, that there
6	think it's important to understand why I wrote the final	6	might be sufficient evidence. That's really the nub of
7	letter that I wrote to Ofcom, because it is you know,	7	it, isn't it?
8	I think it's an important indication of the way we	8	A. Yes. And then I followed the procedure that I'd
9	approached the bid.	9	followed consistently, which was to seek an independent
10	Then we had the horrific Milly Dowler revelations on	10	view about that before I took a decision.
11	4 July, which I don't think anyone could not have been	11	But just to answer Lord Justice Leveson's point, we
12	touched by, and then a couple of days later News	12	didn't get that advice back from Ofcom and the OFT,
13	Corporation announced that they were closing the News of	13	because in the event the bid was withdrawn just a couple
14	the World.	14	of days after we sent the letter asking Ofcom for that
15	That, for me, was a very, very significant moment	15	advice.
16	because then I began to wonder whether there could be	16	Q. Mr Hunt, we've looked at the formal process and it's all
17	a management issue that spread beyond News International	17	documented. There is also a process within the
18	to News Corp, and even if it wasn't an issue of trust,	18	department which is evidenced by a range of emails which
19	even if I accepted that the people that we were	19	you've disclosed and there are also some text messages.
20	negotiating the UILs with, we were doing so in good	20	I'm going to deal with it chronologically, but I have to
21	faith, I asked myself, if they found it necessary to	21	take it in sections otherwise we're going to be darting
22	close down a whole newspaper this is a big, big deal	22	around too much material. We've going to look first of
23	for a company like News Corporation is there	23	all at what the emails might demonstrate and then we're
24	a corporate governance issue here? Is this a company	24	going to look at the text messages, but the emails will
25	that actually doesn't have control of what's going on in	25	be looked at chronologically. The first one is in the
	Page 85		Page 87
1	its own company, even if the management don't know about	1	second supplementary file under tab IND at page 07747.
2	what's happening?	2	A. 007?
3	So it was really that and, of course, the fact that	3	Q. 07747, under the tab IND.
4	there was a plurality issue with a big newspaper being	4	A. Yes.
5	closed down and the fact that Ofcom had been asked to	5	Q. We're on 27 January, where we have evidence here that
6	investigate whether BSkyB was a fit and proper licence	6	the two-week period which is being referred to in the
7	holder for a broadcasting licence, those came together.	7	context of OFT and Ofcom was their advice on the UILs;
8	So a week after the Milly Dowler revelations I wrote to	8	is that correct?
9	both Ofcom and the OFT to ask them whether they still	9	A. Yes.
10	stood by the advice they'd given me at the end of June	10	Q. And we can see that Mr Smith sent an email back to
11	that plurality considerations had been addressed by the	11	various people indicating that he had a conversation
12	UILs as they did then.	12	with you about the two weeks. He says:
13	Q. Yes.	13	"I agree, Jeremy was pretty clear to me he wanted it
14	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that advice available? The advice	14	done in two weeks unless, having looked at it, they come
15	as to the impact of phone hacking?	15	back with a good reason for needing longer."
16	MR JAY: It's referred to in some of the documents we're	16	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I think we just ought to explain what
17	going to look at fairly shortly.	17	a UIL is, for those who may not be quite as familiar as
18		18	we've become with this concept.
19	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good.		
1	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: As a matter of law, Mr Hunt, what you've said is	19	If you refer to the Competition Commission, then
20	MR JAY: As a matter of law, Mr Hunt, what you've said is correct on my understanding, that the intervention	19 20	there's a complete process that analyses probably at
	MR JAY: As a matter of law, Mr Hunt, what you've said is correct on my understanding, that the intervention notice which Dr Cable promulgated on 4 November 2010 was		there's a complete process that analyses probably at great length all the features surrounding this
20	MR JAY: As a matter of law, Mr Hunt, what you've said is correct on my understanding, that the intervention notice which Dr Cable promulgated on 4 November 2010 was on one ground only under the Enterprise Act and	20	there's a complete process that analyses probably at
20 21	MR JAY: As a matter of law, Mr Hunt, what you've said is correct on my understanding, that the intervention notice which Dr Cable promulgated on 4 November 2010 was	20 21	there's a complete process that analyses probably at great length all the features surrounding this
20 21 22	MR JAY: As a matter of law, Mr Hunt, what you've said is correct on my understanding, that the intervention notice which Dr Cable promulgated on 4 November 2010 was on one ground only under the Enterprise Act and	20 21 22	there's a complete process that analyses probably at great length all the features surrounding this particular bid, and the idea of an undertaking in lieu, which is what a UIL means, is that the company seeking to acquire says to you, the Secretary of State, "Well,
20 21 22 23	MR JAY: As a matter of law, Mr Hunt, what you've said is correct on my understanding, that the intervention notice which Dr Cable promulgated on 4 November 2010 was on one ground only under the Enterprise Act and therefore it could not be appropriate to take into	20 21 22 23	there's a complete process that analyses probably at great length all the features surrounding this particular bid, and the idea of an undertaking in lieu, which is what a UIL means, is that the company seeking

22 (Pages 85 to 88)

1	D. We will give you the following undertaking or	1	pro-Murdoch and at the same time the Labour Director of
2	make the following promises to cope with your concerns,	2	Communications was contacting all Labour front benchers
3	and in that way avoid the complexity, complication,	3	with, you know, the line that you shouldn't link phone
4	time, all the rest of it, of a referral to the	4	hacking and which was obviously something that the
5	Competition Commission, because if we can make promises	5	Murdochs would welcome.
6	that satisfy your concerns, then there won't be	6	Q. Wasn't the irony possibly this, that both you and
7	a necessity to do it."	7	Mr Smith appreciated that privately you were
8	That's what you were doing, talking about UILs.	8	pro-Murdoch, although of course you had to follow
9	They were then making promises to you as to how they	9	a proper legal process which had the appearances of
10	would organise their affairs, to see whether that coped	10	being anti-Murdoch?
11	with the concerns which had been expressed to you	11	A. No. Because we weren't following a process for
12	through the OFT and Ofcom, and therefore by April your	12	appearances sake. I mean, I did not know what the
13	question becomes: well, they're making these promises,	13	independent advice I would get back from Ofcom and the
14	but is there a question about whether I should be	14	OFT was. If Ofcom had said that the undertakings were
15	accepting promises in the light of what is being	15	not financially viable, I would have taken that very
16	revealed in another subsidiary of News Corp?	16	seriously sorry, if OFT had said they weren't
17	A. That's right.	17	financially viable, I would have taken that very
18	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And that's the concern that gets	18	seriously. If Ofcom had said that the undertakings
19	greater throughout July.	19	didn't meet plurality concerns, I would have taken that
20	A. That's correct.	20	very seriously.
21	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Have I correctly understood it?	21	So we pushed the boat off the pier, but we didn't
22	A. Absolutely.	22	know where the boat was going to end up, so that was
23	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I thought I had, but just in case it	23	a very it was a very different process to the way
24	wasn't, that was the point.	24	I think you've described it, if I may say.
25	MR JAY: Thank you. The next document we're going to look	25	Q. Okay. Under tab SS.B, further forward in the same file,
	Page 89		Page 91
1	at is under tab SS.Aa at page 07931. Mr Smith forwards	1	page 08096, now you're communicating with your other
2	to you, if you have it, an email on behalf of	2	special adviser, Sue Beeby, do you see that?
3	Ed Miliband's director of strategy, who is Tom Baldwin.	$\begin{vmatrix} 2\\ 3 \end{vmatrix}$	A. Mm-hm.
4	Are you with me on that?	4	Q. You say:
5	A. Yes.	5	"Both our favourite journalists, Andy Porter and
6	Q. 07931. It was to the effect that Labour spokespeople	6	Patrick Foster"
7	should " avoid linking hacking with the BSkyB bid, to	7	Who do they work for?
8	accept ministerial assurances that meetings with	8	A. I think one worked for the Telegraph and the other for
9	Rupert Murdoch are not influencing that process and to	9	the Times.
10	ensure that complaints about tapping are made in	10	Q. " have texted me asking for an exclusive on"
11	a personal, not shadow ministerial capacity.	11	That bit has been redacted out, I'm not exactly sure
12	And then you emailed back Mr Smith:	12	why.
13	"Classic!! Something for the dispatch box or to use	13	"Could we think of something exclusive we can give
14	any time we are accused of being pro-Murdoch."	14	each of them either on that or perhaps something around
15	That's a sort of private joke, I suppose, between	15	News Corp. Let's chat tomorrow."
16	you and Mr Smith, is it?	16	And then:
17	A. I don't think it was particularly a private joke. We	17	"Your special adviser has spoken to Mr Foster.
18	saw great irony in the fact that first of all we had	18	I have spoken to Patrick and given him" I'm not sure
19	a process where we weren't being pro-Murdoch, we were	19	what that is, "exclusive."
20	actually doing things that James Murdoch was very cross	20	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that something "nothing at all to
21	about. At that stage on 2 February, we had said that	21	do with our business"?
22	even though we didn't have to, we were going to go back	22	A. Yes.
23	to Ofcom to ask what they thought about the UILs, and he	23	MR JAY: "This is on the proviso that he writes a bit about
24	was pretty furious about that, but at the same time	24	Labour he's happy to do that. Andy will want [then
25	so we're getting these accusations that we were being	25	it's all redacted out] before we officially announce it.
1	Page 90		Page 92
<u>ا</u>	-		-

23 (Pages 89 to 92)

1 Shall we chat about this har as it's a bit more 1 Q. Because it's clear that Mr Smith acted on that visa-vis 2 sensitive, as is anything on News Corp. ² Mr Michel, but if's relevant to understand on what basis 4 practice of feeding favourie journalists stories; is he might have done on. We can see Mr Smith was copied 6 A. Hinks when you're you know, you're managing you're A. (Nod hered). A. (Nod hered). 6 A. Hinks when you're you know, you're managing you're A. (Nod hered). Back to tho SS. A.g. March now, page 07957. What had 7 media as eithere ongopolitic an exclusive and I vas just In this date Enders had provided a note, a critical one, on 11 that they'l give it a good show. S0 I hink both those That was forwarded to you by MS Smith, that's clear from 13 give them some kind of an exclusive and I vas just In this furth, T minuse 14 the was there may inormalists.' M.S. 15 Q. Was there any inormalists.' M.m. 16 Q. We know from other evidence that News Corp's initial reaction was communicated to Nr. Smith by Mr Michel. Did 16 Q. We know from other evidence that New Corp's initial reaction was communicated to Nr. Smith by Mr Michel. Did 17 </th <th></th> <th></th> <th>1</th> <th></th>			1	
2 sensitive, as is anything on News Corp." 2 M. Michel, but if's relevant to understand on what basis 3 Imean, this is an example of no doubt fairly common 3 he might have done so. We can see Mr Smith was copied 4 In this is due to the construction of mogorithm or in governments, you 5 0.	1	Shall we chat about this later as it's a bit more	1	Q. Because it's clear that Mr Smith acted on that vis-a-vis
3 Image, this is an example of no doubt fairly common 4 3 Image in the ima	2		2	
4 practice of feeding favourite journalists stories; is 4 in on this email. 5 that righ? in on this email. 5 6 A. I think when you're you know, you're managing your 6 A. Reach. 0 Bake a choice. You can sometimes put a story out to 7 media as either in opposition or in governments, your 7 have a choice. You can sometimes put a story out to 9 this date to hS.S.A., 8 March now, page 07957. What had 9 have a choice. You can sometimes put a story out to 9 this date to hS.S.A., 8 March now, page 07957. What had 10 all, or you give a journalists an exclusive and I was just 1 that mey a choice. a this date to hS.S.A. 11 they if you it is good show. So I think hot those 10 That was forwardied to you what the described as News Corp's initial 12 Jews in the most kind of a nexclusive and I was just - Thewe 11 that? 13 there may incoy them with any gist or Thewe 14 that? 14 there was incoy there with any gist or Thewe 14 that? 14 there any incoy them with any gist or Thewe 14 you wout in the nearclos to the case			1	
5 A. Fubick Wen you're – you know, yon're managing your 5 A. Clock to the SS. A. 8 Mach now, page 07957. What had 6 A. Think Wen you're – you can sometimes put a story out to 8 This date Enders hud provided a note, a critical one, on 7 wet you, in which case it might not get picked up at 1 1 1 10 all, or you give a journalist an exclusive on the basis 10 That was forwarded to you by Mr. Smith, that's clear from 11 that they'l give it a good show. So I think hoth those 11 11 the bottom of page 07957, and them M. Smith, 17 minuses 12 two journalists? 10 That was forwarded to you by Mr. Smith, that's clear from 13 give them some kind of an exclusive and I was just 13 initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see 14 theory initial 16 C. We know from other evidence that News Curp's initial 16 term "favourite journalists? 10 That was forwardin the hurdle to the 2 March 2011 20 A. Not theory you recident the wess of the 2 March 2011, rage 07977, rave 11 21 two send to buy dive using to be about 37.30 10 March 2004/bit have happened. 21 vas meeter than on thupe theory on think it was ji		- · ·	1	-
6 A. I think when you're - you know, you're managing your 6 Q. Back to tab SS.A.a. 8 March now, page 07957. What had 7 media as ethics: no poposition or in governments, you have a choice. You can sometimes put a story out to o 9 everyone, in which case It night not get picked up at o this date Enders had provided a note, a critical one, on 10 all, or you give a journalist an exclusive and I was just this blate Enders had provided a note, a critical one, on 11 that they'll give it a good show. So I think both those 11 That was forwarded to you by Mr Smith, that's char from 12 use may incomption, then, in the use of the initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see 13 favourie journalists? 14 that? 14 that? initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see 15 A. Mm. 15 A. Mm. 16 the store than I Kawe many journalists. 16 Q. We know from other evidence that News Corp's initial 17 reaction to the inders 17 reaction to the inders 10 18 A. No, I think I was just - they are two people that I - was really saying. A. I didn't know it to be the case, but I wouldn't have 20 Q. Okay.			1	
7 media as either in opposition or in governments, your 7 happenel, Mr Hunt, so that we have one bearings, is on 8 have a choice. You can sometimes put a story out to 8 this date Enders had provided a note, a critical one, on 9 everyone, in which case it might not get picked up at 1 this date Enders had provided a note, a critical one, on 10 all, or you give a journalist an exclusive and I was just 10 That was forwarded to you by Mr Smith, that's clear from 12 two journalists had contacted me asking me if I could 13 initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see 13 give them some kind of an exclusive and I was just 13 initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see 14 passing on that request to Sue Beeby. 14 that 15 Q. Was there any inory then, Mr Hunt, in the use of the 14 that' 18 favourie journalists? 14 4 14 19 A. Nor, I 20 Q. Was were then but quite well and to so it was just - they 20 A. Min, 21 I was really saying. 22 Q. Did he to your recollection have a discussion with you 23 I was really saying. 23 I was really saying. <td></td> <td>-</td> <th>1</th> <td></td>		-	1	
8 have a choice. You can sometimes put a story out to severyone, in which case it might not get picked up at all, or you give a journalist an ecubasive on the hasis it that they'll give it a good show. So I think hot those b this date Enders had provided a note, a critical one, on the ULs. This was part of the consultation process. 11 atl, or you give a journalist an ecubasive on the hasis give them some kind of an esclasive and I was just passing on that request to Sue Beeby. Initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see that? 12 Q. Was there any irony then, MF Hunt, in the use of the term "favourile journalists?" or do we read that Io Q. We know from other evidence that News Corp's initial reaction was communicated to Mr Smith by Mr Michel. Did you when bote the case at the time?" 13 A. No, I think Y may just - they are two people that I - we knew them both quite well and so I was just - L knew 21 Io Anne, 10 Q. We know that to be the case, but I wouldn't have been surprised to know that to be the wes, bour I wouldn't have been surprised to know that the the wescorp reaction was coming via Mr Michel. 12 I was really asying. A. I didn't know it to be the case, but I wouldn't have been surprised to know that the the wescorp reaction was coming via Mr Michel. 14 I was really asying. A. No to my recollection, but i might have happened. 15 A. Yes. Iimpression that if a nemail like this was sent on to you, if it was reflexiplananory, then you'd dal with it witho is under table to Palainnent.				— —
9 everyone, in which case it might not get picked up at all, or you give a journalist nexclusive on the basis that they fill give it a good show. So I think both these it too journalists had contacted me asking me if I could is give them some kind of an exclusive and I was just initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see that? That was forwarded to you by MS simith, Har's clear from the they fill give it a good show. So I think both these initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see that? 15 Q. Was there any irony then, MF Hunt, in the use of the term "favourite journalists", or do we read that if arourite journalists? 15 A. Mm. 16 term "favourite journalists," or do we read that? 16 Q. We know from other evidence that News Corp's initial reaction was communicated to Mr Smith by Mr Michel. Did you know that to be the case, but I wouldn't have been surprised to know that the News Corp craction was coming via Mr Michel. 20 O kay. Th leave that one and go forward in time but abackward in the bundle to the 2 March 2011, page 0787, which is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. Page 93 20 1 impression that if an email file think was sent on to 2 2 21 A. Nets. in the moming, and then are to Parliament. Page 93 1 impression that if an email file think was sent on to 2 2 2 Q. A meeting which, you chained. in the source, soon the word tab is the next page. You can be you see the third line: 9 1 impression that if an email file think was sent on to 2 2 3			1	
10 all, or you give a journalist an exclusive on the basis that they'fl give it a good show. So I think both those that they'fl give it a good show. So I think both those that they'fl give it a good show. So I think both those that they'fl give it a good show. So I think both those that they'fl give it a good show. So I think both those that they fl give it a good show. So I think both those that they fl give it a good show. So I think both those initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see that? 13 give them some kind of an exclusive and I was just initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see that? 14 14 passing on that request to Sue Beeus. 15 A. Man. 16 term "favourite journalists", or do we read that if avoarite journalists? 16 Ve know from other evidence that News Corp's initial reaction was communicated to Mr Smith by Mr Michel. Did you know that to be the case at the time? 19 A. No, I think Y was just - they are two people that 1 we knew them both quite well and so I may gournalists. That was all 20 0. No, I think Y was just - they are two people that 1 we here them bother to the 2 March 2011, page 07787, which is under tha IND. The evening of 2 March. 20 0. Did March 2011, page 07787, 20 20 A. Not I may recollection, but i might have happened. 21 A. Yes. 1 impression that if an email like this was sent on to you, if it was self-explanatory, then you'd del with if withing in the morning, that's going to be about a 7.30 5 1 impression that if an email like this was sent on to you, would in the na			1	•
11 that they'll give if a good show. So I think both those 11 the bottom of page 07957, and then Mr Smith, 17 minutes 12 two journalists had contacted me asking me if I could 12 later, also sent you what he described as News Corp's 14 passing on that request to Sue Beeby. 14 them both of an exclusive and I was just 15 Q. Was there any irony then, Mr Hunt, in the use of the 16 Q. We know from other evidence that News Corp's initial 17 literally, as they were chosen because they are your 17 reaction was communicated to Mr Smith by Mr Michel. Did 20 A. No, I think I was just - t hey are two people that I 19 A. I didn't know it to be the case, but I wouldn't have 21 I was really saying. 20 O. Did he to your recollection have a discussion with you 22 I was really saying. 20 A. I didn't know it to be the case, but I wouldn't have 23 Q. O (Aay. I'' lite as and po forward in time but 24 A. Not to ny recollection, but it night have happened. 23 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the 3 without a discussion, but if it warranted a discussion, 3 in the moring, and the nater to Parliament. 16 impression that if an ernall like dindiary courus of things <td></td> <td></td> <th>1</th> <td></td>			1	
12 two journalists had contacted me asking me if I could 12 later, also sent you what he described as News Corp's 13 give them some kind of an exclusive and I was just initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see 14 that? initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see 15 Q. Was there any irony then, Mr Hunt, in the use of the 16 16 term 'favourite journalists', or do we read that 16 17 reaction was communicated to Mr Smith by Mr Michel. Did 18 A. No, I think I was just - they are two people that I 19 A. No, I think I was just - they are two people that I 20 we knew them both quite well and so I was just - I knew 21 I was really saying. 22 Q. Okay. III leave that one and go forward in time but 23 Q. Okay. TII leave that one and go forward in time but 24 backward in the bundle to the 2 March 2011, page 07787, 25 which is under tabl ND. The evening of 2 March. 26 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the 3 announcement you're going to make to the markets first 4 thing in the morning, and then later to Parliament. 7 Nee, the therdi			1	
13 give them some kind of an exclusive and I was just 13 initial reaction to the Enders analysis. Do you see 14 passing on that request to Sue Beehy. 14 that? 14 passing on that request to Sue Beehy. 15 A. Mm. 16 term "favourite journalists", or do we read that 16 Q. We know from other evidence that News Corp's initial 17 hiterally, as they were chosen because they are your 16 A. Mm. 18 wo know them both quite well and so I was just - I knew 17 A. I didn't know it to be the case at the time? 19 A. No, I think I was just - they are two people that 1 18 wo know that to be the case, but I wouldn't have 20 Was really saying. 22 Q. Did he to your recollection, but it might have a discussion with you 23 Q. Okay. II leave that one and go forward in time but 24 A. Not on yrecollection, but it might have happened. 25 wich is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. Page 93 Page 95 1 A. Yes. 1 impression that if are enail like tils was sent on to 2 2 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the 3 without a discussion, but if was astelf-explanatory, then youd deal wi			1	
14 passing on that request to Sue Beeby. 14 that? 15 Q. Was there any irony then, MF Hunt, in the use of the term "favourite journalists", or do we read that 16 Q. We know from other evidence that News Corp's initial 17 literally, as they were chosen because they are your favourite journalists." 17 Reads on the evidence that News Corp's initial 18 favourite journalists." O. We know from other evidence that News Corp's initial 19 A. No, I think I was just they are two people that I we knew them both quite well and so I was just I knew 17 I dian't know it to be the case, but I wouldn't hare 20 O. Kay. Til leave that one and go forward in time but 20 Did to to your recollection have a discussion with you about News Corp's initial reaction or not? 21 I was really saying. 22 O. Did to to your recollection have a discussion with you about News Corp's initial reaction or not? 23 Q. Okay. Til leave that one and go forward in time but 23 about News Corp's initial reaction or not? 24 A. Yes. I impression that if an email like this was sent on to 2 25 was ubstance in the morning, that's going to be about at 7.30 impression that if an email like this was sent on to 36 The relvant part of this is the next page. You can				-
15 Q. Was there any irony then, Mr Hunt, in the use of the 15 A. Mm. 16 term "favourite journalists", or do we read that 16 Q. We know from other evidence that News Corp's initial 18 favourite journalists, and the same time operation is the same time and go forward in time but 17 reaction was communicated to Mr Smith by Mr Michel. Did 20 we knew them both quite well and so I was just - I haw as all 18 you know that to be the case, but I wouldn't have 21 Was really saying. 20 No, I think I was just - they are two people that I 20 22 Q. Okay. TII leave that one and go forward in time but 21 backward in the bundle to the 2 March 2011, page 07787, 22 Q. Did he to your recollection have a discussion with you 23 Q. Okay. TII leave that one and go forward in time but 24 A tot on yrecollection, but i might have happened. 25 which is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. 29 Q. Because throughout this process are we to gain the 3 announcement you're going to make to the markets first in thing in the morning, that's going to be about a 7.30 1 impression that if an email life this was self. 4 the relevant part of this is the next page. You can 5 have one with Mr. Smith? <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><th></th><td></td></td<>				
16 term "favourite journalists", or do we read that 16 Q. We know from other evidence that News Corp's initial 17 fitterally, as they were chosen because they are your 17 reaction was communicated to Mr Smith by Mr Michel. Did 18 you know that to be the case at the time? 18 you know that to be the case, but I wouldn't have 20 No, I think I was just - they are two people that I - 19 A. I didn't know it to be the case, but I wouldn't have 20 O. Okay. I'll leave that one and go forward in time but 20 Lo the to your recollection have a discussion with you 23 Q. Okay. I'll leave that one and go forward in time but 21 A. Not to my recollection, but i might have happened. 25 which is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. 22 Q. Because throughout this process are we to gain the 2 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the impression that if an email like this was sent on to 3 you, if it was self-explanatory, then you'd deal with it you would in the natural and ordinary course of things 5 in the morning, and the later to Parliament. 5 have one with Mr Smith? 6 The relevant part of this is the next page. You can 6 News. They would alawe thought that we could send them			1	
17 literally, as they were chosen because they are your 17 reaction was communicated to Mr Smith by Mr Michel. Did 18 favourite journalists? 17 reaction was communicated to Mr Smith by Mr Michel. Did 20 A. No, I think I was just - they are two people that I 18 you know that to be the case, but I wouldn't have 21 I was really saying. 20 A. I didn't Know it to be the case, but I wouldn't have 22 Q. Okay. TII leave that one and go forward in time but 23 about News Corp's initial reaction or not? 23 Q. Okay. TII leave that one and go forward in time but 20 backward in the bundle to the 2 March 2011, page 07787, 24 backward in the bundle to the 2 March 2011, page 07787, 24 A. Not to my recollection, but I might have happened. 25 which is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. 25 Q. Because throughout this process are we to gain the 26 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the announcement you're going to make to the markets first 1 impression that if an email like this was sent on to 2 Q. A meeting which hay thay beging to be about a 7.30 1 impression that if warnated a discussion, you would in the natural procell this is the next page. You can 1 1 7 <				
 18 favourite journalists? 19 A. No, I think I was just - they are two people that I 20 we knew them both quite well and so I was just - I knew 21 them better than I knew many journalists. That was all 22 I was really saying. 23 Q. Okay. TIl leave that one and go forward in time but 24 backward in the bundle to the 2 March 2011, page 07787, 25 which is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. 26 Page 93 1 A. Yes. 20 A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the 3 announcement youre going to make to the markets first 4 thing in the morning, and then later to Parliament. 5 in the morning, and then later to Parliament. 6 The relevant part of this, the new journal sits. Do 8 you see the third line: 9 Twould have thought that we could send them 10 [that's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? 13 of the FN" 14 That's the press notice. 15 A. That's the press notice. 16 A. That's the prisen store. 17 A. That's the press notice. 18 Docs one draw the inference that authorisation was 19 being sought and given to give News Corp at 11 the same time as we communicate our decision, but 12 grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy 13 of the FN" 14 That's the press notice. 15 A. That's the press notice. 16 Q. "Could we show them that the same time (assuming that's reading the process for the process so 12 taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there 13 announcement to which was going to be made by press 14 That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? 15 A. That's the press notice. 16 Q. "Could we show them that at he same time (assuming that's reading the process for the process so 13 announcement to hich was going to be made by press 14 that was all that was talking about. 15 that was all that was talking about. 16 the they oh harve notice of that in advance, and I think 25 that was all that was talking about. 26 that was all that was talking about. 			1	· ·
 A. No, I think I was just - they are two people that I - we knew them both quite well and so I was just - I knew we knew them both quite well and so I was just - I knew them better than I knew many journalists. That was all I was really saying. Q. Okay. TIl leave that one and go forward in time but backward in the bundle to the 2 March 2011, page 07787, which is under tab ID. The evening of 2 March. Page 93 A. Yes. Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the announcement you're going to make to the markets first thing in the morning, that's going to be about a 7.30 belp us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do for the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the testime time as we communicate our decision, but the testime time as we communicate our decision, but the try seriously and tried to understand if there grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the FN" A. That's the press notice. Would we thought that the same time (assuming that ti is readly by then)?" A. That's the press notice. C. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that ti is readly by then)?" A. That's the announcement which was going to be advance notice of the FN" A. That's the announcement, is it? A. That's the prime that the same time (assuming that that was all that was talking about. 			1	-
20 we knew them both quite well and so I was just I knew 20 been surprised to know that the News Corp reaction was coming via Mr Michel. 21 I was really saying. 20 O. Okay. I'll leave that one and go forward in time but backward in the bundle to the 2 March 2011, page 07787, which is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. Page 93 20 O. Because throughout this process are we to gain the Page 95 1 A. Yes. 20 Because throughout this process are we to gain the morning, that's going to be about at 7.30 1 impression that if an email like this was sent on to 2 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the announcement you're going to make to the markets first thing in the morning, and then later to Parliament. 1 impression that if an email like this was sent on to 3 you would in the natural and ordinary course of things have one with Mr Sinh? 4 you would in the natural and ordinary course of things have one with Mr Sinh? 6 The relevant part of this is the next page. You can 7 6 A. Yes. 9 "I would have though that we could send them 9 particular part of the bid in great detail, but if 11 the same time as we communicate our decision, but 11 written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there 16 (br PN		-	1	-
21 them better than I knew many journalists. That was all 21 coming via Mr Michel. 22 Q. Okay. I'll leave that one and go forward in time but 23 Q. Okay. I'll leave that one and go forward in time but 23 23 Q. Okay. I'll leave that one and go forward in time but 24 A. Not to my recollection have a discussion with you 25 which is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. Page 93 A. Not on my recollection, but it migh have happened. 26 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the announcement you're going to make to the markets first 1 impression that if a nemail like this was sent on to 2 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is the next page. You can 1 impression that if an email like this was sent on to 3 you would in the matural and ordinary course of things 5 have one with Mr Smith? 6 The relevant part of this is the next page. You can 6 A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how 7 help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do 8 kept me informed. I don't actually recall this 9 'I would have thought that we could send them 10 Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had 11 the same time as we communicate our decision, but<			1	
 I was really saying. O. Okay. III leave that one and go forward in time but backward in the bundle to the 2 March 2011, page 07787, which is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. Page 93 A. Yes. Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the announcement you're going to make to the markets first thing in the morning, and then later to Parliament. The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: " twould have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? A. That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? Does one draw the inference that authorisation was Does one draw			1	
 23 Q. Okay. I'll leave that one and go forward in time but backward in the bundle to the 2 March 2011, page 07787, which is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. Page 93 24 A. Not to my recollection, but if might have happened. Page 93 25 Which is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. Page 93 26 A. Yes. 27 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the anouncement you're going to make to the markets first thing in the morning, and then later to Parliament. 3 The relevant part of this is the next page. You can be pus with this, please, because it may assist us. Do syous eet the hird line: 9 "I would have thought that we could send them 9 [That's the Pitsen time is we communicate our decision, but 1 the same time as we communicate our decision, but 1 the same time as we communicate our decision, but 11 the same time as we communicate our decision, but 12 a. A. Yes. 13 of the PN" 14 That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? 14 That's the press notice. 15 A. That's the press notice. 16 Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?" 18 Does one draw the inference that authorisation was 19 being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice 19 being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice 10 of the announcement there that and practice went you make an announcement the hard and practice went you make an announcement the hard and practice went you make an announcement to Parliament about a particular company 24 A. Yes. I think that's nobel believe that I had any 25 that was all that was talking about. 26 Descretion, I's that's the pressonice. 27 Could we show thern that at the same time (assuming that it is standard practice went you make an announcement to Parliament about a particular company 27 A. That's the press no				-
 24 backward in the bundle to the 2 March 2011, page 07787, which is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. Page 93 A. Not to my recollection, but it might have happened. 25 Q. Because throughout this process are we to gain the Page 95 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the announcement you're going to make to the markets first 4 thing in the morning, and then later to Parliament. 6 The relevant part of this is the next page. You can 7 help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you used the third line: 9 "I would have thought that we could send them 10 [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at 11 the same time as we communicate our decision, but 12 grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy 13 of the PN" 14 That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? 15 A. That's the parliamentary announcement, is it? 16 Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?" 17 could we show them that at the same time (assuming that 16 Jo Because that I would be involved in, because 17 it is ready by then)?" 18 Does one draw the inference that authorisation was 19 being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice 20 of the announcement which was going to be made by press 21 notice at 7.30 am on 3 March? 22 A. T believe that it is standard practice when you make an 23 announcement to Parliament advance, and I think 25 that was all that was talking about. 24 A. Not to my recollection, but in 25 that was all that was talking about. 				
25 which is under tab IND. The evening of 2 March. 25 Q. Because throughout this process are we to gain the Page 93 26 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the announcement you're going to make to the markets first 1 impression that if an email like this was sent on to 2 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the announcement you're going to make to the markets first 1 impression that if an email like this was sent on to 3 announcement you're going to make to the markets first 3 without a discussion, but if it warranted a discussion, 4 thing in the morning, that's going to be about at 7.30 5 in the morning, and then later to Parliament. 6 The relevant part of this is the next page. You can 6 A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how 7 help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do 7 closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he 8 kept me informed. I don't actually recall this 9 particular part of the bid in great detail, but if 10 Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had 11 written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have 12 grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy 12 taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there				-
Page 93Page 951A. Yes.1impression that if an email like this was sent on to2Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the2you, if it was self-explanatory, then you'd deal with it3announcement you're going to make to the markets first3without a discussion, but if it warranted a discussion,4thing in the morning, that's going to be about at 7.304you would in the natural and ordinary course of things5in the morning, and then later to Parliament.5have one with Mr Smith?6The relevant part of this is the next page. You can6A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how7help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do7closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he8kept me informed. I don't actually recall this9particular part of the bid in great detail, but if10[that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at10Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had11the same time as we communicate our decision, but11written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have12grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy12taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there13of the PN"13was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might14That's the press notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really15A. That's the prese notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it was an process so16 <t< td=""><td></td><td>· -</td><th>1</th><td></td></t<>		· -	1	
1 A. Yes. 1 impression that if an email like this was sent on to 2 Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the announcement you're going to make to the markets first impression that if an email like this was sent on to 3 announcement you're going to make to the markets first announcement you're going to make to the markets first announcement you're going to make to the markets first 4 thing in the morning, that's going to be about at 7.30 without a discussion, but if it warranted a discussion, 5 in the morning, and then later to Parliament. bave one with Mr Smith? 6 A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how 7 help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do sept me informed. I don't actually recall this 9 "I would have thought that we could send them 9 particular part of the bid in great detail, but if 10 [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at 10 Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had 11 the same time as we communicate our decision, but 11 writen with some concerns about the UILs, we would have 12 grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy 13 was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might 13 boes one draw	25		25	
2Q. A meeting which you chaired. This is in advance of the announcement you're going to make to the markets first thing in the morning, that's going to be about at 7.302you, if it was self-explanatory, then you'd deal with it3announcement you're going to make to the markets first thing in the morning, and then later to Parliament.3without a discussion, but if it warranted a discussion, you would in the natural and ordinary course of things have one with Mr Smith?6The relevant part of this is the next page. You can thelp us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line:4Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this9"I would have thought that we could send them (Itat's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN"10Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was ubstance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and to it is ready by then)?"13was ubstance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that any a process that I would be involved in, because16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?"16a process that I would be involved in, because17it is ready by then)?"17essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was peing sought				1 450 > 0
3announcement you're going to make to the markets first thing in the morning, that's going to be about at 7.30 in the morning, and then later to Parliament.3without a discussion, but if it warranted a discussion, you would in the natural and ordinary course of things have one with Mr Smith?6The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do 86A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if7Industry the same time as we communicate our decision, but 1110Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and ti tis ready by then)?"1114That's the press notice. (Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?"13a process that I would be involved in, because essentially because I wanted to structure the process so that 1 basically no one would believe that I had any kind of discretion, I was following independent advice, giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was really my own discretion, really the negotiations at this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp, so I was being informed of what was going on, but in terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	1	A. Yes.	1	impression that if an email like this was sent on to
4thing in the morning, that's going to be about at 7.304you would in the natural and ordinary course of things5in the morning, and then later to Parliament.5have one with Mr Smith?6The relevant part of this is the next page. You can6A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how7help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do7closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he8you see the third line:9particular part of the bid in great detail, but if9"I would have thought that we could send them9particular part of the bid in great detail, but if10[that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at10Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had11the same time as we communicate our decision, but11written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have12grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy12taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there13of the PN"13was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might14That's the perss notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that16a process that I would be involved in, because17it is ready by then)?"17essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I - basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Cor	2	· · · ·	2	
5in the morning, and then later to Parliament.5have one with Mr Smith?6The relevant part of this is the next page. You can6A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how7help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do7closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he8you see the third line:8kept me informed. I don't actually recall this9"I would have thought that we could send them9particular part of the bid in great detail, but if10[that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at10Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had11the same time as we communicate our decision, but11written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have12grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy12taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there13of the PN"13was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might14That's the press notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that16a process that I would be involved in, because17it is ready by then)?"17essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I - basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March	3	announcement you're going to make to the markets first	3	
6The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do6A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this9"I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN"10Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had uriten with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wated to let me know that that was happening and what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really a process that I would be involved in, because16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?"1617it is ready by then)?"1718Does one draw the inference that authorisation was 191819being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice 101920of the announcement which was going to be made by press 212021A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an announcement to Parliament about a particular company 242125that twas talking about.2326that was talking about.2427that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think 252526that was talking about.25	4	thing in the morning, that's going to be about at 7.30	4	
7help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do7closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he8you see the third line:8kept me informed. I don't actually recall this9"I would have thought that we could send them9particular part of the bid in great detail, but if10[that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at10Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had11the same time as we communicate our decision, but11written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have12grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy12taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there13of the PN"13was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might14That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it?14have wanted to let me know that that was happening and15A. That's the press notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that16a process that I would be involved in, because17it is ready by then)?"17essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice,20of the announcement which was going to be made by press20giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was21				
8you see the third line:8kept me informed. I don't actually recall this9"I would have thought that we could send them9particular part of the bid in great detail, but if10[that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at10Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had11the same time as we communicate our decision, but11written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have12grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy12taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there13of the PN"13was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might14That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it?14have wanted to let me know that that was happening and15A. That's the press notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that16a process that I would be involved in, because17it is ready by then)?"17essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice,20of the announcement which was going to be made by press20giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large22A. I believe that it is	5	-		have one with Mr Smith?
9"I would have thought that we could send them9particular part of the bid in great detail, but if10[that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at10Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had11the same time as we communicate our decision, but11written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have12grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy12taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there13of the PN"13was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might14That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it?14have wanted to let me know that that was happening and15A. That's the press notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that16a process that I would be involved in, because17it is ready by then)?"17essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think24so I was being informed of what was going on, but i		-	5	have one with Mr Smith?
10[that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at10Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had11the same time as we communicate our decision, but11written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have12grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy12taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there13of the PN"13was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might14That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it?14have wanted to let me know that that was happening and15A. That's the press notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that16a process that I would be involved in, because17it is ready by then)?"17essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice,20of the announcement which was going to be made by press20giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think24so I was being informed of what was going on, bu	6	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can	5 6	have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how
11the same time as we communicate our decision, but11written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have12grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy12taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there13of the PN"13was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might14That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it?14have wanted to let me know that that was happening and15A. That's the press notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that16a process that I would be involved in, because17it is ready by then)?"17essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice,20of the announcement which was going to be made by press20giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that was all that was talking about.25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do	5 6 7	have one with Mr Smith?A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he
12grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy12taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there13of the PN"13was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might14That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it?14have wanted to let me know that that was happening and15A. That's the press notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that16a process that I would be involved in, because17it is ready by then)?"17essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice,20of the announcement which was going to be made by press20giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think24so I was being informed of what was going on, but in25that was all that was talking about.25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them	5 6 7 8	have one with Mr Smith?A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this
13of the PN"13was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might14That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it?14have wanted to let me know that that was happening and15A. That's the press notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that16a process that I would be involved in, because17it is ready by then)?"17essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large22A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an22part removing my discretion, really the negotiations at23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think24so I was being informed of what was going on, but in25that was all that was talking about.25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them	5 6 7 8 9	 have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if
14That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it?14have wanted to let me know that that was happening and15A. That's the press notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that16a process that I would be involved in, because17it is ready by then)?"16essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice,20of the announcement which was going to be made by press20giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large22A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an22part removing my discretion, really the negotiations at23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think24so I was being informed of what was going on, but in25that was all that was talking about.25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9 10 11	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but	5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had
15A. That's the press notice.15what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that16a process that I would be involved in, because17it is ready by then)?"16essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice,20of the announcement which was going to be made by press20giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large22A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an22part removing my discretion, really the negotiations at23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9 10 11 12	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there
16Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?"16a process that I would be involved in, because17is ready by then)?"17essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice,20of the announcement which was going to be made by press20giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large22A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an22part removing my discretion, really the negotiations at23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9 10 11 12	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there
17it is ready by then)?"17essentially because I wanted to structure the process so18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice,20of the announcement which was going to be made by press20giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large22A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an22part removing my discretion, really the negotiations at23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think24so I was being informed of what was going on, but in25that was talking about.25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN" That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it?	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and
18Does one draw the inference that authorisation was18that I basically no one would believe that I had any19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice,20of the announcement which was going to be made by press20giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large22A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an22part removing my discretion, really the negotiations at23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think24so I was being informed of what was going on, but in25that was talking about.25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN" That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? A. That's the press notice.	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and
19being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice19kind of discretion, I was following independent advice,20of the announcement which was going to be made by press20giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large22A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an22part removing my discretion, really the negotiations at23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think24so I was being informed of what was going on, but in25that was talking about.25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN" That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? A. That's the press notice. Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really
20of the announcement which was going to be made by press20giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large22A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an22part removing my discretion, really the negotiations at23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think24so I was being informed of what was going on, but in25that was talking about.25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN" That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? A. That's the press notice. Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?"	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really a process that I would be involved in, because
21notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?21really my own discretion for making or to a large22A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an22part removing my discretion, really the negotiations at23announcement to Parliament about a particular company23this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp,24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think24so I was being informed of what was going on, but in25that was all that was talking about.25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN" That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? A. That's the press notice. Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?" Does one draw the inference that authorisation was	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really a process that I would be involved in, because essentially because I wanted to structure the process so
22A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an announcement to Parliament about a particular company that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think that was all that was talking about.22part removing my discretion, really the negotiations at this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp, so I was being informed of what was going on, but in terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN" That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? A. That's the press notice. Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?" Does one draw the inference that authorisation was being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really a process that I would be involved in, because essentially because I wanted to structure the process so that I basically no one would believe that I had any
23announcement to Parliament about a particular company that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think 2523this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp, so I was being informed of what was going on, but in terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN" That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? A. That's the press notice. Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?" Does one draw the inference that authorisation was being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really a process that I would be involved in, because essentially because I wanted to structure the process so that I basically no one would believe that I had any kind of discretion, I was following independent advice, giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was
24that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think24so I was being informed of what was going on, but in25that was all that was talking about.24so I was being informed of what was going on, but in25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN" That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? A. That's the press notice. Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?" Does one draw the inference that authorisation was being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice of the announcement which was going to be made by press notice at 7.30 am on 3 March?	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really a process that I would be involved in, because essentially because I wanted to structure the process so that I basically no one would believe that I had any kind of discretion, I was following independent advice, giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was really my own discretion for making or to a large
25that was all that was talking about.25terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN" That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? A. That's the press notice. Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?" Does one draw the inference that authorisation was being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice of the announcement which was going to be made by press notice at 7.30 am on 3 March? A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really a process that I would be involved in, because essentially because I wanted to structure the process so that I basically no one would believe that I had any kind of discretion, I was following independent advice, giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was really my own discretion for making or to a large part removing my discretion, really the negotiations at
-	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN" That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? A. That's the press notice. Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?" Does one draw the inference that authorisation was being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice of the announcement which was going to be made by press notice at 7.30 am on 3 March? A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an announcement to Parliament about a particular company 	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really a process that I would be involved in, because essentially because I wanted to structure the process so that I basically no one would believe that I had any kind of discretion, I was following independent advice, giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was really my own discretion, really the negotiations at this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp.
Page 94 Page 96	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN" That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? A. That's the press notice. Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?" Does one draw the inference that authorisation was being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice of the announcement which was going to be made by press notice at 7.30 am on 3 March? A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an announcement to Parliament about a particular company that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think 	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really a process that I would be involved in, because essentially because I wanted to structure the process so that I basically no one would believe that I had any kind of discretion, I was following independent advice, giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was really my own discretion, really the negotiations at this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp.
	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 The relevant part of this is the next page. You can help us with this, please, because it may assist us. Do you see the third line: "I would have thought that we could send them [that's the letters to OFT and Ofcom] to News Corp at the same time as we communicate our decision, but grateful for views. They would also like to see a copy of the PN" That's the Parliamentary announcement, is it? A. That's the press notice. Q. "Could we show them that at the same time (assuming that it is ready by then)?" Does one draw the inference that authorisation was being sought and given to give News Corp advance notice of the announcement which was going to be made by press notice at 7.30 am on 3 March? A. I believe that it is standard practice when you make an announcement to Parliament about a particular company that they do have notice of that in advance, and I think that was talking about. 	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 have one with Mr Smith? A. Yes. I think that's probably slightly overstating how closely involved I was in the discussion. I think he kept me informed. I don't actually recall this particular part of the bid in great detail, but if Enders, who are a respected industry analyst, had written with some concerns about the UILs, we would have taken it very seriously and tried to understand if there was substance in them, and as I know Enders, Adam might have wanted to let me know that that was happening and what News Corp's reaction was, but it wasn't really a process that I would be involved in, because essentially because I wanted to structure the process so that I basically no one would believe that I had any kind of discretion, I was following independent advice, giving huge weight to independent advice, and it was really my own discretion for making or to a large part removing my discretion, really the negotiations at this stage were between Ofcom and the OFT and News Corp, so I was being informed of what was going on, but in terms of what the UILs should contain, I think News Corp

24 (Pages 93 to 96)

1	her om her this store that I mould listen to Officer and the	1	
1	knew by this stage that I would listen to Ofcom and the		like, we had this lock on the process that in the end we
2	OFT, so if they wanted something in as a UIL, if they	$\begin{vmatrix} 2 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$	were going to get advice from the OFT and Ofcom about
3	wanted something excluded as a UIL, it was Ofcom and the	3	the UILs before I made my decision, and it was going to
4	OFT that they had to persuade.	4	have a lot of impact on that decision.
5	Q. Yes, thank you. Can we move to the first file of	5	Q. Okay. May we move forward in time to April 2011 and
6	supplementary material. We're now on 24 March, under	6	back to the second supplementary file, tab IND,
7	tab EX.P, page 07656. 24 March is the date of the	7	page 07805.
8	meeting you're going to have with the Slaughter & May	8	A. Sorry, just give me a moment. What was the tab again,
9	team for the coalition. It was fixed for the afternoon	9	Mr Jay?
10	of that date. Do you recall that?	10	Q. IND.
11	A. Yes. Sorry, what was the page reference?	11	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: D?
12	Q. 07656. This is an email we saw last week, sent by	12	MR JAY: D, pardon me.
13	Mr Michel to Mr Smith, which contains what he calls	13	A. Yes.
14	a rebuttal document. If you look on the next page,	14	Q. I'm sorry to dart around, but I wanted to bring this out
15	07657, you'll see the Slaughter & May argument to the	15	chronologically. Page 07805. Look at the bottom of the
16	left-hand side, and then the News Corp rebuttal on the	16	page once you've found it.
17	right-hand side.	17	A. Yes.
18	A. Yes.	18	Q. You'll see an email of 18 April. The second bullet
19	Q. Is this a document which was sent to you by Mr Smith, do	19	point meshes in with what you've told us half an hour
20	you believe, in advance of the meeting?	20	ago, namely that you were giving some consideration to
21	A. Not to my recollection, no.	21	the fit and proper person issue in relation to the
22	One thing I should say, which is something that	22	News Corp/Sky merger, do you see that?
23	didn't really occur to me until I was looking at these	23	A. Yes.
24	documents closely as part of this Inquiry's process, was	24	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: PI, is that public interest?
25	that it's quite interesting, we had quite regular Page 97	25	A. Yes, it is. Page 99
	1 450 57	<u> </u>	1 age 77
1	contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from	1	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you.
1 2		1 2	
	contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from		LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you.
2	contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into	2	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as
2 3	contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously.	2 3	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is:
2 3 4	contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the	2 3 4	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it
2 3 4 5	contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter &	2 3 4 5	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap
2 3 4 5 6	contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any	2 3 4 5 6	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on
2 3 4 5 6 7	contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be	2 3 4 5 6 7	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case."
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part of, and so I wanted it to happen as briskly as possible.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously. Q. Although Mr Smith in the events which happened was not 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously. Q. Although Mr Smith in the events which happened was not in contact at all with their public relations advisers, 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part of, and so I wanted it to happen as briskly as possible.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously. Q. Although Mr Smith in the events which happened was not in contact at all with their public relations advisers, was he? A. I don't think that's material. What's material is that the points that they were making were being carefully 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part of, and so I wanted it to happen as briskly as possible. However, whenever I was asked by people who were looking through the consultation responses or by Ofcom and the OFT for more time, I would always give them more time.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously. Q. Although Mr Smith in the events which happened was not in contact at all with their public relations advisers, was he? A. I don't think that's material. What's material is that 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part of, and so I wanted it to happen as briskly as possible. However, whenever I was asked by people who were looking through the consultation responses or by Ofcom and the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously. Q. Although Mr Smith in the events which happened was not in contact at all with their public relations advisers, was he? A. I don't think that's material. What's material is that the points that they were making were being carefully considered. Q. But there may be a difference, though, between the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part of, and so I wanted it to happen as briskly as possible. However, whenever I was asked by people who were looking through the consultation responses or by Ofcom and the OFT for more time, I would always give them more time. So I wanted to make sure that everyone involved in the bid was giving it priority amongst the other things
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously. Q. Although Mr Smith in the events which happened was not in contact at all with their public relations advisers, was he? A. I don't think that's material. What's material is that the points that they were making were being carefully considered. Q. But there may be a difference, though, between the message and the messenger for these purposes, would you 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part of, and so I wanted it to happen as briskly as possible. However, whenever I was asked by people who were looking through the consultation responses or by Ofcom and the OFT for more time, I would always give them more time. So I wanted to make sure that everyone involved in the bid was giving it priority amongst the other things they had to do, but having given it that priority, I was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously. Q. Although Mr Smith in the events which happened was not in contact at all with their public relations advisers, was he? A. I don't think that's material. What's material is that the points that they were making were being carefully considered. Q. But there may be a difference, though, between the message and the messenger for these purposes, would you accept that? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part of, and so I wanted it to happen as briskly as possible. However, whenever I was asked by people who were looking through the consultation responses or by Ofcom and the OFT for more time, I would always give them more time. So I wanted to make sure that everyone involved in the bid was giving it priority amongst the other things they had to do, but having given it that priority, I was happy for them to have as long as they wanted.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously. Q. Although Mr Smith in the events which happened was not in contact at all with their public relations advisers, was he? A. I don't think that's material. What's material is that the points that they were making were being carefully considered. Q. But there may be a difference, though, between the message and the messenger for these purposes, would you accept that? A. I think what's important in the process that I was 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part of, and so I wanted it to happen as briskly as possible. However, whenever I was asked by people who were looking through the consultation responses or by Ofcom and the OFT for more time, I would always give them more time. So I wanted to make sure that everyone involved in the bid was giving it priority amongst the other things they had to do, but having given it that priority, I was happy for them to have as long as they wanted. Q. Okay. And the other point is, and it's coincident with
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously. Q. Although Mr Smith in the events which happened was not in contact at all with their public relations advisers, was he? A. I don't think that's material. What's material is that the points that they were making were being carefully considered. Q. But there may be a difference, though, between the message and the messenger for these purposes, would you accept that? A. I think what's important in the process that I was running is that we were being even-handed, we were being 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part of, and so I wanted it to happen as briskly as possible. However, whenever I was asked by people who were looking through the consultation responses or by Ofcom and the OFT for more time, I would always give them more time. So I wanted to make sure that everyone involved in the bid was giving it priority amongst the other things they had to do, but having given it that priority, I was happy for them to have as long as they wanted. Q. Okay. And the other point is, and it's coincident with the point which we've already seen:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously. Q. Although Mr Smith in the events which happened was not in contact at all with their public relations advisers, was he? A. I don't think that's material. What's material is that the points that they were making were being carefully considered. Q. But there may be a difference, though, between the message and the messenger for these purposes, would you accept that? A. I think what's important in the process that I was running is that we were being even-handed, we were being open-minded. We were listening to comments from the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part of, and so I wanted it to happen as briskly as possible. However, whenever I was asked by people who were looking through the consultation responses or by Ofcom and the OFT for more time, I would always give them more time. So I wanted to make sure that everyone involved in the bid was giving it priority amongst the other things they had to do, but having given it that priority, I was happy for them to have as long as they wanted. Q. Okay. And the other point is, and it's coincident with the point which we've already seen: "Secretary of State wants to make sure we've
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously. Q. Although Mr Smith in the events which happened was not in contact at all with their public relations advisers, was he? A. I don't think that's material. What's material is that the points that they were making were being carefully considered. Q. But there may be a difference, though, between the message and the messenger for these purposes, would you accept that? A. I think what's important in the process that I was running is that we were being even-handed, we were being open-minded. We were listening to what 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part of, and so I wanted it to happen as briskly as possible. However, whenever I was asked by people who were looking through the consultation responses or by Ofcom and the OFT for more time, I would always give them more time. So I wanted to make sure that everyone involved in the bid was giving it priority amongst the other things they had to do, but having given it that priority, I was happy for them to have as long as they wanted. Q. Okay. And the other point is, and it's coincident with the point which we've already seen: "Secretary of State wants to make sure we've thoroughly kicked the tyres on scope for invoking the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 contact from Slaughter & May, and we did right from the start of the process we did actually take into account what they said quite seriously. So when the idea of undertakings was broached in the press, somehow it got out into the press, Slaughter & May fired off a letter pretty quickly saying any undertakings would have to be structural and couldn't be behavioural and would have to be financially sustainable and that's a big question as to how you would get them to do that, and that advice we followed. So we did take what they said pretty seriously. Q. Although Mr Smith in the events which happened was not in contact at all with their public relations advisers, was he? A. I don't think that's material. What's material is that the points that they were making were being carefully considered. Q. But there may be a difference, though, between the message and the messenger for these purposes, would you accept that? A. I think what's important in the process that I was running is that we were being even-handed, we were being open-minded. We were listening to comments from the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. MR JAY: In the middle of the page, Rita recalls you as raising two points. The first is: "Are we sure the process is going as fast as it can Secretary of State keen to make decision asap post holidays. I said I thought it was but we'd stay on the case." That's the first point. Possible concern now about the delay, would you accept? A. Well, I want everything to happen quickly in government, and this had been a process that had been at this stage it had already taken four months, or the best part of, and so I wanted it to happen as briskly as possible. However, whenever I was asked by people who were looking through the consultation responses or by Ofcom and the OFT for more time, I would always give them more time. So I wanted to make sure that everyone involved in the bid was giving it priority amongst the other things they had to do, but having given it that priority, I was happy for them to have as long as they wanted. Q. Okay. And the other point is, and it's coincident with the point which we've already seen: "Secretary of State wants to make sure we've

25 (Pages 97 to 100)

1	So we're back to the same point, it's the fit and	1	A. I think that they thought that the phone hacking
2	proper person point, isn't it, which you were as it were	2	I mean, obviously it was their News International was
3	testing out for consideration?	3	part of News Corp, so they might have been more aware
4	A. Well, I wanted to know, because there is a fit and	4	than we were that there were more and more explosive
5	proper person public interest test in the	5	revelations down the track, as it were, and they were
6	Enterprise Act, and what I wanted to establish was: am	6	worried about the impact they might have, and I think
7	I able to invoke that because of the phone hacking	7	reading through Mr Michel's internal emails in KRM 18,
8	considerations? Was I able to invoke that? And I was	8	he constantly says phone hacking is they're not
9	advised that I wasn't able to do that because you can	9	taking account of phone hacking, so we don't need to
10	only invoke a public interest test once.	10	worry. That was kind of the News Corp internal view.
11	So it could have been invoked by Dr Cable when he	11	We, looking at it externally, didn't know that this
12	invoked the test on media plurality. Obviously he	12	was a volcano that was about to erupt. We just had to
13	didn't know about the phone hacking at that stage, so	13	look at the evidence of what was emerging in the media.
14	that's why he presumably didn't consider that, but we	14	We didn't know that there was worse to come. And we
15	did know about phone hacking now, so that's why I wanted	15	were just taking legal advice at every stage as to
16	to know whether I was able to invoke it, and I was told	16	whether we should have been intervening on the basis of
17	I wasn't.	17	it.
18	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: At this stage you're simply asking	18	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: What, of course, News Corp will have
19	the question?	19	known was that their Management Standards Committee,
20	A. Correct.	20	chaired by Lord Grabiner, was in the process of going
21	MR JAY: 12 May now. First volume of the supplementary	21	through materials and handing such materials as they
22	bundle, tab EX.P, page 07696. This is an email from	22	felt were appropriate to the police; is that right?
23	Mr Michel to Mr Smith. Has it come up? This is further	23	MR WHITE: Not in May. July.
24	thoughts from Mr Michel to Mr Smith. It's not forwarded	24	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much, I'm happy to be
25	to you at the time. What we see at the top of the page	25	corrected.
	Page 101		Page 103
1	refers to the disclosure exercise for this Inquiry.	1	MR JAY: If that's your interpretation, Mr Hunt, presumably
2	Just what Mr Michel says at the end:	2	that's the interpretation Mr Smith received from this at
3	"We are keen to start the consultation as quickly as	3	the time from Mr Michel. Are we in agreement?
4	possible because, in any event, the agreements are not	4	A. No, because this is not my this is not this is
5	subject to the consultation.	5	saying that's what my interpretation is now, now I know
6	"Otherwise, we won't be done before mid-June, which	6	what was happening with phone hacking. Neither myself
7	will be catastrophic for many important reasons."	7	nor Mr Smith knew the picture that was about to emerge
8	Do you happen to know what those reasons were?	8	for phone hacking.
9	A. I don't. I obviously didn't see this letter, but	9	Q. What's rather odd is that Mr Michel is expressing
10	I think with the benefit of hindsight we can probably	10	a private thought of some sensitivity to Mr Smith. He's
11	understand what he might have been talking about.	11	saying rather Delphically: unless it's done by a certain
12	Q. Can you share that with us, please?	12	date, it will be catastrophic for many important
13	A. Actually, I can't see the sentence that you're talking	13	reasons. One inference might be that Mr Smith will
14	about. I heard you read it out.	14	either know what that was or will find out. But wasn't
15	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's the last sentence in the email.	15	that notion communicated to you, Mr Hunt?
16	A. Oh, right. Well, I think that, looking at Mr Michel's	16	A. It certainly wasn't, and I'd be very surprised if
17	emails in KRM 18, his internal emails, it's very clear	17	Mr Smith had any idea whatsoever as to what those
18	that phone hacking was something that was a growing	18	Delphic reasons might be. I think that News Corp are
19	concern to News Corp, and I think they obviously were	19	a very determined company and they're always putting
20	worried that it might derail this bid, as indeed in the	20	everyone under pressure to do things quickly. I wanted
	end effectively it did.	21	to do things briskly but properly, so I think he would
21	chu checuvery n'ulu.		
22	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I see. It's the pace of the police	22	just look at that and say this is just another example
22 23	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I see. It's the pace of the police investigation and the impact on further disclosures that	22 23	of News Corp trying to pile on the pressure.
22 23 24	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I see. It's the pace of the police investigation and the impact on further disclosures that that might generate which might create more trouble; is	23 24	of News Corp trying to pile on the pressure. Q. But didn't you get the general message from Mr Smith
22 23	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I see. It's the pace of the police investigation and the impact on further disclosures that	23	of News Corp trying to pile on the pressure.

26 (Pages 101 to 104)

1	Mr Michel, namely piling on the pressure?	1	know, but I did certainly attach a lot of weight to what
2	A. No, I didn't. I didn't get that impression. You've	2	they said.
3	spoken to Mr Smith. He's a very uncomplaining, decent,	3	Q. The third substantive paragraph:
4	hard-working person, and I think he said to you that he	4	"It would be good to understand the state of play as
5	saw his job as being a buffer for me, so he saw his job	5	it does seem the timetable you outlined to me is
6	to absorb that pressure. I was very determined as	6	slipping away massively and we might want to consider
7	Secretary of State that responsibility for this bid	7	our options at this stage."
8	should not derail all the other important things that	8	So it looks as if Mr Smith had communicated
9	I had to do in my department, so I think Mr Smith saw	9	a timetable to Mr Michel and we get some understanding
10	himself as being that buffer and that was why he	10	of what that timetable was from the next sentence, would
11	wouldn't have informed me of all these conversations.	11	you agree?
12	Q. One might see that as a buffer he wouldn't inform you of	12	A. Yes.
13	all the conversations but given we are encountering here	13	Q. And in so doing, Mr Smith was acting within or without
14	a period of delay with attendant pressure from News Corp	14	his authority, in your view?
15	as one might expect, did not the general gist of the	15	A. I think entirely within his authority. He was a contact
16	message from Mr Michel be imparted to you by Mr Smith,	16	point about process. We wanted to be open and
17	namely they're getting a bit uppity now or words to that	17	transparent with News Corp about the process that we
18	effect?	18	were following that involved their company. This was
19	A. It may well have been, and it wouldn't have been any	19	nothing to do with the decision as to whether I was
20	surprise. You know, as a company they want everything	20	going to accept that the UILs met plurality concerns or
21	done at the speed of light, but I don't remember it	21	not, but to tell News Corp that we were aiming for
22	being raised with me, if I can put it this way, as	22	24 June, I think, would be absolutely a legitimate part
23	a specific issue that I needed to address.	23	of the process.
24	Q. It would just have been part of the background noise	24	Q. Okay. We can move forward in time, I think, to 28 June.
25	which was coming out at this stage, is that fair?	25	I'm afraid we're in the second volume of this
	Page 105		Page 107
1	A If Mr Smith said anything to most all	1	supplementary bundle under SS As at page 08008, which is
1	A. If Mr Smith said anything to me at all.	1	supplementary bundle under SS.Aa at page 08008, which is an email from you to Mr Smith
2	Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to	2	an email from you to Mr Smith.
2 3	Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May.	2 3	an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen.
2 3 4	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. 	2 3 4	an email from you to Mr Smith.A. I haven't quite got it on the screen.Q. The UILs which are being referred to there
2 3 4 5	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we 	2 3 4 5	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it:
2 3 4 5 6	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to 	2 3 4 5 6	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough"
2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name 	2 3 4 5 6 7	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx."
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." Was that factually correct? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx." Can you remember the context of that observation
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." Was that factually correct? A. No. It is true that I met Mr Richards most weeks 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx." Can you remember the context of that observation about the Murdochs?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." Was that factually correct? A. No. It is true that I met Mr Richards most weeks because I have a meeting about the rollout of superfast 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx." Can you remember the context of that observation about the Murdochs? A. I can't remember the exact context. We'd had 40,000
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." Was that factually correct? A. No. It is true that I met Mr Richards most weeks because I have a meeting about the rollout of superfast broadband and local television which Mr Richards came 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx." Can you remember the context of that observation about the Murdochs? A. I can't remember the exact context. We'd had 40,000 objections to the UILs that Ofcom and the OFT had said
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." Was that factually correct? A. No. It is true that I met Mr Richards most weeks because I have a meeting about the rollout of superfast broadband and local television which Mr Richards came along to, so I did see Mr Richards regularly. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx." Can you remember the context of that observation about the Murdochs? A. I can't remember the exact context. We'd had 40,000 objections to the UILs that Ofcom and the OFT had said satisfied their plurality concerns. I think it's
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." Was that factually correct? A. No. It is true that I met Mr Richards most weeks because I have a meeting about the rollout of superfast broadband and local television which Mr Richards came along to, so I did see Mr Richards regularly. If you're saying obviously for News Corp Ofcom 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx." Can you remember the context of that observation about the Murdochs? A. I can't remember the exact context. We'd had 40,000 objections to the UILs that Ofcom and the OFT had said satisfied their plurality concerns. I think it's a fairly accurate description of the mood of the country
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." Was that factually correct? A. No. It is true that I met Mr Richards most weeks because I have a meeting about the rollout of superfast broadband and local television which Mr Richards came along to, so I did see Mr Richards regularly. If you're saying obviously for News Corp Ofcom was a bete noir so they would have thoroughly objected 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx." Can you remember the context of that observation about the Murdochs? A. I can't remember the exact context. We'd had 40,000 objections to the UILs that Ofcom and the OFT had said satisfied their plurality concerns. I think it's a fairly accurate description of the mood of the country at that time, actually, and, you know, in terms of the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." Was that factually correct? A. No. It is true that I met Mr Richards most weeks because I have a meeting about the rollout of superfast broadband and local television which Mr Richards came along to, so I did see Mr Richards regularly. If you're saying obviously for News Corp Ofcom was a bete noir so they would have thoroughly objected to the idea of Ofcom being in the driving seat of 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx." Can you remember the context of that observation about the Murdochs? A. I can't remember the exact context. We'd had 40,000 objections to the UILs that Ofcom and the OFT had said satisfied their plurality concerns. I think it's a fairly accurate description of the mood of the country at that time, actually, and, you know, in terms of the Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco, the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." Was that factually correct? A. No. It is true that I met Mr Richards most weeks because I have a meeting about the rollout of superfast broadband and local television which Mr Richards came along to, so I did see Mr Richards regularly. If you're saying obviously for News Corp Ofcom was a bete noir so they would have thoroughly objected to the idea of Ofcom being in the driving seat of anything, but as far as I was concerned actually Ofcom's 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx." Can you remember the context of that observation about the Murdochs? A. I can't remember the exact context. We'd had 40,000 objections to the UILs that Ofcom and the OFT had said satisfied their plurality concerns. I think it's a fairly accurate description of the mood of the country at that time, actually, and, you know, in terms of the Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco, the concern had been expressed that if Sky News was spun
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." Was that factually correct? A. No. It is true that I met Mr Richards most weeks because I have a meeting about the rollout of superfast broadband and local television which Mr Richards came along to, so I did see Mr Richards regularly. If you're saying obviously for News Corp Ofcom was a bete noir so they would have thoroughly objected to the idea of Ofcom being in the driving seat of anything, but as far as I was concerned actually Ofcom's view was critical. I wanted to know whether Ofcom were 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx." Can you remember the context of that observation about the Murdochs? A. I can't remember the exact context. We'd had 40,000 objections to the UILs that Ofcom and the OFT had said satisfied their plurality concerns. I think it's a fairly accurate description of the mood of the country at that time, actually, and, you know, in terms of the Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco, the concern had been expressed that if Sky News was spun off, that a Murdoch family member might buy you know,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." Was that factually correct? A. No. It is true that I met Mr Richards most weeks because I have a meeting about the rollout of superfast broadband and local television which Mr Richards came along to, so I did see Mr Richards regularly. If you're saying obviously for News Corp Ofcom was a bete noir so they would have thoroughly objected to the idea of Ofcom being in the driving seat of anything, but as far as I was concerned actually Ofcom's view was critical. I wanted to know whether Ofcom were satisfied that plurality concerns were being addressed 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx." Can you remember the context of that observation about the Murdochs? A. I can't remember the exact context. We'd had 40,000 objections to the UILs that Ofcom and the OFT had said satisfied their plurality concerns. I think it's a fairly accurate description of the mood of the country at that time, actually, and, you know, in terms of the Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco, the concern had been expressed that if Sky News was spun off, that a Murdoch family member might buy you know,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q. Turn over the page to 07697. This is Mr Michel again to Mr Smith, 29 May. A. Sorry, I don't have it yet. There we are. Q. It's been redacted for some reason, the name, but we know from KRM 18 that this is a reference to Ed Richards, okay, so we might as well put his name straight back in. "We are getting some feedback from OFT and MPs that Ed Richards is very much in driving seat on the agreements discussion and meeting JH regularly to update him." Was that factually correct? A. No. It is true that I met Mr Richards most weeks because I have a meeting about the rollout of superfast broadband and local television which Mr Richards came along to, so I did see Mr Richards regularly. If you're saying obviously for News Corp Ofcom was a bete noir so they would have thoroughly objected to the idea of Ofcom being in the driving seat of anything, but as far as I was concerned actually Ofcom's view was critical. I wanted to know whether Ofcom were 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 an email from you to Mr Smith. A. I haven't quite got it on the screen. Q. The UILs which are being referred to there LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not there yet. I'll read it: "Hiya. Those new UILs are pretty thorough" A. I have it now, sir. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. MR JAY: " feels like the world doesn't trust the Murdochs further than they can be thrown! What was the resolution on the issue of Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco? Thx." Can you remember the context of that observation about the Murdochs? A. I can't remember the exact context. We'd had 40,000 objections to the UILs that Ofcom and the OFT had said satisfied their plurality concerns. I think it's a fairly accurate description of the mood of the country at that time, actually, and, you know, in terms of the Murdoch family members buying shares in Newco, the concern had been expressed that if Sky News was spun off, that a Murdoch family member might buy you know,

27 (Pages 105 to 108)

1	it were, help the Murdochs gain control of the spun-off
2	Sky News through the back door, and I wanted to be sure
3	that that wasn't going to be possible in terms of the
4	way the UILs were set up.
5	Q. So this is a remark which one reads entirely
6	straightforwardly, it's your interpretation of what the
7	world at large were saying, and you were reporting that
8	back without irony to Mr Smith; is that right?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Can we move forward to July? We are still in the second
11	supplementary bundle under tab IND, a series now of
12	emails which start at 07822. There are seven of them
13	we're going to look at, or seven pages worth.
14	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Can you do this in five minutes?
15	MR JAY: Probably best to do it with a clean start.
16	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Then let's break now and we'll resume
17	at 2 o'clock, if that's all right with you, Mr Hunt.
18	A. Yes.
19	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much. 2 o'clock.
20	(12.58 pm)
21	(The luncheon adjournment)
22	
23	
24	
25	
	Page 109
	~

31 May 2012

Page 110

able 5:16 16:9 A 33:14 40:5 56:11 57:1 59:7 60:2 61:20 64:24 66:24 70:12 A 75:8,14 101:7 a 101:8,9,16 a absence 61:15 absolute 19:16 30:19 a	acute 38:2,15 Adam 15:12 26:3 26:22 56:2,14 56:18,21 57:13 58:1 59:24 60:4 96:13 Adam's 56:16 add 2:3 adding 64:3,4 additional 45:1 60:12 72:19 76:19 address 73:14 105:23	advisers 18:3,5 19:22 38:22 54:6 55:10,12 59:14 68:2,9 80:17 98:13 affairs 62:4 89:10 affect 31:4 afraid 48:17 80:12 107:25 afternoon 34:10 34:22 35:20 37:3 41:17	11:6 66:21 75:19 annexes 1:11 announce 40:3 92:25 announced 7:20 7:23 45:24 84:2 85:13 announcement 78:2 81:6,8 82:7 94:3,14	77:1 Arguably 32:12 43:8 argument 68:11 97:15 arguments 25:9 26:4,23 27:7 arisen 45:14 71:14 71:14	authority 107:14 107:15 available 3:18 70:15 86:14 avoid 7:6 48:25 89:3 90:7 avoidance 8:6 aware 34:1,18 35:8 44:16	42:14 43:23 45:22 46:22 61:19 65:5 68:23 76:7 94:22 96:18 97:20 believed 25:9 33:3 41:13
able 5:16 16:9 A 33:14 40:5 56:11 57:1 59:7 60:2 61:20 64:24 66:24 70:12 A 75:8,14 101:7 a 101:8,9,16 a absence 61:15 a 30:19 a absolutely 18:16 46:14 47:10	Adam 15:12 26:3 26:22 56:2,14 56:18,21 57:13 58:1 59:24 60:4 96:13 Adam's 56:16 add 2:3 adding 64:3,4 additional 45:1 60:12 72:19 76:19 address 73:14 105:23	19:22 38:22 54:6 55:10,12 59:14 68:2,9 80:17 98:13 affairs 62:4 89:10 affect 31:4 afraid 48:17 80:12 107:25 afternoon 34:10 34:22 35:20	75:19 annexes 1:11 announce 40:3 92:25 announced 7:20 7:23 45:24 84:2 85:13 announcement 78:2 81:6,8 82:7 94:3,14	Arguably 32:12 43:8 argument 68:11 97:15 arguments 25:9 26:4,23 27:7 arisen 45:14 71:14	107:15 available 3:18 70:15 86:14 avoid 7:6 48:25 89:3 90:7 avoidance 8:6 aware 34:1,18 35:8 44:16	45:22 46:22 61:19 65:5 68:23 76:7 94:22 96:18 97:20 believed 25:9 33:3 41:13
a)ie 3.10 10.9 33:14 40:5 56:11 57:1 59:7 60:2 61:20 64:24 66:24 70:12 75:8,14 101:7 101:8,9,16 abound 24:4 absence 61:15 absolute 19:16 30:19 absolutely 18:16 46:14 47:10	26:22 56:2,14 56:18,21 57:13 58:1 59:24 60:4 96:13 Adam's 56:16 add 2:3 adding 64:3,4 additional 45:1 60:12 72:19 76:19 address 73:14 105:23	54:6 55:10,12 59:14 68:2,9 80:17 98:13 affairs 62:4 89:10 affect 31:4 afraid 48:17 80:12 107:25 afternoon 34:10 34:22 35:20	annexes 1:11 announce 40:3 92:25 announced 7:20 7:23 45:24 84:2 85:13 announcement 78:2 81:6,8 82:7 94:3,14	43:8 argument 68:11 97:15 arguments 25:9 26:4,23 27:7 arisen 45:14 71:14	available 3:18 70:15 86:14 avoid 7:6 48:25 89:3 90:7 avoidance 8:6 aware 34:1,18 35:8 44:16	61:19 65:5 68:23 76:7 94:22 96:18 97:20 believed 25:9 33:3 41:13
56:11 57:1 59:7 60:2 61:20 64:24 66:24 70:12 75:8,14 101:7 101:8,9,16 abound 24:4 absolute 19:16 30:19 absolutely 18:16 46:14 47:10	56:18,21 57:13 58:1 59:24 60:4 96:13 Adam's 56:16 add 2:3 adding 64:3,4 additional 45:1 60:12 72:19 76:19 address 73:14 105:23	59:14 68:2,9 80:17 98:13 affairs 62:4 89:10 affect 31:4 afraid 48:17 80:12 107:25 afternoon 34:10 34:22 35:20	announce 40:3 92:25 announced 7:20 7:23 45:24 84:2 85:13 announcement 78:2 81:6,8 82:7 94:3,14	argument 68:11 97:15 arguments 25:9 26:4,23 27:7 arisen 45:14 71:14	70:15 86:14 avoid 7:6 48:25 89:3 90:7 avoidance 8:6 aware 34:1,18 35:8 44:16	68:23 76:7 94:22 96:18 97:20 believed 25:9 33:3 41:13
59:7 60:2 61:20 64:24 66:24 70:12 A 75:8,14 101:7 a 101:8,9,16 a abound 24:4 a absolute 19:16 30:19 absolutely 18:16 46:14 47:10	58:1 59:24 60:4 96:13 Adam's 56:16 add 2:3 adding 64:3,4 additional 45:1 60:12 72:19 76:19 address 73:14 105:23	80:17 98:13 affairs 62:4 89:10 affect 31:4 afraid 48:17 80:12 107:25 afternoon 34:10 34:22 35:20	92:25 announced 7:20 7:23 45:24 84:2 85:13 announcement 78:2 81:6,8 82:7 94:3,14	97:15 arguments 25:9 26:4,23 27:7 arisen 45:14 71:14	avoid 7:6 48:25 89:3 90:7 avoidance 8:6 aware 34:1,18 35:8 44:16	94:22 96:18 97:20 believed 25:9 33:3 41:13
61:20 64:24 A 66:24 70:12 A 75:8,14 101:7 a 101:8,9,16 a abound 24:4 a absolute 19:16 a 30:19 a absolutely 18:16 46:14 47:10	60:4 96:13 Adam's 56:16 add 2:3 adding 64:3,4 additional 45:1 60:12 72:19 76:19 address 73:14 105:23	affairs 62:4 89:10 affect 31:4 afraid 48:17 80:12 107:25 afternoon 34:10 34:22 35:20	announced 7:20 7:23 45:24 84:2 85:13 announcement 78:2 81:6,8 82:7 94:3,14	arguments 25:9 26:4,23 27:7 arisen 45:14 71:14	89:3 90:7 avoidance 8:6 aware 34:1,18 35:8 44:16	97:20 believed 25:9 33:3 41:13
66:24 70:12 A 75:8,14 101:7 a 101:8,9,16 a abound 24:4 a absence 61:15 a 30:19 a absolutely 18:16 46:14 47:10	Adam's 56:16 add 2:3 adding 64:3,4 additional 45:1 60:12 72:19 76:19 address 73:14 105:23	89:10 affect 31:4 afraid 48:17 80:12 107:25 afternoon 34:10 34:22 35:20	7:23 45:24 84:2 85:13 announcement 78:2 81:6,8 82:7 94:3,14	26:4,23 27:7 arisen 45:14 71:14	avoidance 8:6 aware 34:1,18 35:8 44:16	believed 25:9 33:3 41:13
00.24 70.12 a 75:8,14 101:7 a 101:8,9,16 a abound 24:4 a absence 61:15 a absolute 19:16 a 30:19 a absolutely 18:16 46:14 46:14 47:10	add 2:3 adding 64:3,4 additional 45:1 60:12 72:19 76:19 address 73:14 105:23	affect 31:4 afraid 48:17 80:12 107:25 afternoon 34:10 34:22 35:20	84:2 85:13 announcement 78:2 81:6,8 82:7 94:3,14	arisen 45:14 71:14	aware 34:1,18 35:8 44:16	33:3 41:13
101:8,9,16 a abound 24:4 a absence 61:15 a absolute 19:16 a 30:19 a absolutely 18:16 46:14 47:10	adding 64:3,4 additional 45:1 60:12 72:19 76:19 address 73:14 105:23	afraid 48:17 80:12 107:25 afternoon 34:10 34:22 35:20	announcement 78:2 81:6,8 82:7 94:3,14	71:14	35:8 44:16	
abound 24:4 a absence 61:15 absolute 19:16 30:19 a absolutely 18:16 46:14 47:10	additional 45:1 60:12 72:19 76:19 address 73:14 105:23	80:12 107:25 afternoon 34:10 34:22 35:20	78:2 81:6,8 82:7 94:3,14			
absence 61:15 absolute 19:16 30:19 absolutely 18:16 46:14 47:10 a	60:12 72:19 76:19 address 73:14 105:23	afternoon 34:10 34:22 35:20	82:7 94:3,14		53:10 61:24	59:7 60:15 74:19
absolute 19:16 a 30:19 a absolutely 18:16 a 46:14 47:10 a	76:19 address 73:14 105:23	34:22 35:20	· · · · · ·	arm 4:25 arm's 5:2 32:25	62:1,2 83:4	believes 28:22
30:19 a absolutely 18:16 46:14 47:10 a	address 73:14 105:23		94:20,23	arose 52:1	103:3	benchers 91:2
absolutely 18:16 46:14 47:10 a	105:23	≤ / · ≤ / · · ² /	answer 32:6 40:6	arrange 30:25	105.5	benchmark 5:12
46:14 47:10 a		47:3 49:15	42:10 53:24	arrangement	В	benefit 3:2
40.14 47.10	addressed 13:5	97:9	87:11	80:3	B 6:24 10:4 11:6	102:10
58:23 59:6	77:21 86:11	agenda 3:20	answered 51:16	arrive 78:16	B 6:24 10:4 11:6 88:25	bequeath 48:10
	106:23	10:11	answers 70:2	arrived 68:22	back 15:25 18:1	BERR 58:18
60:1,18 65:25	addressing 71:2	agent 54:4	anti 82:15	78:15	21:17 34:14	best 35:21 45:22
07.22 107.22	addressing 71.2 adherence 45:11	ago 99:20	anticipate 63:13	articles 3:3 79:15		46:4 56:3
absorb 105.0	45:15	agree 4:20 14:12	anti-Murdoch	79:20	35:4,5,6,22	100:12 109:15
abundantly	adjournment	32:19 35:13	91:10	asap 100:5	37:11 62:23 63:9 65:2 66:5	bete 106:19
50.15	109:21	43:13,14 44:11	anybody 38:19	ascertain 9:6		better 12:5 93:21
accept 13:4	adopted 5:20	49:3 52:2,3,6	anyway 32:17	aside 43:3,23	68:22 69:6,8	better 12:5 95:21 beyond 43:7
17.10 20.0,10	adopted 5:20 advance 70:13	49:5 52:2,5,6 54:5 55:23	65:8	50:5 51:22	69:21 75:18 77:2 7 10 12	85:17
47:21 00:12	94:2,19,24	56:10 57:19	apart 4:7 30:12	64:18,19 65:20	77:3,7,10,13 79:6 80:7	bias 37:15 38:2
63:22 77:5,17	94.2,19,24 97:20	58:8 70:13	apparent 62:17	asked 19:18,21	79:6 80:7 87:12 88:10,15	38:15 42:20
78:3 90:8	adversely 69:4	74:11 88:13	78:17	27:11 28:1,6	90:12,22 91:13	45:13
J0.20 100.J	advice 16:4,9	107:11	appearance	40:12 46:22	95:6 99:6	biased 50:11
107.20	17:5,9,12,14	agreed 53:3 57:9	42:20 48:25	57:25 70:7	101:1 106:8	bid 5:16 7:19,21
accepted 26:19	19:14,21,24	60:4 62:8	appearances	71:14 78:13	109:2,8	7:22,25 10:21
68:25 85:19	20:8,10,13,25	70:11	91:9,12	85:21 86:5	backed 16:25	11:8 13:6 17:8
accepting 68:18	21:1,6,22 22:8	agreeing 81:14	appearing 50:21	100:14	background	22:20 23:23
84:18 89:15	22:12,25 24:10	agreement 60:10	appears 13:13	asking 17:9	47:19 105:24	29:12,14,19
account 14:18,20	26:19 41:25	104:3	31:16 33:12	33:21 82:20	backing 28:25	30:4,5,9,10
14:21 15:1,4 86:24 98:3	44:3 45:12,16	agreements	application	87:14 92:10	backward 93:24	32:19 35:9
103:9	45:25 46:1,2	78:14 102:4	20:19,20 61:5	93:12 101:18	Baldwin 90:3	38:9 39:24,25
accumulation	46:12,15,23	106:11	applies 20:18	aspect 29:6 35:9	barrage 63:1	40:10 41:1
40:22	47:1 49:6	ahead 22:14 40:2	apply 52:17	49:20 83:8	basically 25:2	42:17 43:12,15
accurate 22:1,4	54:16,17 55:14	aide 59:6 68:7	appointed 41:20	aspects 13:6 70:7	39:7 40:23	45:4,8,20
108:18	59:20,20,21	aim 81:6	apportion 78:17	aspirations 8:10	68:25 69:9	47:14,21,24
accurately 6:23	61:22 66:11,13	aimed 71:1	appreciate 21:6	8:14	72:4 84:19	48:4,10 50:24
accusations	66:17 67:3,8,9	aiming 107:21	appreciated 26:3	assist 11:13	96:18	51:7,13,20
90:25	68:15 71:6	Akers 83:22	57:4,6 91:7	15:13 33:14	basis 43:4 52:13	53:22 60:18,22
accused 90:14	72:13 73:1,4	allocated 54:25	approach 2:1	48:16 94:7	58:20 65:21	64:6,7 66:6
acknowledge	73:22,24 74:3	allow 77:18	29:1 60:14	assistance 1:24	75:15 85:3	73:12 74:25
27:10 47:10	75:13,18,18	84:12	approached	Assistant 83:21	93:10 95:2	83:2,14 85:9
acknowledged	77:12,13,13,16	allowed 35:9	18:16 85:9	Association	103:16	87:13 88:22
71:1	77:21 78:13	50:25 78:24	approaching	79:15,20	BBC 3:24 4:23	90:7 96:9
acquainted 2:11	80:7,22 81:12	allows 73:24	45:21 46:5,7	assuming 94:16	4:23,25 5:1,12	98:24 100:18
2:13	82:22 84:8,10	altogether 81:22	46:17	assumptions	10:18	102:20 105:7
acquire 8:11	84:11,16 86:10	ambitions 8:14	appropriate 19:5	72:24	bearings 95:7	big 23:18 31:3
42:22,25 56:9	86:14,14 87:12	amended 80:23	23:8,10,18	assurances 90:8	Beeby 35:25 92:2	72:4 79:11
88:24	87:15 88:7	82:8	24:8,15,16	astonishment	93:14	85:22,22 86:4
acquired 42:7	91:13 96:19,20	amendments	31:6 48:3	63:6	beefed 32:13	98:9
acquiring 40:9	98:10 99:2	31:25	59:14 60:4,11	astute 56:11,12	began 85:16	biggest 17:22
acquisition 8:21	103:15	America 6:1	63:19 68:7	attach 107:1	beginning 38:14	75:6
9:24 13:20 a	advise 48:9	amount 29:7	86:23 103:22	attaining 58:4	behalf 34:2 58:1	BIS 16:23 17:3
act 2:11 40:10	54:10	51:6 63:12	approve 79:19	attempts 11:1	67:23 90:2	20:4 48:8,15
61:18 73:24 a	advised 19:12	amounted 50:4	Approximately	attend 31:13,14	behavioural 98:8	48:18 49:16
86:22 101:6	31:14 46:10	analyses 88:20	42:3	70:20	belief 45:9	58:17
acted 47:7,11	71:22 72:10	analysis 63:9,10	April 84:2,16	attendant 105:14	believe 5:11,23	bit 12:5 62:16
95:1	101:9	69:22 95:13	87:4 89:12	attention 2:9	8:7 10:21	83:11 85:5
acting 75:2 a	adviser 35:25	analyst 96:10	99:5,18	at/in 82:1	11:11 14:15,15	92:11,23 93:1
107:13	55:7 56:1 59:4	Andy 37:17 92:5	area 64:19	August 4:12	16:3 22:3 23:7	105:17
actions 43:22	59:23 64:5	92:24	areas 4:4 64:5	authorisation	27:11 29:7	blame 78:17
activity 44:20,21	81:3 92:2,17	annex 6:24 10:4	69:23 75:20,23	94:18	34:21 35:19	bluntly 42:19

Merrill Corporation (+44) 207 404 1400 www.merrillcorp/mls.com

31 May 2012

			_			
						Page 111
	1		1	1		
59:23	93:24 101:22	83:2	27:25 32:18	30:17 59:19	100:8 102:19	42:18 45:10
board 30:21	108:1 109:11	cent 8:25 76:19	39:17 40:6	67:11 69:1,4	108:21	74:5,17 87:1
64:12,14 75:24	bundles 12:13	76:22 79:13	42:6 43:10,11	69:10,20 71:11	concerned 18:14	98:17
boat 91:21,22	burden 3:25	108:23	44:8 49:24	71:17 72:23	22:23 28:14	considering
born 12:6	bureaucracy	certain 8:4 51:7	52:20 53:13	88:19 89:5	29:16 48:1	68:16
boss 54:7	28:24	56:17 72:24	58:3,15 59:17	commissioned	76:20 83:16	consistent 40:24
bottom 77:20	business 2:15	104:11	71:4 81:22	75:17	106:21	45:1
95:11 99:15	92:21	certainly 35:7	88:13 95:1,10	Commissioner	concerns 20:16	consistently 87:9
bound 46:1	buy 8:6 108:22	36:5 46:11	102:17	83:22	24:22,22 53:19	conspiracy 24:4
box 90:13	buying 76:19	52:19 57:20	cleared 18:3	Committee	69:21 73:14	constantly 103:8
brain 31:11 43:2	108:11,20	62:10 64:12 82:25 104:16	clearly 1:22 Clive 84:4	103:19	74:10,13,15	constituents 3:2 3:9,11
brand 78:14 break 58:13 59:2	C	82:25 104:16 107:1	close 82:11 85:22	common 47:21 93:3	75:20 76:17 77:11,14,19,20	constrained
109:16	C 88:25	chaired 75:25	closed 86:5	communicate	88:25 89:2,6	30:18
breaking 38:23	C 88:25 Cabinet 20:17,18	94:2 103:20	closely 26:25	55:8,22 65:4,5	89:11 91:19	consult 71:11
brief 51:18 62:20	48:2,5,24	chairman 9:2	55:24 56:1,2	94:11	96:11 106:23	consultation
briefing 10:11	Cable 2:7 9:9,10	10:18 76:10,11	96:7 97:24	communicated	107:20 108:17	51:21 66:15,19
13:5 48:13,15	9:13,16,18,19	76:13	closest 59:11	65:7 68:13	concession 76:24	77:6 78:4,8,21
briefly 81:5	9:20 11:16,21	challenges 81:13	closing 66:19	95:17 104:15	conclude 68:17	79:17 81:17
bright 61:20	17:11,17 19:1	challenging	85:13	107:8	concluded 71:9	82:9,10,21
bring 66:23	19:7,12 20:23	72:23	CMS 1:16 20:3	communicating	conclusion 20:1	95:9 100:15
99:14	25:11 26:14	chance 12:8	coalition 32:15	92:1	conclusive 35:22	102:3,5
briskly 100:13	31:8,13 34:19	Chancellor	37:6 63:16	communication	concrete 8:8	contact 14:9 15:2
104:21	35:17 37:16	58:21	68:1 75:2	51:24 54:2,3	conference 11:5	17:15 18:24
British 2:20	42:19 47:2	change 9:4 32:16	78:12 97:9	communications	confidence 46:5	23:11,13 27:1
Brits 64:24	86:21 101:11	41:13	coalition's 68:9	41:10 91:2	confident 84:20	27:3 34:3
broached 98:4	Cable's 17:18	changed 10:1	Code 6:20 79:10	companies 12:4	confidential	53:17,18 54:9
broad 8:20 66:20	24:19 47:9	32:23 87:5	79:14	28:23,25 34:5	13:11	54:18 55:13
broadband 4:3	call 7:22 21:21	changes 30:3	coffee 51:17	company 8:10	confirm 27:15	57:5,7,8,11,12
11:2 56:18,20	23:5 24:8,9	32:10,11	coffees 12:2	9:2 75:24	confirmed 13:18	57:21,25 58:5
106:16	25:17 26:2,9	channel 53:10,14	cogitations 32:1	79:20,25 85:1	confrontation	58:10 59:22,24
Broadcast 3:5	28:11 34:12,23	58:8	coincident	85:23,24 86:1	29:4	59:25 60:2,8
broadcasters	35:2,3,4,5 37:2	channels 52:21	100:21	87:2 88:23	congrats 35:11	60:10,13,25
5:16	37:18,23 38:16	52:23 53:5,8	coincidentally	94:23 104:19	41:18	61:9,10,11,14
broadcasting 4:8	53:19	58:6 80:1	12:7	105:20 107:18	congratulations	62:22 63:2,11
5:12 6:12,20	called 8:18 9:20	character 62:10	colleague 81:23	competition 20:6	40:21 41:16	63:13,15,18,19
79:10,14 86:7	15:8 22:9	characterised	collective 20:18	30:17 35:9	consequence	63:21 98:1,13
broadly 9:24 11:18 22:10	38:12	20:21	48:24 colourful 25:21	67:11 69:1,3 69:10,19 71:11	83:1 Conservative 5:7	107:15
41:11 42:16	calling 9:9,19	characters 56:13 charismatic 62:7	come 3:17 13:24	71:17 72:22	11:4 29:5	contacted 93:12 contacting 91:2
45:7	calls 38:13 63:8 97:13	charming 62:7	18:1 31:16	78:24 88:19	Conservatives	contacts 61:2,8
45.7 broke 34:22	cancel 18:23	chat 23:3 37:5,9	44:17 49:11	89:5	2:18	contain 96:25
35:19,20 47:3	cancelled 25:19	38:9 92:15	62:13 66:5	complaints	Conservative-l	contains 20:13
Brooks 11:7	capacity 90:11	93:1	73:2 76:21	90:10	29:16	21:16 97:13
Brussels 35:8,11	care 58:16	chatted 37:12	80:15 88:14	complete 8:3	Conservative-s	content 11:12
40:21 41:18	career 1:15	check 28:6 79:22	101:23 103:14	88:20	29:11,13	18:6,9 61:9
BSkyB 8:12,15	careful 50:18	cheerleader 2:18	comes 5:3 48:15	completed 52:9	consider 71:23	contents 51:10
8:25 9:3 10:21	51:4 55:6	children 12:6	48:17	completely 4:20	72:10,11,16	context 58:7
11:8 16:22	carefully 34:9	choice 45:17	coming 95:21	8:4 23:3 45:21	73:21 77:6	60:14,21 87:2
23:23 41:11	98:16	93:8	105:25	complex 29:10	78:25 101:14	88:7 108:13,15
57:6 72:7	carriage 78:14	choose 64:24	comment 3:4,11	54:9	107:6	contingently
73:11 76:11	carries 16:25	chosen 93:17	8:23 13:13	complexity 89:3	consideration	87:1
86:6 90:7	carry 12:17 30:6	Christmas 47:4	51:20	complication	17:10 42:12	continue 48:3
bubbled 55:16	case 10:10 22:11	57:23	comments 3:10	89:3	44:23 47:19,25	76:12
buffer 105:5,10	43:4 48:24	chronologically	3:12 36:3,12	composite 48:18	66:16 71:24	continued 11:2
105:12	71:21 84:4	87:20,25 99:15	36:21 37:7	compromised	73:13 80:9	50:19 80:2
building 81:5	89:23 93:9	circumstances	39:23 40:2,4,5	49:1	84:7 86:24	contract 75:6
bullet 48:20	95:18,19 100:7	83:4	47:3,9 48:2	coms 82:2	99:20 101:3	contractors
49:15 99:18	case-specific	civil 73:3	58:21 74:21	concept 20:14	considerations	68:10
bumped 12:8	50:12	clarification	78:23 98:23	88:18	20:6 31:2 43:5	contribute 16:24
52:24	casual 51:19	69:24 70:6	commercial 8:14	concern 11:14,17	43:8 49:18	59:8
bumping 51:13	catastrophic	Classic 90:13	66:3 75:9	18:10 28:21	50:14 75:10	contribution
bundle 10:5	102:7 104:12	Cld 38:9	76:21 78:1	30:1,1 37:14	83:12 86:11	2:19
12:15,16 25:23	catch-up 15:19	clean 43:2	commercially	43:18 47:16	101:8	control 32:16
27:14 35:22	cave 32:14	109:15 alaan 22:0 26:16	4:18 13:11	64:15,17 74:24	considered 13:15	75:8 76:23
67:17,20 70:19	CC 67:5 68:16	clear 23:9 26:16	commission 20:7	76:17 89:18	19:18 25:13	85:25 109:1
	1	l	1	1		

Merrill Corporation (+44) 207 404 1400

www.merrillcorp/mls.com

Leveson Inquiry

31 May 2012

						Page 112
				1	1	
controlled 8:25	28:12 29:19	darting 87:21	87:10 94:11	20:13 108:18	6:12 10:25	E
9:2 32:17	30:9 33:5 36:7	date 7:2,3 95:8	99:3,4 100:5	destiny 64:25	16:22 17:6,7	earlier 23:9 36:6
41:12	39:15,16 40:10	97:7,10 104:12	107:19	detail 60:8 66:20	38:19 40:7	
convenient 58:12	42:8 44:14	dated 1:11 16:9	decisions 20:21	66:25 74:10,12	dispatch 90:13	36:11 47:3
Convention	47:15 49:21	16:16	58:22 59:15	81:12 96:9	disposal 74:20	80:21
51:15	51:1 53:12	day 7:19,23 8:5	83:14	details 56:24	dispute 76:24	early 15:20
conversation 8:2	55:2,9 67:1,11	23:6 34:11	decision-maker	determined	docs 81:12,14	34:22 69:12
18:7 31:21	67:12 73:6	35:1 44:20	17:4	60:18 104:19	document 12:23	74:25 77:16
36:15,19 37:13	78:7,11 82:12	48:8 56:21	decision-making	105:6	13:5,16,18	economically
37:23 38:25	82:13 86:20	63:12 67:7	59:19 84:13	developed 6:2	33:10 36:23	66:6
40:19 57:15	88:8 89:20	75:18 82:23	decisively 47:11	developing 83:13	67:18 89:25	Ed 69:13 71:13
88:11	101:20 106:13	84:8	dedicated 61:20	DG 35:8	97:14,19	90:3 106:7,10
conversations	corrected 2:25	days 27:12 47:4	deduce 8:20	diary 18:22	documented	editorial 75:8
23:25 105:11	103:25	63:7 81:17	13:25	33:11	51:25 87:17	79:9
105:13	correctly 22:7	84:9 85:12	deduction 14:10	differ 46:2	documents 12:19	Edward 44:13
conveying 35:13	89:21	87:14	14:12 21:9,10	difference 41:5,8	16:5 67:13	effect 22:8 67:4
cope 89:2	cost 76:9	DCMS 16:20	27:22	41:9,15 45:6	80:11,20,23	71:6 72:15
coped 89:10	Coulson 37:4,9	33:18 48:9,22	default 61:17	68:11 98:18	82:19 86:16	90:6 105:18
copied 18:4,5	37:17	49:6	defeasible 43:11	different 7:13	97:24	effective 61:25
80:18 95:3	counsel 70:21	de 51:22	definitely 9:18	8:13 14:6	doing 30:13 34:1	62:11,12
copy 94:12	72:14	deadline 77:9	degree 62:15	23:24 30:24	57:18 64:6,8	effectively 5:2
Corp 13:23	counter-produ	deal 2:16 8:18	delay 47:12,13	33:25 34:5	79:2 84:21	102:21
23:17 24:14,16	23:2	60:15 66:5	47:20,23 64:16	42:15 44:24	85:20 89:8	efficient 24:1
27:6 28:14	country 5:13	72:8 74:16,18	78:17 100:9	54:3,8 55:17	90:20 104:25	effort 1:21
29:4 32:17	108:18	77:18 84:21	105:14	56:4,6,13	107:13	either 31:20
51:9 53:11,16	couple 27:13,19	85:22 87:20	delivered 4:12	61:10,14 62:9	domain 40:13,14	32:22 81:21
53:16,18,22	85:12 87:13	96:2	74:9	62:10 91:23	52:1	84:14 92:14
54:10,18 57:6	couples 43:9	dealing 39:13	Delphic 104:18	differently 27:21	door 109:2	93:7 104:14
60:2 63:23	course 1:23 8:11	84:25	Delphically	differing 46:3	doors 62:7	elaborate 57:1
64:9 65:8	10:2 11:24	deals 50:3	104:11	difficult 46:21	doubt 8:7 55:25	element 4:19
67:15,24 68:6	25:16 33:23	December 2:15	demanded 47:6	64:11 73:20	93:3	else's 55:23
68:24 70:11	57:17 59:20	21:5 30:18	democracy	digital 15:12,17	Dowler 85:10	email 14:18,20
71:12 72:2,13	61:24 64:20	33:11 34:6,20	29:25 64:23	dinner 6:24 7:8	86:8	14:21,23,25
72:20 74:7	81:2 86:3 91:8	36:1 37:3 49:5	demonstrate	7:10,11	Downing 44:14	15:3,3,21 21:4
75:5,7 81:15	96:4 103:18	57:18 66:7	59:18 87:23	directed 16:16	44:16	27:16 32:3
82:23 85:18	courteous 52:25	67:3 74:9	demonstrated	direction 42:20	DPM 30:23	36:8,11,24,25
89:16 92:15	courtesy 9:8	decent 105:3	13:8 43:21	director 21:4	Dr 2:7 9:13,16	37:1,16,24
93:2 94:10,19	62:19	decide 22:13	demonstrates	44:4 90:3 91:1	9:18,19,20	44:17 49:5
95:20 96:23,25	cover 2:2	43:4 75:14	75:19	disagree 4:21,22	17:11,17,18	61:13 80:9
97:16 98:25	covered 83:10	decided 18:22	depart 81:19	disagreement	19:7,12 20:23	88:10 90:2
102:19 103:3	covering 80:22	22:13 25:11	department 2:14	77:2	25:11 34:19	95:4 96:1
102:10 105:5	create 19:3 47:20	32:25 51:9	5:4 14:22 19:4	discharge 54:24	35:17 37:16	97:12 99:18
104:18,23,25	102:24	52:13 57:10	44:4 46:8	discipline 45:22	42:19 47:9	101:22 102:15
105:14 106:18	created 22:22	71:16 73:17	54:16 59:21	disclosed 61:7	86:21 101:11	108:2
107:17,21	47:8	79:18	60:3,7 61:5,6	87:19	draft 27:15,20	emailed 36:1
corporate 8:17	critical 5:14 33:8	decision 9:11	63:18 87:18	disclosure 102:1	27:21,25 28:2	90:12
85:24	45:17,23 95:8	17:11 18:18	105:9	disclosures	28:4,19 31:16	emails 21:16
Corporation	106:22	20:5,14,15,17	departmental	102:23	31:19 70:23	36:9 70:15
5:22,25 6:3,13	cross 73:18	20:17,19 24:19	14:23 57:4	discretion 10:16	drafted 28:1,5	87:18,23,24
6:25 14:8	90:20	24:25 25:10	61:11	23:14 58:20	drafts 27:13	102:17,17
18:24 27:1	cross-marketing	26:14,19 31:7	department's	96:19,21,22	draw 2:9 83:9	103:7 109:12
60:17,25 62:5	80:1	32:22 41:23,24	18:17	discuss 6:10 10:2	94:18	embarrass 40:13
63:20,21 76:4	cross-reference	43:1 44:2	depended 17:23	18:6 24:20	drew 65:3	emerge 42:21
76:19 79:6,13	66:24	45:17,23,24	dependent 75:5	30:24 31:2,7	driven 20:15	104:7
84:24 85:2,13	Culture 1:17 7:4	46:5,11,18,24	dependent 75.5 depends 25:7	82:1	driving 106:10	emerged 61:3
85:23 108:23	12:4 23:25	46:25 47:1,8	derail 102:20	discussed 3:22	106:20,25	emerging 103:13
Corp's 60:10	27:5	48:23,25 49:20	105:8	10:21,23 11:8	due 8:10 30:19	employee 68:6
95:12,16,23	cure 45:13	50:6,11,13	describe 3:5	25:1,22 36:20	32:21,24 41:3	encountering
96:15	current 21:22	51:2 52:4,6,12	35:17 73:19	36:21 51:23	41:13 43:19	18:15 105:13
Corp/Sky 99:22	cut 81:21	52:22 53:6	106:24	discussing 79:3	45:9,11,15	Enders 95:8,13
correct 1:18,19	Cut 01.21	58:6,18 64:22	described 6:23	discussion 6:21	duties 50:20	96:10,13
2:22,23,24	D	65:1,10,10,21	54:23 91:24	11:13 22:15	51:12	engraved 31:10
5:22 7:7 8:12	D 89:1 99:11,12	65:23,24,25	95:12	33:4 83:20	duty 17:24 19:16	enormous 58:16
14:22 15:4,5	damage 37:6	66:1 67:5	describes 5:10	95:22 96:3,3,7	23:20 71:11,22	ensure 90:10
17.44 13.4.3	uamage 57:0					entailed 50:21
	danger 62.24	68.12 13 71.19	36.3	106.11	////11/6	1 11 10 0
16:12 21:9,10 22:10,18 27:22	danger 62:24 dart 99:14	68:12,13 71:18 72:5 75:13	36:3 description 4:23	106:11 discussions 4:10	72:11,16	entails 49:3 enter 40:14

Merrill Corporation (+44) 207 404 1400

www.merrillcorp/mls.com 8th Floor 165 Fleet Street London EC4A 2DY

31 May 2012

				-		•
						Page 113
			1			
Enterprise 40:10	exercise 20:23	facie 72:9	fifteen 34:16	96:19 107:18	31:25 66:11	going 16:3 17:16
73:24 86:22	50:19 74:1	fact 9:23 12:6	file 3:15 15:8	follows 13:15	77:10,12 78:13	24:5 30:13
101:6	75:8 102:1	13:2 17:23	16:5 21:15	81:25	79:7,18 80:4	31:4 35:23
enterprising	exercised 49:25	35:18 43:15	25:23 27:14	forbid 61:4	81:11,17 91:25	38:10 48:3
28:23	58:16	58:17 61:10,13	34:8 38:5	forever 76:23	101:23 102:23	49:11 51:7,12
entire 21:25	exhibit 3:14	71:19 73:19	48:12 49:8	form 70:24 72:1	108:10	52:23 53:25
entirely 10:12,16	exhibited 16:8	75:4 77:16	57:23 80:10	72:1	100.10	57:13,16 64:1
23:10,18 40:24	49:5	86:3,5 90:18	88:1 91:25	formal 1:12 53:6	G	64:2 67:1 69:1
59:13 107:15	exhibits 1:23	facts 16:24 20:16	97:5 99:6			70:1 73:14,22
				60:7 83:6,9	gain 95:25 109:1	
109:5	expand 28:25	factually 67:1	files 3:18 16:13	87:16	gathered 51:16	73:25 74:1,2
entry 75:21	expect 105:15	106:13	66:25	formally 42:7	general 3:23 4:1	75:14 76:9
envelope 63:10	expected 55:22	fair 13:17 26:12	final 27:20 28:19	format 28:6	4:22 6:12 9:21	77:5,6 78:3
equal 42:22	56:7	27:2,3 28:13	32:23 41:23,24	formatted 27:22	66:8 84:11	79:14 81:23
equally 51:5	expecting 63:5	29:18 42:21	47:1 70:24	formulation 52:2	104:24 105:15	82:18 85:25
equivalent 63:14	experience 4:25	47:17 51:4	71:25 72:1	52:3	generally 2:1 4:7	86:17 87:20,21
erupt 103:12	6:16	54:12 60:20,20	75:16 77:21	forward 12:11	5:8 16:18 28:4	87:22,24 89:25
essential 60:1	expert 59:20	60:23 64:11	81:19 85:6	24:5 27:12,19	34:1 59:10	90:22 91:22
essentially 17:12	66:11 75:13	69:18 72:25	finally 66:17	34:6 42:5	77:14	94:3,4,20
96:17	experts 63:16	73:25 77:15	financial 8:24	62:24 91:25		96:24 97:8
	74:14		41:6 44:9 75:9	93:23 99:5	generate 102:24	99:24 97:8 99:2,3 100:4
establish 101:6		98:25 105:25			generations	,
Eve 57:23	expire 78:4	fairly 18:1 32:25	financially 30:2	107:24 109:10	64:24	103:20 107:20
evening 6:24	explain 2:5 29:18	36:9 39:8	75:3 91:15,17	forwarded 13:8	genuine 78:21	109:3,13
42:3 93:25	88:16	46:17 53:23	98:8	44:13,15 95:10	George 37:17	good 2:18 6:4
event 7:1 87:13	explained 25:18	56:15 63:25	find 12:22 35:18	101:24	getting 7:22	15:20 29:25
102:4	52:24	64:2 66:6	40:4 48:4,12	forwards 90:1	11:15 19:4	46:3 55:21
events 9:17	explanation 2:8	86:17 93:3	79:5 80:14	Foster 92:6,17	28:24 39:11	82:1 85:20
98:12	49:2	108:18	104:14	found 16:5 44:6	84:11 90:25	86:18 88:15
even-handed	explicitly 43:24	fairness 64:13	fine 23:3	66:20 67:20	105:17 106:9	93:11 107:4
98:22	explore 69:22	faith 85:21	fired 98:6	85:21 99:16	gist 73:16 105:15	108:8
even-handedly	explosive 103:4	fall 64:15	first 2:11,17 7:20	four 47:4 75:20		Goodman 84:4
45:21		familiar 21:2	12:23 16:13	77:11 100:12	give 11:17 16:11	
	exposing 62:24				26:11 29:7	governance
everybody 1:20	exposure 18:20	88:17	17:5 18:19	framework 71:3	46:3 55:4	85:24
evidence 1:13	express 17:9	familiarity 56:10	19:11 27:15,18	frankly 62:7	58:13 72:2	government 5:2
2:25 16:6,25	24:23 25:21	families 12:9	27:22,25 28:2	Fred 26:4 58:5	81:16 83:7	19:3 28:24
21:15 22:5	43:25 54:13,20	family 108:11,20	28:20 33:13	Frederic 11:7	89:1 92:13	29:2,16 42:18
25:20,22 27:9	54:22 61:16	108:22,24	34:7,17 38:8	free 28:22 29:22	93:10,11,13	46:23 47:6
35:21 36:18	expressed 4:14	far 29:16 47:25	39:6 48:20	30:7 34:15	94:19 99:8	48:6 60:17,23
40:22 48:11	11:14,20 25:9	66:1,1 83:15	49:15 66:15	freest 29:23	100:16	63:25 100:10
49:10 50:7	43:17 44:25	106:21	69:11 71:9	frequent 50:23	given 24:3 26:10	governments
52:14 54:25	45:3,19 65:8	fast 100:4	72:20 74:21	51:1	26:13 30:8	93:7
62:15 84:24	89:11 108:21	favour 29:12	76:6 82:10	front 10:8 12:19	32:16 43:20	government's
85:2 87:5,6	expressing 4:7	32:19	83:16 87:22,25	52:14 91:2		47:18
	1 0				44:20 54:13,20	
88:5 95:16	13:16 32:20	favourable 65:17	90:18 94:3	fruits 78:8	54:22 56:3	Grabiner 103:20
103:13	37:14 43:14	favouring 29:19	97:5 100:3,8	frustrated 22:19	61:3 63:14	grateful 1:23
evidenced 87:18	80:17 104:9	favourite 92:5	101:21	22:20	66:16 68:17	94:12
evidences 44:22	expression 44:21	93:4,16,18	fit 86:6 99:21	frustration 18:8	71:12 80:8	great 16:1 35:11
exact 36:18	extent 26:10	favours 64:1	101:1,4	25:21	86:10 92:18	41:18 58:21
108:15	external 14:5	features 88:21	five 21:18 63:11	fulfilled 63:17	94:19 100:19	88:21 90:18
exactly 8:22 13:2	16:21 17:6	February 3:17	70:7 109:14	full 1:8 5:10 12:1	105:13	96:9
	10.21 17.0					amontom 17,12,12
19:6,8 25:4	27:4	75:19,22 77:8	fix 34:17	36:4 50:22	gives 80:18	greater 47:13,13
19:6,8 25:4 52:10 62:23	27:4	,	fix 34:17 fixed 97:9		gives 80:18 giving 43:17 46:4	0
52:10 62:23	27:4 externally	77:9,17 90:21	fixed 97:9	80:23 83:18	giving 43:17 46:4	53:3 89:19
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11	27:4 externally 103:11	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20 93:3 104:22	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6 extraneous	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9 feeding 93:4	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20 FM 15:22	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25 50:3 54:24	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18 Gmail 37:1	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22 grounds 50:12
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20 93:3 104:22 excessive 64:16	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6 extraneous 84:14 86:24	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9 feeding 93:4 feel 18:14 40:16	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20 FM 15:22 focus 4:1 66:4	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25 50:3 54:24 55:7	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18 Gmail 37:1 go 15:7 16:8	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22 grounds 50:12 78:1
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20 93:3 104:22 excessive 64:16 exchanges 61:12	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6 extraneous 84:14 86:24 extraordinary	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9 feeding 93:4 feel 18:14 40:16 44:22 65:2	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20 FM 15:22 focus 4:1 66:4 focusing 8:15	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25 50:3 54:24 55:7 functions 2:5	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18 Gmail 37:1	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22 grounds 50:12 78:1 group 7:11 29:11
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20 93:3 104:22 excessive 64:16 exchanges 61:12 61:13 74:5	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6 extraneous 84:14 86:24 extraordinary 63:12	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9 feeding 93:4 feel 18:14 40:16 44:22 65:2 83:10	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20 FM 15:22 focus 4:1 66:4 focusing 8:15 folder 12:20	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25 50:3 54:24 55:7 functions 2:5 55:17 76:5	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18 Gmail 37:1 go 15:7 16:8	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22 grounds 50:12 78:1
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20 93:3 104:22 excessive 64:16 exchanges 61:12 61:13 74:5	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6 extraneous 84:14 86:24 extraordinary	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9 feeding 93:4 feel 18:14 40:16 44:22 65:2	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20 FM 15:22 focus 4:1 66:4 focusing 8:15	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25 50:3 54:24 55:7 functions 2:5	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18 Gmail 37:1 go 15:7 16:8 20:12 22:14,23	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22 grounds 50:12 78:1 group 7:11 29:11
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20 93:3 104:22 excessive 64:16 exchanges 61:12 61:13 74:5 excite 4:4,5 11:1	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6 extraneous 84:14 86:24 extraordinary 63:12	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9 feeding 93:4 feel 18:14 40:16 44:22 65:2 83:10	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20 FM 15:22 focus 4:1 66:4 focusing 8:15 folder 12:20	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25 50:3 54:24 55:7 functions 2:5 55:17 76:5	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18 Gmail 37:1 go 15:7 16:8 20:12 22:14,23 27:19 29:17 30:17 34:7,9	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22 grounds 50:12 78:1 group 7:11 29:11 85:2
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20 93:3 104:22 excessive 64:16 exchanges 61:12 61:13 74:5 excite 4:4,5 11:1 exclude 72:6	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6 extraneous 84:14 86:24 extraordinary 63:12 extremely 21:2 45:9 61:20,25	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9 feeding 93:4 feel 18:14 40:16 44:22 65:2 83:10 feels 108:9 felt 9:1 23:14	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20 FM 15:22 focus 4:1 66:4 focusing 8:15 folder 12:20 follow 42:10 91:8	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25 50:3 54:24 55:7 functions 2:5 55:17 76:5 fundamental 66:1	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18 Gmail 37:1 go 15:7 16:8 20:12 22:14,23 27:19 29:17 30:17 34:7,9 35:9,11 37:11	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22 grounds 50:12 78:1 group 7:11 29:11 85:2 groups 14:5 29:13
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20 93:3 104:22 excessive 64:16 exchanges 61:12 61:13 74:5 excite 4:4,5 11:1 exclude 72:6 excluded 97:3	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6 extraneous 84:14 86:24 extraordinary 63:12 extremely 21:2 45:9 61:20,25 EX.P 97:7	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9 feeding 93:4 feel 18:14 40:16 44:22 65:2 83:10 feels 108:9 felt 9:1 23:14 29:1,2 31:3	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20 FM 15:22 focus 4:1 66:4 focusing 8:15 folder 12:20 follow 42:10 91:8 followed 41:4	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25 50:3 54:24 55:7 functions 2:5 55:17 76:5 fundamental 66:1 funding 5:3	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18 Gmail 37:1 go 15:7 16:8 20:12 22:14,23 27:19 29:17 30:17 34:7,9 35:9,11 37:11 40:2,22 41:18	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22 grounds 50:12 78:1 group 7:11 29:11 85:2 groups 14:5 29:13 growing 102:18
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20 93:3 104:22 excessive 64:16 exchanges 61:12 61:13 74:5 excite 4:4,5 11:1 exclude 72:6 excluded 97:3 exclusive 92:10	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6 extraneous 84:14 86:24 extraordinary 63:12 extremely 21:2 45:9 61:20,25	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9 feeding 93:4 feel 18:14 40:16 44:22 65:2 83:10 feels 108:9 felt 9:1 23:14 29:1,2 31:3 50:25 51:2	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20 FM 15:22 focus 4:1 66:4 focusing 8:15 folder 12:20 follow 42:10 91:8 followed 41:4 87:8,9 98:10	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25 50:3 54:24 55:7 functions 2:5 55:17 76:5 fundamental 66:1 funding 5:3 furious 28:8	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18 Gmail 37:1 go 15:7 16:8 20:12 22:14,23 27:19 29:17 30:17 34:7,9 35:9,11 37:11 40:2,22 41:18 47:14 51:9	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22 grounds 50:12 78:1 group 7:11 29:11 85:2 groups 14:5 29:13 growing 102:18 growth 8:15
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20 93:3 104:22 excessive 64:16 exchanges 61:12 61:13 74:5 excite 4:4,5 11:1 exclude 72:6 excluded 97:3 exclusive 92:10 92:13,19 93:10	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6 extraneous 84:14 86:24 extraordinary 63:12 extremely 21:2 45:9 61:20,25 EX.P 97:7 101:22	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9 feeding 93:4 feel 18:14 40:16 44:22 65:2 83:10 feels 108:9 felt 9:1 23:14 29:1,2 31:3 50:25 51:2 53:22 63:24	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20 FM 15:22 focus 4:1 66:4 focusing 8:15 folder 12:20 follow 42:10 91:8 followed 41:4 87:8,9 98:10 following 48:8	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25 50:3 54:24 55:7 functions 2:5 55:17 76:5 fundamental 66:1 funding 5:3 furious 28:8 90:24	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18 Gmail 37:1 go 15:7 16:8 20:12 22:14,23 27:19 29:17 30:17 34:7,9 35:9,11 37:11 40:2,22 41:18 47:14 51:9 56:22 58:10	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22 grounds 50:12 78:1 group 7:11 29:11 85:2 groups 14:5 29:13 growing 102:18 growth 8:15 Guardian 10:5,8
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20 93:3 104:22 excessive 64:16 exchanges 61:12 61:13 74:5 excite 4:4,5 11:1 exclude 72:6 excluded 97:3 exclusive 92:10 92:13,19 93:10 93:13	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6 extraneous 84:14 86:24 extraordinary 63:12 extremely 21:2 45:9 61:20,25 EX.P 97:7 101:22 F	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9 feeding 93:4 feel 18:14 40:16 44:22 65:2 83:10 feels 108:9 felt 9:1 23:14 29:1,2 31:3 50:25 51:2 53:22 63:24 65:22 68:10	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20 FM 15:22 focus 4:1 66:4 focusing 8:15 folder 12:20 follow 42:10 91:8 followed 41:4 87:8,9 98:10 following 48:8 50:2 66:9,17	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25 50:3 54:24 55:7 functions 2:5 55:17 76:5 fundamental 66:1 funding 5:3 furious 28:8 90:24 furore 35:17,19	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18 Gmail 37:1 go 15:7 16:8 20:12 22:14,23 27:19 29:17 30:17 34:7,9 35:9,11 37:11 40:2,22 41:18 47:14 51:9 56:22 58:10 64:24 69:15	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22 grounds 50:12 78:1 group 7:11 29:11 85:2 groups 14:5 29:13 growing 102:18 growth 8:15 Guardian 10:5,8 guess 14:2
52:10 62:23 73:15 92:11 example 46:13 56:18 76:20 93:3 104:22 excessive 64:16 exchanges 61:12 61:13 74:5 excite 4:4,5 11:1 exclude 72:6 excluded 97:3 exclusive 92:10 92:13,19 93:10	27:4 externally 103:11 extra 59:22,24 60:6 extraneous 84:14 86:24 extraordinary 63:12 extremely 21:2 45:9 61:20,25 EX.P 97:7 101:22	77:9,17 90:21 fee 5:5,7,9,10,14 5:17 feedback 106:9 feeding 93:4 feel 18:14 40:16 44:22 65:2 83:10 feels 108:9 felt 9:1 23:14 29:1,2 31:3 50:25 51:2 53:22 63:24	fixed 97:9 flavour 80:18 floated 5:18,18 flurry 44:20 FM 15:22 focus 4:1 66:4 focusing 8:15 folder 12:20 follow 42:10 91:8 followed 41:4 87:8,9 98:10 following 48:8	80:23 83:18 fuller 67:10 fully 30:21 function 49:25 50:3 54:24 55:7 functions 2:5 55:17 76:5 fundamental 66:1 funding 5:3 furious 28:8 90:24	giving 43:17 46:4 55:14 81:11 96:20 99:20 100:18 Gmail 37:1 go 15:7 16:8 20:12 22:14,23 27:19 29:17 30:17 34:7,9 35:9,11 37:11 40:2,22 41:18 47:14 51:9 56:22 58:10	53:3 89:19 greatly 26:2 ground 24:17 86:22 grounds 50:12 78:1 group 7:11 29:11 85:2 groups 14:5 29:13 growing 102:18 growth 8:15 Guardian 10:5,8

Merrill Corporation (+44) 207 404 1400

www.merrillcorp/mls.com

31 May 2012

2			1			•
						Page 11
	64:22	implications	55:13 64:21	52:7 63:22	January 67:14	87:11 88:16
H	highlights 66:23	18:21	66:3 96:10	intervene 17:13	68:23 69:12,14	89:18,21,23
hacking 83:13,15	highly 59:7,7	importance 4:18	inference 38:16	58:19	69:17 70:18	92:20 99:11,24
84:2,10,13,17	hindsight 102:10	important 4:17	65:3 94:18	intervening	71:20,25 75:17	100:1 101:18
86:15,25 90:7	Hiya 108:6	4:19 18:11	104:13	103:16	83:17 88:5	102:15,22
91:4 101:7,13		19:17 31:5		intervention		
101:15 102:18	holder 27:4 86:7		inferred 14:18		Jay 1:3,4,7,8 2:1	103:18,24
103:1,8,9	holding 108:23	43:16 45:9	influencing 90:9	5:11 17:13,16	7:18 12:15,22	108:5,8 109:14
104:6,8	holidays 100:6	47:7 48:23,25	inform 20:4 44:1	86:20	12:24 21:4	109:16,19
half 99:19	Honourable 1:4	52:12,15 53:13	105:12	interview 7:13	23:22 32:11	
hand 31:24	hope 16:8 39:4	59:16,18 64:20	information 14:6	41:6 44:9	36:17 37:19	<u> </u>
handing 103:21	39:18 48:12	64:25 66:1,2,2	informed 96:8	introductory	38:4 49:14	keen 80:24 100:5
handle 39:25	Hopefully 3:17	69:16 74:8,14	96:24 105:11	68:24	50:8 59:4 70:5	102:3
handled 60:17	horrific 85:10	74:23 75:10,11	informing 30:12	investigate 86:6	75:16 86:16,19	keep 64:9,12,14
66:7	horrified 37:25	75:24 76:13	inherited 53:21	investigated	89:25 92:23	keeping 80:21
hanging 80:21	hospital 12:7	85:6,8 98:21	60:15,21	83:21	99:9,12 100:2	kept 96:8
happen 68:18	hosted 7:9	102:7 104:12	initial 95:13,16	investigation	101:21 104:1	key 59:6 66:10
70:14 100:10	hostile 74:6 78:9	105:8	95:23	83:19 102:23	108:9 109:15	75:20
100:13 102:8	hostility 3:24	importantly 67:7	initially 18:22	invited 68:5	jeopardise 21:24	kicked 100:24
	hot 38:23	77:25	inkling 39:12	invoke 101:7,8	Jeremy 1:5,6,9	kill 74:18
happened 7:8	hour 42:4,5 47:2	impression 2:24	71:22	101:10,16	21:21 24:18	kind 18:20 57:14
21:12 22:17	99:19	96:1 105:2	Inquiry 1:13	invoked 101:11	34:13 38:10	79:24 93:13
28:7 33:22	hours 27:17 77:3	impromptu 7:12	61:4 67:18	101:12	88:13	96:19 103:10
35:1 36:14	huge 29:7 96:20	inappropriate	102:1	invoking 100:24	JH 15:23 21:8	knew 7:22 11:25
68:22 71:8	hundreds 76:9	24:7	Inquiry's 97:24	involve 24:11,18	106:11	
73:8 81:19,20	Hunt 1:5,6,9,15	INB 48:12	insisted 79:24	24:24 25:14	job 34:3 56:9	13:23,24 26:24
82:18 83:15	1:20 2:12,18	include 6:6	insofar 26:11	59:4	62:6 105:5,5	27:6 33:7
95:7,24 98:12			instruction			39:19,21,23
happening 56:21	7:20 15:7	included 53:8		involved 19:4	jobs 17:23 22:22	40:1 56:8,18
64:7 86:2	24:18 25:1	76:11	61:16	20:23 23:15	joke 90:15,17	56:23 57:2
96:14 104:6	27:19 32:3	includes 79:10	instructions	26:16,18 50:23	Jon 81:1,2	65:20 69:9
happier 32:8	34:8 36:25	including 63:5	54:13,20,22	59:14 96:7,16	Jonathan's	93:20,20,21
happy 6:16	38:20 40:23	incommunicado	55:4 63:14	100:17 107:18	19:22	97:1 104:7
12:17 64:10	42:19 44:6	50:19	insufficient 87:4	involving 40:7	journalism 4:24	know 3:13 6:9
92:24 100:20	58:13 59:4	inconsistent 29:2	intelligent 14:2	irony 90:18 91:6	journalist 3:4	7:24 8:4 11:23
103:24	65:19 66:6	incorrect 16:14	59:7	93:15 109:8	7:7 93:10	11:25 12:1,5
harbour 20:20	71:7 80:10	increasingly	intending 27:6	issue 4:5 11:19	journalists 7:11	12:12 13:2,7
hard 31:11	83:8 86:19	64:10	intention 23:17	13:20 19:17	92:5 93:4,12	13:21,24 14:13
hard-working	87:16 93:15	incredibly 75:10	82:25	30:16 31:3	93:16,18,21	14:17 16:16,17
61:21 105:4	95:7 104:1,15	IND 88:1,3 93:25	interactions	33:8 38:20,23	JS 21:6	19:11,11 20:9
hastily 46:19	109:17	99:6,10 109:11	50:23 51:1,18	39:13 41:2	judge 50:18	21:11,16 23:5
HBOS 58:19		independence	51:22 52:19,20	42:17 43:9	judgment 8:9	24:18 25:19,20
head 7:3 10:18	I	49:1 79:9	52:22 53:4,6	45:10 47:8	19:14	27:18 28:22
95:5	idea 82:3 88:22	independent	55:18 62:3	50:13 55:16	judicial 17:17	29:9 30:12
health 2:19	98:4 104:17	4:18 45:12,16	interest 2:10 4:4	56:8 66:5 67:8	21:23 22:9	31:20 32:16
64:23	106:20	45:25 46:1,2	4:5 14:5 20:5	76:8 83:13	46:8,14 60:16	33:10,15,15,17
	identified 69:20	46:12,15 59:19	65:25 99:24	84:18 85:4,17	61:5	33:21 35:7
hear 21:8 23:18	identify 75:21	68:10 73:22	101:5,10	85:18,24 86:4	judicially 58:19	36:8,14,21
24:21,23 36:6	imagine 8:23	74:3 75:7 80:5	interested 6:13	86:25 99:21	July 5:21 66:19	37:22 44:3,15
heard 18:19 25:2	28:5,21 31:20	87:9 91:13	6:15 14:3	105:23 108:11	82:12,20 83:2	45:20 46:25
25:2,4,5 36:10	32:5 36:9	96:19,20	interesting 13:12	issues 17:21,24	85:11 87:5	47:4,23 48:8
54:17 55:1,5,5	38:22	independently	97:25	55:14 56:4	89:19 103:23	48:17 49:14
102:14		75:25	interests 74:7	59:15 78:24	109:10	
hearing 11:15	immediately 15:25 26:5	indicate 18:8	internal 102:17	79:1 83:19	June 7:19 10:4,6	52:8,16 53:20
26:17 28:13		indicated 8:20	103:7,10	84:12	10:9 66:18	56:4,7,17,23
61:23,23	immense 64:4	71:19 82:11	internally 38:21	item 70:10,19	78:16,18 80:8	62:4 69:11
heaven 61:4	impact 71:2 84:6	83:1	38:24 40:7	items 3:20	80:8 81:20	70:14 73:12,20
heavily 4:8	86:15 99:4					76:4 77:4,7,23
help 30:5 94:7	102:23 103:6	indicates 26:24	71:6	ITV 10:19	82:7 86:10	78:7 84:6 85:7
109:1	imparted 105:16	indicating 88:11	International		107:22,24	86:1 91:3,12
helpful 3:9 26:4	impartial 52:13	indication 72:3	84:2,23 85:17	J	junior 70:20	91:22 93:6
26:23 27:7	75:14	85:8	103:2	James 3:16,21	jurisdiction 67:4	95:16,18,19,20
53:25	impartiality 6:19	individual 62:6	interpret 17:6,19	3:23 5:9 6:6,25	Justice 1:3,20	96:13,14 101:4
helpfully 2:5	79:11,12	industries 29:24	interpretation	7:10 9:2 15:19	7:17 12:18	101:13,15,16
hesitate 30:10	impartially 46:6	industry 17:20	24:10 52:7,11	15:24 26:2	20:12 32:3	102:8 103:11
	50:6 65:11	17:22 19:17	52:11 104:1,2	28:8 34:11,14	36:10 37:11,20	103:14 104:5
			101 5 100 6		49:13 58:12,24	104:14 105:20
Hi 57:25	imperil 47:20,23	23:19 29:21	104:5 109:6	38:12,16 57:25	49.15 36.12,24	104.14 105.20
Hi 57:25 hiding 7:6		23:19 29:21 30:2,6 31:4,5	interpreted	· ·	69:15 70:1	
Hi 57:25 hiding 7:6 high 31:1 higher 47:14	imperil 47:20,23 impinge 84:12 84:14,17			38:12,16 57:25 76:2,20 77:1 80:6 90:20	· · · · · ·	104.14 103.20 106:6,22 107:1 108:19,22

Merrill Corporation (+44) 207 404 1400 www.merrillcorp/mls.com

31 May 2012

			1.	5		
						Page 11
knowing 8:9	lever-arch 66:25	99:15 103:13	93:24,25 94:21	23:1 30:24	62:15,19 63:5	Mm-hm 92:3
40:3	LEVESON 1:3	104:22 109:13		23:1 30:24 91:19	62:15,19 63:5 63:7 66:10	
knowledge 8:2	1:20 7:17	looked 14:23	95:6 97:6,7 margins 82:1		87:19,24	mobile 23:3,6 34:12 35:4
known 45:7	12:18 20:12		margins 82:1 mark 60:22	meeting 6:22		model 30:2
		40:20 87:16,25		10:3,16 11:4	messenger 98:19	
82:18 103:19	32:3 36:10	88:14	62:11	18:22,23,25	met 12:3 33:18	modernise 30:5
KRM 3:14 21:15	37:11,20 49:13	looking 41:7	market 4:8 5:11	19:2,7,9 21:13	33:24 71:16	moment 43:19
70:15 77:24	58:12,24 69:15	44:8 49:4 65:2	6:2 28:23	21:24 22:8,13	77:11,15	75:11 83:18
80:19 102:17	70:1 73:4	66:22 78:22	markets 94:3	23:17 24:7,10	106:14 107:20	85:15 99:8
103:7 106:6	86:14,18 88:16	82:8 97:23	massive 14:10,12	24:13,16 25:6	Michel 11:7,23	moments 51:7
	89:18,21,23	100:14 102:16	24:4	25:8,12,19	11:25 13:7,22	Monday 15:24
L	92:20 99:11,24	103:11	massively 80:5	30:25 31:1,6	13:24 14:1,9	16:3 80:24
Labour 90:6	100:1 101:18	looks 44:17	107:6	31:13,15 33:12	14:11 15:11	81:13 82:1
91:1,2 92:24	102:15,22	49:19 63:10	master 7:9	33:22,24 38:13	21:17,20 22:1	monitoring
language 25:21	103:18,24	107:8	material 3:13	48:8 49:14	22:3,6,15	79:21
32:24	108:5,8 109:14	Lord 1:3,20 7:17	14:17 40:23,24	56:20,25 67:14	25:25 26:25	months 100:12
large 7:11 63:18	109:16,19	12:18 20:12	41:7 45:12	67:19 68:1,20	33:12,17 53:11	mood 108:18
96:21 109:7	Leveson's 87:11	32:3 36:10	52:4,5 66:11	68:24 69:13,17	54:2,4 57:9,14	mooted 41:22
largely 21:16	liaise 23:4	37:11,20 49:13	67:2 68:11	70:5,12,18	57:16,21,22	morning 15:19
latest 36:5	liaison 14:4	58:12,24 69:15	77:24 87:22	71:20 72:12	61:12,13,24	15:20 82:2
latter's 20:4	licence 5:5,7,9,9	70:1 72:14	97:6 98:15,15	73:9,19,20,21	62:22,22 63:2	94:4.5
law 65:15 71:23	5:13,17 78:14	73:4 86:14,18	materials 67:17	78:12 82:2	63:10 65:4,6,7	move 12:11
72:11,16 86:19	86:6.7	87:11 88:16	103:21,21	94:2 97:8,20	67:23 68:6	27:12 34:6
lawyer 45:5	lieu 68:19 88:22	89:18,21,23	maternity 12:9	106:11,15	95:2,17,21	42:5 97:5 99:5
	lift 52:25	92:20 99:11,24	matter 19:18	meetings 3:15	97:13 101:23	107:24 109:10
lawyers 38:12	light 89:15	100:1 101:18	33:23 35:18	4:2 10:13,14	101:24 102:2	moved 7:13,17
42:12,18 46:23	105:21			· ·		MPs 106:9
54:16 57:4		102:15,22	36:5 52:18	10:17 51:6,8	104:3,9 105:1	
60:6	limb 100:25	103:18,20,24	68:16 83:25	54:15 55:1	105:16 106:2	Murdoch 3:13
layer 59:22,24	limited 67:5	108:5,8 109:14	84:15,22,23	56:22 65:8	107:9	3:16,21,23 5:9
60:6,7,12	108:23	109:16,19	86:19	90:8	Michel's 22:25	6:6,25 7:1,10
lead 81:2	limits 53:1	lost 42:19 76:23	matters 40:16	melting 44:23	74:21 102:16	7:23 8:18 9:2
learn 7:20	line 91:3 94:8	lot 31:9 34:4	53:3	member 1:15	103:7	10:17 17:7
learns 52:9	link 91:3	55:11 74:10,12	mean 11:25 14:4	108:22,24	middle 17:2	19:8,9,13
learnt 28:10	linking 90:7	78:20,23 79:25	17:14,19 20:15	members 108:11	100:2	21:14,20 23:6
leave 73:15	listed 74:10,12	99:4 107:1	22:21 28:17	108:20	mid-June 102:6	25:2,16 26:11
93:23	listen 97:1	lots 8:13 14:6	29:20 33:24	memo 40:18,19	Miliband's 90:3	28:8 34:11,14
lecture 4:11,15	listening 98:23	33:24 64:5,6	39:18,25 47:23	memorandum	millions 76:9	35:10 36:19
led 82:21	98:24	75:1 83:20	51:5,19 53:14	27:13 33:3	Milly 85:10 86:8	37:3,12,14,21
left-hand 97:16	literally 93:17	low 68:17 71:16	53:21 56:16	43:9 65:16	mind 10:25	38:9,16 40:20
legal 16:4 18:3	litigious 28:15	loyal 87:3	64:5 72:4 76:4	mentioned 8:5	12:19 25:3	42:7,16 73:18
19:14,22,24	little 12:5 63:3	luncheon 109:21	76:22 78:20	9:18 10:4 23:9	71:14	74:4 76:2,3,20
21:4,22 22:7	66:22		91:12 93:3	68:19,21 75:23		77:1 80:6 90:9
41:25 44:3,4	Llewellyn 44:13	M	103:2	mentioning	70:25 71:10	90:20 108:11
46:15,23 47:1	44:17	M 38:12	means 58:7	72:20	78:2 81:16	108:20,22,24
,	Lloyds 58:19	machinery 58:11	88:23	merely 72:15	mine 65:6	Murdochs 8:24
49:17 59:21 71:3 73:7	lobbying 62:9		meant 18:21	merger 16:22	minimal 52:19	41:12 91:5
		MacTaggart		17:21,22,25	minimia 52.17 minimis 51:22	
77:16 84:8,10	lobbyist 59:23 60:11 61:25	4:11	21:3 48:2 51:3 84:19	17:21,22,25	minister 18:4	108:10,14 109:1
91:9 103:15		magazine 3:5				
legally 20:2	lobbyists 63:15	main 14:8 16:5	measures 76:18	47:7 58:19	28:4 30:12	Murdoch's 2:19
46:11 48:23	local 4:3 6:1,2,11	22:22 57:2	mechanism 5:3	71:3 99:22	32:22 40:18,19	10:24 37:18
69:18 85:3	6:14,17 11:2	major 13:19	74:19	mergers 16:18	41:25 43:10	68:7 74:17
legislation 2:6	106:16	majority 63:20	media 1:18 2:1,6	merit 73:13	46:22 47:11,25	NT
legitimacy 38:13	lock 99:1	maker 20:17	4:19 7:11 9:12	merited 71:24	48:5 55:25	N
legitimate	locus 17:9,12	making 5:14	12:3 16:18,22	merits 43:8	65:16	name 1:8 106:5,
107:22	logic 19:6	17:11,16 20:3	17:22 19:15	48:24	ministerial 90:8	narrative 66:8
length 5:2 32:25	London 6:9	40:1 58:3 59:9	24:1,19,21	meshes 99:19	90:11	natural 59:12
88:21	long 30:3 37:22	64:23 89:9,13	25:10 26:14	message 15:10	ministers 48:2	96:4
lengthy 85:5	38:17 100:20	96:21 98:16	28:16 29:17,21	15:18 35:10	55:25 59:15,16	naturally 57:21
lessons 52:9	longer 20:9,25	102:25	29:24 31:2	37:17 40:20	minutes 10:14,15	necessarily
letter 16:24 69:2	32:23 88:15	management	41:2 43:5,16	41:16 42:6	23:12,13 24:3	52:10,17
85:7 87:14	look 15:8 18:2	85:17 86:1	51:15,15 64:21	43:7 52:25	34:14 35:7	necessary 51:8
98:6 102:9	25:12 28:2	103:19	64:21 66:3	57:22 61:12	37:24 58:25	52:1 71:16
letters 75:1	39:8 57:13,16	managing 93:6	75:2 78:25	66:20 68:14	70:11,13,14	85:21
	67:2,13 78:25	March 66:15	84:7,13 93:7	98:19 104:24	73:3 83:7	necessity 30:19
		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
80:22 94:10	,		101.12 102.12	105.16	95.11 100.14	80.7
80:22 94:10 let's 92:15	80:10,13 82:19	68:1 77:13,22	101:12 103:13 meet 6:3 15:19	105:16	95:11 109:14 missed 35:3	89:7
	,		101:12 103:13 meet 6:3 15:19 19:13 21:22	105:16 messages 15:6 25:23 34:7	95:11 109:14 missed 35:3 Mm 82:24 95:15	89:7 need 12:17 14:24 34:8 52:1

Merrill Corporation (+44) 207 404 1400 www.merrillcorp/mls.com

31 May 2012

•				•		•
						Page 11
(F 10 F 5 5 5		07.00	01 100 17			62 0 02 12 15
67:10 75:25	night 12:8 81:16	occur 97:23	Oh 102:16	64:14	particular 4:23	63:8 83:13,15
77:7 103:9	Nods 95:5	occurred 31:18	okay 3:13 5:21	overnight 77:23	5:6,19 10:25	84:2,10,13,17
needed 48:4	noir 106:19	October 3:16	6:22 15:18	overstating 96:6	18:13 23:19	86:15,24 91:3
50:18 55:6	noise 105:24	11:5,24 12:12 12:12	27:12 34:6 42:1 66:5	owned 8:11 79:13	41:15 55:15 65:17 75:20	101:7,13,15
65:9,11,14 72:10 105:23	note 18:2,3,9 29:20 30:21	odd 36:14 104:9	70:18 91:25	ownership 2:1	88:22 94:23	102:18 103:1,8 103:9 104:6,8
needing 88:15	48:13,15,18	Ofcom 3:21,24	93:23 99:5	Oxford 51:14	96:9	phoned 9:6,8
needs 30:17 58:5	58:17 67:19	3:25 4:6 28:9	100:21 106:7	o'clock 37:13,23	particularly 3:23	phrase 18:20
negative 3:10,12	95:8	28:13 30:16	100.21 100.7	109:17,19	6:13,15 8:16	28:19 38:1,3
negotiating	noted 19:21	35:11 40:21	Olympics 1:17	107.17,17	12:1 82:5 83:9	38:14
85:20	notes 24:6,17	41:18 66:13,17	once 67:20 81:19	P	90:17	PI 99:24 100:25
negotiation	28:4	67:8 68:15,25	99:16 101:10	pace 102:22	parties 55:18,20	picked 93:9
51:10	notice 86:21	69:7,8,14,24	onerous 4:1	page 3:15 12:13	parts 63:18	picture 78:18
negotiations	94:15,19,21,24	70:12,12 71:13	ones 56:15	13:3 16:6,11	party 5:7 11:4	104:7
96:22	notion 104:15	72:21,24 74:2	open 9:23 36:9	17:2 18:2	28:22 29:5	piece 10:5,8
Neither 104:6	November 15:11	74:6,8,19,21	60:19,24 61:2	19:20 21:17	50:11 61:22	34:25
neutral 56:15	15:14,18,22	75:17,20 76:14	62:7 107:16	34:8 35:23	69:4	pieces 40:22
never 5:19 6:13	16:3,4,10,17	76:16 77:2,4	opened 36:8	48:12 49:7	passing 93:14	pier 91:21
12:9,10 61:3	19:24 21:1,12	77:12,18,22	69:17	50:5,8,9 57:23	passionate 29:22	pile 104:23
new 5:21,24,25	22:12 25:25	78:13 79:3	opening 70:24	67:19 70:6,19	passionately	piling 105:1
61:21,22 75:24	27:17 28:10	80:7,22 81:11	open-minded	75:21 80:11	65:23	place 10:6,9 16:7
79:20,24 80:2	30:22 65:17	82:20 85:7	98:23	88:1 90:1 92:1	Patrick 92:6,18	28:15,17 29:5
108:6	86:21	86:5,9 87:12	operates 5:1	93:24 94:6	people 3:3 9:1	29:6 75:12
Newco 108:12,20	nub 87:6	87:14 88:7	Operation 83:17	95:6,11 97:7	10:19 14:7	76:18
news 4:20 5:22	number 10:19	89:12 90:23	operators 4:19	97:11,14 99:7	17:20 19:7,9	placed 44:23
5:24 6:3,13,25	16:11,13 18:15	91:13,14,18	opinion 17:10	99:15,16 100:2	28:25 33:24	52:1
8:3 13:23 14:8	24:4 33:15	94:10 96:23	32:18,18	101:22,25	34:5 38:24	places 16:13
18:24 23:17	38:25 39:12	97:1,3 99:2	opinions 4:14	106:2 108:1	46:4 50:24	plainly 13:15
24:14,16 27:1	40:1 55:17	100:15 106:18	opponents 74:25	pages 27:19	51:13 56:6	planned 69:9
27:6 28:14 29:4 32:17	57:12 60:13 80:11	106:20,22 108:16	98:24	109:13	62:12 79:17	planning 20:19 plans 8:8
51:9 53:11,16	numbers 15:12	Ofcom's 74:2	opportunity 30:5 69:5 83:8	Pannick 72:14	84:5,20 85:19 88:11 93:19	play 107:4
53:16,18,22	15:17 21:18	106:21	opposing 50:24	panoply 59:20	100:14	play 107.4 player 23:19
54:10,18 57:6	57:5	offer 71:21 72:4	opposite 42:23	paragraph 8:19 9:21 20:1	perception 45:13	playing 30:6
60:2,10,16,25	51.5	72:9	57:5	22:25 30:15	perfectly 24:15	please 1:5,8
62:5 63:20,21	0	offered 6:3	opposition 2:16	32:13,23 50:15	performing 17:3	15:10 34:8
63:23 64:9	objected 106:19	offers 27:9 72:17	3:16 5:18 12:2	50:4,9,17,22	period 2:16 27:4	80:10 94:7
65:8 67:15,24	objecting 72:21	office 14:24	27:5 93:7	51:11 59:17	51:10,14 66:19	102:12
68:6,24 70:11	objections 71:12	68:23 73:25	option 5:17,19	66:9 67:9	78:15,16 82:10	Pleasure 26:6
71:12 72:2,5,7	108:16	official 39:11	72:22	81:21 107:3	82:14 88:6	plurality 2:6
72:13,20 73:11	objective 8:17	52:21,23 53:4	options 107:7	paragraphs 2:2	105:14	4:19 9:4 11:19
73:15 74:7	objectively 43:4	53:8,17 57:12	order 20:20	2:7	Permanent 18:4	13:6,20 24:19
75:4,5,7 76:4,6	50:6 65:11	58:6,8,11	46:13 64:22	parallel 19:3	21:7,11 40:7	25:10 26:14
76:7,11,18,23	objectivity 59:18	59:25	67:6 108:25	83:14	permissible 71:4	41:2,13 43:5
79:6,12,12,25	obliged 61:6	officially 92:25	ordinary 55:7	paraphrase	person 9:10 14:3	43:18 50:13
80:5 81:15,24	72:11	officials 10:10,12	57:17 96:4	32:15	42:13 46:20	64:21 65:10,24
82:3,23 84:2	observation	10:13,15,18	organisation	pardon 78:7	57:20 59:10	65:24 67:8
84:23,24 85:1	13:10 108:13	23:10,12,13,25	15:22 18:13	99:12	60:5 99:21	71:3 72:6
85:12,13,17,18	observed 79:23	24:6,17 38:22	72:7 73:11	parentheses	101:2,5 105:4	73:14 74:10,13
85:23 89:16	obstacles 18:15	48:9,19 49:16	74:6	23:21	personal 2:17	74:15 75:10
92:15 93:2	obtain 66:13	54:16 56:23	organisations	Parliament 1:16	14:18 15:1,3	76:8 77:14
94:10,19 95:12	obtained 13:21	57:7 59:11	62:9,12	50:21 51:25	50:5 62:14	78:25 84:7,13
95:16,20,23	13:23,25 72:13	61:11 79:2	organise 89:10	78:2 81:9 82:8	90:11	86:4,11 91:19
96:15,23,25	obviously 9:10	offing 7:21 39:22	organised 21:13	94:5,23	personally 16:16	101:12 106:23
97:16 98:25	10:24 13:11	OFT 66:14 67:3	original 74:16	Parliamentary	44:15	107:20 108:17
99:22 102:19 103:2 3 10 18	15:3 19:13	75:17 77:2,5	76:8 79:8,8 Osborno 37:17	94:14	personification 53:11	pm 34:17 36:17 109:20
103:2,3,10,18 104:18,23,25	21:1,7 22:16	77:12,19 78:13 79:3 80:7,22	Osborne 37:17 38:2,4 39:3,17	part 5:14 7:1,13	53:11 personnel 70:20	PN 94:13
104:18,25,25	47:23 50:21	82:20 86:9	ought 36:14	14:4 17:15	perspective 14:9	point 11:23 14:8
107:17,21	52:8 91:4	87:12 88:7	88:16	34:7 51:20	19:14 29:21	18:1 27:1,3
107.17,21	101:12 102:9 102:19 103:2	89:12 91:14,16	outcome 29:15	56:3,9 58:11 71:9 72:7	49:6 83:24	28:20 30:22
108.21,25,24	106:18	94:10 96:23	outlined 49:16	73:11 82:22	persuade 97:4	34:3 35:16
109.7	100.10		107:5	85:1 94:6 95:9	persuading	42:24 43:2,6
	occasion 3.22 7.5	9/:/.4 99.7		U.J.I. J. T.U. 7.J. 7		,0,,0
newspaper 29:11	occasion 3:22 7:5 8:18 10:22	97:2,4 99:2 100:16 106:9				48:21 49:15
newspaper 29:11 29:13 30:2	8:18 10:22	100:16 106:9	outside 34:4	96:9,22 97:24	46:16	48:21 49:15 53:17,17 54:9
newspaper 29:11						48:21 49:15 53:17,17 54:9 54:18 55:13

Merrill Corporation (+44) 207 404 1400 www.merrillcorp/mls.com

31 May 2012

Page 117

[idge ii/
			l	l		l
57:8,11,25	94:22	65:15,18,20,22	21:17	106:7	51:11 56:2	89:4
59:25 62:18,22	precise 14:3	90:15,17	proper 10:13	puts 22:10	72:2 86:3 87:6	referred 21:14
63:7,15,17	precisely 45:18	104:10	18:16 23:11	putting 51:22	93:22 96:15,21	21:24 49:10
69:7 74:17	72:14 104:25	privately 23:4	46:19 47:17	53:2 104:19	96:22 97:23	86:16 88:6
79:16,21 83:24	preclude 40:9	28:14 91:7	59:13 83:18		reason 9:7 17:2	108:4
87:11 89:24	precludes 20:2	probability	86:6 91:9	0	19:6,8 30:10	referring 65:18
99:19 100:8,21	predict 63:1	36:10	99:21 101:2,5	quadrangle 7:14	42:23 46:3	refers 102:1
100:22 101:1,2	prefer 12:18	probably 11:20	properly 83:10	qualitative 45:3	62:25 78:19	reform 3:21 4:6
	preferably 51:25		83:21 104:21		88:15 106:5	refused 19:1
102:25 107:16		12:1,21 13:25		quality 5:12		
points 2:8 57:12	preliminary 80:8	18:19,25 21:10	proposal 76:8	quantitative	reasonable 26:9	regard 46:19
60:13,25 66:24	81:18	26:17 27:24	proposed 8:20	45:2	reasonably 65:3	regards 26:4
72:19 79:4	preoccupation	31:10 32:9	9:24 71:3	quasi-judicial	reasons 30:8	regular 97:25
98:16 100:3	43:6 47:16	33:3 35:18	proposition	17:4,11 18:20	45:18 102:7,8	regularly 74:24
police 83:19,24	prepared 28:2	36:25 37:1	47:21	18:21 20:14,21	104:13,18	106:11,17
102:22 103:22	presence 23:24	38:23 57:24	proprietors 24:1	21:2 23:16	reassurance	regulated 4:8
policy 4:2 5:7,17	present 7:1	62:17 82:25	protagonist	24:11 31:7,9	26:10,13	regulation 3:25
5:20 20:16	10:10,14,15	88:20 96:6	22:22	37:15 42:2,25	reassure 54:11	regulator 73:23
21:23 28:16	11:10 23:12,13	102:10 109:15	protect 46:8,14	43:1,2 49:3,20	63:23 64:1	regulators 41:3
29:17 31:1,2,7	24:3,6,17	problem 11:22	protection 79:24	49:25 50:25	reassured 64:9	rejected 72:25
43:5,7 50:14	54:15 67:20,22	18:13 48:1,7	protracted 64:11		Rebekah 11:7	73:4,6,6
55:14,15 56:17	70:10,21	85:1	provide 60:8	51:3 52:8 59:5	rebuttal 97:14	relate 15:13
,			-	64:18		
64:5,18 81:2	presented 76:15	procedure 87:8	70:11 75:17	quasi-judicially	97:16	related 34:23,24
84:12	76:25	proceed 73:7	78:13	25:13	recall 6:7 8:2	52:22
political 29:15	preserved 79:12	proceedings 46:9	provided 1:10	Queen's 72:14	11:7 18:7	relates 13:6
50:12 56:14	press 3:2 29:23	process 16:20	3:14 95:8	question 24:2	20:24,25 38:20	15:21
79:10,11	29:24 94:15,20	17:15 19:3,4	provision 4:20	29:3 37:8	96:8 97:10	relation 2:6
politically 28:16	98:5,5	21:23,25 22:9	proviso 92:23	38:13 58:15	recalls 100:2	16:18 21:13
28:18 29:6	pressure 104:20	22:23 23:16,23	pro-Murdoch	60:22 89:13,14	received 1:24	43:12 48:10
32:12 56:11,12	104:23 105:1,6	24:12,22 30:19	90:14,19 91:1	98:9 101:19	14:13 21:1,21	62:21 67:19
56:15	105:14	32:21,24 35:14	91:8	questions 1:7	22:12 45:25	99:21
politics 29:9	presumably 2:21	37:15,15 38:14	public 2:10 20:5	51:16 53:25	67:3,8 71:6	relations 63:15
Porter 92:5	8:9 46:9 71:7	39:7 41:4,14	40:8,13,14	54:10 60:3	72:13 82:14	68:2,9 98:13
position 15:4	101:14 104:1	42:2 43:19,24	45:19,20 46:16	70:2,8 71:14	104:2	relevant 2:6,9
40:25 41:10	presuming 35:3	45:9,11,15	52:1 62:4		reception 6:24	15:7 36:23
43:11,12 61:18	pretty 12:7 27:4	46:17 47:17	63:15 65:9,25	quickly 47:5,7	recognised 18:17	38:4 70:15
				83:7 98:6	79:25	
positions 31:10	28:8 31:10	48:10,20 49:3	68:2,9 71:23	100:10 102:3		78:23 80:19
positive 3:10,12	46:3 62:20	49:17 51:7,21	72:11,16 78:4	104:20	recognising	83:12 84:11
13:16 35:14	72:4 76:13	52:5,9,18	98:13 99:24	quite 18:7 25:20	32:20	86:25 94:6
59:8	88:13 90:24	53:15,18,20,25	101:5,10	26:25 34:9	recollection	95:2
possession 75:13	98:6,11 108:6	54:6,9,11,12	publicly 8:11	36:13 49:11	33:22 68:22	remaining 8:11
possibility 31:23	previously 49:24	54:19 58:1	39:23 41:6	56:5 59:12	95:22,24 97:21	remark 109:5
68:18	prima 72:9	59:5,9 60:1,3,8	43:17 44:25	83:6 88:17	recommend	remarks 34:19
possible 5:14	primary 6:17	60:19,20 61:21	publish 45:24	93:20 97:25,25	16:21	34:21,24 70:24
18:7 19:23	16:6 28:21	63:8,19,23	purchase 8:16	98:3 108:3	recommendati	remedies 69:22
22:14 29:15	56:16 60:7	64:7,10,13,18	76:21 108:25		16:18	remedy 72:17
31:13 41:22	67:17 76:5	65:14 66:7	purchasing 9:5	R	reconsider 82:22	remember 3:21
100:8,13 102:4	80:11	69:2,18 71:9	purported 77:11	raised 74:24 79:5	recorded 34:20	7:2,3 8:22 9:8
109:3	Prime 28:4 30:12	71:15 79:22	purpose 6:18	105:22	49:6	9:20 10:6,25
possibly 21:7	32:22 40:18,19	83:6,10,23	24:13 34:23		redacted 81:14	11:1,12,14
31:20 36:6	41:25 43:10	87:16,17 88:20	70:6	raising 100:3	81:22 92:11,25	36:19 37:20
		90:9,19 91:9		range 87:18	106:5	
41:8 91:6	46:22 47:11,25	,	purposes 58:7	reached 35:14		57:24 84:1
post 100:6	65:16	91:11,23 95:9	98:19	reaction 95:13	redactions 77:25	105:21 108:13
pot 44:23	principally 51:8	95:25 96:16,17	push 62:7,23,23	95:17,20,23	81:15	108:15
potential 30:4,24	78:19	97:24 98:2,21	81:15	96:15	refer 20:5 69:1,3	remembered
71:2	principle 5:16	99:1 100:4,11	pushed 91:21	read 4:11 66:10	69:9 70:25	38:15
potentially 22:21	46:25 62:18	103:20 107:16	pushiness 62:15	68:25 80:22	71:10 72:22	remove 73:11
73:13 84:4	77:17 81:6	107:17,23	62:16	81:25 93:16	83:1 88:19	removed 32:11
pounds 76:10	prior 9:24 83:20	processes 75:12	pushy 62:8 63:3	102:14 108:5	reference 32:11	removing 96:22
power 66:13	priorities 4:2	promises 89:2,5	put 1:22 3:2,7,9	reading 42:21	39:5 44:8	replacement
72:16	56:17 64:19	89:9,13,15	3:12 19:10,19	103:7	48:20 49:19	24:9
powerful 13:14	priority 47:24	promptly 36:9	34:18 42:19	reads 109:5	50:13 58:17	replies 32:6
powers 2:14	65:1 100:18,19	promulgated	43:21 52:19	ready 94:17	67:5 68:15	reply 26:5 52:25
16:17	private 7:10	86:21	59:23 64:18,19		69:13 97:11	58:4 62:19
PPS 80:15	14:24 27:12	pronouncements	66:15,18 68:14	real 37:6	106:6	report 30:16
practical 75:4,6	33:4 44:21,25	40:8	73:10 75:12	realise 31:12	referral 28:8	68:25 69:7,8
				really 2:13 3:1		
practice 93:4	65:4,5,9,13,14	PROP 3:15	93:8 105:22	24:2 36:5 50:4	68:19 71:17	69:24 70:7
	l	l	1	1	l	1

Merrill Corporation (+44) 207 404 1400

www.merrillcorp/mls.com

31 May 2012

						Page 11
			I	I		
71:13,15 72:21	rethought 32:6	39:8 59:9	88:24 100:5,23	78:1 104:10	18:11 56:8	12:10
72:24 74:9,11	revealed 89:16	running 98:22	105:7	sent 13:2,3,7	73:8 76:3	solution 17:18
reporting 109:7	revelation 39:20	Rupert 2:19 3:13	section 2:10 3:1	15:12 21:4	79:15 85:15	39:4,9,14,18
represent 3:8	revelations	7:1 90:9	15:7	31:19 34:11	silk 70:21	39:19,20,22
55:8	85:10 86:8		sections 3:11	35:2,4,6 38:5	similar 2:7 33:1	41:22
representations	103:5	S	87:21	38:11 41:16,19	Similarly 20:19	solve 48:7
20:3 24:24	revenue 75:6	safeguards 79:7	sector 9:12 18:12	42:6 43:9	simply 101:18	somewhat 35:13
69:5,8	revert 61:17	79:9	19:15 22:21	44:19 57:22	single 52:18 75:5	soon 19:23
representative	review 46:9,14	sake 91:12	31:4,5 43:16	69:2,11 71:25	77:3	sorry 12:24
61:18	60:16 61:5	satisfied 106:23	sectors 33:25	72:18 77:7	sir 1:25 108:7	16:12 34:12
representatives	67:10	108:17	see 3:3 5:22,24	87:14 88:10	situation 18:10	35:2 37:2,11
12:3 67:14	reviewed 58:20	satisfy 89:6	11:5 12:17	95:12 96:1	23:15,20 29:8	50:8 80:21
represented 2:21	revision 20:20	save 70:20	13:1,2 15:24	97:12,19	47:6 53:21	85:5 91:16
9:4	66:16	saw 20:9 30:4	18:3 19:21	sentence 26:21	54:8 73:9	97:11 99:8,14
representing	revisions 77:10		24:9 25:25	50:22 57:1	six 34:14 56:3	106:4
55:19 62:12	reworked 31:18	53:17 90:18	26:7 27:20	102:13,15	Sky 32:17 38:9	sort 4:1,7 5:15
		97:12 105:5,5	28:7 29:20	102.13,13	•	
represents 2:22	Richard 1:6,9	105:9			73:15 75:4	23:21 30:6
32:15	Richards 69:13	saying 9:9 23:19	30:15 31:24	separate 21:15	76:7,11,23	36:15 38:22
request 19:22	70:5,8 71:13	28:21 30:16	34:10 36:18	45:15	79:12,25 80:1	41:7 62:18
93:14	106:7,10,14,16	37:25 38:13	41:8 44:18	September 5:23	80:5 108:21,24	73:15 83:13,15
requested 24:14	106:17	39:7,9 51:11	45:3,4 49:4	sequence 9:17	109:2	90:15
require 45:16	right 1:4 7:15,17	52:10 58:10	51:23 53:14	series 109:11	Slaughter 75:1	SoS 19:21 80:21
required 66:12	12:20 13:1	69:2 72:5,6	62:21,25 65:16	serious 47:8	97:8,15 98:1,5	81:1,6
73:18	25:6 28:11	93:22 98:6	65:19 67:22	60:16 73:13	slice 5:7	sought 77:12
requirement	32:1 37:2 38:6	104:5,11	68:20 69:8,16	seriously 37:5	slicing 5:15	84:8,10 94:19
46:15	38:17 42:13	106:18 109:7	70:8 74:5,20	38:9 91:16,18	slightly 27:21	source 14:11
research 6:1	46:10,20 47:10	says 21:5 22:18	78:22 81:20	91:20 96:12	30:11 32:23	sourced 14:6
reserve 2:5	47:12 58:23,24	37:1 38:8	88:10 89:10	98:3,11	36:11 63:9	SpAds 33:13,14
resolution	59:10 69:24	39:17 74:1	92:2 94:8,12	servants 73:3	96:6	33:15
108:11	70:22 71:7	76:5 88:12,24	95:3,13 97:15	set 43:3,23,24	slipping 107:6	speak 82:3
respect 5:15	74:1 78:10	102:2 103:8	99:18,22	50:5 60:12	Smith 2:25 11:10	speaking 5:8
24:25 30:19	89:17 93:5	scenarios 30:25	101:25 102:9	65:20 66:8	13:7,8,21	9:16 11:18
52:3 53:6	98:1 102:16	scenes 56:22	102:13,22	109:4	14:13 15:3	22:10 41:11
55:15 61:8	103:22 109:8	scheduled 80:24	105:12 106:17	sets 22:25	18:6 22:5,6,11	54:7 56:5
respected 41:14	109:17		seeing 20:24	setting 24:17	22:15,18 26:24	66:12 77:14
96:10	rightly 84:1	scope 100:24	seek 45:16 46:12	36:3 43:10	27:3,8,16 28:1	speaks 37:8
	rights 24:20	screen 3:18	46:15 69:24	seven 109:12,13	28:2 31:18,21	-
respecting 32:24	0	12:24 49:11,12		<i>,</i>	,	special 18:5
respond 69:21	right-hand 97:17	49:13 80:13	70:6 87:9	shadow 1:16	32:4 33:4,7,10	35:25 38:22
responded 70:2	rigorous 83:22	108:3	seeking 31:1	12:4 90:11	33:17,23 34:1	54:6,14 55:7
response 11:17	risk 47:14 60:16	screw 38:10	78:17 88:23	Shandwick 68:3	53:8,14 54:2,4	55:10,12 56:1
30:24 35:5	61:15,19	seat 106:10,20	seen 16:7 17:22	68:4	54:13 56:2	59:4,14,22
37:18,21 39:9	risks 17:1 29:1	106:25	19:5,24 22:11	shape 74:16	57:17,20 58:3	64:4 80:17
39:11	62:21,25	second 12:13,16	44:5 55:20	share 4:14 5:5,8	58:8,9,11 60:4	92:2,17
responses 62:17	Rita 100:2	18:1,2 27:14	67:18 69:7	5:17 70:1	60:9,13 61:1	specialist 62:5
78:9,20,21,22	rival 76:21	27:20,21 31:16	100:22	102:12	61:17,20 62:21	specific 2:8 70:7
78:23 79:2,17	robust 46:11	31:19,19 32:13	self-evidently	shareholding 9:1	63:5,11,14,22	105:23
82:15,21	69:18 85:3	66:18 73:2,8	33:7	shares 8:11,17	64:3 65:2	specifically 57:8
100:15	robustly 59:9	74:23 80:12	self-explanatory	9:5 76:19,22	67:22 70:10	81:14
responsibilities	robustness 17:18	82:21 88:1	96:2	108:12,20,24	82:3,5 88:10	specifying 58:9
48:6	role 14:4,4 16:20	99:6,18 107:25	self-same 27:14	108:25	90:1,12,16	spectrum 63:4
responsibility	17:4 30:7	109:10	82:23	short 49:11 59:2	91:7 95:1,3,10	speech 51:16
9:11,25 20:18	42:20,22,25	secondly 76:10	send 26:4,22	66:19 82:11,14	95:11,17 96:5	speed 105:21
39:13 40:9	43:3,21,23	second-guess	27:6,9,10,16	shortened 32:12	97:13,19 98:12	spend 66:22
57.15 40.7		41:3	35:10 69:19	shorthand 58:13	101:23,24	spent 34:4
42:1,8 43:1,20	49:17 50:25				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
42:1,8 43:1,20	49:17 50:25 51:3 54:7,8,14		94:9	shortly 18:1	104:2.7.10.13	spin 75:4 76:7
42:1,8 43:1,20 43:22 47:18	51:3 54:7,8,14	secret 14:16	94:9 sending 37:24	shortly 18:1 36:17 86:17	104:2,7,10,13 104:17.24	spin 75:4 76:7 spirit 79:23
42:1,8 43:1,20 43:22 47:18 48:7 53:22	51:3 54:7,8,14 54:21 56:16	secret 14:16 Secretary 1:17	sending 37:24	36:17 86:17	104:17,24	spirit 79:23
42:1,8 43:1,20 43:22 47:18 48:7 53:22 60:15,22 105:7	51:3 54:7,8,14 54:21 56:16 57:3,7,11 58:3	secret 14:16 Secretary 1:17 7:4 9:11 10:20	sending 37:24 39:10	36:17 86:17 show 14:25,25	104:17,24 105:3,9,16	spirit 79:23 spoke 22:3,5
42:1,8 43:1,20 43:22 47:18 48:7 53:22 60:15,22 105:7 responsible 9:12	51:3 54:7,8,14 54:21 56:16 57:3,7,11 58:3 59:8,25 63:17	secret 14:16 Secretary 1:17 7:4 9:11 10:20 12:4 16:23	sending 37:24 39:10 sends 35:25	36:17 86:17 show 14:25,25 38:1 81:24	104:17,24 105:3,9,16 106:1,3 107:8	spirit 79:23 spoke 22:3,5 51:14 69:18
42:1,8 43:1,20 43:22 47:18 48:7 53:22 60:15,22 105:7 responsible 9:12 17:20 19:15	51:3 54:7,8,14 54:21 56:16 57:3,7,11 58:3 59:8,25 63:17 63:22 64:9	secret 14:16 Secretary 1:17 7:4 9:11 10:20 12:4 16:23 17:3 18:5	sending 37:24 39:10 sends 35:25 sense 29:9 32:25	36:17 86:17 show 14:25,25 38:1 81:24 93:11 94:16	104:17,24 105:3,9,16 106:1,3 107:8 107:13 108:2	spirit 79:23 spoke 22:3,5 51:14 69:18 spoken 9:13,16
42:1,8 43:1,20 43:22 47:18 48:7 53:22 60:15,22 105:7 responsible 9:12 17:20 19:15 31:5 48:4	51:3 54:7,8,14 54:21 56:16 57:3,7,11 58:3 59:8,25 63:17 63:22 64:9 68:6	secret 14:16 Secretary 1:17 7:4 9:11 10:20 12:4 16:23 17:3 18:5 19:15 20:3,4	sending 37:24 39:10 sends 35:25 sense 29:9 32:25 45:1 47:22	36:17 86:17 show 14:25,25 38:1 81:24 93:11 94:16 shows 42:16	104:17,24 105:3,9,16 106:1,3 107:8 107:13 108:2 109:8	spirit 79:23 spoke 22:3,5 51:14 69:18 spoken 9:13,16 71:13 92:17,1
42:1,8 43:1,20 43:22 47:18 48:7 53:22 60:15,22 105:7 responsible 9:12 17:20 19:15 31:5 48:4 64:17	51:3 54:7,8,14 54:21 56:16 57:3,7,11 58:3 59:8,25 63:17 63:22 64:9 68:6 rollout 106:15	secret 14:16 Secretary 1:17 7:4 9:11 10:20 12:4 16:23 17:3 18:5 19:15 20:3,4 21:7,11 23:25	sending 37:24 39:10 sends 35:25 sense 29:9 32:25 45:1 47:22 60:6 62:17	36:17 86:17 show 14:25,25 38:1 81:24 93:11 94:16 shows 42:16 shuffle 34:16	104:17,24 105:3,9,16 106:1,3 107:8 107:13 108:2 109:8 Smith's 13:10	spirit 79:23 spoke 22:3,5 51:14 69:18 spoken 9:13,16 71:13 92:17,15 105:3
42:1,8 43:1,20 43:22 47:18 48:7 53:22 60:15,22 105:7 responsible 9:12 17:20 19:15 31:5 48:4 64:17 rest 8:6 58:14	51:3 54:7,8,14 54:21 56:16 57:3,7,11 58:3 59:8,25 63:17 63:22 64:9 68:6 rollout 106:15 room 33:13,13	secret 14:16 Secretary 1:17 7:4 9:11 10:20 12:4 16:23 17:3 18:5 19:15 20:3,4 21:7,11 23:25 24:12,21 25:14	sending 37:24 39:10 sends 35:25 sense 29:9 32:25 45:1 47:22 60:6 62:17 65:13 69:17	36:17 86:17 show 14:25,25 38:1 81:24 93:11 94:16 shows 42:16 shuffle 34:16 side 51:5,6 52:19	104:17,24 105:3,9,16 106:1,3 107:8 107:13 108:2 109:8 Smith's 13:10 14:9 31:24	spirit 79:23 spoke 22:3,5 51:14 69:18 spoken 9:13,16 71:13 92:17,13 105:3 spokespeople
42:1,8 43:1,20 43:22 47:18 48:7 53:22 60:15,22 105:7 responsible 9:12 17:20 19:15 31:5 48:4 64:17 rest 8:6 58:14 89:4	51:3 54:7,8,14 54:21 56:16 57:3,7,11 58:3 59:8,25 63:17 63:22 64:9 68:6 rollout 106:15 room 33:13,13 33:14,15	secret 14:16 Secretary 1:17 7:4 9:11 10:20 12:4 16:23 17:3 18:5 19:15 20:3,4 21:7,11 23:25 24:12,21 25:14 27:5 40:7	sending 37:24 39:10 sends 35:25 sense 29:9 32:25 45:1 47:22 60:6 62:17 65:13 69:17 74:20 82:6	36:17 86:17 show 14:25,25 38:1 81:24 93:11 94:16 shows 42:16 shuffle 34:16 side 51:5,6 52:19 53:2 67:23	104:17,24 105:3,9,16 106:1,3 107:8 107:13 108:2 109:8 Smith's 13:10 14:9 31:24 34:3 54:8 57:7	spirit 79:23 spoke 22:3,5 51:14 69:18 spoken 9:13,16 71:13 92:17,18 105:3 spokespeople 90:6
42:1,8 43:1,20 43:22 47:18 48:7 53:22 60:15,22 105:7 responsible 9:12 17:20 19:15 31:5 48:4 64:17 rest 8:6 58:14 89:4 result 40:5	51:3 54:7,8,14 54:21 56:16 57:3,7,11 58:3 59:8,25 63:17 63:22 64:9 68:6 rollout 106:15 room 33:13,13 33:14,15 route 51:9	secret 14:16 Secretary 1:17 7:4 9:11 10:20 12:4 16:23 17:3 18:5 19:15 20:3,4 21:7,11 23:25 24:12,21 25:14 27:5 40:7 48:22 49:16	sending 37:24 39:10 sends 35:25 sense 29:9 32:25 45:1 47:22 60:6 62:17 65:13 69:17 74:20 82:6 sensitive 46:20	36:17 86:17 show 14:25,25 38:1 81:24 93:11 94:16 shows 42:16 shuffle 34:16 side 51:5,6 52:19 53:2 67:23 97:16,17	104:17,24 105:3,9,16 106:1,3 107:8 107:13 108:2 109:8 Smith's 13:10 14:9 31:24 34:3 54:8 57:7 57:11 59:24	spirit 79:23 spoke 22:3,5 51:14 69:18 spoken 9:13,16 71:13 92:17,18 105:3 spokespeople 90:6 Sport 1:18
42:1,8 43:1,20 43:22 47:18 48:7 53:22 60:15,22 105:7 responsible 9:12 17:20 19:15 31:5 48:4 64:17 rest 8:6 58:14 89:4	51:3 54:7,8,14 54:21 56:16 57:3,7,11 58:3 59:8,25 63:17 63:22 64:9 68:6 rollout 106:15 room 33:13,13 33:14,15	secret 14:16 Secretary 1:17 7:4 9:11 10:20 12:4 16:23 17:3 18:5 19:15 20:3,4 21:7,11 23:25 24:12,21 25:14 27:5 40:7	sending 37:24 39:10 sends 35:25 sense 29:9 32:25 45:1 47:22 60:6 62:17 65:13 69:17 74:20 82:6	36:17 86:17 show 14:25,25 38:1 81:24 93:11 94:16 shows 42:16 shuffle 34:16 side 51:5,6 52:19 53:2 67:23	104:17,24 105:3,9,16 106:1,3 107:8 107:13 108:2 109:8 Smith's 13:10 14:9 31:24 34:3 54:8 57:7	spirit 79:23 spoke 22:3,5 51:14 69:18 spoken 9:13,16 71:13 92:17,18 105:3 spokespeople 90:6

Merrill Corporation (+44) 207 404 1400

www.merrillcorp/mls.com

31 May 2012

						Page 1
spring 5:19	49:5,10 59:13	25:23 27:14	43:22 48:5,22	35:6,10 36:25	42:5,14 43:14	101:24
spring 5:19 spun 79:22	stood 43:12	88:1 97:6 99:6	43:22 48:3,22 50:15 52:23	37:17 38:2,11	43:18,20 44:24	thousands 17:2
108:21	86:10	101:21 108:1	58:13,24 81:23	39:6,10 40:20	45:6,6 46:16	22:21 84:4
pun-off 109:1	stop 5:10 12:1	109:11	86:23 87:21	41:16,17,19	46:18 47:6,10	threaten 17:17
SS.Aa 12:14,23	76:18	supplied 71:1	98:2,10	42:6,21 43:7	47:24 48:15	three 1:11 66:2:
27:15 90:1	stoppers 81:25	support 77:4,4	taken 10:15	52:25 57:22	49:22,24 51:14	83:16
95:6 108:1	stories 93:4	supporter 29:22	17:10 20:16	61:12 62:14,19	52:7,8 53:1,13	threshold 68:17
SS.B 35:23 91:25	story 93:8	supporting	23:12,14 26:19	63:5.7 87:19	54:6,11,22	71:16
SS.E 36:24 44:3	straight 106:8	28:23 50:24	30:21 40:25	87:24	55:20,24 56:3	thrown 108:10
staff 1:24	straightforwar	supportive 30:8	41:24 50:13	texted 92:10	56:5,6,12 57:2	thrust 4:22
stage 2:17 4:11	109:6	30:11	52:6 83:6	texts 34:14 38:4	57:10,10,13,14	Thursday 1:1
5:6 8:5,7,21	strategy 90:3	suppose 26:9	91:15,17,19	38:5 39:3	59:13 62:1,9	81:7
20:22 21:12	Street 7:7 44:14	27:8 63:3	96:12 100:12	42:15	62:14,16 63:6	Thx 108:12
26:25 30:20	44:16	90:15	takes 79:1	thank 1:10,21,25	63:6,9,24 65:6	time 6:9 7:12
36:22 39:1	strengthening	sure 7:24 8:1,3	talented 59:10	2:16 12:11	68:2,12 69:6	9:21 11:6 12:
40:1 71:5,8	80:4	13:4 15:16	talk 6:16 32:21	80:7 82:7	69:16 70:20	12:11 13:21
72:17 74:25	Streynsham 1:6	26:3,22 29:14	37:10	89:25 97:5	71:24,25 72:19	15:6 16:13
83:16 84:6,22	1:9	31:23 33:20	talked 4:16,17	100:1 103:24	75:11 76:6,13	18:19 25:3
85:4 90:21	strict 76:18	36:4,24 39:24	6:18,19 38:21	109:19	77:7,16 78:6	31:22 33:17,2
96:23 97:1	strictly 13:11	40:1 43:11,25	38:23 45:8	Thanks 21:6	78:16 81:23	34:2,4,17
100:12 101:13	66:12	44:16 47:9,17	81:1	26:2 58:5	82:5,6 83:11	36:18 38:11
101:18 103:15	strong 21:22	49:9,23 53:24	talking 6:15 9:18	theories 24:4	83:12,15 84:1	42:5 45:16,24
105:25 107:7	22:7	59:9 60:18	29:10 34:5	they'd 86:10	84:8 85:3,6,8	52:11 56:19
stages 83:16	strongly 29:12	64:23 66:23	40:18 43:19	thing 6:4 25:5	85:11 88:16	62:2,25 64:6
stakeholders	29:14	75:12 80:2	53:2 89:8	34:15 55:11	90:17 91:24	65:15 66:22
14:5 23:11	structural 98:7	92:11,18 100:4	94:25 102:11	56:6 59:12	92:8,13 93:6	70:20 72:18
34:4 55:13	structure 96:17	100:17,23	102:13	73:2,8 74:22	93:11,19 94:24	76:10 78:15
tandard 1:12	studying 81:12	109:2	tantamount	74:23 76:3	96:6,7,25	79:1 80:19,24
94:22	subject 33:4 47:1	surface 55:16	74:18	94:4 97:22	98:15,21	82:14 89:4
standards	81:11 102:5	surprise 11:20	tapping 90:10	things 4:16,21	102:10,16,19	90:14,24 91:
100:25 103:19	submission	14:7 105:20	task 46:21	6:18 55:6,10	103:1,6 104:18	93:23 94:11,
start 15:10 77:6	72:21 73:5,6	surprised 10:23	team 23:4 97:9	55:12 56:21	104:21 105:4,9	95:18 99:5
98:2 102:3	subsequently	95:20 104:16	technology 30:3	57:17 58:17	107:15,22,24	100:16,16
109:12,15	66:16	surrounding	Telegraph 92:8	64:6 76:16	108:17	101:25 104:3
started 83:17	subsidiary 89:16	88:21	telephone 23:5	90:20 96:4	thinking 9:21	107:24 108:1
starting 83:22	substance 53:3	suspect 38:2	24:8,9	100:18 104:20	10:1 31:11	timed 15:10
starts 19:25	79:4,5 96:13	sustainable 98:8	television 2:20	104:21 105:8	39:12 56:8,24	25:24 27:17
state 1:17 4:25	substantial	sworn 1:6	6:1,2,11,14,17	think 2:13 3:9,23	thinks 5:9 76:4	31:17 36:1
9:12 10:20	32:16 72:17	sympathetic	106:16	4:7,9 5:6,9,18	81:14	38:5 44:5
14:10 16:23	73:10	9:24 11:15	tell 22:3 29:20	5:21 6:18,23	third 26:21	49:14
17:3 18:4	substantive 4:9	26:17 30:10	33:23 107:21	7:4,5,9,17,22	31:23 50:22	timeframe 69:2
19:15 20:3,4	41:9 45:6,10	39:24 41:1	telling 36:13	7:24 8:3 9:1,3	55:18,20 94:8	times 8:24 41:6
24:12,21 25:14	107:3	42:17 45:7	53:15,16	9:6,8,15 10:3,6	107:3	44:9 45:12
27:4 48:22	substantively	sympathies	ten 37:24 84:9	11:14,19 12:20	thorough 74:11	63:11 66:11
50:20 51:12	41:10 42:15	43:24 44:1,1	tend 24:7	13:6,18,19	108:6	92:9
58:18 79:19		45.10	tenor 4:1	14:2 15:16	thoroughly	timetable 60:9
	successful 26:10	45:19				
88:24 100:5,23	64:21	45:19 sympathy 8:20	term 30:3 49:22	18:6,10,12	100:24 106:19	107:5,9,10
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22		term 30:3 49:22 93:16	18:6,10,12 20:24 21:10	100:24 106:19 thought 4:17 6:4	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 stated 41:6	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14	sympathy 8:20 43:15	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10	18:6,10,12 20:24 21:10 22:5 23:22	100:24 106:19 thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 stated 41:6 statement 1:10	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2	sympathy 8:20	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10	18:6,10,12 20:24 21:10	100:24 106:19 thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 stated 41:6 statement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6	sympathy 8:20 43:15	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10	18:6,10,12 20:24 21:10 22:5 23:22	100:24 106:19 thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23 26:2
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 tated 41:6 tatement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19	18:6,10,12 20:24 21:10 22:5 23:22 24:5,15 25:7 25:11,17,18 27:15,19,24	100:24 106:19 thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23 26:2 today's 1:4 70:
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 stated 41:6 statement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6 16:8 25:24	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3	18:6,10,12 20:24 21:10 22:5 23:22 24:5,15 25:7 25:11,17,18 27:15,19,24 28:13,19 29:1	100:24 106:19 thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23 26:2 today's 1:4 70: told 8:7 10:12
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 tated 41:6 tatement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18 50:2 59:17	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4 suggested 79:17	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3 51:2,5 54:24	18:6,10,12 20:24 21:10 22:5 23:22 24:5,15 25:7 25:11,17,18 27:15,19,24 28:13,19 29:1 29:8,14,23,25	100:24 106:19 thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2 29:8 31:6 41:3	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23 26:2 today's 1:4 70: told 8:7 10:12 22:2 33:22
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 tated 41:6 tatement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18 50:2 59:17 66:8	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4 suggested 79:17 84:3	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6 16:8 25:24 35:22 36:23 44:3 48:12	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3 51:2,5 54:24 57:16 59:8	18:6,10,12 20:24 21:10 22:5 23:22 24:5,15 25:7 25:11,17,18 27:15,19,24 28:13,19 29:1 29:8,14,23,25 30:23 31:12	100:24 106:19 thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2 29:8 31:6 41:3 43:15 46:4	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23 26:2 today's 1:4 70: told 8:7 10:12 22:2 33:22 39:15 69:6
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 stated 41:6 statement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18 50:2 59:17 66:8 states 57:23	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4 suggested 79:17 84:3 suggestion 4:24	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6 16:8 25:24 35:22 36:23 44:3 48:12 66:21 67:17	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3 51:2,5 54:24 57:16 59:8 61:8,10 66:7	18:6,10,12 20:24 21:10 22:5 23:22 24:5,15 25:7 25:11,17,18 27:15,19,24 28:13,19 29:1 29:8,14,23,25 30:23 31:12 32:2,5,9,14	100:24 106:19 thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2 29:8 31:6 41:3 43:15 46:4 53:16,16 55:21	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23 26:2 today's 1:4 70: told 8:7 10:12 22:2 33:22 39:15 69:6 74:15 99:19
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 tated 41:6 tatement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18 50:2 59:17 66:8 tates 57:23 State's 49:16	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4 suggested 79:17 84:3 suggestion 4:24 suggests 32:9	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6 16:8 25:24 35:22 36:23 44:3 48:12	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3 51:2,5 54:24 57:16 59:8 61:8,10 66:7 73:20 75:4,7	$18:6,10,12\\20:24\ 21:10\\22:5\ 23:22\\24:5,15\ 25:7\\25:11,17,18\\27:15,19,24\\28:13,19\ 29:1\\29:8,14,23,25\\30:23\ 31:12\\32:2,5,9,14\\33:19,20\ 34:21$	100:24 106:19 thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2 29:8 31:6 41:3 43:15 46:4 53:16,16 55:21 56:4 62:4 63:2	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23 26:2 today's 1:4 70: told 8:7 10:12 22:2 33:22 39:15 69:6 74:15 99:19 101:16
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 tated 41:6 tatement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18 50:2 59:17 66:8 tates 57:23 State's 49:16 tate-sponsored	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4 suggested 79:17 84:3 suggestion 4:24 suggests 32:9 suitability 43:20	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6 16:8 25:24 35:22 36:23 44:3 48:12 66:21 67:17 69:14 70:5 80:11 88:1,3	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3 51:2,5 54:24 57:16 59:8 61:8,10 66:7 73:20 75:4,7 79:9 96:25	$18:6,10,12\\20:24\ 21:10\\22:5\ 23:22\\24:5,15\ 25:7\\25:11,17,18\\27:15,19,24\\28:13,19\ 29:1\\29:8,14,23,25\\30:23\ 31:12\\32:2,5,9,14\\33:19,20\ 34:21\\34:25\ 35:16,18$	$100:24 \ 106:19$ thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2 29:8 31:6 41:3 43:15 46:4 53:16,16 55:21 56:4 62:4 63:2 65:23 71:23	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23 26:2 today's 1:4 70: told 8:7 10:12 22:2 33:22 39:15 69:6 74:15 99:19 101:16 Tom 90:3
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 stated 41:6 statement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18 50:2 59:17 66:8 states 57:23 State's 49:16 state-sponsored 4:24	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4 suggested 79:17 84:3 suggestion 4:24 suggests 32:9 suitability 43:20 46:13	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6 16:8 25:24 35:22 36:23 44:3 48:12 66:21 67:17 69:14 70:5 80:11 88:1,3 90:1 91:25	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3 51:2,5 54:24 57:16 59:8 61:8,10 66:7 73:20 75:4,7 79:9 96:25 108:19 109:3	$18:6,10,12\\20:24\ 21:10\\22:5\ 23:22\\24:5,15\ 25:7\\25:11,17,18\\27:15,19,24\\28:13,19\ 29:1\\29:8,14,23,25\\30:23\ 31:12\\32:2,5,9,14\\33:19,20\ 34:21\\34:25\ 35:16,18\\36:16,17\ 37:10$	$100:24 \ 106:19$ thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2 29:8 31:6 41:3 43:15 46:4 53:16,16 55:21 56:4 62:4 63:2 65:23 71:23 72:25 73:12	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23 26:2 today's 1:4 70: told 8:7 10:12 22:2 33:22 39:15 69:6 74:15 99:19 101:16 Tom 90:3 tomorrow 15:1
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 stated 41:6 statement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18 50:2 59:17 66:8 states 57:23 State's 49:16 state-sponsored 4:24 stating 16:24	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4 suggested 79:17 84:3 suggestion 4:24 suggests 32:9 suitability 43:20 46:13 superadded 60:9	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6 16:8 25:24 35:22 36:23 44:3 48:12 66:21 67:17 69:14 70:5 80:11 88:1,3	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3 51:2,5 54:24 57:16 59:8 61:8,10 66:7 73:20 75:4,7 79:9 96:25 108:19 109:3 test 2:10 74:14	$18:6,10,12\\20:24\ 21:10\\22:5\ 23:22\\24:5,15\ 25:7\\25:11,17,18\\27:15,19,24\\28:13,19\ 29:1\\29:8,14,23,25\\30:23\ 31:12\\32:2,5,9,14\\33:19,20\ 34:21\\34:25\ 35:16,18\\36:16,17\ 37:10\\37:16,22,22,25$	$100:24 \ 106:19$ thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2 29:8 31:6 41:3 43:15 46:4 53:16,16 55:21 56:4 62:4 63:2 65:23 71:23 72:25 73:12 74:7,13 75:9	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23 26:2 today's 1:4 70: told 8:7 10:12 22:2 33:22 39:15 69:6 74:15 99:19 101:16 Tom 90:3 tomorrow 15:1 92:15
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 stated 41:6 statement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18 50:2 59:17 66:8 states 57:23 State's 49:16 state-sponsored 4:24 stating 16:24 statute 66:12,13	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4 suggested 79:17 84:3 suggestion 4:24 suggests 32:9 suitability 43:20 46:13 superadded 60:9 superfast 4:3	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6 16:8 25:24 35:22 36:23 44:3 48:12 66:21 67:17 69:14 70:5 80:11 88:1,3 90:1 91:25	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3 51:2,5 54:24 57:16 59:8 61:8,10 66:7 73:20 75:4,7 79:9 96:25 108:19 109:3 test 2:10 74:14 100:25 101:5	$18:6,10,12\\20:24\ 21:10\\22:5\ 23:22\\24:5,15\ 25:7\\25:11,17,18\\27:15,19,24\\28:13,19\ 29:1\\29:8,14,23,25\\30:23\ 31:12\\32:2,5,9,14\\33:19,20\ 34:21\\34:25\ 35:16,18\\36:16,17\ 37:10\\37:16,22,22,25\\38:1,25\ 39:6,6\\$	$100:24 \ 106:19$ thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2 29:8 31:6 41:3 43:15 46:4 53:16,16 55:21 56:4 62:4 63:2 65:23 71:23 72:25 73:12 74:7,13 75:9 76:12 81:11	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23 26:2 today's 1:4 70: told 8:7 10:12 22:2 33:22 39:15 69:6 74:15 99:19 101:16 Tom 90:3 tomorrow 15:1 92:15 tone 73:20
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 stated 41:6 statement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18 50:2 59:17 66:8 states 57:23 State's 49:16 state-sponsored 4:24 stating 16:24 statute 66:12,13 statutory 17:4	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4 suggested 79:17 84:3 suggestion 4:24 suggests 32:9 suitability 43:20 46:13 superadded 60:9	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6 16:8 25:24 35:22 36:23 44:3 48:12 66:21 67:17 69:14 70:5 80:11 88:1,3 90:1 91:25 93:25 95:6	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3 51:2,5 54:24 57:16 59:8 61:8,10 66:7 73:20 75:4,7 79:9 96:25 108:19 109:3 test 2:10 74:14	$18:6,10,12\\20:24\ 21:10\\22:5\ 23:22\\24:5,15\ 25:7\\25:11,17,18\\27:15,19,24\\28:13,19\ 29:1\\29:8,14,23,25\\30:23\ 31:12\\32:2,5,9,14\\33:19,20\ 34:21\\34:25\ 35:16,18\\36:16,17\ 37:10\\37:16,22,22,25$	$100:24 \ 106:19$ thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2 29:8 31:6 41:3 43:15 46:4 53:16,16 55:21 56:4 62:4 63:2 65:23 71:23 72:25 73:12 74:7,13 75:9	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23 26:2 today's 1:4 70: told 8:7 10:12 22:2 33:22 39:15 69:6 74:15 99:19 101:16 Tom 90:3 tomorrow 15:1 92:15
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 stated 41:6 statement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18 50:2 59:17 66:8 states 57:23 State's 49:16 state-sponsored 4:24 stating 16:24 statute 66:12,13 statutory 17:4 81:17 82:10	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4 suggested 79:17 84:3 suggestion 4:24 suggests 32:9 suitability 43:20 46:13 superadded 60:9 superfast 4:3 11:2 56:17,20 106:15	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6 16:8 25:24 35:22 36:23 44:3 48:12 66:21 67:17 69:14 70:5 80:11 88:1,3 90:1 91:25 93:25 95:6 97:7 99:6,8	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3 51:2,5 54:24 57:16 59:8 61:8,10 66:7 73:20 75:4,7 79:9 96:25 108:19 109:3 test 2:10 74:14 100:25 101:5 101:10,12 testing 101:3	18:6,10,12 $20:24 21:10$ $22:5 23:22$ $24:5,15 25:7$ $25:11,17,18$ $27:15,19,24$ $28:13,19 29:1$ $29:8,14,23,25$ $30:23 31:12$ $32:2,5,9,14$ $33:19,20 34:21$ $34:25 35:16,18$ $36:16,17 37:10$ $37:16,22,22,25$ $38:1,25 39:6,6$ $39:10,21,21$ $40:1,6,24 41:1$	$100:24\ 106:19$ thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2 29:8 31:6 41:3 43:15 46:4 53:16,16 55:21 56:4 62:4 63:2 65:23 71:23 72:25 73:12 74:7,13 75:9 76:12 81:11 84:18,25 89:23 90:23 94:9	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23: 26:2 today's 1:4 70: told 8:7 10:12 22:2 33:22 39:15 69:6 74:15 99:19 101:16 Tom 90:3 tomorrow 15:1 92:15 tone 73:20 top 5:7,15 7:3 10:24 37:1
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 stated 41:6 statement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18 50:2 59:17 66:8 states 57:23 State's 49:16 state-sponsored 4:24 stating 16:24 statute 66:12,13 statutory 17:4 81:17 82:10 stay 100:6	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4 suggested 79:17 84:3 suggestion 4:24 suggests 32:9 suitability 43:20 46:13 superadded 60:9 superfast 4:3 11:2 56:17,20 106:15 superiors 21:17	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6 16:8 25:24 35:22 36:23 44:3 48:12 66:21 67:17 69:14 70:5 80:11 88:1,3 90:1 91:25 93:25 95:6 97:7 99:6,8 101:22 109:11	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3 51:2,5 54:24 57:16 59:8 61:8,10 66:7 73:20 75:4,7 79:9 96:25 108:19 109:3 test 2:10 74:14 100:25 101:5 101:10,12 testing 101:3 text 15:6,25	18:6,10,12 $20:24 21:10$ $22:5 23:22$ $24:5,15 25:7$ $25:11,17,18$ $27:15,19,24$ $28:13,19 29:1$ $29:8,14,23,25$ $30:23 31:12$ $32:2,5,9,14$ $33:19,20 34:21$ $34:25 35:16,18$ $36:16,17 37:10$ $37:16,22,22,25$ $38:1,25 39:6,6$ $39:10,21,21$	$100:24 \ 106:19$ thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2 29:8 31:6 41:3 43:15 46:4 53:16,16 55:21 56:4 62:4 63:2 65:23 71:23 72:25 73:12 74:7,13 75:9 76:12 81:11 84:18,25 89:23 90:23 94:9 100:6 103:1	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23: 26:2 today's 1:4 70:: told 8:7 10:12 22:2 33:22 39:15 69:6 74:15 99:19 101:16 Tom 90:3 tomorrow 15:1 92:15 tone 73:20 top 5:7,15 7:3 10:24 37:1 44:18 101:25
88:24 100:5,23 105:7 107:4 stated 41:6 statement 1:10 1:12,22 2:2,24 8:19 9:22 22:1 22:4 32:18 50:2 59:17 66:8 states 57:23 State's 49:16 state-sponsored 4:24 stating 16:24 statute 66:12,13 statutory 17:4	64:21 Sue 35:25 83:22 92:2 93:14 sufficiency 71:2 sufficient 87:6 suggest 24:8 79:19 85:4 suggested 79:17 84:3 suggestion 4:24 suggests 32:9 suitability 43:20 46:13 superadded 60:9 superfast 4:3 11:2 56:17,20 106:15	sympathy 8:20 43:15 T tab 10:5 12:14 12:22,23 16:6 16:8 25:24 35:22 36:23 44:3 48:12 66:21 67:17 69:14 70:5 80:11 88:1,3 90:1 91:25 93:25 95:6 97:7 99:6,8 101:22 109:11 tabbed 12:22	term 30:3 49:22 93:16 terms 1:15 19:10 19:19 21:10 28:16 29:17 31:25 34:19 43:16 45:2,3 51:2,5 54:24 57:16 59:8 61:8,10 66:7 73:20 75:4,7 79:9 96:25 108:19 109:3 test 2:10 74:14 100:25 101:5 101:10,12 testing 101:3	18:6,10,12 $20:24 21:10$ $22:5 23:22$ $24:5,15 25:7$ $25:11,17,18$ $27:15,19,24$ $28:13,19 29:1$ $29:8,14,23,25$ $30:23 31:12$ $32:2,5,9,14$ $33:19,20 34:21$ $34:25 35:16,18$ $36:16,17 37:10$ $37:16,22,22,25$ $38:1,25 39:6,6$ $39:10,21,21$ $40:1,6,24 41:1$	$100:24\ 106:19$ thought 4:17 6:4 7:12 8:13,15 8:16 11:21 17:23 18:23,25 19:16 23:16,18 23:20 24:2 29:8 31:6 41:3 43:15 46:4 53:16,16 55:21 56:4 62:4 63:2 65:23 71:23 72:25 73:12 74:7,13 75:9 76:12 81:11 84:18,25 89:23 90:23 94:9	107:5,9,10 timing 35:21 tin 76:5 today 21:22 23: 26:2 today's 1:4 70:1 told 8:7 10:12 22:2 33:22 39:15 69:6 74:15 99:19 101:16 Tom 90:3 tomorrow 15:1 92:15 tone 73:20 top 5:7,15 7:3

Merrill Corporation (+44) 207 404 1400 www.merrillcorp/mls.com

31 May 2012

<i>buy 02</i> 1101		-	le vesen inqui	3		51 May 201
						Page 12
27.05.42.02	IIII 51 0 72 17	105 17	71 01 72 04	01.5	51 15 95 14	07(0(101 00
37:25 43:23	UIL 51:9 72:17	uppity 105:17	71:21 73:24	91:5	51:15 85:14	07696 101:22
46:5 75:5,14	88:17,23 97:2	ur 34:12 35:2	76:14 77:19,20	went 5:25 7:8	108:9 109:7	07697 106:2
touch 17:20	97:3	use 14:20 15:1	92:24 100:10	14:17 27:13	worried 22:20	07747 88:1,3
touched 83:11	UILs 46:13	44:1 74:19	105:20 107:6	43:7,8 66:11	22:24 37:5	07787 93:24
85:12	51:10 66:14,15	90:13 93:15	wanted 5:25	79:6	38:10 39:7,22	07805 99:7,15
track 103:5	66:18 69:11	usually 36:9	16:17 18:15	weren't 6:14	102:20 103:6	07822 109:12
Trading 73:25	70:23 71:1,25		21:8 23:17	10:15,15 11:15	worry 79:11	07896 48:12
transcript 36:4	74:14 75:16	V	24:1,3 25:8	23:13,14 31:2	103:10	07905 12:13,23
transfer 46:18	77:5,10,17,24	value 64:3,4	45:20 46:1,11	34:2 51:20	worse 103:14	13:9
transferred 2:14	78:3,9 79:8	various 3:18	53:23 56:19,20	61:25 62:2,24	worth 72:20	07909 27:16,25
transferring	80:4 82:9,23	21:16 49:17	63:25 69:22,23	63:4 68:5,21	109:13	07911 31:16
39:12	85:20 86:12	88:11	72:2 76:12,17	82:15 90:19	wouldn't 8:16	07931 90:1,6
transparency	87:1,3 88:7		77:18 80:1	91:11,16	14:7 26:13,18	07957 95:6,11
		vast 63:20	84:5 88:13			
52:15	89:8 90:23	version 20:9,25		Westminster	33:23 40:4	08008 108:1
transparent	95:9 96:11,25	27:20 32:8	96:14,17 97:2	56:14	42:6 43:14	08089 35:23
51:24 60:19,24	99:3 107:20	66:18 69:11	97:3 99:14	we'll 18:1 28:7	45:25 52:17	08096 92:1
61:3 107:17	108:4,6,16	75:16 82:10	100:13,17,20	36:18 58:24	56:12 75:7	08107 36:23
travel 5:24	109:4	viability 66:3	101:4,6,15	109:16	76:2 95:19	08108 44:5
travelled 5:21	UK 6:14 43:16	75:9 81:24	104:20 106:22	we're 11:24	105:11,12,19	08147 15:8 57:23
treated 21:23	66:3	82:4	107:16 109:2	28:22 53:2	write 16:22,24	08155 34:8
53:23 63:25	Um 42:9	viable 4:18 30:3	wanting 18:25	67:1 77:5,5	writer 58:14	08159 38:5
64:2	unable 4:3	75:3 91:15,17	74:18 98:25	82:18 83:4	writes 92:23	09203 33:11
treating 51:5	unaware 35:16	vibrant 29:22,24	wants 100:23	86:16 87:21,23	written 10:11	0,200 00111
tree 7:6	unbiased 52:13	30:7	ward 12:9	88:5 89:25	79:14 96:11	1
trees 7:15,16	75:15		Warm 26:4	90:25 97:6	wrong 5:10	1 77:13
		view 2:22 3:8 4:7			18:23 28:15,17	
tried 21:21 35:3	uncertainty	5:8 8:24 9:6	warning 61:16	101:1 107:25		1.57 67:9
35:5 96:12	47:13,20	11:18 13:16,18	warranted 96:3	109:13	29:5 32:14	10 38:25 39:12
trivial 52:16,16	uncomplaining	22:10 23:8,24	wasn't 7:9 10:23	we've 7:17 16:6	52:17	40:1 69:14
trouble 102:24	105:3	32:20 33:7	19:6 24:14	19:24 31:11	wrongs 24:20	10.00 1:2
true 57:20	underlying	35:14 41:11	28:20 29:3	39:9 40:20	wrote 76:25	100 79:13
106:14	47:19 67:2	43:17 44:21,25	30:11,13 34:23	41:7 44:5 83:6	82:20 85:6,7	11 1:17 75:19
truly 46:20	82:19	45:4,11 55:8	37:22 39:24	87:16,22 88:18	86:8	82:20
trust 10:18 84:18	understand	55:22 65:4,9,9	47:5,16,24	100:22,23		11.29 59:1
84:20 85:4,18	17:21,24 31:9	65:14,16,18,18	58:9,15 59:24	whatsoever	Y	11.39 59:3
87:2 108:9	31:17 37:12	65:20,22,22	61:14,15 62:23	104:17	year 1:11 11:5	12 3:16,17 15:22
trusted 59:6	42:24 85:6	73:7 74:17	72:18 73:18	wheels 64:15	12:6 68:23	16:4,10,17
trustee 79:21	88:25 95:2	80:17 87:4,5	78:24 84:23	whilst 20:2 50:18	years 56:3	21:1 22:12
truth 1:12	96:12 102:11		85:18 89:24	WHITE 103:23		
	107:4	87:10 103:10	91:6 96:15		York 5:21,24,25	30:22 101:21
try 4:5 62:7,19		106:22 107:14		widely 45:7 84:3		12.46 34:10,18
trying 34:25	understanding	views 4:14,22 5:5	101:9,17	wider 31:2 43:7	Z	12.57 35:7
63:11 104:23	20:22 50:3	30:13 43:3	104:14,16	willingly 64:20	Zeff 61:11 81:2	12.58 109:20
TT 15:8 25:24	55:14,21 86:20	50:5 51:13	109:3	win 29:15		120 80:11
34:7 38:4	107:9	56:7 65:5,6,7	way 7:10 12:22	wiped 43:2	0	13 10:5 83:2
57:23	understands	65:13 81:18,19	18:16 19:4	wish 2:3 65:3	007 88:2	13.14 27:17
Tues 81:15	81:13	94:12	28:24 39:13	66:23	01667 21:18	13573 16:12
turn 13:3 16:9	understood 22:7	Vince 9:9,10	43:21 46:4,7	withdrawn 83:2	01847 25:24	13583 49:7
35:22 106:2	54:17 89:21	11:16,21 19:1	54:1 55:5	87:13	01947 23.24 01962 3:15	14 2:7 77:17
TV 4:3 11:2	undertake 46:20	24:19 26:14	56:18 59:10,18	withdrew 82:23		140 63:8
tweaked 77:24	51:1 54:21	30:23 31:8,13	60:17 61:2	witness 1:4,10	04248 16:6,12,14	15 7:19 16:3
two 3:15 4:2,4	65:14	37:6	66:6 73:7 80:5	50:2 66:8	04249 18:2	21:12 75:22
16:13 29:12	undertaking		81:5 83:12	wonder 85:16	04250 19:19	77:8
34:16 38:5	73:10 88:22	Vince's 28:8 36:3		word 5:13 30:11	04254 19:25	
		36:12,21	84:17 85:8		04256 20:1	15.49 25:24
45:15 63:7	89:1	Virtually 82:15	89:3 91:23	52:17 62:18	04257 21:5	15.50 36:1,5
65:13 67:13	undertakings	vis-a-vis 95:1	105:22 109:4	74:12	04385 67:9	156,000 82:14
72:19 73:23	68:19 71:4,21	volcano 103:12	ways 62:10	words 27:7 76:2	04536 67:19	16 20:1 25:25
75:12 80:17	71:23 72:3	volume 25:24	Weber 68:3,4	105:17	04553 70:6	28:10 77:9
	73:22 79:23	80:12 101:21	website 2:17 3:1	work 26:3,22	04626 70:19	16.08 38:5,19
88:12,14 93:12		107:25	3:7,11	54:25 56:2	05121 80:11	16.10 37:2
88:12,14 93:12 93:19 100:3	84:19,21 91:14		week 56:20 81:7	77:23 92:7	05597 2:3	16.18 31:17
93:19 100:3	84:19,21 91:14 91:18 98:4,7		WULK JU.20 01.7			
93:19 100:3 twofold 17:5	91:18 98:4,7	volunteered	86:8 97:12	worked 55:24.25		16.30 32:7
93:19 100:3 twofold 17:5 two-week 88:6	91:18 98:4,7 106:24		86:8 97:12	worked 55:24,25 56:1 92:8	05602 9:22	16.30 32:7 16 58 39:3 15
93:19 100:3 twofold 17:5 two-week 88:6 type 56:13	91:18 98:4,7 106:24 unfortunately	volunteered 40:17 42:11	86:8 97:12 weeks 88:12,14	56:1 92:8	05602 9:22 05603 50:5,9	16.58 39:3,15
93:19 100:3 twofold 17:5 two-week 88:6 type 56:13 typos 28:6	91:18 98:4,7 106:24 unfortunately 49:9	volunteered 40:17 42:11 	86:8 97:12 weeks 88:12,14 106:14	56:1 92:8 working 6:9	05602 9:22 05603 50:5,9 05619 75:21	16.58 39:3,15 41:17,21 47:1
93:19 100:3 twofold 17:5 two-week 88:6 type 56:13 typos 28:6	91:18 98:4,7 106:24 unfortunately 49:9 unsuccessful	volunteered 40:17 42:11 	86:8 97:12 weeks 88:12,14 106:14 Weeting 83:17	56:1 92:8 working 6:9 26:25 56:10	05602 9:22 05603 50:5,9 05619 75:21 05624 6:24	16.58 39:3,15 41:17,21 47:1 17 95:11
93:19 100:3 twofold 17:5 two-week 88:6 type 56:13 typos 28:6 tyres 100:24	91:18 98:4,7 106:24 unfortunately 49:9 unsuccessful 11:1,3	volunteered 40:17 42:11 W Wall 7:6 want 16:23 23:15	86:8 97:12 weeks 88:12,14 106:14 Weeting 83:17 weight 96:20	56:1 92:8 working 6:9 26:25 56:10 63:12	05602 9:22 05603 50:5,9 05619 75:21 05624 6:24 05626 11:6	16.58 39:3,15 41:17,21 47:1 17 95:11 17.30 44:5
	91:18 98:4,7 106:24 unfortunately 49:9 unsuccessful	volunteered 40:17 42:11 	86:8 97:12 weeks 88:12,14 106:14 Weeting 83:17	56:1 92:8 working 6:9 26:25 56:10	05602 9:22 05603 50:5,9 05619 75:21 05624 6:24	16.58 39:3,15 41:17,21 47:1 17 95:11

Merrill Corporation (+44) 207 404 1400

www.merrillcorp/mls.com

2		1	•		•
					Page 1
		1	I	1	I
69:12 70:16	36:17 37:13,23				
71:25 77:24	85:11 86:21				
80:20 84:16	40 3:14				
99:18 102:17	40,000 78:8,19				
103:7 106:6	108:15				
19 19:24 27:17					
65:17	5				
19.25 15:10,22	5 68:23				
	542 63:5				
2	58 2:10				
2 12:20 15:11,14	50 2.10				
25:24 66:21	6				
77:23 90:21	6 33:11 67:14				
93:24,25	69:17 71:20				
109:17,19	6.45 15:24				
20 70:18 83:7	61 76:22				
2002 67:6					
2005 1:16	7				
2008 5:19	7 12:12 20:11				
2009 3:16 4:12					
	21:5 81:17				
5:21,23	7th 20:12				
2010 1:17 3:17	7.30 94:4,21				
6:22 7:19 11:5					
11:24 12:12	8				
15:11 27:17	8 2:7 66:19 82:12				
34:6 67:3	84:2 95:6				
86:21	04.2 /5.0				
2011 67:14 68:2					
93:24 99:5	9				
	9 15:18				
2012 1:1					
202 33:13					
21 2:15 34:6 36:1					
37:3 57:18					
78:6,7					
22 49:5 66:7					
78:16 80:8					
24 68:1 69:14					
70:5 75:17					
77:3 78:12					
80:8 97:6,7					
107:22					
24-hour 77:9					
26 83:17					
27 78:5 88:5					
28 4:12 9:21 10:6					
10:9 107:24					
29 8:19 106:3					
-> 0.1> 100.3					
3					
3 2:2 16:6,8					
34:20 66:15					
70:10 77:22,23					
78:3 94:21					
30 67:3 81:20					
82:7					
81 1:1 30:18					
70:19 74:9					
5 50:2 63:6					
6 50:4,9					
7 50:17 51:11					
38 59:17					
89 8:25 66:9					
76:19 108:23					
		1			
4					
4 1:11 2:2 34:17					