1 There's debate as to what exactly it was. Can I ask 1 2 (2.00 pm)2 you, please, how long did that exercise take before 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Two things before we start. First of 3 Mr Yates gave his statement that afternoon? 4 all, I understand that the web streaming has failed, in 4 A. I believe he started in the morning, early in the 5 the sense that it is not available contemporaneously 5 morning, and I understand he gave that statement late in 6 with the evidence. Having regard to the pressure of 6 the afternoon, about 5 o'clock, so throughout the day. 7 time, we will carry on. I am assured, first of all, 7 Q. Can I ask you, please, what role you took in relation to 8 that the problem will be corrected, secondly that the 8 that exercise? Did you speak with him that day? 9 evidence is being recorded, and thirdly that it will be 9 A. I did. 10 up and running quickly. Certainly I have no doubt that Q. For how long? 10 11 all the evidence will be available for those who want to 11 A. I think on and off. I was with him for most of the day, 12 see it at the end of the day. 12 starting in the morning, giving him an explanation of 13 The second issue that I'll mention now is that 13 what we had done in the investigation. 14 I understand an error was made in relation to tomorrow 14 Q. Did you show Mr Yates any documents? 15 morning, suggesting that we were starting at 9.30. 15 A. The documents that were produced I showed him my 16 Whereas I am entirely comfortable with that as 16 informing potential victim strategy, I showed him a copy 17 17 a proposition, that's not the intention and we shall of the indictment, and that was it, because we didn't 18 start as usual at 10 o'clock. 18 have any other documents on that date. Sorry, there was 19 19 Right. another short briefing document. 20 MR JAY: Just a short point, Mr Williams. You gave evidence 20 Q. On the basis of that, Mr Yates said that there was no 21 21 to a Parliamentary Select Committee sitting next to new evidence which would justify reopening the 22 Mr Yates on 2 September 2009. Do you recall that 22 investigation; is that correct? 23 occasion? 23 A. That's correct. A. Yes. 24 24 Q. Were you seeking to persuade him that that was the Q. Mr Yates said -- and if you need to see it, I can show 25 position? Page 1 Page 3 1 it to you: 1 A. I just gave an explanation of exactly what we'd done and 2 "The collective belief is that there were then and 2 the position we had reached. I was just explaining to 3 there remain now insufficient grounds for evidence to 3 him exactly what we had done. 4 arrest or interview anyone else." 4 Q. But in a very succinct and editorialised way, you were 5 Ignoring what the position might have been in 2009, 5 giving him a snapshot picture of what your investigation 6 but going back to 2006, was that your view? 6 had established, and he then put that in the public A. Yes. 7 7 domain at about 5.00 in the afternoon; is that right? 8 Q. Insufficient grounds to arrest or interview anyone else? 8 A. Yes. 9 A. Yes. 9 Q. Can I ask you, please, to look at file 4 of this bundle, 10 Q. Are you sure about that? 10 tab 160, which is 03914, which is a briefing that you 11 A. Yes, because I would have wanted to have done more work 11 prepared for Mr Yates in relation to Operation Caryatid. 12 12 to reach that position. Do you recall that? 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: With great respect, that doesn't 13 A. Yes. 14 answer the question. I'm sorry, Mr Williams. You may 14 Q. It was you and Mr Surtees who prepared it. It's dated 15 15 12 July, which was a Sunday. very well want to do more work --A. I believed -- I'm sorry, sir. 16 16 A. That's correct. 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's not the issue. The issue was: 17 Q. But Mr Yates had given his statement already at 5 pm on 18 was there prima facie evidence upon which you could 18 9 July, so by definition Mr Yates didn't have the 19 reasonably conclude that an offence had been committed 19 benefit of this document, did he? 20 by someone whom you could reasonably identify? 20 A. No. 21 A. I didn't believe there was enough grounds to arrest. 21 Q. What was the point of preparing the document at all? 22 22 MR JAY: Move forward to 2009. The article in the Guardian A. Because I had provided a verbal briefing of what had 23 was 8 July 2009, and on 9 July, at the instance of the 23 happened, and I wanted over the weekend to document in 24 then Commissioner, Sir Paul Stephenson, Mr Yates, then 24 writing, so that he had the benefit of exactly what the 25 Assistant Commissioner, was asked to do a review. 25 case had been about. Page 2 Page 4

18

- 1 Q. So does this contain in the same detail as your oral
- 2 briefing to Mr Yates that which you told him on 9 July,
- 3 or does it provide further and additional details?
- 4 A. It may well include additional detail, particularly when
- 5 it goes into quoting figures, because then we had
 - retrieved the investigative documents from storage and
- 7 so I would have been able to do that. On the day,
- 8 I would -- of 9 July, I would have been doing it to the
- 9 best of my ability of my memory.
- 10 Q. Can I ask you, please, just a couple of points on this
- 11 document, now I understand the purpose of it.
- 12 Paragraph 15, which is the third page of the document,
- 13 page 1000 on the internal numbering. Maybe we can start
- 14 with the last sentence of 14:
- 15 "On some there are names which probably relate to
- 16 journalists and cash sums."
 - This is a reference to the corner names, isn't it?
- 18 A. Yes. I seem to -- can you just read that out. It's
- 19 slightly different. Are you reading from paragraph 15?
- 20 Q. It's the last sentence of paragraph 14.
- 21 A. Oh sorry, yes. Forgive me.
- 22 Q. Is that a reference to the corner names, what we're now
- 23 calling the corner names?
- 24 A. Yes, yes.

6

17

25 Q. I should probably read out, in fairness, the previous

Page 5

- 1 evidence which would show that they actually knew what
- 2
- 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Oh, Mr Williams, come on. The
- 4 Mulcaire document was replete with tons of data.
- 5 A. In terms of those journalists, those names, whoever they
 - were, in terms of me approaching them as an
- 7 investigator, where is the evidence, I'm asking myself,
- 8 to show that they knew exactly what he was doing? Yes,
- 9 my supposition is they're tasking him with information
- 10 and he may well be giving it back, but I didn't have
- 11 evidence of what he was being tasked with and what he 12
 - was giving back. That's what I believed.
- 13 MR JAY: But just putting that together or reassembling it,
- 14 Mr Mulcaire's whole modus operandi was hacking into
- 15 voicemails, wasn't it?
- 16 A. Largely, yes, but at the time I was open to he could be 17
 - doing any number of other things. I know now, as
 - a result of everything, everyone shows that, but --
- 19 Q. But in relation to this notebook and the 11,000 pages,
- 20 it's all part of a completely coherent picture that this
- 21 is a man who is hacking into voicemails. This is his
- 22 sole way of being, his industrial activity. That's what
- 23 he lives for, to hack into voicemails, isn't it?
- 24 A. I know we know that now. At the time my genuine belief
- 25 was yes he's doing that, definitely, but he may well be

Page 7

1 sentence:

- 2 "In many there is simply the name of a celebrity or
- 3 well-known figure, in others there is more detail with
- 4 names, addresses, dates of birth, telephone numbers,
- 5 DDNs, passwords, PIN numbers and scribblings of private
- 6 information.'

9

- 7 So that was the picture you were giving Mr Yates.
- 8 Then paragraph 15:
 - "It should be noted that no evidence existed to
- 10 suggest that those possible journalists detailed on
- 11 these sheets had knowledge of the illegal methods
- 12 undertaken to supply these stories. However, it should
- 13 be pointed out that in one of the recordings recovered 14

from Mulcaire it is clear Mulcaire is giving instruction

- 15 to an unknown person (possibly a journalist) on the
- 16 telephone ..."
- 17 So in this document the corner names are probably
- 18 relating to journalists, is that right?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. Aren't you putting it far too low when you say in
- 21 paragraph 15 "no evidence existed to suggest that those
- 22 possible journalists detailed on these sheets had
- 23 knowledge of the illegal methods undertaken to supply
- 24 these stories"?
- 25 A. I don't believe so. I don't believe that I had any

Page 6

- 1 doing a raft of other things.
- 2 Q. But isn't it likely, Mr Williams, that Mr Mulcaire,
- 3 whoever the person is he's speaking to, who's organised
- 4 this, tells that person, "I've listened to celebrity X's
- 5 voicemail and this is what I can tell you is on the
- 6 voicemail." Isn't that at least a plausible picture?
- 7 A. It is a plausible picture, but I have no evidence of
- 8 that to put before a court.
- 9 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, it depends how you define
- 10 circumstantial evidence, doesn't it? Because you
- 11 acknowledge that there is circumstantial evidence, or
- 12 somebody acknowledged, as recorded by Mr Crone, that
- 13 there was circumstantial evidence, and you and I both
- 14 know that many, many criminal cases are pursued solely
- 15 on the basis of circumstantial evidence, which, taken
- 16 together, can be extremely strong, and indeed stronger
- 17 than some direct evidence.
- 18 You said to me before lunch that if you were going 19 to investigate further, you would have wanted to do
- 20 a lot more work. Here you're saying there's no point in
- 21 doing any other work because there's no evidence to
- 22 suggest that anything else has gone wrong. Now I ask
- 23 you whether that's really your evidence.
- 24 A. I believed -- what I've written here is my genuine 25 belief, that I would have needed a lot more to be able

1 1 You could go back to do that which you said you would to take that case forward. I'm not trying in any way to 2 2 have wanted to do had you had the time and it was hide anything from Mr Yates or distort the truth. 3 3 MR JAY: There's another document which was probably appropriate use of resource. But what you're now 4 4 prepared for the same sort of purpose, tab 168, which is presenting is a decision that there's nothing else to 5 03938, this time dated 16 July. I'll give you time to 5 do. Actually, what you were saying to me before lunch 6 look at it. 6 was there was a great deal you could have done, but for 7 A. Yes. 7 very understandable reasons, and I'm not challenging 8 8 that reasoning, but for very understandable reasons, you Q. But again, was this a -- designed, as it were, after the 9 event for Mr Yates to consider? 9 didn't feel it was appropriate to go there. I'm really 10 10 A. Yes. Mr Yates is being asked a whole series of trying to understand. 11 11 questions, and he's asking me to articulate in writing A. No, I see what you're saying. I've written this at 12 12 some of the thinking behind the investigation. a time -- I'm writing this in the point of view I'm 13 Q. Thank you. On the second page of this document, the 13 thinking of it in my head as the evidence I didn't have 14 fourth bullet point, you say: 14 in my mind of what I would have needed to take that 15 "All of the above was not a decision that I made in 15 investigation forward, and if I've created the wrong 16 isolation. Throughout, this investigation had the 16 impression, I've created the wrong impression. It was 17 highest oversight at all times." 17 not done intentionally. I'm trying to provide 18 Is that a reference to Mr Clarke or to anybody else? 18 a briefing to my senior officer as genuinely as possible 19 19 as to what we did and what we didn't do then. I'm A. It's all my senior management, and -- yes, up to 20 Mr Clarke, and obviously when the investigation became 20 saying I haven't made these decisions -- I accept I'm 21 21 responsible, I was the SIO, no question about that, but public, I know those briefings went higher in my 22 organisation. 22 I haven't done it in isolation, I have briefed and 23 Q. To Mr Hayman; is that right? 23 talked to a whole range of people and I always do that 24 24 A. Yes, he was briefed. for the purpose of taking advice and talking things 25 25 Q. Was he briefed earlier than 8 August 2006? through. Ultimately my decision as SIO where we go with Page 9 Page 11 A. I don't know. 1 that -- in the parameters I've been given with the 2 Q. "The potential breadth/scale of what may or may not be 2 investigation. I understand what you're saying, but 3 out there was fully discussed together with what 3 I was not doing anything here to mislead or create 4 resources might have been required to even begin 4 a false impression. 5 exploring that. There was no appetite to expand the 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Before you wrote this briefing for 6 investigation ..." 6 Mr Yates, had you read the material that the Guardian 7 What is that a reference to? 7 had published? 8 A. I believe this is purely that decision around resources, 8 A. I'd seen what they'd written in the original 9 9 investigation, yes, and it was material that we, the because of the conflicting operations. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But you've gone further, because you 10 police, had all released in terms of Mr Taylor's private 11 don't think there's an evidential basis to expand it. 11 prosecution, and again, maybe it's the wrong perception, 12 12 A. It may be my lacking, sir, and I apologise, but I -my feeling was that they were very much saying we were 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, don't apologise. 13 trying to hide something, so my -- that's my impression 14 A. Well, I personally -- this is my personal belief as an 14 from the coverage, and I'm trying to say there was 15 15 investigator, and maybe others will judge my threshold absolutely no intention to hide anything. And this is 16 is too high, but given my experience of investigations 16 what I'm trying to articulate to Mr Yates. 17 17 MR JAY: Mr Yates gave a statement on 9 July, it's the one and presenting a case before a court, I obviously have 18 a personal higher threshold than others as to what 18 I referred to given about 5 pm. 19 I believe in terms of the right thing to do in terms of 19 A. Yes. 20 20 reasonable ground before I start depriving other people Q. Did you have any hand in the preparation of that 21 of their liberty. 21 22 22 I do understand that you are arguing to me that A. I did see it. We'd all contributed in terms of the 23 there is a lower threshold and I could have arrested and 23 background to that statement. He would have prepared 24 interviewed. 24 that in conjunction with our department of DPA. 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, or you could have investigated. 25 Q. The statement says: Page 10 Page 12

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20

1 "Their potential targets ..."

2 Obviously Goodman and Mulcaire?

3 A. Yes.

6

8

Q. "... may have run into hundreds of people [this is 4

5 tab 94 and the 418] but our enquiries showed that they

only used the tactic against a far smaller number of

7 individuals."

Was that a correct statement?

9 A. It was from my perspective of what would constitute an 10 interception. I totally understand that there is

11 a different view on that now.

12 Q. Can I just take that in stages? If one includes

13 everyone whose phone had been accessed, regardless of

14 whether or not it was before the intended recipient had

15 listened to the message --

16 A. Yes.

20

22

23

17 Q. -- was that a correct statement?

18 A. I believed it was a correct statement, because in my

19 mindset it's about the people -- I'm thinking about the

people that had been intercepted in terms of our

21 prosecution. I understand in my victim strategy that

I was looking to inform a wider pool of people, and

potentially unknown group of people.

24 Q. Because it's a positive statement here:

25 "Our enquiries showed that they only used the tactic

Page 13

1 MR JAY: Then the statement carries on:

2 "Where there was clear evidence that people had

potentially been the subject of tapping, they were all

4 contacted by the police."

Was that accurate or not?

A. Well, it's not -- not all people, because of course

7 I believe -- strictly speaking it's not accurate because

8 actually we did a particular group of people, the

police, as I've outlined, and as I believed, the other

10 people were being dealt with by the mobile phone

11 companies.

Q. Because the group you took it upon yourself to contact

13 were those in the four categories, the MPs.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And only those where you had evidence that their phones

16 had in fact been intercepted and not, therefore, those

who had been potentially the subject of tapping. Do you

18 see the difference?

19 A. I do see the difference. Yes, I do.

Q. Mr Yates told Parliament, I think in April 2011 -- we'll

21 look at the document with him tomorrow -- that 36 people

22 in that category were contacted by the police. Is that

23 about right?

24 A. I think if you're talking the period 2005 to 2006?

25 Q. Yes.

Page 15

against a far smaller number of individuals." 1

2 In fact it's not quite the right way of putting it,

3 that had you done further enquiries, it might have shown

4 or demonstrated that the tactic had been used far more

5 widely.

6 A. Yes.

9

21

7 Q. Do you see that?

8 A. Yes. And there is a completely unknown. We actually

don't know who has actually suffered from this at all.

10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But go back to my bank robbery 11

analogy again. We do know that there were many, many

12 more who were the victims of a conspiracy to intercept

13 their messages. Whether it's a RIPA conspiracy or

14 merely a Computer Misuse Act conspiracy. We're not 15

16 anybody. We're simply talking about criminality.

17 A. Yes, and I understand that, and you're asking me about 18 this document and why I wrote it, and you're picking on,

19 yes, particular expressions that I've used. What I'm

talking now about sentence, you're not prosecuting

20 trying to explain, I've written this from the memory --

yes, and from the reviewing over the case, but from the

22 mindset of my case and what I was trying to do, and

23

I know now quietly there's a different perspective on

24 what a victim would be and that it's far more

25 wide-reaching. I understand that.

Page 14

1 A. I believe it's 28.

2 Q. Sorry, you're right, it's 28 plus 8 equals 36, and the 8

3 may not be in those four categories, okay.

4 A. Okay.

5 O. But that's more than the far smaller number of

6 individuals, is it, that you're referring to earlier?

Because you say "our enquiries show that they used the 7

8 tactic against a far smaller number of individuals".

9 Were you intending to refer just to 28 or what number

10 were you intending to refer to?

A. Do you mind if I have a look at that document? 11

12 Q. Yes, of course. Let me hand this to you. I printed it

13 off the Internet. It's the one I've highlighted.

14 (Handed).

15 A. Thank you very much. (Pause).

16 My intention to convey to him is there may be many

17 hundreds of people here, potential people, as we've said

18 here. That is unknown. In terms of my investigation,

19 our enquiry to the tactics, yes, okay, I see the word

"tactics". Now we're reanalysing the words.

21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm afraid we only read words,

22 Mr Williams.

23 A. No, you're absolutely right. I can see the

24 interpretation. I'm thinking the actual from the point

of view of actual intercept, as I would have thought Page 16

4 (Pages 13 to 16)

20

25

1	about it, was a far smaller group than many hundreds, in	1	you sir that that ariginal investigation with my team
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix}$	which case I would have had in mind that smaller group.	2	you sir that that original investigation with my team, and we were working with our senior management, and yes,
	-	3	Mr Clarke from my perspective was that threshold, we
3	MR JAY: Okay. A. I understand now what you're saying, yes.	4	absolutely put a lot of effort into that investigation,
5	MR JAY: Those are all the questions I have for you,	5	with the best of intentions, and we were absolutely not
6	Mr Williams. There are other witnesses who will fill in	6	influenced by any of the things that have been suggested
7		7	
	other pieces of evidence as we proceed this afternoon. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Mr Williams, I don't want you to	8	and what your Inquiry is about, which I think is
8	•	9	entirely right and proper. When it comes to 2009, and I've thought about this,
	misunderstand me. I am not suggesting that you have been involved in some inappropriate relationship which	10	is with Mr Yates, he from my perspective was in the
10		11	
11 12	has caused you personally to backtrack on an	12	invidious position and I've had an insight into the role of Assistant Commissioner now he is basically
13	investigation. But I am sure you will understand the concern that decisions taken in the heat of the terrible	13	
		14	inheriting, if you like, an investigation that he had
14	events of 2006 and I'm not now talking about the	15	nothing to do with. It was a hugely complex
15	arrest with which we've been concerned, but the other	16	investigation, as you've seen. I know a lot about it.
16	work of your department are very readily	17	And I am trying to get him to understand the ins and
17 18	understandable. But it's quite difficult to translate	18	outs of that investigation, and he is trying to take all
19	some of those perfectly legitimate decisions into a construct where we now know the facts from the	19	that on board. These briefing documents were part of that process.
20	documents I'm not talking about what Ms Akers and	20	Again, in my workings with him, I've not worked with
21		21	him directly before, but I saw nothing or heard nothing
	Weeting have produced and say that, well, there was	22	•
22 23	nothing there at all.	23	that made me think that we that there was anything
24	The risk is not that I'm challenging you about words, and I take your point, but that people might	24	wrong going on here, that we were looking to hide anything. He was looking at an investigation that was
25	perceive that your reaction to these issues and I'm	25	four years old. I briefed him and over the period
23	Page 17	23	Page 19
	1 450 17		1 450 17
1	talking about your collective reaction, I'm not talking	1	I believe he was genuinely seeking to understand what
2	to you personally	2	had happened and make proportionate decisions.
3	A. Yes, I understand.	3	I just want to assure you that I've seen nothing
4	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: encourages inappropriate	4	that makes me think that there is anything other than
5	inferences to be drawn. Do you understand what I'm	5	a genuine desire to do a proper investigation and to
6	saying?	6	keep the public informed about what's going on.
7	A. I do, sir.	7	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Do you think that your reaction in
8	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So it's that that is the concern that	8	2009 the police reaction, I'm not talking about
9	I have to address, because it is critical that the	9	you
10	public have confidence in the police. I know that as	10	A. Yes.
11	much as if not more than anybody. But, of course, the	11	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: was just too quick? That rather
12	consequence of an approach that may be justified for one	12	more ought to have been done, so that a far broader
13	reason and then justified again for a slightly different	13	analysis of the nuanced position which you had from
14	reason is that if it becomes unpicked, you have to start	14	your decision logs, it's all there before Mr Yates
15	from scratch, which of course is exactly what's had to	15	went out snap?
16	happen.	16	A. I agree in hindsight
17	A. Yes.	17	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm not so sure that necessarily
18	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And that itself has public interest	18	should be in hindsight, but anyway
19	consequences.	19	A. Well, no, from a position now I can see, and I think
20	A. Absolutely.	20	Mr Yates has said it, at the time what it felt like was
21	Can I make a comment, sir?	21	that everybody was saying that this was a conspiracy and
22	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's precisely what I was prepared	22	we'd hidden it, and actually I believe what we were
23	to invite you to do.	23	trying to say: that's absolutely not the case here. But
	-		
24	A. Thank you, sir. What I'd like to say, and I know we	24	in doing that, I agree with you, perhaps we could have
24 25	-	24 25	in doing that, I agree with you, perhaps we could have just paused for a moment and thought: is it just that? Page 20

1 Because we - in a sense to me it fell we were reacting 2 to the fact that someone was saying we'd hidden 3 something and I knew we had absolutely not hidden 4 anything, and in hindight, yee, if we had passed, maybe 5 there would have been a different approach. We all 6 learn. 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Because the consequence of going our 8 as you did go out is to feed and futel the concern that 9 you have hidden something which only now is all coming 10 our. That's the consequence. I'm not saying you 11 intended to do that, but I just felt it was important to 12 give you the opportunity to comment upon that. 13 A. Thelieve Thave, and I thank you, sir, for that 14 opportunity. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you sery much. 16 MR JAY: Thank you, Mr Williams. 17 A. Thank you, Mr Jay. 18 MR JAY: We'll move on now to our next witness, who is 19 Mr Surfass, please. 20 MR KETH SURFEES (swoom) 21 Questions by MR JAY 22 MR JAY: Me'll move on now to our next witness, who is 23 A. My name is Keith Surfees. 24 O, Thank you. The pop your egoing to be able to find 25 easily a bundle with winness statements, and under tab 5 Page 21 1 of that bundle you'll see a statement which you gave in 2 the judicial review proceedings on 30 September 2011, 2 A. Yes, I have that. 2 Q. You ke signed that statement under a standard statement 3 of truth. You are in the current rank of Detective 2 Chief Inspector; is that right? 3 A. That's correct, yes, sir. 4 Charles Guerrian of the strategy which sugeriang officer of operation 12 Caryarid on 18 April 2006, following a request, you say, which came from Detective Superimedent; its that right? 4 A. That's correct. 5 So it goes without saying that these data would 6 correlate with the phone numbers of the viocemails of the viocemail of the futtion, to this investigating officer of toperation 1 an untishel, the difference between the responsibilities 1 of truth. You are in the current rank of Detective 2 Chief Supprinedent; its that right? 4 A. That's correct, yes, sir. 5 Charles from the curren				
a mything, and I knew we had absolutely not hidden there would have been a different approach. We all the learn. I CORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Because the consequence of going our as you did go out is to feed and fuel the concern that you have hidden something with only now is all coming out. That's the consequence: In not saying you intended to do that, but I just feit it was important to give you have hidden something with only now is all coming out. That's the consequence: In not saying you intended to do that, but I just feit it was important to give you the opportunity to comment upon that. A Defiver I have, and I thank you, sir, for that opportunity. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much. If MR JAY: Now, we're not going to cover all the points made in this statement, we re just going to alphit on some key points, because we've had a lot of the evidence a larready from Mr Williams. But paragraph 14, Jepase: The only way to establish whether illegal access to you was as a senior investigating officer with a counter terrorism command or anti-terrorist branch as it was then known. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: we have no be his slower, Wr Surtes, because otherwise we don't pick it up. MR JAY: Now, we're not going to cover all the points made in this statement, we re past going to cover all the points made in this statement, we re just going to cover all the points made in this statement, we re just going to cover all the points made in this statement, we re just going to cover all the points made in this statement, we re just going to cover all the points made in this statement, we re just going to cover all the points made in this statement, we re just going to cover all the points made in this statement, we re just going to cover all the points made in this statement, we re just going to cover all the points made in this statement, we re just going to all the points made in this statement, we re just going to all the points made in this statement, we re just going to a large for form Mr Williams. The point made		Because we in a sense to me it felt we were reacting	1	role of senior investigating officer for numerous
anything, and in Indisdight, yes, if we had paused, maybe to the three would have been a different approach. We all learn. 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Because the consequence of going out as you do go out is to feed and fuel the concern that you have hidden something which only now is all coming 10 out. That's the consequence. Fin not asying you have hidden something which only now is all coming 110 out. That's the consequence. Fin not asying you have hidden something which only now is all coming 110 out. That's the consequence. Fin not asying you have hidden something which only now is all coming 110 out. That's the consequence. Fin not asying you have hidden something which only now is all coming 110 out. That's the consequence. Fin not asying you have hidden something which only now is all coming 110 out. That's the consequence. Fin not asying you have hidden something which only now is all coming 110 out. That's the consequence of going out as you have hidden something which came for hidden and the points made in this statement which you give you the opportunity. 120 EAR A. Was you the opportunity to comment upon that. 121 and that's opportunity. 122 dispersion of the final you are you have hidden so that hidden something which came is keep that you have been a different approach. We all the points made in this statement which you give you the opportunity to comment upon that hidden something which came hidden so make a statement which you give you have hidden so hidden so make a statement which you gave in the judicial review proceedings on 30 September 2011. 24. A. Yes, that's correct. 30 A. Yes, I have that. 30 A. Yes, I have that. 31 A. That's correct, yes, sit. 32 Q. Back in 2006, when you joined SO13, you were Detective Chief Inspector; is that right? 32 A. Was possible and the point which was statement and of Detective Chief Inspector; is that right? 34. A. Was that you became the investigating officer of Operation 122 Caryalid on 18 April 2006, following a request, you say, which came from Detective Su		•		
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1 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Decause the consequence of going out as you did go out is to feed and fuel the concern that you have hold go out its of feed and fuel the concern that you have hidden something which only now is all coming out. That's the consequence. I'm not saying you to the proportionity to comment upon that. 12 give you die opportunity to comment upon that. 13 A. I believe I have, and I thank you, sir, for that opportunity. 14 opportunity. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: You have to be a bit slower, Mr Surtrees, because otherwise we don't pick it up. 1 mineded to do that, but I just felt it was important to give you die opportunity to commend upon that. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: You have to be a bit slower, Mr Surtrees, because otherwise we don't pick it up. 1 mineded to do that, but I just felt it was important to give you die opportunity to commend upon that. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: You have to be a bit slower, Mr Surtrees, because otherwise we don't pick it up. 1 mineded to do that, but I just felt it was important to give you die opportunity to commend upon that. 16 MR JAY: Thank you, Mr Jay. 17 A. Thank you, Mr Jay. 18 MR JAY: We'll move on now to our next witness, who is MR JAY: Thank you, Mr Jay. 19 MR JAY: We'll move on now to our next witness, who is MR JAY: Thank you, Mr Jay. 19 MR JAY: Mr We'll move on now to our next witness, who is MR JAY: Thank you, Mr Jay. 19 MR JAY: Mr Mr We'll move on now to our next witness, who is MR JAY: Thank you, Mr Jay. 10 MR JAY: Mr Mr We'll move on now to our next witness, who is MR JAY: Thank you, Mr Jay. 11 Oyenston by MR JAY: Thank you gave in the judicial review proceedings on 30 September 2011. 22 A. Yes, I have that. 23 A. Wy name is Keith Surtees. 24 Q. Thank you. I hope you're going to be able to find 2 the judicial review proceedings on 30 September 2011. 25 A. That's correct, yes, sir. 26 Chief Inspector; is that right? 27 A. That's correct, yes, sir. 28 A. That's correct, yes, sir. 29 Chief Inspector; is that right? 20 A. That's cor		5 there would have been a different approach. We all	5	
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15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much. 16 MR JAY: Thank you, Mr Williams. 17 A. Thank you, Mr Jay. 18 MR JAY: We'll move on now to our next witness, who is 19 Mr Surtees, please. 19 Owaritees, please. 20 MR KEITH SURTEES (sworn) 21 Questions by MR JAY 22 MR JAY: Mr Surtees, your full name for the Inquiry. 22 MR JAY: Mr Surtees, your full name for the Inquiry. 23 A. My mane is Keith Surtees. 24 Q. Thank you. I hope you're going to be able to find 25 easily a bundle with witness statements, and under tab 5 Page 21 1 of that bundle you'll see a statement which you gave in 26 the judicial review proceedings on 30 September 2011. 27 A. That's correct, yes, sir. 28 Q. Back in 2006, when you joined SO13, you were Detective 29 Chief Inspector; is that right? 20 Caryatid on 18 April 2006, following a request, you say, which came from Detective Superintendent Williams. This is paragraph 7 of your statement. Just so we have it in a paragraph 7 of your statement. Just so we have it in a strategy of an investigating officer and an investigating officer? 21 A. Yes, that's correct. 22 Many You went about doing that was to obtain account information under part 1 of RiPA, in ringing into the voicemails of obtain account information under part 1 of RiPA, in reliant to Mr Goodman's telephone to ascertain who he was calling revestigation, and 1 did obtain through RIPA legislation access to the call data, the outgoing call data of Mr Goodman's telephone to ascertain who he was calling Page 23 1 at that particular time. 2 Q. So it goes without saying that these data would correlate with the phone numbers of the voicemails of Mr Goodman's telephone to ascertain who he was calling correlate with the phone numbers of the sinvestigation pretty early in terms of the investigation access to the call data, the outgoing all data of Mr Goodman's telephone to ascertain who he was calling correlate with the phone numbers of the voicemails of wire static part in the current rank of Detective So it to call that that particular time. 2		13 A. I believe I have, and I thank you, sir, for that	13	"The only way to establish whether illegal access to
16 MR JAY: Thank you, Mr Williams. 17 A. Thank you, Mr Jay. 18 MR JAY: We'll move on now to our next witness, who is 19 Mr Surtees, please. 20 MR REITH SURTEES (sworn) 21 Questions by MR JAY 22 MR JAY: Mr Surtees, your full name for the Inquiry. 23 A. My name is Keith Surtees. 24 Q. Thank you, I hope you're going to be able to find 25 cassily a bundle with witness statements, and under tab 5 26 page 21 1 of that bundle you'll see a statement which you gave in the judicial review proceedings on 30 September 2011. 3 A. Yes, I have that. 4 Q. You've signed that statement under a standard statement of truth. You are in the current rank of Detective 2 Chief Superintendent; is that right? 3 A. Thank you, Superintendent; is that right? 4 A. Thant's correct, yes, sir. 5 Q. Back in 2006, when you joined SO13, you were Detective 6 Chief Inspector, is that right? 6 A. Thant's correct, yes, sir. 7 Q. And you became the investigating officer of Operation 7 Q. And you became the investigating officer of Operation 8 Q. Sand you became the investigating officer of Operation 9 Caryatid on 18 April 2006, following a request, you say, which came from Detective Superintendent Williams. This is paragraph 7 of your statement. Just so we have it in a nutshell, the difference between the responsibilities of a senior investigating officer and an investigating officer? 18 A. Senior investigating officer and an investigating officer of requirement, et cetera, is met. The investigating officer carries out that strategy, turns that into tactics, if you like, and delivers those tactics to defer the strategy which has been set by the senior investigating investigating investigating officer. 24 Like the strategy which has been set by the senior investigating inforcer. 25 Like the strategy which has been set by the senior investigating officer on the propertical could you not carry out the same exercise in relation to a limited number of those victims to see who else may have been calling into their closurants, in detail and tone trains to d		14 opportunity.	14	voice messages was taking place was to obtain the
17 A. Thank you, Mr Jay. 18 MR JAY: We'll move on now to our next witness, who is 19 Mr Surtees, please. 20 MR KEITH SURTEES (sworn) 21 Questions by MR JAY 22 MR JAY: Mr Surtees, you full name for the Inquiry. 23 A. My name is Keith Surtees. 24 Q. Thank you. I hope you're going to be able to find 25 easily a bundle with witness statements, and under tab 5 Page 21 1 of that bundle you'll see a statement which you gave in the judicial review proceedings on 30 September 2011. 3 A. Yes, I have that. 4 Q. You've signed that statement under a standard statement of the full officer carries on the investigating officer of Operation of Caryatid on 18 April 2006, following a request, you say, which came from Detective Superintendent Williams. This is paragraph 7 of your statement. Just so we have it in a nutshell, the difference between the responsibilities of forcer? 18 A. Senior investigating officer and an investigating officer? 19 officer? 10 officer? 11 officer? 12		15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much.	15	incoming telephone data to the voicemail of the
18 MR JAY: We'll move on now to our next witness, who is 19 Mr Surtees, please. 19 obtain account information under part 1 of RIPA, in relation to Mr Goodman's telephone. Is that correct? 21 MR JAY: Mr Surtees, your full name for the Inquiry. 22 MR JAY: Mr Surtees, your full name for the Inquiry. 23 A. My name is Keith Surtees. 24 Q. Thank you. I hope you're going to be able to find 25 easily a bundle with witness statements, and under tab 5 Page 21 1 of that bundle you'll see a statement which you gave in 2 the judicial review proceedings on 30 September 2011. 3 A. Yes, I have that. 4 Q. You've signed that statement under a standard statement 5 of truth. You are in the current rank of Detective 6 Chief Superintendent; is that right? 7 A. That's correct, yes, sir. 8 Q. Back in 2006, when you joined SO13, you were Detective 9 Chief Inspector; is that right? 10 A. That's correct; 11 Q. And you became the investigating officer of Operation 12 Caryatid on 18 April 2006, following a request, you say, 3 which came from Detective Superintendent Williams. This is paragraph 7 of your statement. Just so we have it in 18 a natishell, the difference between the responsibilities 19 of a senior investigating officer and an investigating 10 of a senior investigating officer sesentially sets out the 11 strategy of an investigation, makes sure the resource 12 requirement, et cetera, is met. The investigating 23 deliver the strategy which has been set by the senior 24 investigating into some body's privacy, essentially. 25 If we move forward in time so that we can understand 26 this investigating officer of operation 27 Chief Inspector; is that right? 28 A. Senior investigation, makes sure the resource 29 requirement, et cetera, is met. The investigating 29 officer carries out that strategy, turns that into 29 taction to Mr Goodman's telephone. Is that attement and idio duain through RIPA legislation 29 action to Mr Goodman's telephone. Is that circ that was precincate? 20 So it goes without saying that these data would 21 at t		16 MR JAY: Thank you, Mr Williams.	16	complainants, in other words a list of telephone numbers
MR Surtees, please. MR KEITH SURTEES (sworn) Questions by MR JAY MR JAY: Mr Surtees, your full name for the Inquiry. A. My name is Keith Surtees. Q. Thank you. I hope you're going to be able to find easily a bundle with witness statements, and under tab 5 Page 21 for that bundle you'll see a statement which you gave in the judicial review proceedings on 30 September 2011. A. Yes, I have that. Q. You've signed that statement under a standard statement of truth. You are in the current rank of Detective Chief Superintendent; is that right? A. That's correct, yes, sir. Q. Back in 2006, when you joined SO13, you were Detective Chief Inspector; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. And you became the investigating officer of Operation 12 Caryatid on 18 April 2006, following a request, you say, which came from Detective Superintendent Williams. This is paragraph 7 of your statement. Just so we have it in sparagraph 7 of your statement. Just so we have it in sparagraph 7 of your statement. Just so we have it in sparagraph 7 of your statement. Just so we have it in sparagraph 7 of your statement. Just so we have it in sparagraph 7 of your statement. Just so we have it in strategy of an investigating officer and an investigating officer? A. Senior investigating officer and an investigating officer of officer? Mr Goodman's telephone. Is that correct? A. Yes, that's correct. Mr Goodman became a suspect of this investigation pretty early in terms of the investigation and I did obtain through RIPA legislation access to the call data, the outgoing call data of Mr Goodman's telephone to ascertain who he was calling investigation, and I did obtain through RIPA legislation access to the call data, the outgoing call data of Mr Goodman's telephone to ascertain who he was calling investigation, and I did obtain through RIPA legislation access to the call data, the outgoing call data of Mr Goodman's telephone to ascertain who he was calling investigation, and I did obtain through RIPA legislation access to the cal		17 A. Thank you, Mr Jay.	17	ringing into the voicemails of the victims."
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- 1 whether other journalists were concerned?
- 2 A. Potentially, yes, eventually.
- 3 Q. Why eventually? Why not presumably straightforwardly?
- 4 A. If I work through the process of a victim first, what
- 5 I would see is a multitude of data coming in to a victim
- 6 of crime. So I'd see thousands of lines of data. If
- 7 I do it the other way, ie I have a suspect in the form
- 8 of Goodman or Mulcaire, I have what we call and what we
- 9 termed within this investigation rogue telephone
- 10 numbers. I have something to pinpoint. That rogue
- 11 telephone number going into a victim precisely is easier
- to locate than simply looking at thousands of lines of
- data from a victim of incoming telephone calls and then
- 14 potentially translating each one of those individual
- 14 potentially translating each one of those murridual
- 15 lines of data into a separate RIPA request to see who
- 16 those particular lines of data belong to. Virtually
- 17 impossible to do, I would suggest, under those
- 18 circumstances.

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The way to do it is when you have a suspect in mind and you're looking at that suspect, to see whether that suspect particularly is accessing the voicemails or DDNs

- 22 of particular victims.
- 23 Q. I'm going to just understand that, Mr Surtees. Imagine
- that you have one of our 418 victims and you have the
- 25 unique voicemail number. Why don't you simply ascertain
 - Page 25
- 1 who is calling into that number? Are we agreed?
- 2 A. In terms of rogue telephone numbers, and in the case of
- 3 Goodman and Mulcaire I had some rogue telephone numbers.
- 4 Easy to do to see whether those telephone numbers have
- 5 gone into any of those victims, accepted. In terms of
- 6 anybody else, impossible to do unless you identify
- 7 particular rogue telephone numbers you're looking for.
- 8 Q. I'm not sure that it's quite so difficult, Mr Surtees.
- 9 You take one of the victims. You have a series of --
- you might see a series of potentially rogue numbers.
- Why don't you go and speak to the victim, who will say,
- "I can tell you that these numbers are legitimate
- 13 numbers" --
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 Q. -- "but I simply don't know who these other numbers
- are", so why don't you just focus on those other
- 17 numbers?
- 18 A. Possibly a way to do it, yes.
- 19 Q. It's quite simple, isn't it?
- 20 A. It would be possible to hand over the data to those
- 21 people who hold that telephone and say "Do you recognise
- 22 any of these numbers?"
- 23 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Or to ask this question: "Do you ever
- 24 access your voicemail remotely?" Because I would have
- 25 thought most people would say no.

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- A. On the telephone bills of the victims we're actually
- 2 talking about, the fact that the voicemails had been
 - activated or accessed doesn't feature on those telephone
- 4 bills. You don't receive a telephone bill that actually
- 5 shows the fact that your voicemail has been activated.
- 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, I think you misunderstand my
- 7 suggestion and I think I have it right. If you ask
- 8 somebody, "Do you ever access your voicemail remotely
- 9 from another phone?", answer, "No", they don't need to
- 10 know the numbers that have actually tried to do that,
- they don't need to know the fact that that's happened.
- You know that because you can get that information from
- their phone companies, can't you?
- 14 A. From the phone companies, going back to a victim, I can
- 15 get the incoming call data into a victim's telephone,
- 16 **yes**.
- 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, that's the point. So I'm right,
- 18 am I?

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- 19 A. If I were to simply randomly pick a victim, you or
- anybody else, for instance, and simply look at that data
- of incoming call data, I'd see lots of lines of
- 22 information. What I wouldn't see and identify really
 - quickly is the fact that amongst that myriad of lines of
- data, ie telephone numbers, I would be able to pick out
- 25 suspicious activity from those lines of data. I simply
 - Page 27
 - wouldn't be able to do that. What I would be able to do
- 2 in terms of Mulcaire and Goodman, for instance, because
- 3 I know those telephone numbers, I'd be able to pick
- 4 those out
- 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I understand that. My point was that
- 6 the data would tell you which incoming calls were remote
- 7 access to voicemail. Is that right?
- 8 A. No. Only the vampire data tells us that. The incoming
 - call -- the vampire data shows us details of calls into
- 10 voicemails.
- 11 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes.
- 12 A. The telephone companies don't -- the whole sort of
- problem at the beginning of our investigation was the
- 14 fact that the telephone companies keep data information
- on the basis of what they can charge customers for.
- 16 That's what they keep their data for. They can't and
- don't charge for this issue of access into voicemails.
- 18 So it isn't as straightforward as simply looking at
- 19 somebody's telephone bill or at incoming call data.
- 20 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, no, I wasn't suggesting you would
- 21 look at their bill. I was wondering what the telephone
- 22 companies could do. Anyway, I've asked the question.
- 23 MR JAY: Of course you already had data which referred to
- the News of the World hub phone, didn't you?
- 25 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. And in those cases you didn't know whether or not that
- 2 was Mr Goodman within the News of the World, or some
- 3 other journalist within the News of the World; is that
- 4 right?
- 5 A. It's a hub telephone number attributed at that 6 particular point to nobody.
- 7 Q. As soon as you were outside that which was of interest
- 8 to a royal correspondent, you were beginning to suspect
- 9 that it wasn't Mr Goodman but some other journalist,
- 10 weren't you?
- 11 A. Sorry, in terms of whether it spanned outside of the
- 12 roval issues?
- 13 Q. Yes.
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 Q. We'll come back to that. In paragraph 18 you identify
- 16 the total of nine rogue numbers being used by your two
- 17 suspects, who at that stage were Goodman and Mulcaire.
- 18 Can I ask you about paragraph 24, where you're
- 19 referring to the serious threat to life presented by
- 20 terrorist threats. To what extent did those
- 21 considerations impede the investigation before 8 August
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- 23 A. They were in my mind throughout the time between April
- 24 and the August period you mention inasmuch as in the
- 25 first instance I was a senior investigating officer
 - Page 29
 - responsible for a number of those investigations.
- 2 I think the term -- I think the number of 50 plus
- 3 investigations at the beginning of this investigation
- 4 moving through to somewhere close to 73 by the end of
- 5 December 2006 I was absolutely cognisant of because as
- 6 a senior investigating officer I was responsible for
- 7 a number of those investigations during that period, and
- 8 whilst undertaking those duties, I was also in and out
- 9 of the country where those investigations took me.
- 10 So in terms of my responsibilities as a senior 11 investigating officer for terrorist investigations along
- 12 with this investigation, this was part of my workload if
- 13 you like as well as other terrorist investigations at
- 14 that time.
- 15 Q. Was the position this: at the time Goodman and Mulcaire
- 16 were arrested on 8 August, you had all the evidence in
- 17 place which you believed to be necessary to effect those
- 18 arrests; is that right?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. And that was notwithstanding all the other pressures you
- 21 were under, is that also right?
- 22 A. That's correct.
- 23 Q. Can I move forward, please? You explain the position,
- 24 paragraphs 29 to 31, in relation to unifying the
- 25 individual rogue numbers of Goodman and Mulcaire with

Page 30

- your victims. In your own words, what did you need to
- 2 do pursuant to that exercise to obtain evidence which in
- 3 your view would satisfy the criminal standard of proof?
- 4 A. What I needed to show was the fact that in the case of
- 5 Goodman and latterly Mulcaire they were in possession of
- 6 some telephones, and from those telephones they were
- 7 ringing up our victims, they were ringing up the unique
- 8 voicemails or the direct telephone numbers, simple as
- 9
- 10 Now, we undertook a process through I think May,
- 11 June time which is the experimental process, if you
- 12 like, to try to prove the sequencing of a voicemail
- 13 message being left, a voicemail message being accessed
- 14 by a rogue telephone number before it was opened by the
- 15 intended recipient and who actually did that at the
- 16

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- 17 So the process we went through was obviously with
- 18 Jamie Lowther-Pinkerton and Helen Asprey, and this was
- 19 a test period of a number of weeks, to actually prove
- 20 that sequencing, in terms of proving the unopened
- 21 envelope, if you like.
- 22 In terms of the process, the process we needed to do
 - was to prove potentially that in the case of Goodman the
- 24 home telephone number of Goodman was in Clive Goodman's
- 25 hand at the time. It wasn't in Mrs Goodman's hand or it
 - Page 31
 - wasn't in Mr Smith's hand, who may well have happened to
- 2 be at Mr Goodman's house at the time, because those are
- 3 always the issues that I as an investigator would
- 4 clearly look at, because through experience there was --
- 5 Q. Through an abundance of caution. This is lines of
- 6 defence some people raise, is it?
- A. Absolutely. 7
- 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, but you put together
 - a circumstantial case which blows away the suggestion
- 10 that this telephone was suddenly used by a guy who said,
- 11 "Can I borrow your phone?" in the pub.
- 12 A. Absolutely right, yes. Yes.
- 13 MR JAY: I think, if I can cut to the quick, there are
- 14 possibly two stages. In order to prove an interception
- 15 of a voicemail, you have to prove that the phone number
- 16 has been accessed for or been rung for sufficient period
- 17 of time that the voicemail itself is being accessed.
- 18 That's about 9 or 10 seconds, is that correct?
- 19 A. We took some advice with regard to this and Mr Bristow
- 20 supplied some of that advice, as did the Crown
- 21 Prosecution Service, who we spoke to throughout the
- 22 investigation. To potentially prove the existence of
- 23 a voicemail in the first instance, clearly we would need
- 24 to say there was a voicemail in there. Secondly, to 25
 - prove potentially the fact that somebody had gone into

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- 1 that voicemail and listened to it, actually opened the
- 2 envelope, if you like, and listened to it, the expert
- 3 was saying to us this was probably between the 10 to 14
- 4 seconds, and that simply was based on the fact that when
- 5 you or I listen to our voicemail messages --
- 6 Q. It takes that long to get in?
- 7 A. We get a blurb before that, before we actually listen to
- 8 what I've actually tried to listen to in the first
- 9 instance. That's just 10 to 14 seconds.
- 10 Q. I think we can agree, Mr Surtees, that you have to get
- 11 to those 10 to 14 seconds before an offence is
- 12 committed, but as soon as you go beyond the 10 to 14
- 13 seconds, the inference is that someone is listening to
- 14 a voicemail rather than there being nothing in the
- 15 mailbox. Would you agree?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. Then there's the second point, which is the technical
- 18 legal argument which we've already looked at, as to
- 19 whether it's necessary to prove that the listening is
- 20 occurring before the intended recipient is accessing,
- 21 and that is something that you pursued along with
- 22 Mr Bristow, who was your expert adviser; is that right?
- 23 A. Yes. Throughout the investigation, even up to August,
- 24 September time, that advice remained the same from the
- 25 **Crown Prosecution Service.**

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Q. I've asked this question of Mr Williams, but I'll ask it

- 1
- 2 of you. That's true of the direct offence under section
- 3 1 of RIPA, but for a conspiracy offence under the
- 4 Criminal Law Act you wouldn't have to prove that, would
- 5 you?

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- 6 A. I don't think so. I think what we'd need to prove is
- 7 some guilty mind and a guilty act.
- 8 Q. Thank you.
- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Overt act to prove the substantive 9
- 10 agreement, and if somebody's got hold of the PIN number
- 11 of an owner of a voicemail, mobile telephone, then
- 12 that's not an overt act.
- 13 A. There are various things I would rely on as an
- 14 investigator to evidentially put to a suspect in that
- 15 type of instance. I guess very straightforwardly
- 16 I would need to prove that either somebody who was
- 17 receiving information or instructing others to carry out
- 18 activity on their behalf either knew when they received
- 19 that information or gave that instruction what they were
- 20 participating in was an illegal offence.
- 21 MR JAY: Thank you. Move forward to paragraph 35 of your
- 22 statement which on the internal numbering is page 16.
- 23 It starts at 04170. I'm not quite sure where
- 24 paragraph 35 is going to be precisely, but I hope we'll
- 25 be able to put it on the screen. 4185? It's the

Page 34

- identification of customers who were outside the purview
- 2 of the royal household. It's Mr Clifford and HJK. This
 - was in May of 2006. At that point did you begin to
- 4 suspect that these activities may be going beyond
- 5 Mr Goodman?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 O. Why was that?
- 8 A. I don't precisely know the timing of this. We were
- 9 informed through our contacts within O2 and Vodafone of
- 10 some potential -- or some suspicious activity with a guy
- 11 who was ringing into O2 using the name Paul Williams and
- 12 attempting to change PIN numbers. This was recordings
- 13 that O2 had had to their various customer service
- 14 centres that they thought was suspicious activity and
- 15 that came about as a result of the conversations and the
- 16 contacts that I and others within the investigation team
- 17
 - were having with them at that point.
- 18 I don't know precisely -- it will be in the
- 19 documentation -- when I was informed of the Paul
 - Williams position, but here we have an expansion, if you
- 21 like, beyond the royal household. I was cognisant to
- 22 the fact that we have a royal editor from the
- 23 News of the World.
- 24 Q. Can you ask you this, Mr Surtees: did anybody carry out
- 25 a study, if that's the right word, of the sort of pieces
 - Page 35
 - Mr Goodman was writing in the News of the World?
- 2 A. There was at a very early stage before I joined this
- 3 investigation by Phil Williams, which I think started
- 4 part of the investigation off, which was looking at some
- 5 of the document -- or some of the stories that had been
- 6 produced by Clive Goodman in the News of the World.
 - Q. Can I ask you to look at a briefing note which I think
- 7
- 8 was probably for DAC Clarke's eyes. At tab 59 of the
- 9 first file, which is 03028 -- you will have the first
- 10 file. This is a briefing note that you prepared.
- 11 A. Sorry, what number?
- 12 Q. Tab 59. Because Mr Williams was away. By this point,
- 13 you'd ascertained that Mr Williams and Mr Mulcaire were
- 14 the same person. At the bottom of the page, various
- 15 checks in the investigations are recommended, going to
- 16 be carried out in relation to Mr Mulcaire. The
- 17 inference you draw as to the conspiracy between Goodman
- 18 and Mulcaire is the top of the next page, is that right,
- 19 Mr Surtees?
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. And then other victims, Mr Clifford and HJK are
- 22 mentioned. You say:
- 23 "This investigation was undertaken by the ATB for
- 24 the reasons outlined within this decision log. The
- 25 physical risks to the Royal Family cannot be

1 1 underestimated and as such anything other than a CT ..." A. Yes, it's a fair observation, I accept that. 2 that's obviously counter terrorist? 2 Q. There might be a reason why it was kept within SO13. 3 3 A. Yes. A. Yes. Q. "... investigation into the unlawful access would be 4 4 Q. We can ask Mr Clarke tomorrow. 5 unwise. The wider issue, however, is somewhat 5 A. Absolutely. 6 different, as the potential terrorist risk to private Q. Can I ask you to look forward to tab 79. 7 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: We're just passing tab 60. It citizens does not fall into the counter terrorist 8 8 portfolio. That does not mean that it shouldn't be doesn't matter, but it does say: 9 9 investigated because each unlawful interception is "Itemised billing on the suspect numbers would show 10 a serious offence. I have briefed DAC Clarke and others 10 calls into the relevant retrieval number including 11 into the widening aspect of this investigation with 11 dates, times and durations." 12 a suggestion that another investigative team should take 12 All right, tab what? 13 the wider investigation. I await a response on this 13 MR JAY: Tab 77 first, which is 03104. You have a cabinet 14 14 minister whose phone has been accessed, and what you're 15 15 Well, it goes without saying that your suggestion saying here is this is a reason for accelerating what 16 was rejected; is that right? 16 you call executive action, namely arresting Goodman and 17 A. Yes. 17 Mulcaire; is that right? 18 Q. What reasons were given to you? 18 A. Yes. I think I refer back in my decision log around 19 A. The parameters of the investigation were set by 19 this challenge, if you like, between extending this 20 Mr Clarke at a very early stage. I was clear on those 20 investigation and prolonging the investigation to 21 21 parameters and clearly pursued those parameters in the include the widening aspects of it, and I talk about the 22 way in which I conducted this investigation. 22 actual challenge that that presents to the investigation 23 The issue of other victims coming into this 23 inasmuch as it would continue to expose potential 24 24 investigation and the potential widening of it, looking victims to continued interception. 25 back at "the potential terrorist risk to private 25 My primary concern at that particular point is the Page 37 Page 39 1 citizens does not fall into the counter terrorist 1 continued exposure of both Royal Family, cabinet 2 portfolio", clearly it does. I think what I was trying 2 ministers, because of the national security implications 3 3 to get at here was here we have a switch in issues going of that, and the fact that we now have, as well as the 4 on. The location potentially of senior members or 4 Royal Family -- and I appreciate the vast majority of 5 junior members of the Royal Family is clearly a national 5 the Royal Family issues or access is servicing news 6 6 issue in terms of national security, therefore it quite stories -- the fact that we now have a cabinet minister 7 rightly fits within the confines of the anti-terrorist 7 causes me more concern with regard to this national 8 branch CT investigation. The tittle-tattle issue of 8 security aspect. I need to be able to stop this. 9 other particular members of the public would potential 9 Because if I allow this to continue for a number of 10 fall out of the remit of the anti-terrorist branch and 10 weeks whilst trying to widen any investigation, 11 that's what I'm getting at there. 11 I continue the exposure potentially to cabinet ministers 12 I've suggested that at that particular point simply 12 and others. 13 because we have a widening of the investigation at that 13 Q. So to be clear, Mr Surtees, the widening of the 14 point with the inclusion of Clifford, HJK, and I've had 14 investigation would obviously have embraced widening the 15 15 those discussions, and in terms of that, the suggestion victim pool, but might also have embraced widening the 16 I made, I think on 31 May that is dated? 16 group of conspirators, but your primary concern was to 17 Q. It is. 17 move this to a conclusion to halt the exposure of 18 A. Has been considered and a decision has been made not to 18 individuals in high office to voicemail interception. 19 accept that at that point. 19 Do I have it right? Q. It might be said it's a bit difficult to disentangle the 20 20 A. Yes, you have, and I think there are two separate issues

narrow investigation into the royal household and any

wider investigation that if there is going to be a wider

investigation, it should be kept in the same place, as

it were, rather than have two investigations going on

Page 38

concurrently. Is that a fair observation or not?

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in terms of widening it in terms of a victim pool and

widening it in terms of a suspect pool. The widening in

terms of a victim pool, we would have a point at which,

in terms of two defendants going before the court, we

have a point at which we saturate, if you like, an

1 indictment against them. Whether that's 100 victims 1 at least, of additional co-conspirators; is that 2 2 within a pool that have been targeted by two suspects or 3 whether it's in the instance seven or eight, which 3 A. I think it's more with regard to the fact that we've got 4 I think is how the indictment ended up, really matters 4 more information/evidence coming from the telephone 5 little. I think, in terms of widening the suspect pool, 5 companies to talk about access to DDNs and the 6 that is a protracted piece of work, because we'd have to 6 sequencing which we're concentrating on as opposed to 7 7 go through the whole process again of trying to more suspects. 8 8 identify, et cetera. Q. I move forward to tab 83, which is 03121, which again Q. Thank you. To move the story forward, I'm not hoping to 9 9 I think is your document; is that right? 10 10 duplicate evidence we've already heard, but just one A. It is the search strategy. 11 11 piece of evidence which we haven't yet heard. At Q. We see that strategy explained at the bottom of the 12 tab 81, 03109, this is seven pages within that tab, 12 first page: 13 there's an email from the CPS copied in to you on 13 "There's an issue with the searching of 14 7 August 2006 on the internal numbering at page 200. It 14 Clive Goodman's office desk area within News 15 15 International and that a section 8 warrant excludes the refers to a meeting, or rather speaking to counsel. You 16 believe that was leading counsel; is that right? 16 application of said warrant if it's likely that 17 A. Yes. 17 journalistic material would be found during the search. 18 O. Four lines down: 18 I have decided that a section 8 warrant will be sought 19 "The meeting was very useful. We concluded that in 19 to allow entry and search of the finance office within 20 essence the alleged criminal activity alleged against 20 News International that would hold details of documents 21 21 the suspect does give rise to the offences I have relating to payments by News Corporation International 22 outlined. We have briefly discussed before the 22 to Glenn Mulcaire. We do not seek nor do I anticipate 23 possibility of arguing that what we have termed our 23 finding journalistic material during this search. 24 24 Computer Misuse Act offences might fall to be considered "Whilst I accept the entire finance and resource 25 as RIPA offences but the issue had not definitively been 25 department of News International is likely to be Page 41 Page 43 1 argued." 1 outsourced and not located within Virginia Street, there 2 2 Is that a reference to bringing this matter within must be an accountancy financial clearing house within 3 3 RIPA or to the technical argument about the timing of the building that would receive correspondence." 4 4 So what you were doing there was in order to avoid the interception? 5 5 A. The latter, the technical argument about the opening. difficulties with journalistic material, focus the LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's the same point. 6 6 search on non-journalistic material; is that correct? 7 MR JAY: It's the same point. 7 A. In the first instance I've set a very comprehensive 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Because it brings it into RIPA -- if 8 search strategy. I think over 13 premises and vehicles 9 you have to open the envelope, that's only for RIPA 9 were searched as a result of the search strategy I set 10 10 purposes, it's not for the Computer Misuse Act purposes. prior to August 8. The second part specifically deals 11 MR JAY: Because the Computer Misuse Act would be infringed 11 with the challenges around searching of News 12 even --12 International. If we refer back to 82, which is the 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: In any event. 13 document from Carmen Dowd, I think from memory she 14 MR JAY: In any event. The CPS continues: 14 actually talks about the search legislation. 15 15 "I was reticent about arguing the point in this Whilst I'm producing my search strategy, clearly I'm 16 case. However, having considered the matter with 16 aware of the limitations of the Police and Criminal 17 counsel, we have concluded that we could properly argue 17 Evidence Act with regard to what we can search for and 18 the point, and in any event nothing would be lost as we 18 where we're likely to find either journalistic or other already have the four main clear RIPA offences (if not 19 19 protected material. Section 8 specifically precludes 20 20 more I hear!)" actually applying for the section 8 warrant where we're 21 Do you know what that's a reference to? 21 likely to find journalistic material within that search. 22 22 A. I don't. I can suspect it's because of the ongoing RIPA, the offences for which we were investigating, 23 23 material that has been supplied to us by the telephone does not carry a power of search. Thereafter, my only 24 companies through August, September, October, et cetera. 24 route left beyond section 8 is section 18, section 18(2) 25 25 Q. So that might have been a reference to the possibility, and (5). The reason I sought advice is because clearly Page 42 Page 44

- I wanted the view of the Crown Prosecution Service for
- 2 this. I wanted very much to get into
- 3 News International, because I wanted to search the desk,
- 4 I wanted to search the financial areas, I wanted to find
- 5 evidence around who was involved in this illegal
- 6 activity.

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- 7 The advice given back was that section 8 was very
- 8 difficult and it was unlikely to succeed and we may well 9 be breaching at that point where we were likely to find
- 10 journalistic material. I saw that advice and
- 11 I justified obtaining the section 8 warrant on the basis
- 12 of what I put into my decision log on the basis that
- 13 I thought I'm likely to find not journalistic material
- 14 in the areas that I'm going to search; I'm going to find
- 15 financial material.
 - So despite suggestions that it would be difficult under section 8 and potentially not possible, I thought
- 18 there was a way for us to do that and I sought that
- 19 route and obtained the section 8 warrant.
- 20 Q. In the event, owing to what happened on the day, is this
- 21 right, the search was limited to the desk only and did
- 22 not cover that which was the subject of the warrant as
- 23 set out in tab 83; is that correct?
- 24 A. There was some real difficulty in conducting the search
- 25 at News International. There were I think four of my
 - Page 45
 - officers who actually got into the premises before 1
 - News International barred the rest of my officers from
- 3 going into News International. We got to the desk of
- 4 Goodman, we seized some material from the desk of
- 5 Goodman. There was a safe on his desk, which was
- 6 unopened. My officers were confronted with
- 7 photographers, who were summonsed from other parts of
- 8 News International, and they were taking photographs of
- 9 the officers. A number of night or news editors
- 10 challenged the officers around the illegality of their
- 11 entry into News International. They were asked to go to
- 12 a conference room until lawyers could arrive to
- 13 challenge the illegality of the section 18(1) and 18(5)
- 14 and section 8 PACE authorities, and it was described to
- 15 me as a tense stand-off by the officer leading that
- 16 search. 17

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- The officer tried to get our forensic management team, our search officers into the building. They were refused entry, they were left outside. Our officers
- 20 were effectively surrounded and photographed and not
- 21 assisted in any way, shape or form. That search was
- 22 curtailed. Some items were taken. The search did not
- 23 go to the extent I wanted it to.
- 24 Q. I've been asked to make this clear on behalf of News
- 25 International, that insofar as you look at paragraph 47
 - Page 46

- 1 of your statement, Mr Surtees, the fourth line, you can
- 2 see this, that Detective Inspector Pearce was concerned
- 3 at the time that News of the World staff may offer some
- 4 form of violence against the small police team in the
- 5 building, that the clear position of News International
- 6 and indeed their lawyer is there was no question of any
- 7 threat of physical violence. Would you accept that?
- 8 A. Very difficult, on the basis that I wasn't there, I was
 - simply speaking to my officers at the scene. It's very
- 10 difficult for me to take a view either way. The
- 11 information that was relayed to me is in my statement.
- 12 Q. Okay. It's clear from the --
- 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Whether or not you were entitled to
- 14 do all you sought, if you had a warrant to do certain
- 15 things, to do certain of what you sought, you were
- 16 entitled to do it.
- A. Yes. 17
- 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Did you get it done?
- 19 A. No. Section 19 of PACE, of course, allows us to seize
- 20 any evidence whilst we're legally on premises that we
- 21 think is pertinent to any criminal activity.
- 22 MR JAY: Was any thought given to returning on another day
- 23 with a larger team of officers and properly executing
- 24 the warrant?
- 25 A. I think the moment had been lost with regard to the
 - Page 47
 - information we sought. It, I think, had gone, quite
- 2 frankly.
- 3 Q. Implicit in that answer, Mr Surtees, is that News
- 4 International might have hidden or destroyed
- 5 incriminating information. Is that what you're
- 6 suggesting?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. Which is obviously a point which cuts both ways, because
- 9 it would -- well, it goes without saying that it would
- 10 increase -- if you had that level of suspicion about
- 11 News International, that level of suspicion might take
- 12 you into suspicion that others in News International
- 13 were involved in this conspiracy. Do you see that?
- 14 A. I do.
- 15 Q. Can I ask you about the compilation of tab 94, which is
- 16 the list of those potentially compromised. We may
- 17 understand some more about it if you look at tab 93.
- 18 03171, which again is your document, isn't it,
- 19 Mr Surtees:
- 20 "Having reviewed the material seized at the address
- 21 searches it is clear that there is a wealth of sensitive
- 22 documents relating to hundreds of individuals, including
- 23 royal household, Members of Parliament, sports stars,
- 24 military, police, celebrities and journalists."
- 25 Can I ask you this: did you personally conduct any Page 48

1 review of the material?

- 2 A. I saw the Blue Book in its various stages of completion,
- 3 so ves.
- 4 Q. Did you see any pages of the Mulcaire notebook?
- 5 A. I don't recall seeing any pages of the Mulcaire
- 6 **notebook.**
- 7 Q. At some later stage -- this is after 8 or 9 August
- 8 2006 -- did you have occasion to look at the Mulcaire
- 9 notebook?
- 10 A. I don't know whether I did or I didn't. I can't recall.
- 11 Q. When if at all did you become aware of first names, the
- corner names, the top left-hand side of relevant pages
- of the notebook?
- 14 A. I think in terms of notebook, I'm not familiar with
- 15 a notebook. What actually was recovered was quite a lot
- of loose A4 pieces of paper, and I describe them in this
- 17 decision log as research in various forms of completion,
- and they ranged from simply first names all the way
- 19 through to first names, surnames, account numbers,
- addresses, DDNs, telephone numbers, et cetera,
- 21 et cetera.
- 22 So I don't recognise a notebook, because I don't
- recall actually finding one or seeing one. I do recall
- lots of loose-leaf A4 pieces of paper, as I've said,
- with various stages of research on, and I think I refer Page 49
- to that within this decision. I see that through the
- 2 process of -- I think it's probably from August 9, 10,
- 3 onwards. I firstly negotiate a group of officers,
- 4 I think somewhere in the region of 20 or 30 officers,
- 5 who I negotiate because they're not anti-terrorist
- 6 branch officers because they're all busy doing Operation
- 7 Overt and everything else. They're Special Branch
- 8 officers, they're vetted to the highest level, and it's
- 9 those officers, I negotiate their overtime, because
- 10 they're working through weekends when they should be
- off, and they work through I think for a period of five
- 12 to seven days to go through all of the documentation,
- and with that they're briefed by me at the beginning
- around what I want them to do with that in the first
- instance, which is to ascertain whether there's anything
- 16 to undermine or assist the police case with regard to
- 17 Goodman and Mulcaire, because by then we've charged both
- $18\,$ $\,$ Goodman and Mulcaire and my obligations under CPIA kick
- 19 **in.**
- 20 Is there anything to undermine or assist? Is there
- any evidence around any other people on these documents?
- 22 They're given that brief and they work through that for
- 23 the next five to seven days, and that's what makes this
- document which is now known and referred to as the
- 25 Blue Book. That is added to days and weeks later with
 - Page 50

- various bits of information that is supplied by the
- 2 telephone companies as well.
- 3 Q. Is the version we see under tab 94 the final iteration
- 4 of the Blue Book, with the 418 names or 419 names?
- 5 A. I'm pretty sure it is.
- 6 Q. Can I ask you one point on this decision log because
- you've accurately summarised a lot of what is contained
- 8 in the book. Look at the second page, level with the
- 9 upper hole punch:
- 10 "To establish the full picture as to whether
- 11 individuals have been intercepted or the amount of times
- they have been intercepted all of the airtime providers
- will need to search their databases to give us those
- 14 details."

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- Could you explain what that was a reference to?
- 16 A. Yes, and this comes back to an earlier conversation
- 17 where I was explaining perhaps very badly the process
- 18 that we had to go through to establish that evidence.
- 19 To establish a full picture as to whether individuals
- 20 have been intercepted and the amount of times, the
- 21 airtime providers would need to go through their
- 22 databases.
 - What I have is I have the DDNs now of some people.
- 24 I have the DDNs on these documents and I need the
 - airtime providers to tell me whether some rogue numbers
 - Page 51
 - or any other numbers have accessed that, and this is
- what I was trying to explain right at the beginning.
- 3 Here I have just what I was talking about. I have
- 4 a start point, if you like: telephone companies, can you
- 5 tell me whether anybody's accessed these DDNs, please?
- 6 Q. Was this something that you were intending to do at the
- 7 time this decision log was completed?
- 8 A. Yes. But indeed through the days and weeks following
- 9 this that was done in various guises, because as I said
- where you see the numbers in this Blue Book on the
- right-hand side in the columns to the right, those
- 12 numbers, if you like, have been added as a result of
- 13 that action.
- 14 So where you see sort of randomly 1, 9, 11, 4, 5,
 - that is where the telephone companies have supplied the
 - information I was talking about.
- 17 Q. So if, for example, we look -- this is the third column
 - from the right in the Blue Book, is it?
- 19 A. No, it's the two columns that are on the right. It's
- 20 the far right column and the one in from the far right
- column. So the first time you see a number appearing is
- 22 number 9 on page 2.
- 23 Q. So what is that 9 a reference to, Mr Surtees?
- 24 A. That is the telephone company is telling us that
- 25 somebody had gone into the DDN of that particular person

1 nine times. 1 fact that News International have for a number of years O. This is the footballer, nine times? 2 paid substantial cash payments to his bank accounts." 3 3 A. Yes. And then I go in to talk about the various states of 4 4 Q. But it's not telling us from which phone number that some of those documents and the varying stages of the 5 person is calling into nine times? 5 research that I think they're in. A. The top of the book, if you go back to page 1 of the 6 Q. Thank you. In relation to these substantial cash 7 7 book, look at the very badly copied tab at the top. payments, were they limited to £12,300? 8 Q. Yes. 8 A. No. 9 A. I think from memory that is likely to say either Goodman 9 Q. What sort of figure were we talking? 10 10 or Mulcaire in terms of those accesses. So that's A. I think from memory he was on a wage of £100,000 plus 11 11 telling me either Goodman or Mulcaire has done that nine per year, and I saw a number of other invoices, if you 12 12 like, we found from his address where I think he was 13 Q. Is this right, the enquiry did not go beyond Goodman or 13 individually paid for stories. I saw at least one for 14 Mulcaire? 14 7,000, and I think there are one or two others also. 15 A. As I explained right at the beginning, it's very 15 Q. Yes, but to be fair, the sums he was receiving pursuant 16 difficult because I didn't have telephone numbers to 16 to his monthly retainer -- I think he was actually paid 17 17 weekly -- was just over £2,000 a week in 2006. That was actually start point at. 18 Q. Okay, so the picture was being built up with reference 18 paid by bank transfer, it wasn't a cash payment, was it? 19 19 to the rogue numbers you knew, namely the nine rogue A. It was into his HSBC bank account, yes. 20 numbers we've referred to earlier, but it wasn't being 20 Q. But were you drawing the inference that those sums were 21 21 built up with reference to any other rogue numbers? being paid for the same unlawful activity: namely 22 A. No. 22 accessing voicemails? 23 Q. Is that right? Although you did know in relation to 23 A. Broadly, yes. What I was seeing here was an 24 24 some, if not many, of these victims that people were investigator. In terms of the extent of illegal 25 phoning in from the News of the World hub number; is 25 activity, so for instance was his whole week Page 53 Page 55 1 that correct? 1 100 per cent spent in illegal activity? I don't know. 2 A. I know the News of the World hub number was ringing into 2 I think a substantial amount of his time was spent in 3 DDNs in treble figures, ie hundreds of times, yes. 3 illegal activity, and it's difficult for me to actually 4 Q. And that was in relation to people who were not, as it 4 put a figure on whether the whole of his time, half of 5 were, in Mr Goodman's natural habitat, namely the Royal 5 his time or whatever amount of his time was put to 6 Family and those associated with it; is that correct? 6 illegal activity. 7 A. That is correct, yes. 7 There was also research activity which was taking 8 Q. Okay. So is this right, that that sort of information 8 place, as I have mentioned, with regard to the documents 9 was fuelling your suspicions that others outside Goodman 9 we found in various stages of research. Now, that may 10 at News International may well be involved in this 10 well have been legitimate, open-source research and 11 conspiracy? 11 other perhaps nefarious research that he would have been 12 12 A. Yes. undertaking. Whether that would have breached the 13 Q. Can I just understand your analysis of -- I call it 13 criminal law, I don't know. 14 a notebook, it isn't a notebook, it's the sheets of 14 So broadly the answer to your question is: yes. 15 15 paper which is the 11,000 pages. Did this to you create Q. Yes, I follow. 16 16 a picture of a consistent trade craft, namely someone You must have been disappointed, then, that in the 17 17 who was building up the means unlawfully to access criminal proceedings the amount of money that was 18 voicemails? In some cases he'd got to last base and had 18 forfeited was £12,300 and that was it? 19 acquired means, but in other cases he had only acquired 19 A. We had some discussions in court around that and the 20 20 some of the means to access voicemails? answer to that question is yes, I was disappointed. 21 A. Yes, and I think I phrase that in my decision log: 21 Q. Can I ask you please to look at paragraph 52 -- or maybe 22 22 "It is clear from the documents recovered from the before we come to 52, if we could take a short break? 23 searches conducted that Mulcaire has been engaged in 23 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, let's have five minutes. 24 a sustained (years) period of research on behalf of 24 (3.29 pm) 25 25 News International. This assumption is based on the (A short break)

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1 (3.35 pm)MR JAY: Mr Surtees, paragraph 52 of your statement, please. 2 3 You refer to the spreadsheet which is our tab 94. About 4 eight lines down you say: 5 "It was also clear that on some of the sheets of 6 paper generated by Mulcaire that he had written names on 7 the top corner, which may have been the intended 8 recipients of the information from within News of the 9 World. Whilst the most probable explanation for the 10 corner names was that journalists at the News of the 11 World were in receipt of this information, and that they 12 could be aware of the illegal practices, the difficulty 13 was proving this." 14 When did you become aware of the existence of these 15 corner names? Can you recall? 16 A. Probably during the weekend and the days after when the 17 Special Branch officers I'd tasked to go through the 18 11,000 or so sheets of paper had been completed. 19 Q. Did you not think it likely that not merely would these 20 journalists -- or rather the corner names be the 21 individuals who were, as it were, commissioning 22 Mulcaire, but that they would also know Mulcaire's trade 23 craft, because Mulcaire would be sharing with them the

the management team and was aware of, by that point, the 70 or so major terrorist investigations that were taking

place. I was part of them.

So in terms of what I would have liked to have done coupled with my obligations and the seriousness of the investigations I was involved in, I knew where my priorities lay, and those were with the issues of serious threat to life investigations. That's where

I needed to be and that's where my staff needed to be. Q. Did you consider and discuss with your senior officers

the possibility of a more limited investigation in the 12 first instance, namely target the most senior 13 journalists, arrest them, see what can be done with the 14 call data, because you'd be able to find out their

15 mobile phone numbers or other relevant numbers, and just 16 see what the fruits of that enquiry might reveal?

A. I can't remember exactly the extent of the conversations we had at this particular time, which would have been around the late September/October time of 2006, but certainly having had the Blue Book compiled and having had the documents that were gone through and the information with regard to potential journalists at the top corner of some of those documents, the extent of the conversations I had around scoping a possible investigation in the future and the extent of what that

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fruits of his illegal activities, namely what was on the

A. Potentially, yes. 1

voicemails?

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- 2 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: There's no point in using him if
- 3 you're not going to use him.
- 4 A. Absolutely right. I know he was supplying journalists
- 5 with his product. The issue was whether or not those
- 6 journalists knew how he was obtaining that product and,
- 7 knowing how he was obtaining that product, were either
- 8 tasking him or receiving it, or whether they were simply 9
 - blindly receiving product.
- 10 MR JAY: You rightly point out at the bottom of this page:
- 11 "This would have meant potentially arresting those 12 journalists listed on Mulcaire's documents."
- 13 Because obviously you couldn't have proceeded
- 14 without doing this. Then you say:

15 "To effect this, there would need to be a full scale 16 criminal investigation sanctioned by senior officers of

17 SO13."

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You're rather suggesting there or you might be suggesting there that was something you would rather have liked to have done. Is that correct?

21 A. Absolutely. But if I can potentially -- or if I can add

- 22 something to that -- I need to stop saying
- 23 "potentially" -- if I can add something to that, yes,
- 24 I would have liked to have done that, but I was an SIO

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25 on a number of terrorist investigations, I was part of

- 1 investigation would look like, I can't remember the
- 2 exact details of that. I certainly can't remember going
- 3 into -- we could have a major investigation or we could 4
 - have a smaller investigation.
- 5 Q. I understand. In paragraph 56, towards the bottom of that paragraph, you say that you:

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"... contacted several potential victims to inform 7

8 them that their phones had been illegally intercepted

9 and to request they provide statements and assist any

10 future trial. One of these victims was Tessa Jowell.

11 All of the potential victims declined to assist us with

the prosecution."

Did they give any reasons?

- 14 A. Most of the conversations were greeted with shock,
- 15 incredulity and surprise. I can't remember specifically
- 16 whether one person said something or another person said
- 17 something else. It resulted in me asking them whether
- 18 they would support an investigation, ie supply
- 19 a statement to me to say that, "I didn't give anybody
- 20 permission to access my voicemail box", and they
- 21 declined that request. I can't remember precisely how
- 22 that was relayed across to me.
- 23 Q. It's important that this piece of evidence comes out,
- 24 because it demonstrates that it wasn't necessarily that
- 25 straightforward in all aspects of this, at least in

1	terms of identifying victims.	1	it, you receive a text on your telephone to say your PIN
2	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But in one sense that helped with one	2	number has been changed. That didn't happen in 2005, it
3	of your other problems, didn't it, Mr Surtees, because	3	happens now.
4	there was a pressure on you with other work, some of the	4	So there was remedial action taken by the telephone
5	victims you'd spoken to didn't really want to go down	5	companies to actually stop that. There was other action
6	the prosecution route, but it wouldn't have been an	6	taken by them.
7	enormous task, would it, to take your Blue Book and make	7	There was also my understanding that the telephone
8	sure that everybody on the Blue Book was told that there	8	companies for the non-four categories of victims, the
9	was some information to this effect, it may not be	9	non-military, royal household, MPs, police, were being
10	possible to prosecute it for reasons which you've	10	told by those telephone companies that potentially their
11	explained, but they ought to be aware of that fact and	11	telephones had been accessed.
12	take appropriate security arrangements and at least be	12	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Do you know whether they did that?
13	alert. That wouldn't have been the work of officers of	13	A. I know now that they didn't do that.
14	your rank or indeed officers of senior rank of any sort,	14	MR JAY: Can I just understand one aspect of the strategy
15	would it?	15	for notifying victims.
16	A. I accept that. In terms of the Blue Book and in terms	16	A. Can I just follow up on that one point? I know now that
17	of the document that was produced later, which was	17	some of them didn't do that. O2 I know did do that.
18	a document produced as a result of the analysis of the	18	Q. Yes. I think they notified 45 individuals. Other
19	electronic media, which I think came to us on	19	companies did nothing.
20	23 November 2006, in relation to both those documents,	20	Paragraph 58, please, of your statement, the victim
21	I accept that, the Metropolitan Police, could have	21	strategy. Your understanding of what the strategy was
22	approached all of those people and said, "Look what is	22	in relation to the four categories, the royal household,
23	on a piece of paper", or, "Look what is on a document	23	MPs, military officials or police officers, was the
24	and look how it relates to you". I accept that.	24	strategy to notify those who were, as you say here,
25	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Of course you could. But the value	25	suspected to have been targeted or was it to notify
	Page 61		Page 63
1	of it is that then they are alert. They can take it	1	those in these four categories in respect of whom there
2	further if they want to, and then you have decision	2	was clear proof that their voicemails had been accessed?
3	trees to go through about what you do, but more	3	A I was very clear on the victim definition at that time
4			A. I was very clear on the victim definition at that time,
4	significantly, they can take steps to make sure that	4	and that was where there was some evidence that somebody
5	significantly, they can take steps to make sure that they change their numbers or whatever, because once it's		
		4	and that was where there was some evidence that somebody
5	they change their numbers or whatever, because once it's	4 5	and that was where there was some evidence that somebody other than the individuals who legitimately ring into
5 6	they change their numbers or whatever, because once it's out there, it's out there. Is that not fair?	4 5 6	and that was where there was some evidence that somebody other than the individuals who legitimately ring into their DDNs had rung into their DDNs. If I go to the
5 6 7	they change their numbers or whatever, because once it's out there, it's out there. Is that not fair? A. Yes, I accept that. With the benefit of hindsight,	4 5 6 7	and that was where there was some evidence that somebody other than the individuals who legitimately ring into their DDNs had rung into their DDNs. If I go to the Blue Book, the examples of that would be where we have
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1 the original parameters." 1 format. I certainly remember having conversations with 2 Can you remember when that decision was made, 2 Phil Williams, Tim White and others, including Peter 3 3 Mr Surtees? Clarke, through this investigation. Specifically the A. Not specifically, but it would have been end of 4 4 late September/October time I don't recall the form that 5 September into October of 2006. 5 briefing took. Q. Is it your understanding it was made by DAC Clarke? 6 Q. When you say in paragraph 69 of your statement, towards 7 7 A. Yes. the end of it, that consideration was given to 8 Q. Were you present at a meeting where that was discussed 8 outsourcing the outstanding aspects of the investigation 9 or was the decision as it were communicated to you 9 to another MPS specialist department, was that something 10 10 subsequently? which you were keen to achieve or not? 11 11 A. I can't recall being at a meeting. I think the decision A. Yes, that was a solution that I was putting forward. As 12 was subsequently communicated to me. 12 I'd already documented in my decision log earlier in the 13 Q. When it was communicated to you, what was your reaction? 13 proceedings, I think around May time, 31 May, from 14 A. As I've already said, I was fully aware of the vast 14 memory, I proffered that as an option/opportunity. 15 resource requirements on the counter terrorism command 15 Again in the latter part of the investigation, 16 at that time with regard to the 72 investigations. 16 September/October time, I was clear, of course, at that 17 I was aware of that because I was leading a number of 17 time the levels of police resource that were being 18 those, and involved in a number of others. Had I been 18 absorbed by the anti-terrorist branch to fulfil our 19 concerned about the legitimacy or otherwise of that 19 obligations under current investigations. For instance, 20 decision, I would have taken that elsewhere. What 20 both in Op Overt, which was the August 2006 issue, all 21 21 I mean by that is I clearly am alive to the fact that we of the surveillance resource in London and the vast 22 have got lines of investigation that had not been 22 majority of the surveillance resource across the country 23 pursued in this case. The lines of investigation could 23 was used on this operation. 24 24 have been pursued, and, as a detective, I would have Now, what that meant in real terms was that other 25 25 liked to have pursued them. criminal investigations, such as serious organised Page 65 Page 67 1 If Peter Clarke had made a decision based upon 1 crime, armed robbery, professional standards 2 2 resource, and my experience at that particular time was investigations within the police, fraud investigations, 3 3 would not have that resource for a considerable length that there was lots of resource, and I thought the 4 decision was perverse, then I would have taken that 4 of time. This was the reality of what was occurring in 5 elsewhere. That was absolutely not my position when the 5 2006, and I was fully aware of that. In addition to 6 decision was communicated down to me. I was fully aware 6 that, we had a whole lot of other investigative 7 of where we were within the anti-terrorism branch or 7 resources on loan to us. I think at the beginning of 8 8 counter terrorism command at that time. 2006 it was probably somewhere in the region of 750 to 9 9 Q. In relation to the correspondence with Burton Copeland 1,000 officers over and above ours. I think as we went 10 10 towards the end of 2006 that diminished slightly, but it and their response to your requests for information, was 11 it your view that News International, through their 11 was a constant ebb and flow of requests, both within the 12 12 solicitors, were co-operating or not? Metropolitan Police and outside, for resource to support 13 13 anti-terrorist branch investigations. A. No, it was my view that they weren't co-operating. 14 Q. Were you asked to put together, as it were, a briefing 14 So I could understand Peter Clarke's challenge of 15 15 pack for DAC Clarke to enable him to reach an informed going again to ask for more resource with regard to this 16 16 decision on this important issue? investigation. 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That takes you back to the issue that 17 A. With regards to August/September time or --18 Q. No, this is September/October time, keeping the 18 we've just mentioned. If you can't go further forward 19 investigation within the original parameters, which 19 with it, don't you have to do your best to ensure that 20 20 means not expanding it to include the possibility of you got the very widest benefit from the work that you 21 21 bringing in other individuals. have put in, first of all by ensuring that everybody 22 22 A. I don't recall putting together a briefing note as such. knows about it who might have been affected, might have 23 23 And I don't know whether that decision was based upon been affected, and secondly, that the organisation which 24 a verbal briefing delivered or whether it was delivered 24 you believe has been the hub of instructing this private 25 25

in a written format. I don't recall doing the written

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detective has demonstrably sorted itself out, if I can

1 just put it colloquially, and that wouldn't have taken 1 sets out the background: 2 a great deal of police resource? 2 "Two individuals who were obtaining details of 3 3 A. No. On the first issue, I accept the organisation could mobile phone messages ... [et cetera]. Attempts have 4 4 have taken a different tactic, if you like, and tasked been made to obtain personal details of one politician 5 to go to a number of persons of interest -- I won't term 5 and Commander Paddick. It is also believed attempts may 6 them victims -- persons of interest, if you like, and 6 have been made to corrupt serving police officers and 7 7 inform them of that. misuse the Police National Computer." Could you explain that to us, Mr Surtees? 8 With regard to the second piece, the communication 8 9 strategy, if you like, and the actions that we'd taken 9 A. No, I can't. All I can suggest is that the task has 10 with regard to News International I think delivered the 10 been handed to the officer from the Department of 11 message to News International very firmly that either we 11 Professional Standards by one of the exhibits officers 12 have individuals within News International -- certainly 12 within the counter terrorism command, DC Hills, who has 13 we have individuals within News International who were 13 made various assumptions and briefed on that basis. 14 engaged in sustained periods of criminal activity. That 14 That's all I can assume this is. 15 was borne out with the prosecution, it was borne out 15 The investigation from December 2005 through to 16 with the opening that Mr Parry on behalf of prosecution 16 August 2006 and beyond that was a very, very tight 17 led on. 17 investigation. There were very few officers who were 18 I have considered the issue of whether or not we 18 involved in that who knew the details of what had gone 19 19 would go to News International and have a conversation, on. Hence when I opened this up to the 30 or so 20 and if we'd done that, it may well have been viewed 20 officers who went through and populated the Blue Book, 21 21 cynically. Had we done that in 2006, for example, they were developed vetted staff officers. 22 I don't know whether we would be sitting here in 2012 22 Throughout this investigation and beyond, into 2006, 23 trying to answer --23 there was a tight investigation, the details of which LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Maybe you would, but then you would 24 24 were known by very few people. 25 be able to say, "Well", as you've just said, actually, 25 What I have here and I can assume is that DC Hills, Page 69 Page 71 1 "counter terrorism, armed robbery, the resource is not 1 who wasn't part of that, has briefed the officer from 2 2 limitless, so we're doing the best we can." the Department of Professional Standards, put some 3 3 context around this, and that's what the officer has A. Yes. 4 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Certainly you'd have been able to 4 written within this tasking. It's not significant 5 say, "And my God, when they started to talk about 5 I recognise with regard to the investigation. 6 6 a single rogue reporter, we put them right. We didn't Q. There were names though in the project list, as it were, 7 feel that this was doing justice to the work that we'd 7 that according to Detective Sergeant Maberly were on the 8 8 done and they knew about." witness protection programme. Is that something you 9 9 A. I accept that. knew about? 10 10 MR JAY: Can I ask you about one specific document, tab 157 A. Yes. It was brought to my attention that some names 11 of file 3. 03823. This is a report from the 11 here within this document may well have been from the 12 12 Directorate of Professional Standards which relates to witness protection programme. What I instructed DS 13 an interrogation of one of Mulcaire's computers. Is 13 Maberly to do was to contact the witness protection 14 this a report which you saw at the time, Mr Surtees? 14 unit, get them to come across to our office, show them 15 15 A. Yes. I think it was delivered to us either the week the the document, get them to look at it, and if there were 16 two defendants, Mulcaire and Goodman, pleaded guilty or 16 any risks to people they were protecting, take whatever 17 the week before they pleaded guilty. It was somewhere 17 mitigation they needed to take to protect them. 18 around 20 November 2006. 18 I didn't ask or seek information from the witness 19 Q. The week before since it's dated 23 November and the 19 protection people around the quantity or individual 20 20 guilty pleas were -details of who --21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Not individual details, but weren't 21 A. Yes, I have seen it and it does relate to a number of 22 22 computers, not just one. you interested to know whether it was in fact the case? Q. Can I ask you, please, to clarify two points, really. 23 23 A. I knew it was the case on some of them because it was 24 If you look at the second paragraph on the first 24 quite obvious it was the case. 25 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Didn't that itself create an enormous narrative page of the report under "Tasking", where it Page 70 Page 72

1 issue for you? This must be among some of the most 1 your role, please? 2 confidential information that's held. A. I was the case officer. 3 3 A. Yes, and the officer from the witness protection unit Q. As its name might suggest, you were hands-on dealing 4 was best placed to take whatever remedial action needed 4 with the evidence as it came in and progressing the 5 to be taken in regards to that. In terms of the 5 case, is that broadly right? 6 provenance of the information, that also concerned me, 6 A. That's right, carrying out the instructions of the SIO 7 7 and the IO. MR GARNHAM: Forgive me for interrupting, I know you were 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But you didn't do anything about 8 9 9 very anxious to know when the statements were free to go 10 10 onto the Inquiry website. They have now all been A. I had conversations throughout May, June, July and 11 11 checked and are in that state, and since there are August in terms of the investigation. I had 12 12 conversations August, September, October, November with people behind who are keen to see them, I thought I'd 13 regards to the various drips of information that were 13 let you know straight away. 14 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much indeed, coming through, and briefed those up. 14 15 MR JAY: But in that context, if the conspiracy was limited 15 Mr Garnham. Possibly we could send a message to make 16 to Goodman and Mulcaire, there would be concern but 16 sure that that should be done as soon as possible. I am 17 17 there wouldn't be enormous concern, but if the conscious that today, unfortunately, not only there has 18 conspiracy went wider, as you suspected it did, to 18 been that hiatus, but for part of the day, although no 19 others at News International, that concern would be 19 longer now, the web streaming has failed. 20 multiplied, wouldn't it, in relation to possible 20 MR JAY: Yes. 21 21 prejudice to those on the witness protection programme? Mr Maberly, I have failed to introduce your witness 22 A. Witness protection programme, access to government 22 statement, prepared as it was for the purposes of the 23 23 ministers, access to military, right across. There were judicial review proceedings and not this Inquiry, but 24 24 lots and lots of concerns, yes, including the witness it's dated 30 September, signed by you and under 25 protection issues, yes. 25 a standard statement of truth, so it's the evidence you Page 73 Page 75 MR JAY: I think I'll leave it there, Mr Surtees. Thank you 1 1 formally gave within those proceedings; is that right? 2 very much. 2 A. Yes, sir. 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much, Mr Surtees. 3 Q. Mr Maberly, I'm going to focus on a few discrete points 4 MR JAY: The final witness for today is Mr Maberly, please. 4 rather than go through the history, because we've got 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. Apparently he's in the 5 the history substantially through your colleagues. Can 6 6 annex. I hope he's not been keeping away because in I just ask you though to clarify two of the technical 7 criminal cases witnesses aren't in court. 7 issues? In relation to Vodafone, we've heard reference 8 A. No, sir, he was fully aware. 8 to something called vampire, which is separate from the 9 9 MR JAY: We'll wait then. standard call data which I think you can get from 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: We'll wait. We'll stretch our legs 10 a telephone provider. So that we're clear about it, 11 for two minutes. 11 what is vampire? 12 (4.05 pm)12 A. My understanding of vampire data is that it was an 13 13 (A short break) engineering or a diagnostic tool that Vodafone use to 14 (4.07 pm) 14 see how their systems were running, including their 15 MR MARK MABERLY (sworn) 15 voicemail systems. And in the process of doing so, it 16 Questions by MR JAY 16 collected and captured information in relation to 17 MR JAY: Your full name, please, Mr Maberly. 17 people's accounts. 18 A. My name is Mark Maberly and I'm a Detective Inspector 18 Q. What sort of information? 19 with the Metropolitan Police Service. 19 A. Information would include when a message is left, when 20 20 Q. It's Mr Maberly? that message is opened, but I think the significant 21 21 A. Yes. issue in relation to vampire data is it didn't last very 22 22 Q. Your rank, please, in March 2006 when you were working long and it required the company to sort of harvest it 23 23 within SO13 was? on a regular basis. 24 A. In 2006 was Detective Sergeant. 24 Q. And the length of time or rather the time when it would 25 25 Q. Thank you. In relation to Operation Caryatid, what was expire and you could no longer do the harvesting, was Page 74 Page 76

1 that one year?

- 2 A. No. I believe it was much shorter than that. I think
- 3 what you're referring to is at the time there was
- 4 a requirement on mobile telephone companies to keep
- 5 their call data for a six-month period. Some of the
- 6 companies kept them for one year, but in relation to
- 7 vampire data, there was no requirement on them to keep
- 8 that data, and it's something that, as I said, it was an
- 9 engineering tool. It ran constantly in the background.
- 10 But if I gave you a date, I would be guessing, but my
- 11 impression was it was a matter of days, maybe a couple
- 12 of weeks.
- 13 O. In relation to the standard call data, we've had
- 14 evidence that it is rare for people to phone into their
- 15 mobile phone voicemails from another telephone. Most
- 16 people access their voicemails, as I do occasionally,
- 17 from the mobile phone itself. Is that your
- 18 understanding?
- 19 A. The majority of people, on most people's handsets, they
- 20 press and hold 1, that's a short code, and it directs
- 21 them directly into their voicemail account. Probably
- 22 the exceptions that you may have to that are people on
- 23 contracts where they're paying for voicemail retrieval,
- 24 in which case it may be more normal for them to sort of 25 recover those from their work address, because they're
 - Page 77
- 1 not paying for it.
- 2 Q. But given that rarity, doesn't that narrow down the
- 3 possibilities in relation to people phoning in to
- 4 voicemails from another number? Because either the
- 5 owner of the mobile phone is doing it exceptionally for
- 6 whatever reason, or it's a rogue call. Do you see the
- 7 point?
- 8 A. I do, and I think it's clear that there is a difference
- 9 in the kind of voicemail interception that was being --
- 10 that we believe was carried out by Mr Mulcaire, in that
- 11 his was a more sophisticated form of voicemail
- 12 interception. You may hear sort of Fleet Street
- 13 folklore about something that they call double whacking,
- 14
- 15 voicemail interception could happen in that if I ring

- 18 is with some of the telephone companies a prospect then
- 19
- 20
- 21 putting in a PIN number.
- 22
- 23 be able to do that for too long because there's only so
- 24
- 25 board or other spurious calls which would engage your Page 78

- 1 phone before you would catch on to that.
- 2 But the method of voicemail interception that you
 - had from Mr Mulcaire was a much more sophisticated form
- 4 of voicemail interception. He was changing people's PIN
- 5 numbers, he was resetting those by calling into the
- 6 service providers. He had knowledge of their -- the
- 7 language that they would use, for instance. O2 would
- 8 talk about direct dial numbers. Vodafone were
- 9 different, they had unique voicemail numbers, and it was
- 10 clear that he had a knowledge of different company
- 11 systems in order to be able to do so.
- 12 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But could you retrieve data that
- 13 identified that an outside call had been directed to
- 14 voicemail and then identify the number of that outside
- 15 call? I'm not talking about me necessarily knowing it
- 16 about my own, but my service provider?
- 17 A. I was not aware -- I don't recall the telephone
- 18 companies telling me that they would be able to track
- 19 who had been listening to the voicemails through that
- 20 method. I think it's almost impossible to know if
- 21 someone is calling someone and they're listening to
- 22 their messages, because that would just show as a call
- 23 to that person's voicemail number.
- 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But you would be able to tell what
- 25 calls were made and directed to voicemail, even if you

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- and I'll provide that as another example of how
- 16 your phone and engage it, and then another person rings
- 17 your phone, they're directed into your voicemail. There
- of interrupting that voicemail message that you receive
- and then being diverted into the voicemail account and
 - So that's double whacking, and you probably wouldn't
 - many calls that you could get from someone at the gas

- 1 couldn't necessarily know that it had been for the 2 purposes of accessing voicemail?
- 3 A. I think that's why we needed to concentrate on this
- 4 vampire data, because it's only through that kind of
- 5 information that person A was leaving a message on
- 6 person B's voicemail, and someone else was coming in to
- 7 retrieve that, that's what vampire data provided us
- 8 with, that kind of background information.
- 9 MR JAY: Thank you. Can I ask you about paragraph 9 of your
- 10 statement.
- 11 A. Could vou remind me which binder it should be in?
- 12 MR JAY: That one in front of you.
- 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Behind divider 6.
- 14 MR JAY: Which file is that?
- 15 A. This is file 5.
- Q. Yes. Divider 6. 16
- 17 A. Yes, and paragraph? 18 Q. 9. On the internal numbering in the bold it's 113. You
- 19 say, level with the upper hole punch:
- 20 "DC Green and I made a number of applications for
- 21 phone data and this predominantly centred on the nine 22 identified numbers that Goodman and Mulcaire were
- 23 identified as using."
- 24 This suggests that your enquiries went beyond those 25 nine rogue numbers; is that right?

- A. That's correct. We were looking at other potential
- 2 numbers at the time. I can't give you details of these
- 3 from memory. What I would say is that in addition to
- 4 our investigation, Vodafone and O2 were carrying out
- 5 their own assessments of their systems and who
- 6 potentially was accessing voicemails. I'm aware of at
- 7 least one number that O2 flagged up that they'd
- 8 identified as potentially accessing customers'
- 9 voicemails. From recollection, when we did research on
- 10 that, it was an unregistered mobile number, and
- 11 I believe it was -- there was a similar case with
- 12 Vodafone as well at the time.
- 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That all could be sensible trade
- 14 craft so it couldn't be traced back, wouldn't it?
- 15 A. Exactly that, sir. What I would say is that none of the
- 16 phone companies flagged up to us that they had a large
- 17 amount of incoming calls to voicemails that they'd
- 18 traced -- you know, the rogue numbers that we provided
- 19 was where the bulk of our information came from.
- 20 MR JAY: Can I ask you about paragraph 22. We can look at
- 21 the underlying document if it's necessary, but it may be
- 22 it isn't. You say:
- 23 "On 10 July I received data from a billing request
- 24 in relation to a PJ Williams ... On examination this
- 25 data contained calls to the unique voicemail numbers for Page 81
 - JLP and HA amongst other members of the royal household.
- 2 Other unique voicemail numbers contained within this
- 3 data were to be identified later in the enquiry."
- 4 Can you remember whose those were?
- 5 A. Not off the top of my head. We put in a number of
- 6 applications to the service providers. Initially they
- 7 had difficulty, and some of our applications had to be
- 8 submitted several times because they were saying that
- 9 number didn't exist, when in reality it was a voicemail
- 10 number.

1

- 11 O. Were these unique voicemail numbers which went outside
- 12 members of the Royal Family and therefore included
- 13 victims in a different category?
- 14 A. That's correct, yes.
- 15 O. When were those numbers identified?
- 16 A. I can't say off the top of my head, but as and when we
- 17 put in the applications, we would have received the
- 18 results back over a number of weeks. Because this
- 19 wasn't a threat to life enquiry, we were just on the
- 20 standard return rate for our requests.
- 21 Q. After 8 August, when you compiled the list of those
- 22 potentially compromised, our tab 94 with the 418 or 419
- 23 victims, did you start to obtain data which related to
- 24 any of those potentially compromised victims?
- 25 A. We carried out an analysis of the billing data in our Page 82

- 1 possession. Over a period of time, Mr Mulcaire had
- 2 a number of different office numbers. We looked at
 - those. We also looked at the 5354 number that was the
- 4 hub number for News International. They also had
- 5 another number that ended in 312 that was a very
- 6 similar -- it had the appearance of a mobile number, but
- 7 again it was another hub number, and the explanation
- 8 I received at the time from our telephone expert is that
- 9 it was least-cost routing, so by doing it through this
- 10 central hub number it saved News of the World money.
- 11
 - However, it did cause us difficulty in then identifying
- 12 who was the other person at the end of that phone.
- 13 Q. Of course in relation to the News of the World hub 14 phone, the 5354 number, I've spotted now the 312 number
- 15 does look like a mobile phone number, but you tell us it
- 16 isn't. That could be anybody within the News of the
- 17 World; is that right?
- 18 A. Exactly that.

20

- 19 Q. Did you make any enquiry with telephone providers as to
 - whether or not it was possible to ascertain who it might
- 21 be within the News of the World?
- 22 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Or whose desk the phone might be on?
- 23 You don't ever do that.
- 24 A. Yes. We -- that was part of the conversation that we
- 25 had with Mr Bristow, our telephone expert, and I believe

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- 1 that we also made enquiries with Vodafone, it was on
- 2 their network, the 312 number, and we were told that we
- 3 would have to get that information from News of the
- 4 World, News International.
- 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But that suggests it was available to
- 6
- 7 A. The advice that I had from Mr Bristow is that no large
- 8 firm would have unaccounted for billing. For instance,
- 9 if you had someone at a particular desk, a lady that was
- 10 calling her boyfriend in America on a daily basis, they
- 11 would want to know why there was billing data for
- 12 thousands and thousands of pounds -- why these calls
- were costing thousands of pounds, sorry. So there was 13
- 14 an expectation that News of the World, News
- 15 International would be keeping that sort of -- that
- 16 data, that information, for their own records and to
- 17 make sure that no one was abusing their internal
- 18 telephone systems.
- 19 MR JAY: I rather lost the thread of that piece of
- 20 evidence --
- 21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: This is all to do with getting to the
- 22 desk from which calls into voicemail retrieval systems
- 23 are made. Right?
- 24 A. That's correct, yes.
- 25 MR JAY: So you were being advised that it was likely that

- 1 these records would exist to ascertain whose desk it was
- 2 within the News of the World that was making the call:
- 3 is that correct?
- 4 A. That's correct. And in later applications through BCL
- 5 solicitors I think one of my requests was to ask for
- 6 a list of the desk phones and diagrams as to where
- 7 people were sitting.
- 8 Q. That's absolutely correct, and I think there was one
- 9 document only which was provided to you pursuant to that
- 10 particular request; is that right?
- 11 A. That's correct.
- 12 Q. And you must have been very suspicious at that point
- 13 that you were being as it were fobbed off, to use the
- 14 vernacular; is that so?
- 15 A. Definitely.
- 16 Q. Equipped with that information, you -- well, it's so
- 17 obvious it goes without saying. I'm not going to even
- 18 ask the question.
- 19 If I move on, please, through your statement, I'm
- 20 only alighting on points which, as it were, are new to
- 21 us, because your colleagues have --
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. -- kindly dealt with other points. Paragraph 39, an
- 24 email received on 29 August 2006, which is in file 3,
- 25 tab 135. Tab 135 is 03621.

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LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: If we take somebody who was subject

- 2 to prosecution, the 2228 number, Mulcaire's office,
- 3 phoned a mobile and accessed the voicemail of
- 4 Mr Sky Andrew 23 times?
- 5 A. Yes. That's correct, yes.
- 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Got it.
- 7 MR JAY: What may be important as well is that the next
- 8 page, which is the 7275 number, which is Goodman's
- 9 number, we are solely within the royal household, save
- 10 for the last entry, a singer, apparently, who was phoned
- 11 once.

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- 12 A. I can assist with that. I've seen the unredacted
- 13 document and that particular voicemail number is one
 - digit different to a member of the royal household, so
- 15 I believe it was a misdial.
- 16 Q. That's helpful, Mr Maberly. That's giving us some idea
 - what Mr Goodman was doing, what he was interested in and
- 18 what Mr Mulcaire was doing. But I won't make it more
- 19 explicit than that.
- 20 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: They all are, because JLP,
- 21 presumably, is Mr Lowther-Pinkerton, the private
- 22 secretary?
- 23 A. That's correct.
- 24 MR JAY: I'm very grateful to Mr Sherborne for pointing out
- 25 that to me rather late yesterday evening as I was

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A. Tab 135 is an email from Lindsey Hudson. 1

- 2 Q. That's right. I just want to understand the
- 3 significance of this. It's a spreadsheet of other
- 4 numbers called in by 2228 and 7275, and these were
- 5 respectively Goodman and Mulcaire's numbers, weren't
- 6 they?
- 7 A. Yes. The 2228 number related to Mr Mulcaire's office
- 8 and was registered to his offices in Kempton Road.
- 9 Q. I understand, though, the significance of the next page,
- 10 the list of numbers and names. What is this telling us?
- 11 A. All right, the information that you have would have been
- 12 the result of a billing data request. The list of
- 13 numbers that you have alongside the 2228 number, it has
- 14 a list of the people that were called, their voicemails
- 15 were called by the 2228 number, and the number that you
- 16 have there is the amount of times that they were called.
- 17 So in the case of the top line, that number there,
- 18 their voice number was called 43 times.
- 19 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So let me understand this. That is
- 20 the number that you've identified as Mulcaire's office
- 21 phone --
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- telephoning somebody else's
- 24 voicemail, who happens to be a journalist?
- 25 A. Yes.

- 1 reading this. I didn't spot it myself.
- 2 Can I move forward to September 2006. We've heard
- 3 that a decision was made, possibly the end of September,
- 4 possibly the beginning of October 2006, that you would
- 5 keep this investigation within its original parameters
- 6 and not travel outside down these additional lines of
- 7 enquiry. What was your view about that, Mr Maberly?
- 8 A. There were still lines of enquiry that I would have been
- 9 keen to follow. In particular, I'd identified three
- 10 names who, if I had the sufficient evidence, I would
- 11 have liked to have spoken to. I accepted the decision
- 12 that, you know, the resources were not there to widen
- 13 the enquiry, and I myself was deployed on other
- 14 anti-terrorist branch enquiries at the time.
- 15 Q. And these were three journalists within News of the
- 16 World, were they?
- 17 A. That's correct, yes.
- 18 Q. I don't think we can be more specific than that, because 19 we might begin to start identifying them.
- 20 A. If I could just clarify that point, I believe one of
- 21 them may have potentially moved on and was part of
- 22 another company at that point.
- 23 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: All right.
- 24 MR JAY: I think we'll leave it.
- 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: When you say "if I had the sufficient Page 88

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- 1 evidence", did you believe that there was sufficient to
- 2 go a comparatively short distance to get to the state
- 3 that you would have been able appropriately to interview
- 4 them?
- 5 A. There would have been aspects of the case that I would
- 6 have liked to have asked them about, but I had no firm
- 7 evidence of either their knowledge of voicemail
- 8 interception or of them tasking Mr Mulcaire. That is
- 9 something that I would have looked to find before
- 10 speaking to them, because it would have been the case
- 11 that, you know, if we did bring them in for questioning,
- 12 the likelihood is that they would have made no comment,
- 13 as did the other two employees of News of the World. We
- 14 would have got nowhere.
- 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But it's all a question of inference,
- 16 isn't it? You put the building blocks together and --
- 17 A. We had some inference; we had no evidence.
- 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, I'm not sure about that.
- 19 Circumstantial evidence --
- 20 A. Circumstantial evidence, inference --
- 21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- is evidence, is real evidence, is
- 22 usually very valuable evidence.
- 23 A. It is, but it requires something more substantial to
- 24 obtain a successful prosecution at the end of the day.
- 25 MR JAY: What's your view about the significance of these

10

bits of paper.

Q. Right.

- 9 appeared in billing data. Q. This is -- yes, well. This is arguably extremely
- 11 interesting circumstantial evidence, isn't it?
- 12 A. I mean, call pattern analysis, which is the police term

A. So from that point of view, I could identify, for

example, one of these three journalists, I had his

A. In the billing data for Mr Mulcaire, there were calls by

him to other journalists. We were aware in the material

he had written down those journalists' mobile numbers on

mobile number, and I was aware that that mobile number

- 13 that we would refer to it by, it can be very good
- 14 circumstantial evidence, but as I mentioned earlier that
- 15 sort of Mr Mulcaire's billing was slightly more chaotic
- 16 than that.
- 17 Q. There's one other document I'll ask you to look at.
- 18 Tab 152 in file 3, which is 03765. I just wonder if you
- 19 could explain the significance of this document. Of
- 20 course it's heavily redacted. What, if anything, is it
- 21 telling us? Particularly the second page with the
- 22 various counts, as we can see them described.
- 23 A. If I just explain the fact it's an email, it's the
- 24 cover, it's an email from a counterpart at O2.
- 25 Q. Yes.

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- 1 what we're now calling corner names?
- 2 A. The three journalists that I was interested in following

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- 3 lines of enquiry, I believed that their first names
- 4 appeared on some of the documents that were recovered
- 5 from Mr Mulcaire's files.
- 6 Q. Had you detected a pattern in relation to Mr Mulcaire's
- 7 activity, whereby he would telephone someone within the
- 8 News of the World before accessing a voicemail,
- 9 accessing a voicemail and then phoning that person back?
- A. Certainly we believe that to be the case. The 10
- difficulty that we had with Mr Mulcaire's billing is 11
- 12 that quite often he would just ring one voicemail after
- 13 another, and in his billing data, you would just get
- 14 a long list of voicemail type numbers. So it's quite 15
- 16 something interesting that he would then want to speak

difficult to judge at which point he may have obtained

- 17 to a particular journalist about. It wasn't always the
- 18 case that you think, hang on a second, he's listened to
- 19 that voicemail for a long period of time, then the next
- 20 call is -- it didn't always work that way, I'm afraid.
- 21 Q. I can understand it might be more complicated than that,
- 22 but the person within the News of the World who he'd
- 23 speak to after accessing in a case where there was
- 24 evidence of accessing, would that be a person you could
- 25 identify by call data?

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- 1 A. On the front cover, the actual email itself, he's
- 2 explaining that this is a spreadsheet of the DDNs -- as
- 3 I mentioned earlier that the O2 language that was
- 4 a direct dial number, so voicemail numbers. And it's
- 5 the number of times that the voicemail numbers were
- 6 called by the suspect number.
- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: By any of the suspect numbers. So 7
- 8 this is you providing them with some numbers that you
- 9 think you can link to people in whom you are interested,
- 10 and he's telling you who they called and how many times,
- 11 is that it?
- 12 A. That's it, yes.
- 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So the first one, the number was
- 14 called 520 times?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 MR JAY: To be clear, are these the direct dial numbers of
- 17 those potentially compromised in our Blue Book?
- 18 A. I'm aware of this document. Obviously the email came to
- 19 me, and you'll see the rather large numbers at the top.
- 20 Pretty much they relate to the royal household. Those
- 21 individuals received the most attention.
- 22 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It depends which suspect numbers you
- 23 were providing then, doesn't it? This doesn't tell
- 24 us --
- 25 A. No.

4	LODD WATER FUEGOV	١.	
1	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: whose numbers you'd asked them to	1	Thank you very much.
2	look at.	2	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And you passed from this work in late
3	A. That's correct, sir, yes.	3	2007; is that right?
4	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes.	4	A. From the throughout this investigation I continued
5	MR JAY: The only other document which I'd ask you to	5	to service the prosecution until they were sentencing in
6	consider we may already have covered it, but you do	6	January of 2007, but I was involved in other
7	address it in your witness statement is tab 157, the	7	investigations throughout this period as well.
8	third file, which is a report from the Directorate of	8	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. Thank you.
9	Professional Standards.	9	MR JAY: Sorry, there's one other question I've been asked
10	You make it clear that there were those amid the	10	to put to you. It's a very short one.
11	project names who were or you believe to be in the	11	The Mail on Sunday were notified that four people
12	witness protection scheme, and you took steps to notify	12	had been targeted by Mr Mulcaire. Do you recall that?
13	those who were, as it were, in charge of the scheme, and	13	A. I'm aware that was the case. That was my colleague,
14	an officer from the witness protection unit came to you	14	Keith Surtees, who informed them.
15	and you drew these matters to his attention?	15	Q. Yes, and you were copied in to the email. Do you know
16	A. That's correct, yes.	16	why they received arguably different treatment from
17	Q. Do you know what came of that?	17	others?
18	A. No. That's a matter for the witness protection unit,	18	A. This was probably a period of time when we were trying
19	because I wouldn't want to know who was in the scheme	19	to contact potential victims of the interception. At
20	and who wasn't. That's a sensitive matter from a police	20	that time we were concentrating on those who were in
21	point of view.	21	a position to give evidence, had been most affected, and
22	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Not just sensitive; horribly	22	probably where our best evidence laid in relation to the
23	sensitive.	23	investigation.
24	A. (Nods head).	24	MR JAY: Thank you, Mr Maberly.
25	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I mean, it must be amongst the most	25	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much indeed.
	Page 93		Page 95
1	secretly kept data.	1	MR JAY: May I raise one administrative matter in relation
2	A. That's correct, yes.	Ι.	-
	A. That's correct, yes.	2	to tomorrow? Mr Yates is giving evidence by video-link
3		$\begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix}$	to tomorrow? Mr Yates is giving evidence by video-link from the Middle East. He's billed for noon. Mr Clarke,
3 4	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So I can understand why you'd want to look at it a bit further.		from the Middle East. He's billed for noon. Mr Clarke,
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4	LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So I can understand why you'd want to look at it a bit further. MR JAY: Did you explain to that person that those who had	3 4	from the Middle East. He's billed for noon. Mr Clarke, I expect, will take about an hour and a half, so subject to your view, may we take an early lunch, because it
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