1 1 Putting to one side Motorman, again, he's right, 2 (2.00 pm)2 isn't he, in saying that you hadn't made direct inquiry MR JAY: Mr Toulmin, we're on tab 51, the letter from the 3 of News of the World executives and reporters save for 4 Guardian of 10 July 2009. You were given certain advice 4 the letter that was written to Mr Myler; is that right? 5 by Mr Rusbridger: 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Was that issue ever pursued? "May I suggest that you: 7 "(a) Write to the Information Commissioner to ask A. Well, I think the answer to that should be found in the 8 him to share all the material his office gathered during 8 subsequent copies of correspondence between me and the 9 his Motorman man investigations. To my knowledge, the 9 newspaper. That was the result of the approach that the 10 PCC has never asked for or seen this material, which 10 Commission decided on at its various meetings that it 11 11 would give you a good idea of the extent of the problem had before it pronounced on the subject. 12 of hacking and illegally obtaining private data." 12 Q. Well, the matter then continued, as it were. We can, 13 I think the position more precisely is that 13 I think, deal with the subsequent correspondence quite 14 14 certainly after the publication of the two reports in economically. Let me just identify it. At tab 32, 15 15 2006 Mr Thomas made it clear that the names of the there's a letter from you to the chairman of the DCMS 16 journalists were not going to be shared with anybody, 16 committee dated 13 July 2009. 17 including the PCC, but I think Mr Rusbridger is right, 17 A. Mm-hm. 18 is this correct, when he says the PCC has never asked 18 Q. You make the point -- I paraphrase -- that the PCC 19 for or seen this material? 19 doesn't have formal investigatory powers so there was no 20 A. Well, we touched on this earlier. My recollection only 20 question of launching a broad inquiry. You wanted to 21 21 complement the police inquiry. Then you say on the is that Sir Christopher Meyer did ask to see it, though 22 you might have to check that with him tomorrow. 22 second page, eight lines down: 23 23 Q. Okay: "We're also testing News International's 2007 24 24 "(b) Write to News International to ask them to submission to us against the claims made in the 25 25 share with all the documentation relating to the use of Guardian, to see whether there is any truth to the Page 1 Page 3 private detectives which is in the possession of 1 1 suggestion that we were misled." 2 Scotland Yard. If they have not retained copies they 2 I think there were two aspects to this: not merely 3 could, I imagine, ask Scotland Yard to release copies of 3 the aspect of a continuing investigation but also the 4 the material to you." 4 parasitic aspect of whether News International, 5 Was any consideration given to that? 5 particularly Mr Myler, in his submissions to you, had 6 A. Well, consideration was given to all these points by the 6 misled you, which in itself would have justified further 7 Commission when it met. So they would have discussed 7 inquiry and investigation. Do you see that? 8 the way ahead and the most appropriate thing to do, 8 A. Mm. 9 given the limited powers available to it, and then they 9 Q. That, presumably, was a matter of great concern to you, 10 would have proceeded accordingly. So the answer so your 10 because if Mr Myler had misled you, that would have 11 question is: yes, consideration would have been given to 11 certain serious ramifications, wouldn't it? 12 it. 12 A. Yes, it would. 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But you didn't need power to ask, did 13 Q. Mr Abell, in fact, wrote to Mr Davies next at 40743 14 14 under tab 54, asking for further evidence. This was in, 15 A. No, but I'm saying the Commission would have considered 15 really, the aftermath of the Guardian piece on 9 July. 16 that point based on its approach to the whole matter. 16 At tab 56, you ask some further questions of 17 The question was about whether consideration was given 17 Mr Myler. Can I just draw your attention to the first 18 18 to it. bullet point: MR JAY: And then (c): 19 19 "Does it remain your position that the illegal 20 "Make direct enquiries (as you have not, I believe, 20 behaviour of Clive Goodman was a rogue exception and 21 so far done) of News of the World executives and 21 that no other journalists or executives of the newspaper 22 22 reporters around the time of the Gordon Taylor, were aware of the practice?" 23 Clive Goodman and Motorman exercises. The names of the 23 That was the first time you had put that specific 24 relevant journalists will be found in the Motorman and 24 question to anyone at the News of the World, wasn't it? 25 Scotland Yard papers." 25 A. I should think it was. Page 2 Page 4

- 1 Q. Then the top of the next page:
- 2 "It has been pointed out that while Clive Goodman
- 3 was a royal journalist, most of those names said to have
- 4 had their phones tapped are non-royal figures and the
- 5 judge in the Goodman/Mulcaire case apparently referred
- 6 to Mulcaire dealing with others at News International.
- 7 Can you identify these individuals and what the judge
- 8 was referring to?"
- 9 So that was, if I may say so, a rather good
- question, but the first time you'd put it, I think?
- 11 A. (Nods head)
- 12 Q. It was obvious that at that point you had read the
- transcript and perhaps less obvious that you'd seen it
- before; would you agree?
- 15 A. Yes, I think that's probably right.
- 16 Q. You got a very strong letter back from the
- 17 News of the World, Mr Myler, tab 57, which we've looked
- 18 at with Mr Myler. Our page 40725, where he says very
- 19 clearly:
- 20 "The allegations by the Guardian were not just
- 21 unsubstantiated and irresponsible; they were wholly
- 22 false."
- He really adheres to the position that it was only
- one rogue reporter, doesn't he?
- 25 A. He does, very strongly, I would say, yes.

Page 5

- 1 Q. What happened after then was that further questions were
- 2 asked, in particular in relation to, I think, a leaked
- 3 report of a police officer that there were 6,000 mobile
- 4 phones hacked, and that was specifically denied. Your
- 5 report came out in November at tab 67. Do you see that?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. I say "your report". Is it fair to describe it as you
- 8 being the principal author of this report?
- 9 A. Well, what happened was that the PCC looked at this
- issue over, I think, three different meetings, and it
- was very unusual in the sense that normally what would
- happen would -- with a complaint is that the PCC
- secretariat, headed by me in those days, would produce
- a draft recommendation for discussion to start off the
- discussion. In this case, it was unprecedented and
- 16 I was uncomfortable about doing that, so the board of
- 17 the PCC looked at two meetings at the issue, and on the
- second occasion I drafted a summary of where we'd got
- to, in order to take instruction from the Commission
- about what further should be said about the conclusions.
- 21 So it was actually the other way around from normal.
- 22 Q. Yes.
- $\,$ 23 $\,$ A. So far as I remember. So whilst I will physically have
- typed the words, they were the -- they amounted to the
- 25 decision of the Commission.

Page 6

- 1 Q. Thank you. I think there was a draft at tab 57 --
- 2 sorry, it's not tab 57. I have seen a draft.
- 3 A. There is a draft that then went to the third meeting,
- 4 I think. That may be what you saw.
- 5 Q. Tab 61 is one of the drafts.
- 6 A. Yeah.
- 7 Q. We can read -- indeed, have read -- the report as
- 8 a whole. The conclusions are at page 41341 at 13.1. Do
- 9 you see that?
- 10 A. Yes.

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- 11 Q. "The Commission's latest inquiry into this matter has
- been concerned with whether it was misled by the
- News of the World during its 2007 investigation, whether
- there's any evidence that phone message hacking has
- taken place since 2007 when it published a list of
- 16 recommendations."
 - Then there's some expository sentences. It's 13.2,
- 18 "Was the PCC misled?":
- 19 "The Commission has spoken to and obtained
 - information from a number of people and sources."
- 21 To identify those, primarily Mr Myler, but there was
- 22 also material in relation to Mr Davies, I think, but
- 23 quite limited, and subsequently, I think, further
- 24 information was obtained in relation to this police
- officer I've mentioned and the 6,000 mobile phones.
 - Page 7
- 1 A. Yes.
- Q. But that wasn't available, I think, at this point?
- 3 A. That's right.
- 4 Q. You say:
- 5 "Set against the Guardian's anonymous sources are
- 6 a significant number of on-the-record statements from
- 7 those who conducted enquiries and have first-hand
- 8 knowledge of events at the newspaper. While people may
- 9 speculate about the email referencing Neville, the
- 10 Taylor settlement and the termination payments to
- Mulcaire and Goodman, the PCC can only deal with the
- facts that are available rather than make assumptions."
- Had you seen the email referencing Neville?
- 14 A. Yes, I think that was in the bundle that went to the
- 15 Commission in the papers that were supplied based on
- what had appeared in the Guardian. Obviously not the
- whole thing, though, because I think --
- 18 Q. It had been substantially redacted.
- 19 A. Yeah.
- 20 Q. But that was available to you, was it?
- 21 A. I'm fairly sure it was -- you will have it in the
- papers, but I'm fairly sure it was in the bundle that
- went to the PCC.
- 24 Q. I think I know the answer to this. Did you ask to see
- any of the papers which bore on the Taylor settlement?

- A. Ask --1
- 2 Q. To see any of the papers which were relevant to the
- 3 Taylor settlement?
- 4 A. From the News of the World?
- 5 O. Yes.
- A. No, we didn't, no. 6
- 7 Q. So when you say "the PCC can only deal with the facts
- 8 that are available rather than make assumptions", you
- 9 probably mean the limited facts which you had obtained
- 10 from Mr Myler or were otherwise in the public domain; is 10
- 11 that correct?
- 12 A. By virtue of the Select Committee hearings that were going on and the public statements of the police, yes. 13
- 14 Q. Of course, the conclusions of the Select Committee
- 15 weren't published until February of the following year
- 16 and we can recall those.
- 17 "The PCC has seen no new evidence to suggest that
- 18 the practice of phone message tapping was undertaken by
- 19 others beyond Goodman and Mulcaire or evidence that
- 20 News of the World executives knew about Goodman and
- 21 Mulcaire's activities."

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- 22 You probably regret that sentence now, you'd say,
- 23 with the advantage of hindsight?
- 24 A. Well, I think what I'd say about this is that this was
- 25 what the Commission wanted to say at the time. I, as Page 9
 - the secretary, was responsible for capturing that.
- 2 I think it was obviously wrong and I think the decision
- 3 to make a sort of qualitative judgment on the evidence
- 4 before us in terms of dismissing the Guardian's evidence
- 5 was a major mistake. There's no doubt about that. It's
- 6 very regrettable that that happened. So of course, yes.
- 7 Q. Are you saying that the decision to make a qualitative
- 8 judgment on incomplete evidence wasn't really your
- 9 decision but the Commission's decision?
- 10 A. Well. I don't -- I mean, the director of the PCC doesn't
- 11 make decisions. They're an official. And as I said to
- 12 you -- and you can see at tab 61 -- when this went to
- 13 the Commission for the second time, there were no
- 14 conclusions. There were no draft conclusions then
- 15 because it was unprecedented and it was important for
- 16 the Commission to meet and discuss the way that they
- 17 wanted to handle it and what they wanted to say.
- 18 Q. The first time we see any conclusions in a draft
- 19 report -- if you look at tab 65, please. This is the
- 20 iterative draft of 29 October 2009. If you look at
- 21 41043, you'll see conclusions which look very similar to
- 22 the conclusions we were reading in the final version.
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. This is obviously a report which is going to the
- 25 Commission as a whole, but can I just understand how it 25 Page 10

- worked. Was there an earlier meeting at which the sort
- 2 of conclusions it wanted to reach was discussed?
- 3 A. Yes, that's what I'm saying, exactly.
- 4 Q. And you then put those ideas into formal terms --
- 5 A. That's exactly right. So there was a meeting -- it
- would have been in the September. I think somewhere in 6
- 7 all these bundles I've actually seen some sort of notes
- 8 relating to that, or interaction with Commissioners.
- The PCC will have all of that sort of stuff. Where 9
- there was a -- exactly as you describe, a discussion
- 11 about what should be said and could be said based on
- 12 what had been discovered, and then it was my job to go
- 13 away and capture that. That was then sent back in the
- 14 draft, which you see at tab 65.
- 15 Q. So I should really be asking the Commission, not you, to
- 16 explain these conclusions; is that fair?
- 17 A. Well, what I can do is give you an insight. Obviously
- 18 I was in the room but in terms of the decision-making
- 19 responsibility, that was for the board.
- 20 Q. Okay.
- 21 A. And I wasn't a member of the board.
- 22 Q. Fair enough. So when we look at paragraph 13.3 of the
- 23 conclusions, back at page 41341, it having been stated
- 24 that there's nothing to suggest the PCC was materially
- 25 misled during its 2007 inquiry -- again, the word
 - Page 11
- "inquiry" is used but that one's been flogged dead as a 1
- 2 point, but at 13.3:
- 3 "Indeed, having reviewed the matter, the Commission
- 4 could not help but conclude that the Guardian's stories
- 5 did not quite live up to the dramatic billing they were
 - initially given."
- 7 I mean, that statement and the language (inaudible)
- 8 in which it is formulated comes then from the
- 9 Commission; is that right?
- 10 A. Yes.

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- 11 Q. That, I suppose, is the one sentence which everybody has
- 12 alighted on as being, with the advantage of hindsight or
- 13 otherwise, the most problematic?
- 14 A. Well, it's a major mistake, and so far as I've had any
- 15 influence in hindsight, I wish I'd done something to
- 16 take it out, but I was the secretary of the board and
- 17 that's what they wanted to say.
- 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It wasn't just a one-off, because it
- 19 was in your draft.
- 20 A. Yes, because, as we've just --
- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I understand. So they had time to 21
- 22 think about it.
- 23 A. Yes, but I do think it's important to say -- I mean, it
- 24 clearly has achieved significance in hindsight and it
 - was a major mistake and a hostage to fortune, but the Page 12

3 (Pages 9 to 12)

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| Day | 33 - PM Leveso |
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| 1 | board of the Commission, so far as I can well, I can |
| 2 | certainly attest to the fact that these were people |
| 3 | approaching this matter in good faith, trying to do |
| 4 | something of use, and by the time we got into 2009, of |
| 5 | course, it was too late to pretend that the PCC had |
| 6 | never done anything about it, because they'd already had |
| 7 | that 2007 report. There was nothing in it for the |
| 8 | members of the Commission and the impressive lay member |
| 9 | to deliberately land the PCC with this major problem of |
| 10 | falsely suggesting that the Guardian's story wasn't as |
| 11 | important as it seemed. |
| 12 | Q. Mm. Maybe a more parsimonious approach might have been |
| 13 | to have said in the conclusions words to this effect: |
| 14 | "We still haven't carried out a full inquiry because we |
| 15 | believe our powers are circumscribed, and the limited |
| 16 | inquiries that we have carried out, of Mr Myler in |
| 17 | particular, appear to demonstrate that these activities |
| 18 | did not go outside Mr Goodman and Mr Mulcaire. On the |
| 19 | basis of that limited information and Mr Myler's |
| 20 | assurances, we can't conclude that we were materially |
| 21 | misled back in 2007." |
| 22 | Full stop and left it at that. That might have been |
| 23 | a bit wiser, mightn't it? |
| 24 | A. I think that sound much better. |
| 25 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: How about: |
| | Page 13 |
| 1 | "Actually, we're not a regulator at all. We're |
| 2 | a complaints mechanism, and it's a misunderstanding of |
| 3 | what we do to think that we have anything to do with |
| 4 | this at all in the absence of a complaint." |
| 5 | A. Well, again, that was that would have probably have |
| 6 | been preferable, but rooted in the activity of 2007 |

1 a decision not to have got involved at all at this 2 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm not necessarily driving at just 3 4 using hindsight. I'm driving at: what should the system 5 be now? A. Yes. 6 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Whether it's good enough, whether it does what it says on the tin or whether it needs 8 improvement, and if so, in what way. 10 A. Well, I think there are a number of things that can be done to improve it. Perhaps we'll come onto those once 11 en 12 you've finished with the phone hacking. I don't know. MR JAY: I think I probably have, apart from -- well, 14 I won't ask that question. 15 The future, then, Mr Toulmin. You are no longer, as 16 it were, constrained by any loyalty to the PCC, although 17 I'm sure you still possess it, but speaking frankly, 18 where do you see the way forward? 19 A. Well, I think it's important, since you're looking at 20 structural things, to very much preserve the very, very 21 good work that the PCC does, and now I'm on the other 22 side, I have used it on behalf of my clients and it does 23 provide an excellent, quick, free service which resolves 24 things on the go. And if you're a type of person who is

been preferable, but rooted in the activity of 2007, 7 which was to look into how the newspaper was applying 8 the code and whether there was this sort of structural 9 problem. It had got into it for better or worse, and 10 then there was an allegation it was misled and we've 11 heard that that would have been very serious, so it was 12 in a very difficult position. 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But if you'd said that first time 14 around, then the industry could have thought about ways 15 of getting to grips with these questions. As it is, all 16 the industry has ever said is: "Well, there's 17 a wonderful self-regulatory system." 18 A. Well, these matters are very obvious now. I think that 19 all I can say is that in 2007, in the expectation that 20 the issue had been -- the criminal issue had been 21 dispensed with by the courts, the PCC in good faith 22 wanted to do something that would be valuable to the 23 public in order to make sure these things didn't happen 24 again, and that was the genesis of this activity. Of

course, it's easy to pinpoint where it could have taken

Page 14

many millions of people, you're not so interested in what's going on happen in a few months' time; you want it changed as matters unfold. And I think the PCC is very well placed to help with things like that, and I think preserving that ombudsman service, which it does do brilliantly, is essential.

on one of the newspaper websites, which reach now many, Page 15

In terms of the phone hacking lessons, obviously I think the PCC would maintain it never tried to get to the bottom of the issue because it couldn't, and I think actually what we've been talking about today in terms of 2009 shows in very sharp relief the limitations it was under, but I think there's talk of having some sort of separate standards body that would do that, but that, I think, maybe should be separate from the complaints-driven things.

In terms of the membership of the Commission, that's obviously a major problem, having one newspaper group outside. I think ways must clearly now be found to make sure that people take part. One of the issues, obviously, is the passage of time. In 1990, when the PCC was set up, all the groups were agreed that this was the right thing to do, but proprietors change and editors come and go and people's agendas change and so on, and there must be some mechanism available. I think the that the industry will be given the chance or may be Page 16

- 1 given the chance to show how that can be done, and if 2 not, then it might just be the time to come up with 3 a simple piece of legislation that just outlines that 4 the industry should come together and provide an 5 ombudsman service for the members of the public, 6 because, at the heart of this, really, is protecting the 7 public from what can be, obviously, the overweening, 8
 - occasionally, power of the press. And finally, I think I'd say that the landscape around the PCC was clearly changing. It was set up before the days of the Internet, before the days of the Human Rights Act, and as I said before, the time that proprietors thought it would be a good idea to come out of the system on the basis of not liking the biscuits or whatever it was, and clearly issues around the Commission have changed, and one of the most significant ways is the development of privacy. And what has happened is what a lot of people warned would happen, which is that you've had a sort of a two-tier system. There's no -- we actually developed some ways of
- 19 20
- 21 obtaining compensation for people in a voluntary way but
- 22 I think there needs to be a recalibration of that, so
- 23 that -- I think there's become an expectation that
- 24 privacy intrusions will be compensated in some way,
- 25 perhaps not all of them, but certainly the more serious Page 17

1 around their -- I think their return to England at some

- 2 point. I remember having a conversation with the
- 3 council about the physical presence of journalists and
- 4 TV vans and all this stuff around their home.
- 5 Christopher Meyer was in close contact with them because
 - they'd been -- his wife had been helping them out,
- 7 I think, in relation to their campaign.
- 8 So it wasn't as if there was no contact between the
- 9 two parties but the system does require a complaint and
- 10 while they used the anti-harassment service, I don't
- 11 think there was a complaint about those defamatory
- 12 articles and I think they did speak to the chairman of
- 13 the PCC about them -- he'll tell you all about it
- 14 tomorrow -- and they went to court.
- 15 MR JAY: Thank you very much, Mr Toulmin.
- 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you.
- 17 MR JAY: The next witness is Mr Stephen Abell.
- 18 MR STEPHEN PAUL ABELL (affirmed)
- 19 Questions by MR JAY
- 20 MR JAY: Thank you, Mr Abell. Your full name?
- 21 A. Stephen Paul Abell.
- 22 Q. Mr Abell, in the bundle of witness statements, which is
- 23 bundle A, which I hope is available somewhere, you'll
- 24 find under tab 3 your witness statement.
- 25 A. Bundle 1A, yes.

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- 2 Q. I've been asked to put this question to you in relation 3 to the McCanns, particularly the period September 2007
 - to January 2008, when there were 38 defamatory articles
- 5 in the Express and arguably others in other newspapers,
- 6 and it's said the PCC did nothing during that period.
 - When you were watching what was going on or not going on, did you form a view, even privately, about the desirability to intervene or not to intervene in that particular, if I may say so, egregious case?
- 11 A. Well, I think what we've clearly established here is 12 that the PCC is a complaints body. It needs the
- 13 engagement of people to complain, and talking generally, 14
- the way that we took the system forward was to try and 15 engage those people in the -- with the Commission if
- 16 there was a problem that we could help with. And
- 17 I think certainly the McCanns was a case where we
- 18 spotted very early that it might obviously be a huge
- 19 story, that they were vulnerable members of the public
- 20 and that we would be well-placed to help them if that's 21 what they wanted.
- 22 Very early on, I think it was my then deputy who is 23 now the director, found a way of reaching them, I think,
- 24 or something happened probably three days after
- 25 Madeleine went missing. We also helped with issues Page 18

- Q. It's 408 pages long. 1
- A. I'm sorry about that.
- Q. 727 paragraphs long and signed and dated by you on
- 16 September last year. This is your formal evidence to
- 5 the Inquiry; is that right?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Mr Abell, it's not a matter -- or
- 8 it shouldn't be a matter of regret. I'm grateful to you
- 9 for the monumental amount of work that you clearly put
- 10 into preparing this comprehensive analysis of the work
- 11 of the PCC.
- 12 A. Thank you.
- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Which has been very helpful. 13
- 14 A. Thank you.
- MR JAY: Mr Abell, we'll use your witness statement as the 15
- 16 path through your evidence, which of course would be
- 17 logical. I'm going to ask you first of all about
- 18 yourself. You, of course, are the current director of
- 19 the PCC. You graduated from Cambridge University in the
- 20 year 2000 and then went straight to the PCC; is that
- 21 right?
- 22 A. (Nods head)
- 23 Q. In various capacities you worked your way up the system
- 24 and became director in December of 2009, I believe; is
- 25 that right?

- 1 A. That's right, end of December.
- 2 Q. Thank you very much. Some of your statement is entirely
- 3 expository and uncontroversial. Other parts will
- 4 warrant further discussion. But in order to make sense
- 5 of your evidence, I'm going to ask you to talk to
- 6 certain parts of your statement, allow me to summarise
- 7 other parts, but not deal with all of it, because there
- 8 isn't time.
- 9 A. Okay.
- 10 Q. Paragraph 30, first of all, at page 33500. You deal
- 11 conceptually with the status of the Editors' Code of
- 12 Practice.
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. There are really two elements. There's an element which
- tracks the common law -- and you give the example of
- privacy, common law under the Convention and clause 3 of 16
- the code -- and then there were individual clauses which
- provide extra protection, such as clause 8 for
- 19 hospitals, which isn't really part of the common law but
 - which is there because there's thought to be a good
- 21 reason for it; is that correct?
- 22 A. Yes.

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- 23 Q. But in terms of the jurisprudence of the PCC itself --
- take the example of privacy -- does the PCC take into
- 25 account decisions of the courts in framing its own
 - Page 21 response to complaints?
- 2 A. Yes. I think we're all very aware of decisions of the
- 3 courts, and because clause 3 of the code asks the
- 4 Commission to make judgments effectively about the Human
- 5 Rights Act, which is the same exercise employed by the
- s ragins rice, which is the same exercise employed by
- 6 courts, that we are very conscious of rulings as they
- 7 come down.
- 8 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 86 at page 33511, you summarise
- 9 Sir Christopher Meyer's permanent evolution, which he
- announced at a speech at the Newspaper Society in May
- 11 2003, which I believe was fairly soon after he arrived;
- is that right?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. The key points you summarised: the increase of the lay
- members to 10. So the balance from 2003 has been 10:7;
- is that correct?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Secondly, public members would be appointed following an 18
- 19 open advertisement process and the first vacancy
- attracted over 1,000 applications. I'm going to deal
- 21 with the issue of selection in a moment.
- Then the creation of a charter compliance panel.
- 23 Could you explain a little bit about that, Mr Abell?
- 24 A. Yeah, the idea was that there would be people who could
- 25 examine and request files on an almost random basis,
 - Page 22

- either based on a random selection of file numbers or
- 2 based on certain types of cases -- things like cases
- 3 involving children or cases that had taken more than 12
- 4 weeks to complete or cases involving death -- and they
- 5 would have a look at the files in their entirety and
- 6 make recommendations about how we might improve
- 7 practices check.
- 8 Q. Thank you. Then the appointment of a charter
- 9 Commissioner who could review decisions of the PCC in
- the event of further complaint; is that right?
- 11 A. Yeah. Really on handling grounds, it was established.
- 12 So if someone came to him and said, "I don't think my
- 13 complaint was handled probably", he would, again, get
- 14 the whole file and then, in my role as -- running the
- 15 complaints department, I would have lots of exchanges
- with him where he would talk about the case and then
- 17 come up with a judgment.
- 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Not too quickly, please, Mr Abell.
- 19 A. Sorry.
- 20 MR JAY: The final point I want to address in terms of
- 21 permanence of evolution is the Editors' Codebook, which
- 22 is a sort of exegesis of the code itself. The codebook,
- however, was written entirely by editors, isn't it?
- 24 A. It's written by the secretary of the Editors' Code of
- 25 Practice committee, but very much in conjunction with Page 23

 - the office of the PCC. So he will come to us with --
- 2 ask for our thoughts on cases, what we thought were
- 3 significant cases, but he would write it himself in the
- 4 end.

- 5 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 87, the 24-hour emergency
- 6 helpline which was set up in 2003, how well publicised
- 7 is that helpline?
- 8 A. We recently, over the last two years, had an advertising
- 9 campaign which focused quite considerably on it. It's
- one of the things you get drawn attention to when you go
- onto our website. It's one of the parts of our work
- that I think people who work at the PCC are most proud
- of and think can be the most effective, because it means
- that people who are concerned either that there's
- something about to appear in the paper or there's knocks
- on the door late at night or at any time can get in
- 17 contact. So we try and publicise it a lot. It's what
- we spend a lot of time trying to do. We ran an
- 19 advertising campaign I think in 2010, which really made
- 20 clear the existence of this 24-hour hotline.
- 21 Q. Thank you. That ties in with paragraph 89, where you
- 22 explain the desist notice system.
- 23 A. Yeah.
- 24 Q. Which you also say is at the heart of your work today.
- 25 In your own words, please, what is that system and about Page 24

- 1 how often a year is it activated?
- A. It's really designed for people who do not wish to speak 2
- 3 to the press, either after they've been contacted once
- 4 or twice. Generally, if they're at the centre of a news
- 5 story, most often through no fault of their own, they'll
- 6 be contacted by someone from the press, legitimately in
- 7 most circumstances, but they will take a view that they
- 8 don't wish to speak, and we quickly realised that we
- 9 could co-ordinate that request by circulating it to the
- 10 industry and indeed the broadcasters as well, because
- 11 Ofcom by statute doesn't have any pre-broadcast powers.
- 12 The PCC informally sends these messages both to
- 13 broadcasters and to members of the press. So it's used
- 14 primarily, really, to help members of the public who
- 15 take a view that they don't wish to speak to the press,
- 16 often because they're bereaved, but it may be because of
- 17
- 18 It's also used by public figures who are concerned
- 19 about paparazzi attention. If they wish to convey to
- 20 the industry their concern about either a particular
- 21 incident involving paparazzi or a pattern of behaviour,
- 22 we communicate that on their behalf, with the intention
- 23 that editors will then be able to take a judgment about
- 24 material which they decide to publish, because once they
- 25 publish it, they take responsibility for the conduct of Page 25
- those who have obtained it, and if there's concern about 1
- 2 that conduct, it should lead editors to not publishing
- 3 the material, which would affect the market for the
- 4 photographs.
- Q. The issue of paparazzi photographs is one you take up
- 6 later on in your witness statement and we'll come to it.
- 7 A. Okay.
- 8 Q. You tell us in paragraph 94 that when Baroness Buscombe
- 9 became chairman in April 2009, she announced that PCC
- 10 governance would be subject to an independent review.
- 11 The review was completed -- and this is paragraph 98 --
- 12 in July 2010, made 74 recommendations, and I think
- 13 virtually all of those were accepted, weren't they?
- 14
- 15 Q. Now there's a further review process, perhaps a more
- 16 existential one, in the light of this Inquiry, which to
- 17 some extent supersedes the 2010 review, so we're not
- 18 going to go into the detail of that.
- 19 A. Okay.
- 20 O. Can I deal in more detail with the issue of the
- 21 structure of the PCC and the way in which members are
- 22 appointed.
- 23 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Before you do that, just on the topic 23
- 24 that you've been talking about, if you issue a desist
- 25 notice, it isn't a breach of any code not to comply, is

Page 26

- 1 it? Or is it?
- A. Well, clause 4 of the code makes clear that journalists,
- 3 once asked to desist, must leave the property, stop
- asking questions and move away. So if you convey the 4
- 5 desist message, the newspapers are aware that they've
- 6 been asked to desist and they return. They would be
- 7 breaching the code, unless there was a public interest
- 8 justification.
- 9 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And what would the potential sanction
- 10 for that be?
- 11 A. We would expect, having made contact with the
- complainant, to receive a complaint and it be considered 12
- 13 as a complaint.
- 14 MR JAY: Is it, following on from that, a more serious
- 15 matter, though, that -- it's not an injunction, because
- 16 it doesn't have that force, but if an instruction by the
- 17 PCC to desist has not been complied with and the
- 18 complaint is brought not specifically because the
- 19 instruction was not being complied with but is brought
- 20 under clause 4 of the code, is it an aggravating factor
- 21 that the recommendation or the notice has not been
- 22 complied with?
- 23 A. It would very much be. Generally speaking, in almost
- 24 every occasion, particularly involving members of the
- 25 public, the people leave. I mean, the virtue of the
 - Page 27
- 1 system is that -- and this slightly appeals to
- 2 self-interest of editors who don't want to send
- 3 reporters to somewhere where they're not going to get
- 4 a response, no doubt, but ultimately if there are people
- 5 there, they tend to leave, and the success rate, because
- 6 we often speak to complainants afterwards, is actually
- 7 quite high.
- 8 So the other slight way it can be used is more
- 9 prophylactically, where we have families who are
- 10 bereaved, they know an inquest is going to take place in
- 11 three months' time or three weeks' time, and they can
- 12 use it to make clear to reporters in advance that
- 13 they're not going to speak to reporters and they
- 14 shouldn't be contacted.
- 15 So in my experience, very, very seldom has there
- 16 ever been an issue which follows up, because it has
- 17 actually been rather universally complied with.
- 18 Q. The issue of appointments of members. This is
- paragraph 110 and following of your witness statement, 20 but you'll need to turn up bundle B1, tab 6, which is
- 21 the articles of association.
- 22 A. Yes.

19

- Q. If you look at article 5 at page 34555:
- 24 "The number of members of the Commission shall be 25 not less than 9."

Page 28

7 (Pages 25 to 28)

- Well, now it's 17, shall not exceed 17:
- 2 "Members of the Commission shall be appointed in
- 3 accordance with Article 6 below, provided at all times
- the majority of the total number of members who are appointed shall be public members."
- So there's power there to have the 10:7 split we see now.
- Three class of member under Article 6: chairman, public, press members. 6.2:
- 10 "The chairman shall be appointed by PressBoF."
- 11 That is the industry body which, you explain in
- paragraph 357 of your witness statement, is comprised
- only of newspaper members --
- 14 A. And publishers, yeah.
- 15 Q. And publishers. Can I ask you about the relationship,
- as far as you understand it, between PressBoF and the
- 17 PCC? The PCC is entirely funded, is this right, by the
- levy which PressBoF imposes on its members?
- 19 A. Yes, that's right.
- 20 Q. Do you happen to know how that levy is worked out
- vis-a-vis PressBoF and its members?
- $\,\,$ 22 $\,\,$ A. I don't know the full detail of it. It's based on an
- equation that really relates to the size and sale of
- 24 publications, so the bigger publications pay more and
- 25 it's based on a formula that's agreed with the industry.

 Page 29
 - Q. Thank you. Obviously, News International will pay more
- 2 than -- that's one end of the extreme, and a small
- 3 magazine on the other?
- 4 A. That's exactly right.
- 5 Q. Going back to clause 6.2:
- 6 "The chairman appointed for such period and upon
- 7 such terms as PressBoF may, in is absolute discretion,
- 8 think fit, and PressBoF shall be entitled to vary or
- 9 revoke such appointment."
- The position, therefore, before the independent
- review in 2010 -- because there was a change -- is that
- the chair was appointed entirely at PressBoF's
- discretion. That's correct, isn't it?
- 14 A. Yes.

- 15 Q. The position now, on my understanding -- and this it is
- paragraph 110 of your statement and therefore would have
- 17 applied to Lord Hunt but not previously. There's an
- independent assessor involved?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. And consultation with the public members of the PCC
- before the appointment is formally made by PressBoF; is
- 22 that correct?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. How did it work in relation to the last appointment?
- Was it a recommendation which was made to PressBoF or Page 30

- did PressBoF have a shortlist and then choose for itself
- 2 from amongst the names put forward?
- 3 A. My understanding is they consulted with the Commission
- 4 through the deputy chairman of the PCC but the ultimate
- 5 decision from the shortlist was taken by PressBoF. The
- 6 Commission didn't exercise any role in that.
- 7 Q. Okay. Indeed, under the articles, there's no difference
- 8 between public and press members, but the position has
- 9 changed de facto --
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. -- under the Buscombe review. 6.3:
- "Subject to the provisions of article 5 above, the
- public members and the press members shall be appointed
- by the Appointments Commission for such period upon such
- 15 terms as the Appointments Commission may, in its
- 16 absolute discretion, think fit."
- 17 So the Appointments Commission, we can see under
- clause 10.1, is comprised of the chairman, the PressBoF
- 19 chairman and three other independent persons who are
 - nominated by the chairman of the PCC and the chairman of
- 21 PressBoF. That's correct, isn't it?
- 22 A. That's how it used to be, yes.
- 23 Q. So under the old regime, both public members and press
- 24 members were appointed pursuant to those processes; is
- 25 that correct?

Page 31

1 A. Yes.

20

- Q. The position now, if I've correctly understood it, is
- 3 that the press members are nominated by their trade
- 4 associations, as it were, and the Appointments
- 5 Commission has no formal role; is that right?
- 6 A. Well, the Appointments Commission has been abolished.
- 7 It's now a nominations committee of the PCC comprising
- 8 lay members only, which was felt to be a better approach
- 9 because they would have a greater sense of what the
- 10 Commission would need in terms of personnel. So to make
- it more independent, that was changed, and it was
- recommended by the governance review that as editors
- were being provided in their role as editors, the
- 14 Appointments Commission wasn't really exercising much of
- a judgment on them, so it was decided to split the
- processes and say the lay people should be appointed by
- a more robust and a more independent process, and the
- editors would be openly -- were more clearly provided by
- 19 the trade bodies.
- 20 Q. So we should look more closely then at the appointment
- of the lay members, the public members.
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. As you say, they are now appointed or selected by
- a nominations committee of three lay members of the PCC,
- 25 together with an external independent assessor; is that Page 32

8 (Pages 29 to 32)

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- correct? 1
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. How are the lay members of the PCC chosen to serve on
- 4 the nominations committee?
- 5 A. I believe it was agreed, in the first iteration of it,
- 6 it would be the chairman and the deputy chairman, as
- 7 there was then, plus a volunteer, and then it was
- 8 discussed when the nominations committee was empanelled,
- 9 effectively, by the Commission, and a figure said that
- 10 he would do it and he was the third person. It was
- 11 agreed by the Commission that it would be those three.
- 12 Q. Right. In relation to the public members, as you say in
- 13 paragraph 115 of your statement, there is an open
- 14 competition; is that correct?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 O. Have you been involved in the workings of the
- 17 nominations committee in any way?
- 18 A. Yes.

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- 19 Q. Could you tell us a little bit how it works then? Is
- 20 there a long list, a shortlist with interviews, and then
- 21 final selection by the PCC itself on the recommendation
- 22 of the nominations committee?
- 23 A. There is -- the nominations committee met to agree
- 24 criteria for the appointment. That formed the basis of
- 25 the advertisement. We then had 3,000 applicants for the Page 33

2 the press from improper pressure. 3 Were interviewees asked for their view of and

expression and the public's right to know and defence of

- possible approach to those general principles?
- 5 A. They were -- I think the list of criteria in my
 - statement at 116.5 talks about an interest in and
- 7 appreciation of the dynamics of a free press and freedom
- 8 of expression and a recognition of the need to balance
- 9 with other rights. So they were asked to discuss what
- 10 a free press means, but what it specifically means in
- 11 the context of protecting the rights of people,
- 12 particularly bearing in mind that the preceding comments
- 13 are talking about particularly vulnerable groups of
- 14 people who were in need of assistance.
- 15 Q. Thank you. So it's not just Article 10; it's balancing
- 16 Article 10 against Article 8?
- 17 A. Yes, and I would say that that's -- and the way -- when
- it gets to a complaints process, it's -- Article 8 would 18
- 19 have slight primacy, but one has to look at it within
- 20 the structure of something that seeks to preserve the
- 21 existence of a free press. Certainly that wouldn't be
- 22 a trump card at all.
- 23 Q. Thank you. The other aspect of the structure, looking
- 24 at it more widely but admittedly outside the PCC, the
- 25 Code of Practice Committee, which you it up on in Page 35
- post. The first sift was undertaken by the independent 1
- 2 assessor, with help from me and the independent assessor
- 3 together. That led to a reduction to a field of
 - a couple of hundred, I think. The nominations committee
- 5 then met to discuss those couple of hundred. There was
- 6 a long list created of up to 50, I think.
 - At that point, there was consultation with PressBoF of: here is the list of the 50. One of the criteria is "must be able to command the respect of the newspaper industry". He was invited to make any comments. They
- 11 weren't a veto, by any means, but a chance to make 12
 - comments. None were made in the event.
- 13 The nominations committee then agreed a shortlist 14 for interview. The interviews took place with three
- 15 members of the nominations committee, the independent
- 16 assessor and me asking questions. So I sat on the panel
- 17 but -- I don't think I was a voting member but I asked
- 18 questions based on my experience. That led to a very
- 19 short list, which was then promulgated to the Commission
- 20 with the recommendation that they accept it, which in
- 21 the event they did.
- 22 Q. We know from article 53.7 -- we've seen this this
- 23 morning -- that in carrying out its functions in
- 24 relation complaints, the Commission shall have regard to
- 25 generally established freedoms, including freedom of Page 34

- 1 paragraph 350 of your witness statement, that, in formal
- 2 terms, is a subcommittee of PressBoF; is that right?
- 3 A. That's right.
- 4 Q. There's no lay involvement. It's comprised entirely of
- 5 newspaper the proprietors and editors; is that right?
- 6 A. Although the chairman and the director were asked, as
- 7 a result of the governance review, to have a clearer 8 role because -- the chairman and director had ten
- 9 meetings and it was decided that they should have a much
- 10 clearer role in representing the views of the Commission
- 11 on the Code Committee.
- 12 Q. And also there is a process for public consultation for 13 any amendments to the Code, isn't there?
- 14 A. There's an annual audit where the public are asked to
- 15 make suggestions, the Commission considers whether it
- 16 wants to make any suggestions and interest groups do the
- 17 same, and that feeds into an annual consideration of the
- 18 code.
- 19 Q. So in practice, then, is there a process by which
- 20 ongoing issues and concerns of the PCC, particularly in
- 21 the context of possible code amendments, are fed back to
- 22 the Code of Practice Committee for consideration on an
- 23 annual basis, if not more frequently?
- 24 A. They can be, and if the Commission has a code issue, it
- 25 would be fed back to the Code Committee, and the Page 36

| Day | 233 - PM Leveson | Inq | uiry 30 January 2012 |
|-----|---|-----|---|
| 1 | Commission is asked to ratify changes to the code as | 1 | gathered from commentators and those who criticise the |
| 2 | well. So the Commission has to be happy with the terms | 2 | PCC, in terms of the structure and just put them to |
| 3 | of the code it's working with but the primary | 3 | you |
| 4 | consideration of the content of the code is by the | 4 | A. Of course. |
| 5 | Editors' Code committee and the idea is that editors | 5 | Q for your comment? Given that the relevant standards |
| 6 | must recognise that that's a document that they can work | 6 | are set by the adjudications the PCC makes and we can |
| 7 | with. | 7 | see the number it makes each year and given that |
| 8 | Q. So is this right: there's no possible of the PCC itself | 8 | there is a broad principle of precedent stare decisis |
| 9 | imposing an amendment on the Code of Practice Committee; | 9 | which the PCC operates, it's not in the interests of |
| 10 | the ultimate decision resides with that committee? | 10 | editors generally to make adverse decisions, |
| 11 | A. Yes. The Commission could raise an issue and it could | 11 | particularly on important points of principle, in |
| 12 | not ratify an amendment with which it disagreed, but it | 12 | individual cases, because they might find themselves |
| 13 | couldn't impose an amendment which the Code Committee | 13 | subsequently at the wrong end of a principle which they |
| 14 | wasn't seeking to make. | 14 | themselves have participated in creating. (a) Do you |
| 15 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Does that mean it's the lowest common | | see the point, and (b) is it a structural flaw? |
| 16 | denominator about these rights? Because if it doesn't | 16 | A. I understand your point, but I don't agree with it. |
| 17 | get through the editors, it never gets anywhere? | 17 | I think that the structural answer to that is to have |
| 18 | A. It has to the editors have to agree that it's | 18 | a body that is not dominated by editors, so the majority |
| 19 | a principle, but I think that they would have to explain | 19 | of 10:7. I'm not saying that is a definitive that's |
| 20 | why they didn't want to put it in if there was | 20 | the best ratio that's possible, but what that does mean |
| 21 | a legitimate reason to put it in. So there's quite | 21 | is there are ten independent-minded people who would |
| 22 | a lot of explanation of that point, but ultimately the | 22 | ensure that decisions are not being driven by editors, |
| 23 | decision is made by the Code Committee as to whether it | 23 | if they were to intend to do that. |
| 24 | should be contained. But it's not entirely a passive | 24 | My experience is that there isn't a resistance or |
| 25 | process. | 25 | act of propulsion by editors in either direction very |
| | Page 37 | | Page 39 |
| 1 | Q. Have there been situations where the PCC has been keen | 1 | often. It's often a debate around quite fine issues. |
| 2 | to amend the code in a particular way but that hasn't | 2 | I think the structural guarantee of having 10 |
| 3 | happened, owing to resistance within the Code of | 3 | independent people means that whatever the editors' |
| 4 | Practice Committee? | 4 | views are, there are people who are not editors who |
| 5 | A. To my experience, there's never been anything as | 5 | ultimately are the majority in the organisation. |
| 6 | definitive as that that I can recall. There have been | 6 | Q. Although editors are always in a minority numerically, |
| 7 | examples where the Commission has asked for | 7 | owing to their greater knowledge of the subject matter |
| 8 | clarification or raised an issue about specific clauses | 8 | and perhaps owing to certain personalities, in practice |
| 9 | of the code, but I can't recall ever the Commission | 9 | the views of editors tend to overbear those of the lay |
| 10 | saying, "In our view, this has to change", and then the | 10 | members. Is that a fair observation? |
| 11 | Code Committee refusing to change it. I think that | 11 | A. No, I don't think it is. I think also a lot of the |
| 12 | would cause a constitutional difficulty if that point | 12 | expertise in the code resides in the staff of the PCC, |
| 13 | was reached. | 13 | which has s helped to frame some of these decisions. |
| 14 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Why? | 14 | The PCC now has on it a former judge, a former chief |
| 15 | A. I suspect if the Commission felt very strongly that | 15 | constable, a professor in media law so there are |
| 16 | there was something either wrong with the code or there | 16 | people there with areas of expertise that possibly go |
| 17 | was something not in it that prevented it from doing its | 17 | beyond editors' expertise of the code and the law, and |
| 18 | job, it would create a difficult if the Code Committee | 18 | I think that they're appointed as independent people. |
| 19 | was point blank refusing to consider it. That's not | 19 | So the personality argument I think doesn't work. |
| | | | |

10 (Pages 37 to 40)

a legal one?

happened in my experience.

MR JAY: The difficulty would be a political one, not

A. Oh, it would -- it would also, yeah, raise a question

about the relationship between the two bodies.

Q. Can I raise a number of issues, many of which I've

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The people who sit on the Commission are quite strong

personalities. I think to join the PCC, you'd have to

Q. Given the clear interlinkages of personnel, money and

Committee -- we can see the extent to which they're

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power through PressBoF, PCC and the Code of Practice

have a strong personality.

1 1 interwoven, even in the current improved system -- the considerably in newspapers and there are retired editors 2 2 structure is not independent because we see too tightly who this Inquiry will have seen who may not be quite as 3 interwoven the interests of the press, as it were, over 3 in step with the current culture as well. 4 4 and above the interests of any individual? LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I can't think who you're talking 5 A. I think that there are virtues in the notion of buy-in 5 about. 6 and involvement of the industry which are considerable, A. But it is an issue, and I think the speed of change is 6 7 7 but I think that the risk will always remain that it such -- I'm not dogmatic against it and the difference 8 8 doesn't look like it's sufficiently independent and between appearance and reality is not necessarily 9 9 there's a risk that there's not sufficient external insignificant, because in people's minds they have 10 10 scrutiny of all that is going on, starting from the a view and that view needs to be shifted. 11 MR JAY: Do you subscribe to the view that the PCC is not funding and the code, going downwards, and I think one 11 12 of the virtues of something like this Inquiry is that 12 a regulator in the proper sense of the term but is 13 it's an entirely external examination of the 13 rather a complaints-handling service with one or two 14 14 add-ons? over-arching structure. I think a lot of what with we 15 15 A. I think there is a sort of danger of semantics here, but have at the PCC, particularly in my experience, has 16 changed a lot of the internal structures, but the 16 I think that the PCC is a complaints-handling body which 17 over-arching architecture has remained for 17 has pre-publication work, does training work, does 18 18 guidance work, and I think it's part of a system that a considerable period of time, and I think that when one 19 starts considering about appropriate mechanisms in this 19 clearly has regulatory aspects. 20 area, one has to look at the compete picture, and that 20 If, by "regulator", we mean something that is more interventionist, the PCC has not shown itself to be 21 21 starts with funding and agreement as to powers. 22 It contains the code of practice and the functions of 22 that. I think while it has certain powers invested in 23 23 it, I don't think they are sufficiently spelled out or the PCC. 24 24 So I think there is great virtue in involvement in the structures attendant upon them are sufficiently 25 25 clear to place it in the category of regulator that the system, and buy-in into the system and you can see, Page 41 Page 43 1 people might consider it might be. 1 if that stops to happen, where problems can arise. It's 2 2 I think it is, as its articles make clear, primarily not to be underestimated, but one has to balance that 3 3 a complaints-handling body. It does have attendant against the issue of independence, and I think there is 4 4 other roles to perform -a legitimate demand for external scrutiny on all the 5 processes to ensure that independence. 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It developed some other roles, rathe 6 than has them. It developed them for itself. 6 Q. It may not be the fact of lack of independence; it may 7 7 A. And I think -- and the articles give provision for that, be the appearance of lack of independence. One way to 8 improve that and remove that appearance would be, for 8 so I think it has been a sort of --LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Internally. 9 9 example, to say that only retired editors should sit on 10 A. -- organic development, but the problem with that sort the PCC. It is that a proposition with which you would 10 11 of development is it lacks clarity and an over-arching 11 shall sympathetic or not? 12 A. I wouldn't be dogmatic against it. I think one could 12 viewpoint. I think that what's happening --13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: One of the concerns is that people 13 come up with other ways of involving the industry 14 without using retired editors. One could have editors 14 thinking about a regulator would think about a body that 15 who are more clearly framed as consultants or experts to 15 was over-arching, that took a coherent, cohesive look at 16 16 an entire industry, or whatever it was that it's an adjudicating panel, rather than voting members. 17 17 regulating, identified standards for everybody to meet My concern about ex-editors is simply the speed of 18 18 and ensured in some way that people came up to those the industry, the way it moves. I think there's quite 19 19 standards, whereas the PCC is looking at specific cases considerable change that goes on underneath people's 20 20 and doesn't over-arch in that way. feet whilst they're in post and once they're out of 21 21 post, things do shift. So I think the expertise A. I think there's a very good point there, that the way 22 22 argument is strengthened with people who are still in the PCC -- and this is not to say the PCC is negligent 23 23 on the issue of standards. It's seen itself as taking the heat of the fray. 24 24 small cases and developing broad principles, whereas I think that people who are retired editors -- and

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it depends how half you go back. Cultures change quite 25

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what you're talking about is to take broad principles

- and find a method of enforcing their adherence, and
 I think whilst there may be provision, in the broadest
 sense, for the PCC to do that, no concomitant structure
 has grown up with it to enable it to -- nor is it
 resourced, as it stands, to do that.
 - So I think the attitude towards standards in the PCC is we try and set out more clearly now, so it can be absolutely clear, that what we're doing is to have a complaints system that holds editors to account, have a proactive role to try and get people within that system and to do additional work on guidance and pronouncing on the code. That's what we do, and I think are resourced to do.

The question I think is a very good one is to say:
if we're starting from scratch and having an
over-arching view to it, here are a set of standards,
and the PCC or the body that there is becomes should
have this clear structure and power to enforce that.

I think the mechanism to do that might be to say to newspapers: "You have your own internal standards much more clearly defined and the role of the new body should be to make sure that you hold yourself to those standards and have proper processes." That's not currently in place at the moment.

25 Q. The standards, of course, are set out in the code of Page 45

that included, of course, the PCC-brokered amicablesolutions.

Can we seek to summarise it in this way: we've heard about the sifting of new complaints and the extraction

5 of anything which was plainly outside remit or plainly

6 misconceived; is that correct?

- 7 A. Yes. People would write to us -- if it was nothing to
- 8 do with newspapers, for example, we would send them to
- 9 the body that it might be appropriate -- it might be
- about adverts, it might be about behaviour of
- 11 newsagents. It might be very, very incomplete
- information, where someone dashes off half an email and
- 13 we write back to them and say, "What do you actually
- 14 mean?" and they never come back. A large proportion of
- 15 people dash off that first email and then do not
- 16 continue in any way to engage with the process, often
- because their concerns are more nebulous than focused on
- a specific article.
- 19 Q. If we're looking at the statistics then for 2010, 821 20 out of the 7,000 were immediately ruled out as being
- outside remit. We know that from page 36509.
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. Then 2,274 were not pursued. This was presumably the
- 24 cases which started with incomplete information or which
- 25 died an early death; is that correct?

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- 1 practice but in very general principles. If you want to
- see the articulation of any more precise standards, you
- 3 look to the adjudications, which spring from individual
- 4 complaints. That's the way it operates.
- 5 A. Yeah.

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- 6 Q. So if you want to see general rules, the general rules
- 7 spring only from individual situations, which have given
- 8 rise to a complaint and not otherwise. That's correct,
- 9 isn't it?
- 10 A. That's the primary root of them. They have led to
- general guidance, for example, and I list the 20 or 25
- guidance notes the PCC has issued. They are rooted in
- the code and they are likely to have been occasioned by
- information that was brought to the Commission's
- attention by virtue of a complaint, but there is that
- provision to take those specific cases and make a broad
- lesson, which I think is a valuable role.
- 18 Q. Can I deal with the complaints process, which you
- 19 address in paragraphs 188 and following. What I'm going
- 20 to ask you to do is turn up the 2010 annual review,
- which is tab 49 of bundle B1.
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. If you look at the annual review and the statistics for
- 24 2010 at page 36503, you can see the position. There was
- over 7,000 complaints but rulings in 1,687 cases, and Page 46

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. So that accounts for about 3,500, half of all of them.
- 3 If the complaint is deemed to fall within the remit,
- 4 there are then two stages. If the complaints officer
- 5 considers that the complaint raises no prima facie case,
- 6 it's presented to the Commission for an immediate
- 7 decision?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. But if it's thought to raise an arguable point, it then
- goes through to a fuller investigation; is that correct?
- 11 A. Yes, and the Commission, if they disagree with that
- 12 first prima facie presentation, their first step would
- be to say, "Actually, we don't have enough information
- on this", or: "This looks like it might be something
- more significant. Please go and write to the editor and
- 16 find out more information."
- 17 Q. Right. We heard from Mr Toulmin what happens when the
- investigation starts. The newspaper must reply within
- seven days and then the process of mediation starts.
- 20 Can I just have your view as to the role the PCC takes
- 20 Can't just have your view as to the fole the feet
- 21 within the context of that mediation --
- 22 A. Yeah.
- $\,$ 23 $\,$ Q. $\,$ -- and the extent to which it assists the claimants or
- is entirely impartial. Can you help us with that?
- 25 A. The way I explain it to complaints officers and the way Page 48

12 (Pages 45 to 48)

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1 we discuss it internally is I see the role of 2 a complaints officer as 60/40 in favour of the 3 complainant, if that is necessary, in the sense that 4 some complainants will not be best placed to know the 5 full position, know really what the code says or what 6 the newspaper might be expected to do. So I think there 7 is an advocacy role for complaints officers to take on 8 board the concerns of the complainant and drive them. 9

I think the other function -- it can be difficult, but I think it is appropriate for a complaints officer to sort of ride two horses. One would be to push for mediation and to find ways of doing, and the second would be, as that process goes on, to try and ensure that enough information is available that should the mediation not be successful, the Commission will ultimately be able to reach a decision.

So I don't think it's a neutral act by complaints people. I think their job is to grip the issues and to try and bring them to a conclusion, and that will invariably be by assisting the complainant.

- Q. Thank you. If the mediation process succeeds, self-evidently that's the end of the matter.
- 23 Correction, apology, bouquet of flowers or whatever the
- 24 solution might be. But if the matter then is not
- 25 resolved amicably, as we heard this morning, the matter Page 49

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and more work done on it.

2 What tends to happen if a commissioner doesn't feel

very strongly about it or if feels the merits of the

- 4 argument run in counter to their own, they may well bow
- 5 to the will of the majority, content that they can stand
- 6 behind the decision, but the movement will be to try and
- 7 have everyone say what they think and a consensus
- 8 position reached.
 - Q. You attend these meetings as secretary to the
- 10 Commission --
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. -- and separately as an officer of the Commission's
- 13 director, no doubt. Just give us a sense of how
 - decision-making breaks down to this extent -- obviously
- 15 we're not concerned with the confidentiality of
- 16 individual decisions, but do you get a sense that the
- 17 press members tend to line up on one side and the public
- 18 members on another side, or is it far more nuanced and
- 19 complex than that?
- 20 A. It's more complicated, and it really depends on the
- 21 issues of each case. I've very seldom, if ever, seen
- 22 all editors agreeing and all lay commissioners taking an
- 23 opposite view. It's often people raising different
- 24 issues. Editors will say in their experience what they
- 25 would think. Sometimes they say, "We wouldn't have done Page 51

proceeds for ruling or determination, and there are 1

- 2 three possibilities: either no breach of the code, or
- 3 breach of the code but publication has offered
- 4 sufficient remedial action, in which case no adverse
- 5 ruling is made, or finally there's adjudication.

6 An adjudication might be either upholding the 7 complaint or rejecting the complaint; is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

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9 Q. Can I ask you about what happens in Commission meetings.

a recommendation to the Commission of one direction or

- 10 You explain in paragraph 204 that the full file is seen,
- 11 presumably by each commissioner, and under 205, there
- 12 isn't a formal vote but a consensus is sought to be
- 13 attained. How does that operate in practice?
- 14 A. The office will disclose the full file. It will make
- 16 another. The chairman will then invite comments from
- 17 commissioners. Sometimes the Commission will all
- 18 declare they are content with the officer's proposed
- 19 recommendation. Other times they will start raising
- 20 comments.
- 21 It's then the role of the chairman, together with
- 22 the director, to bring those comments together, with the
- 23 intention of reaching an agreed decision. Now,
- 24 commissioners can say that they fundamentally disagree
 - with the decision, in which case it will be taken away Page 50

- this in our paper for the following reasons", which 1
- 2 I think commissioners give regard to, as one might
- 3 expect, but they are quite often long, complicated
- 4 exchanges where people will also say at the start,
- 5 "I think one thing", and at the other end they will say,
- 6 equally fervently, they think something else.
- 7 So there is quite a lot of exchange and
- 8 deliberation, which is proper, I believe.
- 9 Q. Thank you. Now look at some key rulings in your 10 statement.
- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just before we go to the rulings, 11
- 12 before we forget the point, you've spoken about
- 13 mediation, which then allows the complaint to drop out
- 14 of the system and it goes nowhere else; is that right?
- 15 A. It used to be more like that -- one of the things that
- 16 has changed in the last couple of years is if there's
- 17 something significant in it -- often the complaints
- 18 officer will flag it up to me and then to the chairman
- 19 of the Commission, who will write to the editor or write
- 20 to the managing editor and say, "This looks like
- 21 a significant issue. Can you reassure us what happened
- 22 here?"
- 23 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not just that I'm thinking
- 24 about; I'm thinking about the industry as a whole. If
- 25 lots of the cases are being mediated, then the rest of Page 52

13 (Pages 49 to 52)

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- 1 the industry will not know what are the issues and how
- 2 they're being resolved so that their own guidelines
- 3 internally can be changed or modified in accordance with
- 4 the views --

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- 5 A. I think that's a fair point which has been sought to be 6 addressed by (a) the statements of resolution are now 7 very, very full indeed. So when we do resolve a case,
- 8 we publish a full summary of it, which we then

9 communicate via Twitter and on our website. 10

The training that the PCC undertakes is not only about adjudicated decisions; it also takes in resolved 12 cases. So if a resolved case raises a specific issue, 13 we use that as an example. One case I can recall was 14 when a woman was photographed in a public place outside 15 a shopping centre and the photograph was used by 16 a magazine in a discussion about her potential ill 17 health with an eating disorder. The editor of the 18 magazine eventually settled with a very prominent

- 19 apology and undertakings about the future, but it was
- 20 relatively near the Naomi Campbell decision and it was
- 21 an example of a photograph in a public place but
- 22 containing a quality of information that related to
- 23 privacy, and therefore it was a significant issue for
- 24 the PCC, and in our training that we've done, in our
- 25 public pronouncements, we've specifically drawn Page 53
 - attention to that to say to people: although it was
- 2 settled, which was right and proper and was what the
- 3 complainant wanted, the issue was more significant than 3
- 4

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- 5 MR JAY: I think that leads on to -- maybe it's the same 6
 - point, but the principles of precedent which set the
- 7 standards or enunciate the standards which we see in the
- 8 adjudications, either upheld or rejected. To what
- 9 extent are the adjudications you feel representative of the type of cases the PCC is seeing in any particular
- 10 11 year? It may be that statistically they're not because
- 12 they only represent those cases which, for some reason
- 13 have not been settled. 14
- On the other hand, it may be said that's exactly the 15 same as civil litigation, where the vast majority of 16 cases settle and only a few get to court and it's the
- 17 few which get to court which set the standards. How
- 18 does it work, do you think?
- 19 A. I think that we're conscious in the office of a case 20 that is significant, with significant implications, and
- 21 particularly if it's a serious breach of the code, where
- 22 we will seek to carry out the mediation function, as we
- 23 always would do, but we'd also try to ensure that if
- 24 that's not successful, that is flagged up immediately to
- 25 the Commission as a case that's worthy of publication, Page 54

that will hopefully set standards.

2 So we keep in our mind -- I mean, there are three 3 mechanisms by which cases can go to be sort of formally

4 promulgated by the PCC. One is that commissioners can

5 see it via correspondence and feel it's significant

6 enough to warrant that. One is that it's a breach of 7 the code that's gone unremedied, and the second is where

8 it's a potentially grey area which would benefit from 9

public discussion.

So we seek to try and channel that, if possible, whilst still balancing the wishes of the complainant, because the intention should be that the adjudications, of which there aren't many, we have to make a virtue of the fact that they therefore can have more impact when they do come out and if they fix on specific areas,

16 we're keen and alive to bringing that out.

17 Q. It may be there are situations where a complaint officer 18 feels that there's been a serious breach of the code,

19 that it would be an open-and-shut case if the matter

20 ever went to adjudication, but if the impetus is to try

21 and broker a settlement, that message may not be

22 communicated to the complainant. Or is it a message

23 which is communicated to the complainant?

24 A. I think the idea is that the complaints officers discuss

25 with complainants what they want. So in those sort of Page 55

1 cases I would expect a complaints officer so say, "This

2 looks like a fairly straightforward breach of the code,

although I can't guarantee" -- what one doesn't want to

4 do is for a complaints officer to promise to

5 a complainant effectively: "This will be upheld", and

6 then that not happen, which I think would be hugely

7 disappointing to someone. But I think -- I would expect 8 them to speak to the complainant and say, "There's

9 a strong argument that this will be handled in this way

10 and published. There's an equally strong argument that 11 the newspaper, because of that, will be willing to do

12 this, that and the other. What do you actually want out

13 of this?" 14

There are some cases where no remedy is possible. As soon as we get in the realm of identifying victims of

16 sexual assault or certain serious privacy intrusions, 17 it's very hard to see what the remedy could be. Those

18 cases tend to select themselves, as well.

19 Q. You don't have power to fine, but as part and parcel of 20 the conciliation processes, does monetary consideration

ever pass hands? 21

22 A. We do allow it to happen and we will be party to it if 23 that is what the newspaper is willing to do and that is

24 what the complainant wants. So we do have cases settled

by ex gratia payments. Page 56

14 (Pages 53 to 56)

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- 1 Some people in the industry are very happy to do
- 2 that because they see it as a way of settling complaints
- 3 in full and final settlement. Others are more reluctant
- 4 to do that, and so we don't have the formal authority to
- 5 say, "You have to compensate to X amount", but it does
- 6 take place as part of the broad mediation process.
- 7 Q. In your experience, is this right, that very few
- 8 successful complaints, whether resolved amicably or
- 9 following an adjudication, then turn into civil
- 10 litigation?
- 11 A. I think, yeah, few -- I think a couple of year, two or
- 12 three a year that I've become aware of. There may be
- 13 more that I'm not aware of, but I would expect to be
- 14 made aware of.
- 15 Q. May I ask you about four or five key rulings,
- 16 understanding, as one must, that to look at just a few
- 17 cases in the context of the comfortable number you refer
- 18 to in your witness statement may not be representative.
- 19 A. Okay.
- 20 Q. I raise them either because -- one case is particularly
- 21 notorious, but some have been mentioned in this Inquiry.
- 22 The Clare Balding against the Sunday Times case,
- 23 "Dyke on a bike", that's 33611 in your witness
- 24 statement. You comment on that one. That's quite
- 25 recent, during your time as director.

Page 57

- 1 version on that.
- 2 Q. In that case, the final decision was made by the
- 3 Commission and not by you. Again, was that a case which
- 4 the Commission reached fairly easily as opposed to
- 5 officers within the Commission?
- A. I think there was debate about it, because of the 6
- 7 cultural issue, because of the almost philosophical
- 8 point about the meaning of words and their effect, and
- 9 also because it's relatively rare for the PCC to get
- 10 a complaint like this, possibly due to the existence
- 11 of -- if you read papers from the 1980s, use of what
- 12 might be considered to be discriminatory references to
- 13 sexuality and particularly homosexuality were very
- 14 common. We don't get many complaints like this. So
- 15 there was a full and frank discussion of it, including
- 16 by editors, but to my recollection it was the unanimous
- view of the Commission that this was a breach of the 17
- 18 code
- O. The most controversial case I think the Commission has 19
- 20 received in recent years is the Daily Mail Jan Moir
- 21 article on the death of Stephen Gately. The piece
- 22 itself was 16 October 2009, before you became director.
- 23 You were deputy director, I believe, at that stage.
- 24 A. Yes.

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25 Q. But the adjudication where the complaint was rejected Page 59

- A. Yes. 1
- 2 Q. We heard from Mr Witherow on this and that the term
- 3 "dyke" he says is often used in a non-pejorative fashion
- 4 and therefore either is not discriminatory or might be
- 5 regarded a fair comment. Clearly, the PCC took
- 6 a different view. Are you able to assist on why that
- 7 was so?
- 8 A. I think one has to look at the context of the article
- 9 itself, and I think Mr Witherow's argument, which I do
- 10 understand, is that the valency of words changes over
- 11 the course of time and certain communities can reclaim
- 12 them and they have different meanings to different
- 13 people, so a website that treats the term "dyke" might
- 14 be in the context of a reclamation of a word. It might 15
- be in the context of a community of people who feel
- 16 content with that word.
- 17 My recollection of the article was that it was 18 an attempt to be sort of humorous about Clare Balding in 18
- 19 a negative way. I don't feel that one reading that
- 20 article would regard it as a neutral use of the term.
- 21 My own view at the time, which remains, is that
- 22 clause 12 of the code is designed to protect individuals
- 23 from pejorative use of terminology, and I think "dyke on
- 24 a bike" to me is a relatively straightforward breach of
- 25 clause 12 of the code. I don't agree with Mr Witherow's Page 58

- was February 2010. Am I right in saying that you had
- 2 involvement in -- not in the decision, but at least you
- 3 observed the decision being taken?
- 4 A. Yes, I was involved in it, absolutely.
- 5 O. That was a particularly controversial case. I think
- 6 there were at least 22,000 complaints; is that right?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. Your website crashed that day, and the headline,
- 9 although it was removed soon after by the Daily Mail,
- 10 was "Why there was nothing natural about
- 11 Stephen Gately's death". It raised issues under
 - clause 1, accuracy, clause 5, intrusion into grief, and
- 13 clause 12, discrimination, because it was said that the
- 14 implication very strongly was that it was homophobic,
 - basically.
- 16 First of all, how did the Commission approach that
- 17 case and to what extent was there consensus on the
- conclusion?
- 19 A. When it first happened -- I mean, I think we may have
- 20 been an example of what was called "Fry-bombing", when
- 21 Stephen Fry, who has a million people following him on
- 22 Twitter, directed people to the PCC's website. So he
- 24 time and that, I think, led to the crash. But there was
- 25 a large body of people who were deeply concerned about Page 60

directed a million people to go to the website at one

15 (Pages 57 to 60)

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this article. We then contacted the family of Mr Gately through the band's PR apparatus to seek their views on it, and his partner subsequently made a formal complaint.

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line.

This was a case that took a long time through the Commission, and indeed internally at the office, with a lot of considerations on both sides, because on the one hand, there was the issue of comment such as these made in the aftermath of a death, which touched upon lifestyle issues connected to the sexuality of Mr Gately. On the other hand, there was this notion of the right of the press to comment freely and vigorously on matters that were well established in the public domain, even in the context of someone's death, and so there is a balancing exercise to be struck.

I think the Commission, if you read the full decision, which is a very long decision that tries to bring out some of these points, sought thoughtfully to engage with each of those issues. It came up to the view that it was just short of a breach of the code, although it did criticise the paper within that framework. I believe there will be some Commissioners who felt it went over the line but the majority and then the consensus was that it just stopped short of the

- Page 61
- Q. One point on that case, that the use of -- particularly 1
- 2 in the headline -- "Nothing natural about Stephen Gately 3
- it's death" -- given that the clear evidence was that he
- 4 died from natural causes, didn't that necessarily engage 5

a breach of article 1, particularly when one read it in

- 6
- conjunction with other language in the article itself,
- 7 which had pretty clear homophobic overtones?
- 8 A. I think the intention of the Commission was certainly to
- 9 examine it in that context. My understanding of it was
- 10 the article did make clear the precise medical
- 11 diagnosis. It seemed to me that the contention of the
- 12 columnist was that certain lifestyle factors not
- 13 exclusive to the sexuality of Mr Gately were the subject
- 14 of her criticism, and so he died -- there was some
- 15 discussion of drug-taking. There was some discussion of 15
- 16 another partner being involved, sort of late nights in
- 17 at club and going back to a hotel.
- 18 It seemed to be at least -- or the Commission took 19 this view -- a rhetorical point about -- she was saying
- 20 that people, to her mind, possibly -- I don't want to
- 21 speak for her -- that natural death involves people
- 22
- dying quietly of old age in their beds and she took
- 23 a view that the dissolute circumstances surrounding this
- 24 made it not natural as a point of opinion.
 - The article did make clear that the medical Page 62

- diagnosis was not of improper practice or improper
- 2 behaviour but she was formulating an opinion based on
 - her view of the world and possibly her sense of the view
- 4 of the world of her readership. It's a difficult point,
- 5 and I think the Commission wrestled with it, but that
- 6 was the conclusion that they ultimately drew from it.
- 7 Q. But if, as a matter of fact, the death was due to
- 8 natural causes, commentary around alleged lifestyle
- 9 factors which, by definition, did not contribute to the
- 10 death as a matter of fact, were inaccurate, weren't
- 11 they, in the context of clause 1?
- 12 A. Well, I don't think that the word "natural" necessarily
- 13 has only a medical connotation there. I think it's
- 14 a term that one can use as a point of perspective, what
- 15 is natural and what is not natural. I don't think it's
- 16 necessarily -- and the Commission did not think it was
- 17 an inaccuracy in that sense.
- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I think it's probably sensible to 18
- 19 take five minutes.
- 20 MR JAY: Yes.
- 21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you.
- 22 (3.35 pm)
- 23 (A short break)
- 24 (3.45 pm)

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25 MR JAY: Paragraph 240 of your statement, the issue of

Page 63

- 1 prominence of the published remedy. That is an issue,
 - 2 I think, which rankles not necessarily most but
 - 3 certainly significantly with many complainants and also
 - features, I think, in the related issue of the public
 - 5 perception of the PCC.
 - 6 Can we take it in stages? In relation to an adverse
 - adjudication, the PCC does not have a right to insist
 - 8 exactly where and how that adjudication is published; is
 - 10 A. No, although the code was changed at the beginning of
 - 11 this year to say that the location has to be agreed in
 - advance with the PCC through the director.
 - 13 Q. That was introduced in January of last year --
 - 14 A. No --
 - Q. -- but does that mean that the PCC can insist where the
 - 16 adjudication is published?
 - 17 A. No, it means it has to be agreed with them. The power
 - 18 to direct where it should appear still does not --
 - 19 Q. I think I've correctly understood it. It's still
 - 20 a question of negotiation -- you will try and get the
 - 21 editor to follow your will -- but ultimately you might
 - 22 have to yield to the editor's view or it becomes
 - 23 a matter, again, of discussion and consensus; is that
 - 24
 - 25 A. Yes, or if the editor exercises his discretion and Page 64

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- 1 publishes it in a way that the Commission finds not to
- 2 be sufficiently prominent, it would give rise to the
- 3 case being considered again and possibly upheld
- 4 a further time.
- 5 Q. Is this right as well: it's not just a question of the
- 6 location of the publication of the adjudication, but
- 7 also the size of print and exactly how it's headlined?
- 8 These are also matters which would be up for discussion?
- 9 A. Yes. The code has a requirement that the PCC is
- 10 referenced in the headline. So that's a matter of
- 11 requirement and a failure to do that would require some
- 12 form of action. But the precise layout is not something
- 13 on which the Commission tends formally to take a view.
- 14 Q. Wouldn't you agree, particularly in this context, where
- 15 there's been an adverse adjudication by the PCC, that
- 16 it's evidence of a weakness in a system which depends
- 17 ultimately on consent that the PCC, as quasi-regulator,
- 18 if that's what it is -- it may be less than that --
- 19 cannot insist to the editor in breach to publish the
- 20 adverse adjudication in a particular way according to
- 21 the wish of the PCC, rather than the wish of the
- 22 newspaper?

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- 23 A. I think it's -- it sets a limit to the power of the
- 24 sanction, certainly, and if one were to look, as I've
- 25 been thinking about, to the future, one could conceive Page 65

- demonstrates that the PCC is without teeth because it
- 2 can't even insist in an adjudication case how the
 - newspaper must publish the offending adjudication."
- 4 Do you accept that?
- 5 A. I think there's a risk with any over-arching system of
- 6 self-regulation that newspapers in this case don't
- 7 provide sufficient provision and that would lead to
- people losing confidence in it. I think if you actually 8
- 9 look at the way newspapers historically have responded
- 10 to apologising, one could argue that they would garner
- 11 greater trust with their readers if they did it more
- 12 readily and more openly. But sometimes a view is taken
- 13 on a specific case or as a matter of principle that
- 14 doesn't push in that direction.
- 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's interesting. One of the
- 16 greatest complaints I heard in the weeks that I heard
- 17 evidence on this topic was you labour away at the PCC
- 18 complaining, batting forward the correspondence, and
- 19 then you need a very large magnifying glass to read the
- 20 ruling in your favour. You must have read the evidence
- 21 that I received.
- 22 A. Yes.

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- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But that does seem to have a degree 23
- 24
- 25 A. I think there's a -- and I think that one can look at Page 67

of increasing the power of sanction by saying either

- 2 that all adjudications must be referenced, for example,
 - on the front page, whatever the circumstance, and
 - secondly that the precise location would be a matter
- 5 dictated by the organisation itself.
 - The argument has always been that things move very quickly and pages change shape and the right to put
- 8 things in a certain way in a newspaper, notwithstanding
- 9 the terms of what the code require, must be a matter for
- 10 the editor, and I think that's often been a prevailing
- 11 argument. But it seems to me -- and I think people
- 12 would agree with me on this on the Commission -- that if 12
- 13 one were to look at a way of increasing the power of the
- critical sanction, which would not involve anything 15 massively significant other than the agreement of the
- 16 industry that this would take place, one could say
- 17
- adjudications should appear always trailed on the front
- 18 page and always in a location dictated by the
- 19 organisation.
- 20 Q. It might be said that the newspapers' holding out for
- 21 some sort of control over the publication of
- 22 adjudications or even the publications of apologies and
- 23 corrections is short-sighted because it might be
- 24 contributing to the demise of the PCC itself, because in
- 25 terms of public perception, the public say, "This Page 66

- a process of improvement here but one that perhaps
- 2 hasn't gone far enough, and I'm very conscious that the
- 3 rulings that we do now I think are longer and require
- 4 greater prominence in their promulgation by the paper,
- 5 but I think that there's been a process of improvement
- 6 in this area. You might well conclude, and we may well
- 7 conclude, that it could have gone further and should go
- 8 further in the future. I don't -- I think that's
- 9 a legitimate position to take.
- 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Paying for it to be published in
- 11 somebody else's newspaper? That was an idea that
 - somebody had.
- 13 A. Yeah, I'd not heard that idea before. With all these
- 14 things, if everyone agreed to it, it could be done.
- 15 I think if people didn't agree to it, it would seem hard
- 16 to legislate, even with a small 'l', for. I think the
- 17 idea of publicising very clearly when it has happened is
- 18 something that should be considered -- I think
- 19 newspapers can control their own publication -- and the
- 20 work of the PCC has been to try and publicise it
- 21 ourselves. So we tweet about it, we encourage other
- 22 people to write about it. So that notion is something
- 23 that we're quite warm on, I think.
- 24 MR JAY: Ultimately, is there a philosophical question here
- 25 that the PCC feels there's only a certain distance it Page 68

17 (Pages 65 to 68)

| 1 | can go in terms of insisting because we are dealing with | 1 | code could change to say the general expectation will be |
|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | a system of self-regulation which depends on the consent | 2 | that there is prior notification, and the editor will be |
| 3 | of the newspaper, or is it a question of the PCC pulling | 3 | expected to make an argument why that hasn't taken place |
| 4 | punches which it could land if it wished to? | 4 | in a particular case, because one can conceive of |
| 5 | A. I think certainly my experience is that in this area | 5 | investigative journalism where it would be wrong to put |
| 6 | we strain as much as possible to get prominence. | 6 | someone on notice of things that are about to appear. |
| 7 | I think the system is consensual and there's no getting | 7 | But one could easily say that should be an argument that |
| 8 | away from it, but as I said, that carries with it | 8 | it should be for an editor to make and explain clearly |
| 9 | a benefit because you can get things which would be | 9 | why they've got done it. |
| 10 | fought against if the system was non-voluntary, | 10 | The issue we've sometimes had we had a case last |
| 11 | particularly the fast-moving stuff. So getting stuff | 11 | year where the editor felt that the information was not |
| 12 | taken off websites very quickly, the anti-harassment | 12 | contentious, it came from a source close to the person, |
| 13 | work, the pre-publication guidance work that is | 13 | and they didn't go to that person for comment. Now, |
| 14 | a feature of a system that is pitched at the flexible, | 14 | I think we, in our view, concluded that was a wrong |
| 15 | fast-moving end. What you lose at that end which you | 15 | decision, but it was a relatively fine decision to have |
| 16 | would gain by a greater certainty of powers you lose, | 16 | to make, not because I think the editor was concerned |
| 17 | I suppose, some element of authority, because it's | 17 | about the risk of injunction but rather they took |
| 18 | authority that is that at the moment is based on | 18 | a common sense view, as they saw it, that the issue |
| 19 | collaboration and | 19 | wasn't such that would benefit from a comment. |
| 20 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I don't understand why you would lose | | So I think there's quite a large area of this where |
| 21 | the fast-moving end if you had a little bit more power | 21 | it's a fine decision to make. I don't think it's always |
| 22 | at the other end. | 22 | very straightforward. The example you've discussed with |
| 23 | A. I think provided that power was accepted and established | 23 | Tim Toulmin about Burrell was relatively clearcut, but |
| 24 | and structural present, I'm not disagreeing with you. | 24 | there will be areas that drift into the grey a little |
| 25 | What I'm saying is that at the moment the certain | 25 | bit. |
| | Page 69 | | Page 71 |
| | | | |
| 1 | flexible side of things are in the nonformal | 1 | Q. I don't think the DCMS committee were concerned with |
| 1 2 | flexible side of things are in the nonformal consideration. So if the system had a greater | 1 2 | Q. I don't think the DCMS committee were concerned with grey areas in that sense. All they were saying was that |
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| 2 | consideration. So if the system had a greater | 2 | grey areas in that sense. All they were saying was that |
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- 1 the Commissioners, one should have a great deal of 2 personal sympathy for Mr Mosley based on those peculiar 3 circumstances of his case, because of he -- reading that 4 information and seeing those pictures and that video 5 about himself without being aware that it was going to 6 come, at a personal level one can see how terrible that 7 would have been. 8 So I don't think there's any view of the Commission 9 corporately about Mr Mosley, except to say on the 10
 - specifics of the case it was quite likely he would have found favour with the judgment of the Commission if they had been asked to make one. So I certainly don't accept that at all as a motivating factor.
- 13 14 Q. Okay. I'm going to pass over significant further 15 sections of your statement and take them as read, 16 because many of them are expository, and pick up the 17 story in relation to phone hacking at paragraph 513.
- 18 A. Yes.

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12

- 19 Q. As far as you're concerned, you're director now 20 from December 2009, so you produce a paper in January 21 2010 in which you refer to additional evidence which had 22 come to light. You've also -- I perhaps should cover 23 this -- in paragraph 510, page 33788, referred to libel
- 24 proceedings by Mr Mark Lewis in the context of something
- 25 Baroness Buscombe said at a lecture. So additional Page 73

- News of the World newsroom at the relevant time, has
- 2 accepted an official version of events. Four
- 3 award-winning reporters who have done first hand
- 4 investigation of their own have arrived at a directly
- 5 opposite conclusion. So did the judge who heard the 6
 - evidence in the Goodman case."
 - Did that letter cause you any disquiet?
- 8 A. Absolutely -- well, I don't think it took that letter to
 - necessarily cause me disquiet. I was aware of the
- 10 New York Times piece being prepared really from the time
- 11 I became director onwards. It subsequently appeared.
- 12 We had this letter from Alan Rusbridger, who I'd met
- 13 when I became director to discuss his concerns with what
- 14 had happened in the past. I then prepared for the
- 15 Commission a summary of the position as I saw it, based
- 16 on Mr Rusbridger's letter but also based on what the
- 17 New York Times had said and what had been around really
- 18 in the preceding six months.
- 19 So it did cause me disquiet and I reflected that 20 disquiet to the Commission and asked them to consider 21
- 22 Q. Yes, you did that in a paper which I think you wrote 23 in September of 2010. It's under tab 75, so it's going
- 24 to be in the next of the B files. It summarises the
- position. I'm right in saying that you wrote this, 25

Page 75

- material which comes to light but which, I think I'm 1
- 2 right in saying, doesn't cause you to update the report
- 3 at that stage; is that correct?
- 4 A. That's correct.
- 5 Q. Then the DCMS report in February 2010, and we can recall
- 6 the conclusions they came to --
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. -- referring to the "for Neville" email, the February
- 9 2005 contract, the Taylor settlement and the various
- 10 other matters.
- A. Yeah. 11
- 12 Q. In paragraph 515, you received a letter from
- 13 Mr Rusbridger in September 2010 criticising your report
- 14 and drawing your attention to a piece in the New York
- 15 Times. Maybe we should turn up that particular letter.
- 16 It's in file B4, tab 74, at the very back of the first
- 17 B4 file. Page 41447, where Mr Rusbridger draws your
- 18 attention to certain evidence which we know about but
- 19 which I'm not going to read out, draws attention to the
- 20 New York Times work and then says, at 41449, level with
- 21 the lower hole punch or just above it:
- 22 "The contrast between the PCC's report and the
- 23 evidence of people with direct knowledge of events at
- 24 the time is striking. The PCC, which has not, to my
- 25 knowledge, spoken to a single journalist inside the Page 74

- am I? 1
- 2 A. Yes.
- Q. Can I ask you to look at page 41466, paragraph 39, under 4
- the heading "The validity of the 2009 report reopening 5 the inquiry":
- 6 "The Commission must consider whether the fresh
- 7 material means that the 2009 report should be revisited
- 8 (as suggested by Rusbridger). In 2009, the Commission
- 9 was seeking to take a view on the material that it had
- 10 seen in relation specifically to the issue of whether it
- 11 had been misled in 2007. It is, of course, wrong (and
- 12 mischievous) to suggest that we instigated an 'inquiry'
- 13 into the practice itself ... and somehow exonerated the
- 14 News of the World. That perception persists, however,
- 15 as does the argument that we should have instigated such
- 16 an Inquiry (even if we didn't)."
- 17 So you were having it every single way you could
- 18 there, I think.
- 19 A. Well, I'm trying to reflect, I think, the fact -- as I
- 20 go on to say, the problem with how this was considered
- 21 by the Commission was a lack of clarity about what it
- 22 should and shouldn't be trying to achieve here and how
- 23 it then sought to go perform that.
- 24 Q. You take this up again in paragraph 46:
- 25 "The latest information perhaps suggests we should Page 76

19 (Pages 73 to 76)

| 1 | examine internally how we came to the conclusions we did | 1 | language. My point is that the system of |
|--|--|---|---|
| 2 | and the extent to which we were clear enough about our | 2 | self-regulation, the existence of the Code Committee, |
| 3 | remit and role from the beginning. This is still | 3 | the role of the PCC, the role of PressBoF in funding |
| 4 | potentially perilous: would we commit to issuing | 4 | that, that is a system of self-regulation, and the |
| 5 | a statement on the subject? We might actually consider | 5 | question has to be asked and I think that we were |
| 6 | this as part of our ongoing response to the governance | 6 | right to ask it was: in this specific case, how did |
| 7 | review, which recommends the Commission give | 7 | that system succeed or fail? |
| 8 | consideration specifically to the clarity of its role in difficult areas such as this." | 8 | And it is about self-imposed standards. That's what |
| 9 | | 9 | I take "self-regulation" to mean in the purest sense |
| 10 | What internal examination was given, do you think, | 10 | about it. That's to say there is a systemic point there |
| 11 12 | to the issue of the use of the term company "inquiry", whether it was an inquiry and whether it should have | 11 | to say newspapers are undertaking to restrain and |
| 13 | been an inquiry if it wasn't an inquiry? | 12 13 | regulate their own behaviour, and the PCC is the mechanism that that's enforced currently. |
| 14 | A. I think certainly what then subsequently happened | 14 | But I don't disagree. I think the key question that |
| 15 | when we created, in January 2011, the phone-hacking | 15 | comes out of phone hacking always has been not only the |
| 16 | review committee, almost it's primary function, or one | 16 | precise behaviour of the PCC, but the whether the |
| 17 | of its functions, was to look at these reforms and come | 17 | system was such as to provide a proper mechanism for |
| 18 | to a view about why how we operated in this way, | 18 | stopping it happening in the first place. It did not |
| 19 | if what mistakes were made and how one could, within | 19 | stopping it happening in the first place. One can make an |
| 20 | the current structure, have done things differently. | 20 | argument that if people are going to commit criminal |
| 21 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just before you go to January 2011 | | acts and then conceal them, there are very few systems |
| 22 | still in your report, there's a prescient comment in | 22 | in the world that can catch them, but that doesn't mean |
| 23 | paragraph 52: | 23 | that this system shouldn't be held responsible for |
| 24 | "There's no doubt that the breadth of the | 24 | allowing it to happen. |
| 25 | allegations is damaging to the PCC in that it will | 25 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I understand that, and I readily |
| | Page 77 | | Page 79 |
| | | | |
| 1 | | | |
| 1 | suggest to people that a system that allows such | 1 | recognise that there will be questions about the police |
| 2 | behaviour to take place is no fit system at all." | 2 | and many others. |
| 2 3 | behaviour to take place is no fit system at all." That's right, isn't it? | 2 3 | and many others. A. Of course. |
| 2 3 4 | behaviour to take place is no fit system at all." That's right, isn't it? A. And I think the point I've always said is that the | 2 3 4 | and many others. A. Of course. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But presumably one could devise |
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| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | behaviour to take place is no fit system at all." That's right, isn't it? A. And I think the point I've always said is that the over-arching systems, including the PCC's role in this, and in how the rule of law was enforced, the fact that this went on and it went on to whatever extent and we are still trying to establish we, by which I mean everyone, are still trying to establish the extent of it. It is a legitimate criticism that a system of self-imposed standards, enforced by the PCC which I don't want to suggest hasn't achieved material gains in other areas, but while that system was existent in 2003, 2004, 2005 allowed this to take place and I think we have to accept, very clearly, responsibility. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: A system of self-imposed standards That's getting much closer, actually, to what you do, but when you wrote to Mr Rusbridger, you still used the word "self-regulation" in a way that actually blurs just this point, when you say: "I know you are a supporter of effective self-regulation and hope you will continue to help the PCC in achieving it." A. I think that perhaps a lot of people have been guilty | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ?16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | and many others. A. Of course. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But presumably one could devise a system that identifies self-imposed standards which actually is rather less dependent upon consensual opt-in than the present system. A. I think that if one were to spell this out first, you could still have the element of agreement to it but it would have to be very, very clearly set out in advance, and that seems to me to be to say and we got close to this in the work of the phone hacking review committee. You need to say newspapers have to take responsibility for having internal processes that deal with the access of personal information, including from third parties, and that would have to be across the industry. The role of a future more of a regulatory body would be to say, "And our function would be to check that you're doing that, and if you fail to do that, to impose sanctions for that." That, to me, is the standards work, that although the PCC has had a role in standards and certain powers, that leap has not been made yet, and I think one of the virtues of this Inquiry and you will make your own |
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Day 33 - PM Leveson Inquiry 1 1 should be that newspapers volunteer accurate information and look at the over-arching structure and see what's 2 missing or what might be changed. That, to me, I think 2 to it, and if the PCC took the view that the 3 3 is a standards function. News of the World were very, very strong in their 4 4 I'm not entirely sure it couldn't be achieved by position, one would expect them to be honest and full 5 agreement, but it would have to be set up and 5 and frank with the PCC. 6 established for all to see, so that people then clearly 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It depends upon their relationship 7 7 with the PCC, and that's one of the issues, isn't it? consent to it. 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm going to run ahead of myself. 8 What is the culture of the relationship? 9 I'd rather let Mr Jay take the line forward but there A. What I find interesting is even if you speak to people 10 10 are a number of things there that I'd very much like to who are more hostile to the News of the World, like 11 take up with you. I'll wait my turn patiently. 11 Mr Driscoll, who has reasons to have concerns about the 12 MR JAY: I do want to leave half of hour of your evidence to 12 News of the World -- it talked about the seriousness 13 cover these matters. 13 with which they dealt with complaints, and I can testify 14 14 You're confronted with the horns of a dilemma to to that and that of other newspapers, that if you get 15 this extent: either the PCC had power to investigate and 15 a complaint, their response to it -- they, in my view, 16 should have investigated, on the one hand, or it didn't 16 do take it seriously and I feel that they have a 17 have power to investigate but should have had the power 17 responsibility, which they exercise, to be frank and 18 to investigate, and therefore there's a systemic problem 18 co-operative with the PCC. 19 19 on the other hand. There isn't really a mid-position In this area -- and to take it to a logical 20 here, is there? 20 conclusion, when Mr Toulmin wrote to them saying, "What 21 21 A. No, although I think the PCC clearly, because it information do you have, is it a rogue reporter?" one 22 exercised this, had the ability to ask questions. It 22. would expect them to be honest about that. 23 clearly came to a judgment about the answers of those 23 MR JAY: There are two aspects of culture, if I may, which 24 24 questions. Now, either because it didn't consider I can take up with you in the context of the 25 itself to have the full authority or the resource to 25 News of the World and its response to the PCC. Page 81 Page 83 1 The first point: would you accept that if one knows 1 pursue this fully, I think the PCC doesn't have the 2 2 that the body to whom you speaking, here the PCC, does clearly defined mechanism to explore this type of 3 3 not truly have teeth, you might have reasonable grounds systemic issue with the News of the World properly. 4 4 for feeling that you can get away with more and perhaps You might say that it theoretically had the power 5 5 and didn't test that out. Either it regarded itself as be less economical with the truth, whereas if you're --6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Probably more economical with the having limited power or indeed the power and resources 6 7 7 that were available to it were insufficient, but it got 8 into a position where it was making, as I say, 8 Q. Yes, pardon me. Whereas if you're dealing with 9 9 a regulator in the strict sense, you wouldn't dare a qualitative judgment about information that it wasn't 10 10 misrepresent the position to them. Would you accept really in a position to do, and the Select Committee, 11 11 which has, arguably, greater powers than the PCC in 12 terms of calling witnesses and having oral hearings to 12 A. I think clearly the notion of financial sanctions is 13 13 a power that the PCC doesn't have and would focus the test it, they didn't necessarily reach any greater 14 14 findings of facts, but they were more sceptical about mind. What I'm surprised about, looking back on it, is 15 15 that things were said both to the Select Committee and the information which they did receive, which I think is

16 a factor in this. Q. Yes, and they also, although it wasn't on oath, 17 18 interviewed a significant number of witnesses, didn't 19 they? 20 A. Exactly. 21 Q. Which the PCC did have power to do, but it didn't 22 clearly have the will and perhaps not the resources --

23 A. I think it had the ability to ask questions, and -- you 24 know, you spoke to Mr Toulmin about this. If -- one of 25 the points of a system of self-regulation over-arching

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22 check on what they disclose. 23 Q. One wouldn't dispute the generality of that, but I was 24 making it slightly more piquant to this extent: that if, 25 for example, a lawyer were to misrepresent the position Page 84

wasn't necessarily the true position.

the PCC in a public forum, when there were people who

will have seen evidence, wouldn't have known that that

So to me, I think one would expect newspapers, if

they're speaking to an external body that is likely to

publicise what they say, that would be a reasonable

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1 to his or her professional body, the automatic 2 consequence would be erasure or being struck off. It's 3 as simple as that. 4 That's not going to happen in this context because 5 you don't have any teeth. Although the expectation 6 might be the newspaper tells you the truth, ultimately 7 the newspaper knows that there's no sanction if it 8 doesn't tell you the truth. That's true, isn't it? 9 A. Yeah, and I think that as we internally -- and this has 10 been discussed externally -- look at ways for 11 improvements to the system, one could have as a --12 whether you agree with the contractual notion or not, 13 one could have, as a matter of agreement, by contract in 14 advance, disclosure of information and clearly a fixed 15 penalty for failing to do that, and I think that's 16 a perfectly reasonable proposal, taking on board the 17 lessons of the News of the World. 18 Q. Yes. The other cultural point -- it's a slightly more 19 loaded or possibly even sinister one -- is that there's 20 there may be a special relationship between 21 News International, a particularly power body, and the 22 PCC, which caused the PCC, either consciously or perhaps 23 subconsciously, to pull its punches. Is that fair, do 24 you think? 25 A. I don't think it's fair, no, not in my direct experience Page 85 of the relationship with News International at all. 1 2 In terms of complaints, in my time, there was no 3 News International person on the Commission while I've 4 been director, and so the relationship we had with those 5 papers were primarily on the complaints function, and in 6 that sense, their managing editors were quite good at 7 dealing with the PCC in terms of complaints. 8 There may be an issue here of the PCC's 9 relationships with managing editors and some of these 10 responses may have come from a more corporate position. 11 Q. International comparisons. Paragraph 688. Can we just 12 try and summarise the position here? Accepting, of 13 course, that historically, culturally, socially, the 14 position of the press in any particular country is going 15 to vary, and we won't necessarily understand, for 16 example, how it might operate in Denmark as opposed to 17 the Balkans, as opposed to Estonia or wherever. 18 A. No, I agree with that. Q. You point out in paragraph 691 that all bar three, 19 20 I think, of the PCC-like organisations in Europe are 21 voluntary in nature. There are three that have some 22 basis in legislation: Denmark, Luxembourg and Lithuania; 22 23 is that correct? 24 A. Yes, as understand it. Q. If we can take the one that's possibly closest to the

Page 86

- 30 January 2012 1 United Kingdom, the Danish Press Council. You explain 2 it's established by legislation and entirely funded by 3 the media. Do you happen to know who sets the relevant 4 standards? Is it the council itself or is it the 5 legislation? 6 A. I do not know, I'm afraid. I could find out, but 7 I don't know. 8 Q. Funding. Paragraph 694. The longer-established Press 9 Council is generally funded in full by the media 10 industries they operate, although in some jurisdictions 11 there's some degree of state subvention; is that right? 12 A. Yes, the most notable example being Germany, which has 13 a no-strings-attached grant from the government. 14 Q. Paragraph 701: 15 "The primary work of all press councils is the 16 investigation of complaints." 17 To your knowledge, do any press councils or 18 commissions set out standards more generally? 19 A. No, I think that they are considered to be primarily 20 complaints-handling bodies. Q. You give the answer to this, 705 --21 22 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Does that mean they have no standards 23 bodies? 24 A. I think that -- my understanding is that they are -- no, 25 they are primarily -- these are the bodies that exist in Page 87 these countries, and they're primarily public-facing 1 2 complaints bodies. 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But does that mean that in these 4 other countries, there may be somebody to whom you can 5 go if you have a complaint about the press but there is 6 no body that oversees standards at all, even if it's not 7 called a Press Council?
 - 8 A. My understanding would be that there is not another
 - body. I know that the ombudsman in Sweden has an
- 10 educational role in terms of training and promotional
- work, but there's a large extent to which that crosses 11
- 12 over with the PCC as well. I don't believe that there
- 13 is another body to which I'm not referring here.
- 14 MR JAY: Culturally, the country which has the closest
- 15 association with the United Kingdom, of course, will be
- the Republic of Ireland. 16
- A. Yes. 17

9

- Q. You tell us a little bit about the system. They have an 18
- 19 ombudsman system, one which is akin to an ombudsman,
- 20 I think in paragraph 711; is that correct?
- 21 A. That's right.
- Q. Do you have direct knowledge of the system in Ireland
- 23 which you can share with us?
- 24 A. A little bit. To my understanding, it is rather similar
- 25 to the PCC, except for this two tier approach that it

1 takes, and the fact that its existence is referenced in 1 Northern & Shell pulled out, because that was in 2 the Defamation Act, which I think is a significant 2 mid-January. 3 factor to which you will no doubt refer, and I think is 3 A. Yeah. 4 an important one. 4 Q. There was warning of it because they refused to pay the 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I think you're probably right, yes. 5 subscription. A. Actually in terms of structure, it is -- they used quite 6 A. Exactly. 7 a lot of PCC expertise in terms of setting it up, so it 7 Q. As I think they'd done in 2008 and 2009? 8 is primarily a complaints-handling body. The ombudsman 8 A. That's right. The difference then was that we continued 9 takes a lot of complaints. He refers them up if he 9 to consider complaints but that position had changed by 10 thinks there's a breach of the code. That, though the 10 2010/2011. 11 council acts as an appeal to a certain extent to the 11 Q. The point you made, if I can paraphrase it, in the 12 ombudsman role, but they tend to track the work of the 12 middle of the page, is that if they're not going to pay 13 PCC, so they would have developed, I believe, an 13 and indicate they're going to stall payment, the next 14 anti-harassment service following on from the PCC 14 step is for the PCC to decline to deal with complaints 15 developing it. 15 about the titles: 16 Structurally, the ombudsman/Press Council 16 "This will inevitably cause the PCC practical, 17 relationship is significant, and it's the Swedish model, 17 philosophical and procedural problems." 18 but in reality that's just a two-tier approach to the 18 Then you attach two papers. The papers are 19 same thing, which is really dealing with complaints. 19 available, but what I'm going to ask you to do is to 20 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that voluntary? 20 summarise for us those three problems. 21 A. It is voluntary, yes, although it's incentivised, 21 A. It sounds -- I think I was getting carried away with my 22 I believe, by the Defamation Act. 22 own rhetoric there. I think the practical and LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Incentivised by the Defamation Act? 23 23 procedural are probably closely linked together. If 24 In other words, there's some benefit? 24 people wish to make complaints, particularly members of 25 A. There's a Reynolds-type benefit, but to say --25 the public, and we're not able to offer a service to Page 89 Page 91 1 I believe, and I don't want to hold myself out as an 1 them, that is a significant practical problem. 2 expert in this --2 There is the secondary problem of a lot of our work 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: You don't need to concern yourself. 3 is based on pre-publication work, and that's based on 4 We'll find out. 4 willing co-operation. That would no longer necessarily A. But my understanding is the incentivisation is that if 5 be forthcoming. 6 you are a member, you can have at least a shot at 6 The philosophical problem is the one that you'll be 7 a Reynolds defence by saying you're a responsible 7 very familiar with, which is that if you're going to 8 journalist. 8 have a system, in the broad sense of a term, of MR JAY: If you're not a member, you can't? 9 self-regulation and a major player doesn't want to be 10 A. No, although I think the difficulty that exists is that 10 part of it, that raises a serious issue about the 11 if you're, say, an NGO or a charity, you can still say 11 functionality of that system. 12 you have your own set of standards internally that 12 Q. That's the penultimate paragraph of the email at 43237. 13 you're following which still will allow you to avail 13 It's also in one of the two attaches papers, 42331, 14 yourself with Reynolds, but I suspect if you're 14 paragraph 15. 15 a newspaper that's not a member, the judge would look 15 A. Yes. 16 pretty dimly on you trying to say you're a responsible Q. Thank you. The strengths of the PCC -- many of these 16 17 journalist if you're not a member of a system which 17 you've covered in your evidence. Can I just ask you to 18 deals with responsible journalists. 18 clarify one point, which is the time it takes for 19 Q. Before we look at the future, may I just touch on the 19 complaints and investigations to be determined on 20 Desmond problem, as it's been described to us by others. 20 average. This is paragraph 723, point 2, page 33871. 21 In this smaller file, which is section 5, it's under 21 A. Yeah. 22 tab 34. B5. 22 Q. When you say investigations take an average of 33 23 A. Section 5, tab 34? 23 working days, what are you including within 24 Q. Yes. It's an email that you sent to the Commissioners 24 "investigations"? More precisely, are you excluding the

on 4 January 2011, which is just before, I think,

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investigations which fail at the first hurdle because

- 1 they're out of remit or they fail to raise a prima facie
- 2 case?
- 3 A. Yes. We're excluding those. The overall turnover of
- 4 all complaints in 2010, I think, was 17 days, but that
- 5 includes all those which go at the first hurdle. The
- 6 investigation is one where we've taken it up with the
- 7 editor and are having an exchange with correspondence.
- 8 Q. Thank you. I think in 2010 we had 1,229 of those?
- 9 A. Yes, and I think it's gone up to 13,00 and something in 2011.
- 11 Q. So an average of 33 working days.
- The weaknesses. First of all, existential. It's
- not a regulator in what you call the classical sense,
- possibly in any sense of the term, would you agree,
- 15 Mr Abell?
- 16 A. I'm happy that we shouldn't use the term "regulator" to
- describe the PCC. I think it performs some functions
- that a regulator would. I think pre-publication
- intervention, having a code of practice, training, they
- are regulatory functions, but I'm -- that's why I don't
- 21 believe it is should self-describe as a regulator.
- That's why I say it there.
- 23 Q. In 725, you address a philosophical question about
- 24 whether an industry with freedom of expression at its
- 25 centre should be subject to the more formal -- and then Page 93
- 1 you have "statutory" in brackets -- regulation. Can you
- 2 explain what you mean by that?
- 3 A. Yeah, I think there's two points there. One is the
- 4 statutory point, which will be endlessly and rightly
- 5 discussed, which is: if you versus a statutory
- 6 involvement in the system, how far can you have that
- 7 whilst still preserving freedom of expression?
- 8 Then there's the second point, which is not even an
- 9 issue, I think, necessarily to do with statute, which is
- that if we believe in a relatively unfettered
- circulation of information, then the powers of any body,
- whether based on statute or not, to intervene, to impact
- on editorial decisions, has to be carefully considered
- 14 and weighed up.
- So I'm not saying merely that self-regulation is good, statutory regulation is bad, which is often a very
- simplistic way of looking at it. My point is that at
- the heart of the newspaper industry is legitimately the
- 19 notion of people exercising their freedoms to be
- 20 polemical sometimes, editors exercising their discretion
- about what information should be included, responding to the needs and wishes of their readers.
- 23 That doesn't necessarily break down into
- 24 a statutory/self-argument, but actually breaks down into
- a more fundamental one, which is: within the context of Page 94

- that industry, what checks should be placed on the
- 2 circulation and dissemination of information? I think
- 3 that's a very important philosophical question, whatever
- 4 the structure you're debating.
- 5 Q. There are at least two different concepts there. Are
- 6 you saying that given the nature of the activities
- 7 newspapers habitually and traditionally carry out, the
- 8 weight that should be given to Article 10, freedom of
- 9 speech considerations, which we do see in article 53.7
- 10 of the articles of association, should be very much
- stronger than the Article 8 or privacy rights of
- 12 individuals?
- 13 A. No, I don't --
- 14 Q. Is it a matter of philosophy?
- 15 A. No, I don't think that's right. I think on the specific
- cases they have to be weighed properly. My mission is
- if you're thinking about a structure, one has to have
- 18 regard for the nature of the industry itself, and
- 19 I think that can't come at a compromise of the rights of
- 20 individuals.

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- I very strongly believe that the way the PCC has
- operated has never been Article 10 at the expense of
- Article 8, and I don't think even its construction is
- based on Article 10 at the expense of Article 8. My
 - point is: in those cases you have to conduct the
 - Page 95
- 1 requisite balancing act, but I think regard has to be
- 2 given to the nature of the industry when coming up with
- 3 the over-arching structure for doing that.
- 4 Q. Possibly I'll come back to that point. Is there truly
- 5 an objection to statutory regulation if it's made
- 6 absolutely clear that neither the legislative nor the
- 7 executive will be responsible for the imposition of any
- 8 standards?
- 9 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Or indeed whether the standards have
- 10 been broken. The question is -- and I think you might
- 11 have put it correctly -- that statutory and self is an
- 12 artificial description of the debate.
- 13 A. I think that the risk of legislation is that the course
- of legislation can lead to things being added and
- amended by the system of Parliament we have, and so
- there's a risk inherent in legislation because titles
- 17 can be changed of bills and amendments can be made and
- debated. That's right and proper, but it does raise the
- spectre of a parliamentary involvement in setting out
- 20 the principles and therefore the effect of the
- 21 regulation.
- 22 But I think, speaking personally, that if one can
- 23 conceive of statutory recognition of a body, or a system
- 24 where the existence of it and its broad framework was
 - recognised by the state, that comes short of statutory

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| | regulation. I think that's a perfectly legitimate aim | 1 | Post, who I understand would be willing to get involved |
|---|--|--|--|
| 1 2 | to be examined. I think that is different to either | 2 | voluntarily you could create that which would cover |
| 3 | conferring powers to the state or even conferring | 3 | the vast majority of what people conceive of as |
| 4 | backstop powers to the state, because I think that does | 4 | significant players. That, I think, is an achievable |
| 5 | raise legitimate questions. | 5 | aim. |
| 6 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: This goes back to what Mr Jay called | | To come up with the notion that everyone who |
| 7 | the Desmond question. Mr Desmond made it abundantly | 7 | performs a newspaper-like function should be caught and |
| 8 | clear why he withdrew from the PCC. He clearly has very | 8 | compelled, and if they don't agree or play along with |
| 9 | serious differences with some very big players in the | 9 | that compulsion, that would need to be enforced by |
| 10 | PCC. | 10 | someone, the state saying, "We are catching you as |
| 11 | A. Well, actually, my understanding Mr Desmond, I think, | 11 | a newspaper, we expect you to do this and we will have |
| 12 | didn't want to pay the money, was the first thing that | 12 | some form of enforcement if you don't go along with |
| 13 | I ever heard about this and consistently heard about | 13 | it" that, to me, I don't thinking is actually |
| 14 | this. His objections, I think, were less to the PCC as | 14 | practicable any more in the world we live in. |
| 15 | to the and maybe this doesn't matter, but I think it | 15 | So I entirely agree that you have to have the |
| 16 | was to the over-arching system. Mr Desmond does not | 16 | players in and you have to try and encourage membership |
| 17 | regard himself collegiately with other people in the | 17 | but and try and bind them in once they are members, |
| 18 | industry who do subscribe to the system. I don't think | 18 | but I think the notion of a compulsion across the board |
| 19 | he likes the idea of a funding body like PressBoF on | 19 | for universality, personally speaking, I don't believe |
| 20 | which sits people with whom he is not in tune. | 20 | it achievable any more. |
| 21 | So I think his concern is notions of collegiality | 21 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Whether it's desirable to achieve is |
| 22 | which he doesn't feel. | 22 | another matter. Don't set me a challenge. The |
| 23 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That may be a fair way of putting it | 23 | desirability of it may be something else, for reasons |
| 24 | but it's not a very happy position to be in that our | 24 | that you forcefully argue. |
| 25 | system, whatever the system is, depends upon that. | 25 | MR JAY: In paragraph 725, you identify a number of |
| 23 | Page 97 | 23 | Page 99 |
| | | | |
| 1 | A. No, but I think one and this may not be a hugely | | |
| | , | 1 | weaknesses. It's not clear whether you're saying these |
| 2 | helpful answer but either you believe that there is | $\begin{vmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$ | weaknesses. It's not clear whether you're saying these are perceived weaknesses in certain quarters or they're |
| 2 3 | | | , , , , |
| | helpful answer but either you believe that there is | 2 | are perceived weaknesses in certain quarters or they're |
| 3 | helpful answer but either you believe that there is a prospect of universality of a system or you don't. | 2 3 | are perceived weaknesses in certain quarters or they're weaknesses which you believe have validity. |
| 3 4 | helpful answer but either you believe that there is a prospect of universality of a system or you don't. Now, to me personally, the advent of online, the | 2 3 4 | are perceived weaknesses in certain quarters or they're weaknesses which you believe have validity. A. I think some and to me there's a if a perception |
| 3 4 5 | helpful answer but either you believe that there is a prospect of universality of a system or you don't. Now, to me personally, the advent of online, the number of people who look like they can be | 2 3 4 5 | are perceived weaknesses in certain quarters or they're weaknesses which you believe have validity. A. I think some and to me there's a if a perception is sufficiently widely held, it is as significant as |
| 3 4 5 6 | helpful answer but either you believe that there is a prospect of universality of a system or you don't. Now, to me personally, the advent of online, the number of people who look like they can be newspaper-like products online with varying jurisdictions means notions of universality which existed very strongly 20 years ago "Here are the | 2 3 4 5 6 | are perceived weaknesses in certain quarters or they're weaknesses which you believe have validity. A. I think some and to me there's a if a perception is sufficiently widely held, it is as significant as something that is real. So I don't wish to diminish |
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1 sanctions, for example, where you say:

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2 "Some observers question whether sanctions ..."

I think it may be fairer to say that most observers

do outside the newspaper industry itself.

- 5 A. I think the issue of sanctions to me has always been 6 predicated on how you would introduce, say, fines into 7 a fast-moving, complaints-handling system. I think the answer to that may be that you don't but if you were to
- 8 9 be much more obvious in the future -- in a future
- 10 manifestation of systemic issues, what might be called
- 11 standards issues -- so you deal with the complaints in
- 12 a fast, economical way, which I think you can make an
- 13 argument does not include a monetary aspect, because
- 14 that could slow it down, but you then have a systemic
- 15 role to look at issues of broad standards or internal
- 16 systems that could carry with it a financial penalty,
- 17 because it would be a much more drawn out process
- 18
- anyway, much more formal, and the issue of fines then
- 19 could be brought in without necessarily compromising the
- 20 ombudsman function, if you like, the complaints-handling 20
- 21 function. And once you make that mental leap into sort
- 22 of two prongs, to me the notion of fines becomes more of
- 23 an attractive option.

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24 Q. But if the fines are only going to be levied in the context of an investigation which has identified 25

Page 101

for the future.

2 I think that people would want to see that, and

3 reading the evidence here, one of the things that people 4 say, quite rightly, is whatever happened to them, one

- 5 can talk about how that should be remedied but they
- 6 don't want to see it happen to someone else. So that,
- 7 I think, is a very powerful step that the public would

8 want to see.

- Q. I think with much of this, when you're identifying 10 either the perceived weaknesses or weaknesses which some
- 11 observers have identified, it keeps returning to the
- 12 extension problem or the definitional one. Is the body
- 13 we're talking about effectively going to be
- 14 a self-regulator in the sense in which you define the
- 15 term -- namely, it's responsible for standards within
- 16 the industry which the industry itself imposes and
- 17 itself ultimately enforces through the PCC -- or are we
- 18 talking about a regulator with greater teeth, possibly
- 19 with a statutory framework, but not necessarily one
- which --

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- 21 A. To me, I think you can go a long way with definitional
- 22 clarity, and which can include greater teeth by
- 23 saying -- that's why the two-pronged approach -- and
- 24 leave aside the potential third prong, which I know
- 25 you're interested in, to do with arbitral reactions to Page 103

a systemic failing, possibly there are two problems.

- 2 First of all, the complainant won't see any link between
- 3 the transgression in his or her case and the imposition
- 4 of a condign punishment. Do you agree with that?
 - A. That's possible, but if you're clear enough about it and you still have imposed a suitable sanction in respect of
- 6 7 the complaint, then he or she, the complainant would
- 8 have the advantage of whatever that sanction may be, or
 - settlement even, but the systemic point would be

10 addressed post hoc.

> If people are aware of that, and indeed if they're informed about it when it arises, then I think they would take some succour from that potentially.

- 14 Q. The second point is that given we're investigating or 15 might be investigating systemic issues of the nature the 16 PCC or its successor body would only be doing that
- 17 exceptionally, there would be considerable delay. That
- 18 would not necessarily bolster public confidence, would 19
- 20 A. I think what it would be able to do is you would still 21 be able to offer swift redress to complaints. There
- 22 would still be all the existing operations of the other
- 23 authorities, but there would be an appropriate response
- 24 after the event that would lead to standards changing --
- 25 punishment, if that is necessary, but systems changing Page 102

libel and privacy, which I think is something that can be brought in or out as you or others decide.

You have a two-prong approach, and if it's agreed in advance -- and this seems to me to be the clear benefit for the future. We have been internally discussing -and I know Lord Hunt will go into this in detail -- his proposals that have followed on from the work of the reform committee to which I refer in a sort of confluence of ideas.

If you have it contractualised, and whether or not you think that's sufficient and you require a legislative background, but at least, even if you don't have that legislative background, you have it accepted and agreed in advance that these will be the two functions, that these will be the penalties for failing to disclose or failing to maintain internal standards, and yet this will be the complaints function, which I think the PCC -- and I do want to be clear about this. While I'm very keen to come up with proposals that may or may not be useful to you to how to make it better, I don't want to leave the impression that I don't think the people at the PCC have not done a tremendous job in helping people, because I firmly believe that they have.

But if -- the real benefit would be clarity and Page 104

- 1 agreement, and I think you could achieve that by 2 a contract in advance to say, "We expect the body to do
- 3 the following things and we will contribute to the body
- 4 in the following ways", and that would be agreed in
- 5 advance, irrespective of what the legislation ended up.
- 6 Q. We'll hear more about this tomorrow. Framework which
- 7 you're suggesting may be the way forward is
- 8 a contractual framework, possible statutory mention of
- 9 it, but not imposition of the framework through statute,
- 10 clear understanding of what the rights and obligations
- 11 are under the contract, and, is this right,
- 12 participation in the contract for a fixed-term, but on
- 13 the other hand you can't compel people to join up to the
- 14 contract in the first place?
- 15 A. No --
- 16 Q. Did I get all of that correct?
- 17 A. To my mind, that is how I see it. Now, the notion of
- 18 compelling people to be a member is not one I can offer
- 19 the perfect answer to.
- 20 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, the way you can do it is not so 20
- 21 much with a stick --
- 22 A. As with a carrot.
- 23 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- as with a carrot, and the
- 24 question then -- and you've identified a possible carrot
- 25 yourself, that there is recognition of your membership Page 105
- 1 of the club, or whatever you want to call it, when
- 2 consideration is given to perhaps available defences or
- 3 indeed to whether there is a risk for exemplary damages.
- 4 A. I think that sort of incentivisation is very appropriate
- 5 and should be strongly considered. I suppose the
- 6 difficulty one has to come up with is if that
- 7 incentivisation leads to every major newspaper player,
- 8 some online sources that otherwise would be outside the
- 9 system wanting to be members, a general kite-marked view
- 10 that if, by doing so, you're declaring to your standards
- 11 you have a set of standards -- something we've been very
- 12 keen to push and I'd remain keen to push -- if with all
- 13 that you get all the major players, a few online people,
- 14 so you're starting to create a clearly regulated sphere,
- 15 if that is considered to be enough, then I think that is
- 16 very workable and doable.
- 17 To me, the risk comes, which I don't agree with, in 18 saying, "But anyone who looks like a newspaper online
- 19 has to be in", because I don't think that's achievable,
- 20 and if we can all be honest enough to say we need to
- 21 have the majority of people, or the most significant
- 22 people, or people who are performing a newspaper-like
- 23 function the most, that readers would expect to have
- 24 standards, that is a legitimate aim, and I think should
- 25 be achieved, but that means dropping the notion of Page 106

- universality, and if the consensus is that that is
- 2 doable, then I think that allows practical consequences
- 3 that mean something is achievable there.
- 4 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I don't see why it shouldn't be
- 5 universal if the carrot is sufficiently attractive.
- A. True, but if some people are carrot averse, and they 6
- 7 decide not to do it, then if we can live with that,
- 8
- I suppose, is the question. But you're right, the more
- 9 attractive that you make it, the less of a problem it
- 10 would be.
- 11 MR JAY: I think we're all agreed the problems are going to
- 12 arise more acutely if a major national player refuses to
- 13 take up the carrot, on the one hand, and the smaller
- 14 online outfit does so on the other because we may be
- 15 able to live with the latter and not the former,
- 16 politically --
- 17 A. Politically, and I think from a consumer perspective we
- 18 shouldn't have to live with a big-player problem.
- 19 Q. What happens under the contractual model if, after a year or two, the major national player says, "I don't
- 21 like this system any more; I'm out", although in theory
- 22 it's a five-year contract or whatever, how do you
- 23 enforce --

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- 24 A. No, there are questions whether you can build in
- 25 compensation arrangements, because in a contract you Page 107

can't build in penalties, but you can build in

2 compensation, but that would be difficult.

3 I think the bottom line with all of this is that if

major players aren't willing to be part of a system,

5 then, even though it doesn't want to, and even though it

6 creates huge difficulties, something more impositional

7 from the state will have to take place.

- 8 Q. So is the contractual model then yet another iteration 9
 - of the last-chance saloon --
- 10 A. I don't think it is.
- 11 Q. -- let's see how that plays out before we look at the 12
 - statutory model?
- 13 A. I don't think it is because I think (a) it doesn't
- preclude a statutory model, because I think we can talk 14
- 15 about -- I think it's really important for the newspaper
- 16 industry that they don't just throw their hands up about
- 17 statutory regulation the whole time. I always say that 18 there's a sort of -- Voltaire on his death bed, the
- 19 priest said, "Do you deny the devil in all of his form?"
- 20 and Voltaire, said, "This is the wrong time for me to be
- 21 making enemies." I think the newspapers have to be
- 22 exactly that way in regard to statutory regulation or
- 23 statutory involvement. They have to accept that people
- 24 need to be involved in this. It has to be a measurable
- 25 set of standards that they're following up to.

1 So the contractual thing is not in the absence of 1 terminology", for example, "How do we stop this 2 a legislative recognition, but to me offers a more 2 happening?" and then we host seminars with them and 3 3 solid, a more explicit and a more enforceable model than bring in the newspaper industry to lead to a change in 4 there is at the moment. 4 the manner of reporting. 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Do you think that each one of those 5 In science reporting, we do take complaints from 6 advantages is itself desirable? More explicit, more 6 members of the public. We also then contact the 7 solid, more enforceable? 7 scientists themselves and even if they don't want to 8 A. Yes. 8 complain, ask them to just give us an overview of their 9 MR JAY: I think I'll leave it there. 9 own position. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: There's a rather small detail that 10 10 So I think we have to do more to reassure these 11 I'd like to ask you about. It's not considered small by 11 people and actually have to do more directly to help those who complain about it. You may have read or seen 12 12 them, but I think there is provision there for that work 13 13 the evidence of a number of groups last week who spoke to be done, and I took their evidence as a concern that 14 14 with real feeling about the failure of the PCC to be they didn't feel that we were offering that and actually 15 prepared to deal with complaints from such groups --15 as a legitimate challenge to find a ways to do it. 16 A. Yes. 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Another challenge is the mismatch 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- where, by definition, there would 17 between headlines and text, and the willingness of the 18 not necessarily be an individual complainant. Domestic 18 PCC to read into the small print words of qualification 19 19 to headlines which, on the face of it, are clear and violence, women's groups, those concerned about 20 Islamophobia and the science group. Is there any reason 20 explicit. Do you think there's work to be done in that 21 21 why the code should not be devised in such a way that area? 22 permitted such groups to pursue complaints? There will 22 A. I think there is. I think there are several examples of 23 always be the remedy of being able to knock out the ones 23 cases where, although one should always look at the 24 that you feel don't advance anything or don't otherwise 24 article, it doesn't provide a get-out-of-jail for 25 25 engage the code. a misleading headline. There's a case we've done very Page 109 Page 111 A. Yes. 1 recently, which we'll publish shortly, on that point. 1 2 2 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But there is a concern -- and it's So I think -- no, there are examples of us doing it 3 not just been expressed by them -- that the definitional 3 and I know individual commissioners feel equally 4 provisions are used to exclude what might be legitimate 4 strongly about it, that while one should look at the two 5 5 complaints, taken in the round, but which don't actually together, you have to be very careful that you don't 6 6 tick the boxes. I'm sure you understand the point. allow a late paragraph to be used to apparently negate 7 A. Yeah, I do. I think that what we've done rather better 7 an inference drawn from the headline. So I think I am 8 recently is -- I actually think that it's the duty of 8 conscious of that. 9 the PCC to engage with groups like that. 9 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. Mr Abell, I think that's 10 10 sufficient, although I don't rule out the prospect of If you look at the parallel case of, say, mental 11 asking you to return at some time if I want to try out 11 health reporting. That's where we've worked very 12 closely with various mental health charities who do 12 ideas on you when they are more fully formed. 13 raise complaints about terminology or points of issue. 13 A. I'd be very happy to do that. 14 Even though there's no first party to the complaint, we 14 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much. 15 take those complaints. We have done something similar 15 Anyone interested in the evidence of Mr Abell should 16 with the Islamic community, although as the evidence 16 not believe that it is restricted to that which we have heard over the last few hours. His 408-page statement 17 17 suggests, not sufficiently. 18 So I think there's work that has been done and can 18 is utterly comprehensive and deals with each aspect of 19 19 be done to have these people complain to us about the work of the Council. I repeat my thanks to him for 20 general issues of fact, particularly, where you don't 20 it. Right. 21 21 MR JAY: There's a problem about the availability of one of require a first party, and I think the work we've done 22 22 tomorrow's witnesses. May I find out what it is and with mental health is a good model for that. We have 23 23 quite close links with Broadmoor hospital, but more perhaps report back in a couple of minutes? LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, certainly. 24 generally with Shift and with mental health charities, 24 25 25 where they come to us and say, "Here's a problem in (5.00 pm)Page 110 Page 112

| 1 | (A short break) |
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| 2 | (5.08 pm) |
| 3 | (The hearing adjourned until 10 o'clock the following day) |
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