| 1 |  | 1 | the then -- the office had changed, but the new |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | ( 2.05 pm ) | 2 | individual had inherited some of the build issues, but |
|  | MR JAY: Sir Denis, we've touched on one aspect of the | 3 | also some of the backwash and terrorist investigations |
|  | events of July 2009. I'm going to come back to it in | 4 | and the lik |
| 5 | due course, but I know you have some insights you wish | 5 | Just by way of context, I think 2007, from my own |
| 6 | to share with us about the pressures on assistant | 6 | records, there were 175 terrorist-related arrests. So |
| 7 | commissioners specialist operations. Can you tell us | 7 | there was a lot still coming through the system, and in |
| 8 | anything about that? | 8 | 2008, in a report not published, again restricted, |
| 9 | A. Yes, well, I think at the top end of policing, where one | 9 | titled "Co-ordinating Pursue", I did say that the |
| 10 | is dealing with the most serious cases, murder and the | 10 | pport of this Assistant Commissioner in co-ordinating |
| 11 | like, there have always been pressures, and particular | 11 | the network and other things needed to be revised in |
| 12 | police forces experience that from time to time. The | 12 | order to give them an opportunity to be able to manage |
| 13 | Metropolitan Police, by their very nature, their size, | 13 | all of these separate compelling needs. |
| 14 | their scale, they experience a significant number of | 14 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm not quite sure where this is |
| 15 | those kinds of inquiry. But over and above that, the | 15 | taking us, Sir Denis. I mean, in relation to 2006 |
| 16 | whole issue of terrorism, of course, has changed | 16 | I think I've said to at least half a dozen very senior |
| 17 | character dramatically, really, in the last ten years, | 17 | officers that a decision not to pursue Caryatid was |
| 18 | and whilst I think we sometimes, with the benefit of | 18 | entirely understandable and reasonable, provided that |
| 19 | hindsight, may have great regrets about what happened in | 19 | there was put into place the two extra limbs which |
| 20 | 2009 and everything else, if we reflect back to 2006, | 20 | I mentioned this morning to the Assistant Commissioner. |
| 21 | I think it's probably fair to say that two features | 21 | That doesn't detract from the other responsibilities of |
| 22 | stand out: the momentum of work at that time in relation | 22 | the Assistant Commissioner ultimately responsible for |
| 23 | to terrorism was substantial, to say the least. The | 23 | s work, and by the time we get to 2009, whatever |
| 24 | Assistant Commissioner at the time, because of the | 24 | esponsibilities the relevant Assistant |
| 25 | nature of the threat, undertook to help build Page 1 | 25 | Commissioner has, first of all, he needn't have Page 3 |
|  | a counter-terrorist network across the country, centred | 1 | undertaken this one, and secondly, it didn't again |
| 2 | on three major geographical locations, and then five | 2 | require too large an input of time; it required an input |
| 3 | subsidiary locations, in parallel with undertaking - | 3 | of appropriate thought to give sensible direction, |
| 4 | overseeing terrorist investigations and in relation to | 4 | didn't it? |
| 5 | their work, as a member, if you like, of the management | 5 | A. It required all of those things. I understood -- maybe |
| 6 | board, the corporate end of the Met, and of course, | 6 | I misunderstood -- Mr Jay's point was: over a period of |
| 7 | along the way, to deal with all of the relationship | 7 | time, basically the needs, the stress, if you like, the |
| 8 | issues with various other agencies and Whitehall that | 8 | intensity of the work changed in character and the build |
| 9 | would go along with such a high-profile role. | 9 | of the new network was not a sort of a one-year thing. |
| 10 | I thought it was just worth mentioning that and just | 10 | t was -- it's a sort of three to five-year project, |
| 11 | to contextualise it, I -- we do -- reports we publish | 11 | radually building up in strength, and it was simply to |
| 12 | much of the time, but we also undertake work which is on | 12 | make the point that there were other -- in the |
| 13 | a restricted basis, and I undertook a report on the | 13 | context -- and this doesn't put 2006 or 2009 to bed, but |
| 14 | development of the network and the need, entitled | 14 | is simply to say that was part of this context, and this |
| 15 | "Intercepting terrorism", and internally for the various | 15 | is quite an unusual thing for an individual to be |
| 16 | agencies and Police Service in 2006, and $I$ did at the | 16 | dealing with that. That is all. |
| 17 | time say: because an individual would have to face in | 17 | w, of course, the network is much mor |
| 18 | several directions, the point may have been reached | 18 | established, the routine of support is much more |
| 19 | where it was difficult at best even for a talented | 19 | established and the expectations about how much they can |
| 20 | individual to fulfil these duties effectively and at the | 20 | do and when they review things I think is stronger and |
| 21 | same time retain executive responsibilities in | 21 | clearer than it certainly was in 2006. 2009 is |
| 22 | a demanding force. | 22 | a different question. |
| 23 | It was putting down a marker that -- and I then went | 23 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. Well, I understand and I'm very |
| 24 | on to say: we may have to reconsider this as work in | 24 | keen to ensure that the context is correctly described. |
| 25 | progress as we go, and I returned to it in 2008 because | 25 | What I was really getting at was I wasn't quite sure how |
|  | Page 2 |  | Page 4 |

1 (Pages 1 to 4)
it gelled with the specific decisions that I have to make, but the context I understand.
A. Sir, yes. I guess the point, maybe poorly made by myself, is this: that there isn't been a time in policing when there's not been a considerable amount of reform and change going on.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes.
A. I guess in the context of what you hope to achieve in the end, any proposals will need to survive the rigour of that environment and that's the point: to be able to deal with the rough times as well as when things are going more smoothly. And I say it as somebody who, you know, has supported reform in every way, shape and form, not always with success, $I$ hasten to add.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I entirely agree with that as a proposition, and it is for that reason that I have asked each of the retired commissioners, and I think one retired deputy commissioner, to provide me with a view. You, of course, have done so in your report, but if you have any other views in the area of where I should be going, that will be valuable, not least because you understand from the policing perspective what will work in a way that, however much I listen to however many very senior officers, I will not quite have the same feel for. If you want to take that up, you're very Page 5

## welcome.

A. I hope to have an opportunity to do that, sir.

MR JAY: Sir Denis, may I come to your report, "Without fear or favour". I don't know whether you have this as a separate document which you've brought along?

## A. I have.

Q. It is, of course, in our reports bundle, tab 4. We've
looked at the overview section with Mr Baker and then we get to the meat of it. Chapter 1 to begin with, which on the internal numbering is page 21. I think on our wider numbering it's page 04396.

This report, of course, goes further than difficulties in the relations between the police and the press. It's looking at police integrity issues more widely, self-evidently. Can I ask you this question: on the narrower issue of police relations with the press, is it your understanding or perception that this is a problem which is particular to the Metropolitan Police Service or is it a problem which is country-wide?
A. I think the conflicts of - the emerging conflicts of interest evidence is country-wide. I think the issues with the press are most intense in the most intensive environment, which is London.
Q. Thank you. Now, chapter 1, "What the public think". As Mr Baker pointed out, the approach here was both Page 6
quantitative and qualitative, and the findings we can see here. May I ask you this blunt question, if you don't mind: what is the value of public opinion in this domain?
A. Well, it's another anchor point, I suppose, in police legitimacy, which is something I guess we'll come back to. With a measure of public sentiment, anything is possible. Without it, progress is very difficult.

In relation to this, I was actively interested to see, frankly, whether what had occurred last summer had made a real dent in the police reputation, in the public's belief in them and the trust, and that's why myself and Mr Baker undertook this work, and you will see there was a concern about corruption -- there was a huge minority, a substantial minority -- but there was a residual very strong support for the police, you know, for some people, at enviably high levels.
Q. In the use of the term "corruption", you're making it clear that that ranges across a whole spectrum of behaviours, with frank corruption, money passing hands, at one end of the spectrum, which is relatively rare, and the much softer corruption at the other end of the spectrum?
A. Yes, and the public -- as appears in the text, it's doing favours, treating something much more favourably, Page 7
one institution than another, you know, a place where hot dogs or something are served, one particular franchise much more favourably than another. That would raise a question in their mind because they're obviously seeing things on the street every day, and it kind of anchors us a little bit that even at the lower end, as some people would see it, of what happens, there is an expectation of the police, thankfully, which is hugely inspiring. 89 per cent of the public think that they should be better than others in regard to their mission and what they do and be very even-handed about it. That's how I interpret that.
Q. The importance of perceptions -- and I suppose therefore the part of the answer to the penultimate question I posed to you -- you deal with at page 25 of the internal numbering, 04400. Really, I think this part speaks for itself.

Chapter 2, though, Sir Denis, 04402, page 27, "Relationships with media and other parties". May I ask you, please, to elaborate or clarify the paragraph which deals with the over-arching principle, level with the lower hole punch, four paragraph down, where you say:
"The over-arching principle of police relationships with the media is that the Police Service should not seek to constrain the media but allow them to accurately

Page 8

|  | report news in which the principal beneficiary is the |  | officer, you are -- have to be in a slightly separate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | That part is clear enough |  | Q. On the next page, page 28, you address the Information |
| 4 | sentence: | 4 | Commissioner's reports. Then you say in that paragraph: |
| 5 | "However, forces should take account of the l | 5 | "HMIC has contacted the ICO and established that |
| 6 | and intensity of these relationships and not least how | 6 | ation Motorman, |
| 7 | they'll be perceived by the public.' | 7 | urse] they have had no additional referrals |
| 8 | What do you mean by that, please? | 8 | olice-related information disclosure of which the |
| 9 | A. Well, if the relationships become, as it were, visible | 9 | police were not aware." |
| 10 | and particularly focused on one or two individuals or | 10 | This relates, does it, to confidential information |
| 11 | one particular news organisation -- this really is in | 11 | Police National Computer or does |
| 12 | re of a national level than a local level, where very | 12 | relate to other matters? |
| 13 | often, frankly, there is only one local newspaper -- | 13 | A. I understand this -- I will check this, sir, but |
| 14 | n the point is that people may have the wrong | 14 | tand this to relate to investigations into |
| 15 | rceptions of it, or maybe the right perception, but | 15 | authorised disclosure of information by the police in |
| 16 | they may -- it may cause them to become concerned. | 16 | eral terms, and the object of the exercise was to |
| 17 | Q. Thank you. Then you say: | 17 | check with this body, with the PCC, with others, to see |
| 18 | "No evidence of endemic co | 18 | ether there was a broader set of data than usually |
| 19 | relationships with the media." | 19 | Ihe IPCC, the people who look at complaints, to |
| 20 | And that statement applies, | 20 | whether there was a broader set of data that painted |
| 21 | Metropolitan Police Service as much as it does to anyone | 21 | a different picture. That the was the object of that. |
| 22 | else; is that right? | 22 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: The problem with that in relati |
| 23 | A. On the information available to us -- and I have no | 23 | nformation Commissioner, however, is that if you go |
| 24 | special advantages on this, Mr Jay -- that is true. | 24 | into Motorman, I think I'm right -- I'll |
| 25 | Q. Then the last paragraph: Page 9 | 25 | corrected if I'm not -- that that was started because of Page 11 |
| 1 | 'The boundaries of accep |  | a perception of leaks not from the police but from the |
| 2 | understood." |  | DVLA, and it was only when the Information Commissioner |
| 3 | Obviously they exclude the exchange of informatio |  | nt in with support that he discovered the Whittamore |
| 4 | for money. About four lines down: | 4 | apers, which revealed far more extensive data lapses |
| 5 | "One force gave a view, shared by others in the | 5 | than they'd looked at. But it was reactive. It wasn't |
| 6 | service, that most leaks come about by staff being | 6 | that they were looking for what was going on with the |
| 7 | loose-lipped and discussing things with friends and | 7 | police or looking for particular problems; they |
| 8 | family which then get passed on or overheard, rather | 8 | mply -- correct me if I'm wrong -- went in and found |
| 9 | than deliberate corruption or financial gain." | 9 | something they weren't expecting, and of course then |
| 10 | Just explore what is the evidential foundati | 10 | took it all up and secured all the documents. |
| 11 | that, if any? | 11 | The question is not: "Have there been complaints?", |
| 12 | A. The evidential foundation for that is the -- is looking | 12 | cause there may not have been a complaint there, but |
| 13 | back on the investigations that had been conducted on | 13 | hether there is anything to be derived from the fact |
| 14 | unauthorised disclosure of information, and where they | 14 | that they haven't seen anything since, and I just don't |
| 15 | have tended to fall, the bulk of them, and very few of | 15 | know the answer to that question. |
| 16 | those have been actually with the media. That doesn't | 16 | A. And neither do I, sir. Perhaps I should explain that |
| 17 | an to say the problem doesn't exist, but one can only | 17 | of our approach, when we approach an issue, is we |
| 18 | work with what is in front of one. The bulk have tended | 18 | to go from the outside in rather than just simply |
| 19 | to be more of this sort of, as it were, indirect leaking | 19 | k the sector itself, and in preparing this report and |
| 20 | because of -- maybe people have not been as thoughtful | 20 | other thoughts, we have spoken to journalists and |
| 21 | or cautious as they should have been. | 21 | number of other institutions to see whether they have |
| 22 | Q. Rather than gossip and similar lack of caution over | 22 | her information. It may have a bearing -- it may give |
| 23 | a social interaction with a journalist? | 23 | , as it were, a better intelligence picture about the |
| 24 | A. Yes. There's always an appetite for gossip and that's | 24 | issues, and it is really only in there in that context. |
| 25 | understandable. The fact of the matter is, as a police Page 10 | 25 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: All right. It's unlikely many Page 12 |


| 1 | journalists would admit that think were doing something |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | that was, if not actually and frankly illegal, at least |
| 3 | likely to excite your attention to a very high degree. |
| 4 | A. Well, sir, I can only take them as I find them. The |
| 5 | ones I have spoken to were people I thought were |
| 6 | established, trustworthy and thoughtful, and they did |
| 7 | have views about police corruption, because that was one |
| 8 | of the issues that was put directly to them, and the |
| 9 | rationale varied from people who had looked at it |
| 10 | intensively to those who took account of what was |
| 11 | appearing in the courts, in the press, if their everyday |
| 12 | dealings, and I took some measure of comfort from having |
| 13 | asked. That's all I would say. |
| 14 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Oh yes, that's entirely fair enough. |
| 15 | I'm not for a moment challenging your way of working. |
| 16 | I just have to be careful that I don't derive more from |
| 17 | it than you seek to argue I should derive from it. |
| 18 | A. Yes. I regard -- I have learnt, sir, that you are as |
| 19 | good as what you truly know and what you think you ought |
| 20 | to know, but what we try and to in these things is to |
| 21 | see whether anybody else knows things and they will |
| 22 | share them with you. |
| 23 | MR JAY: Sir Denis, at the bottom of this page, you address |
| 24 | the Metropolitan point as against the regional police |
| 25 | forces. Can I just deal with the point you make four or |
|  | Page 13 |
| 1 | five lines from the top of page 29 in the internal |
| 2 | numbering. You say: |
| 3 | "HMIC believes this misses the point." |
| 4 | The point being tangible differences in London. |
| 5 | "We are living in a virtual communications world and |
| 6 | issues are being followed in real time through a range |
| 7 | of new technology and social media." |
| 8 | What point are you making there and what point has |
| 9 | been missed? |
| 10 | A. I think intense inquiries which will generate |
| 11 | competition for information can happen anywhere in this |
| 12 | country. That's a fact. If you look at Cumbria -- |
| 13 | you know, think of the last couple of years. Cumbria, |
| 14 | Northumbria, Bristol. So those kind of inquiries which |
| 15 | draw the most intense scrutiny can happen anywhere and |
| 16 | with that potential conflicts of interest and issues, |
| 17 | but running alongside that is a whole new world which is |
| 18 | unwrapping around us, as people twitter this Inquiry and |
| 19 | as people engage in a huge range of social media, and |
| 20 | that includes people who are serving police officers and |
| 21 | members of staff who may or may not be aware of just how |
| 22 | much of themselves they are revealing, and we did not |
| 23 | find that that issue was restricted to the Metropolitan |
| 24 | Police. |
| 25 | Q. The next paragraph: |

Page 14
"... inconsistency across the Police Service in the use of off-the-record briefings."

What do you mean by that? Not what you mean by the term "off-the-record briefings" but wherein lies the inconsistency?
A. Well, I understand by this -- although I will check my understanding, my understanding is that across the country, some people have a form in which they will do nonreportable briefings, some are much less formalised, some will do it more frequently than others. Some are less concerned about exclusiveness in these things in terms of how many people they speak to. It's of that kind of nature, really, that I am -- that's the point I'm making.
Q. Thank you.
A. If it must happen, I suppose the suggestion would then be: well, it would do to have some bit of structure on it, at the very least.
Q. The next paragraph. You found some evidence of corporate entertaining with the media:
"However, there was little clarity with the boundaries of acceptability, with forces and individuals instead relying on a common-sense approach."

Are you referring there to different media and gifts and hospitality policies or are you referring to the Page 15
common-sense approach differing as across the country?
A. Well, I guess the point is that here we didn't really
find an enormous amount of corporate entertaining of the media. That's the major point. Inasmuch as there was, it was at the common-sense end, sandwiches and tea end of it -- that's my understanding -- rather than some of the more fashionable alternatives that you've heard about.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's one way of describing them. MR JAY: Level with the lower hole punch, you say:
"We found that forces lack the capacity and capability to proactively identify any inappropriate relationships. Forces conveyed a sense of inevitability that resourcing complex investigations into media leaks rarely yields any positive result. Forces should explore options for identifying and monitoring emerging and inappropriate relationships with leaks to the media."

It might be said you're not giving the forces many hints as to what they should be doing; you're asking them to formulate the options. But if you were to suggest even tentatively some ideas as to how this could be taken forward, could you share those with us, please?
A. Well, police forces actually have developed systems for protective monitoring of their internal security

Page 16

| 1 | systems. For example, the PMC. It took a little while |
| :---: | :--- |
| 2 | and now they have well-rehearsed systems and testing |
| 3 | procedures and they even have software, things like |
| 4 | that, that help them spot anomalies in the system. |
| 5 | When it comes to what's appearing in social media or |
| 6 | media in general, that's much less the case. We did |
| 7 | find three forces who looked at that kind of thing. |
| 8 | There are mechanisms that will now -- actually |
| 9 | relational databases that, if you seek to use them well, |
| 10 | will actually show you that some things are suddenly |
| 11 | appearing in some part of the media, when maybe, if you <br> 12 |
| have some kind of view about what should be going out of <br> 13 | the organisation, might raise a question in the mind. |
| 14 | This will not necessarily tell you who, how or when, but |
| 15 | it actually means that you have some kind of radar. |
| 16 | Now, there are a number of companies that provide |
| 17 | these kind of sentiment relational database activity. |
| 18 | They're quite established. We looked at it, for |
| 19 | example, in relation to public order. Big organisations |
| 20 | do it now. People who are concerned with their |
| 21 | marketing and branding do it. You have -- and I don't |
| 22 | want to advertise them particularly, but you have people |
| 23 | like Trufflenet and others on the Internet who actually |
| 24 | offer services. This will not actually give you who |
| 25 | done it, but it will tell you maybe something is | Page 17

happening and a pattern of activity that you should be aware of that nobody else is telling you about. It improves your intelligence for your environment. I think it's time to patrol that environment piece.
Q. Thank you. Then the next page, on the internal numbering page 30 . It's going to be 04405 , I think. Can you help us, please, with the paragraph slap in the middle, the notifiable association policy. Could you explain that to the uninitiated?
A. There have been a number of investigations about the relationship individuals have with the media. Some are married to people in the media, some know people in the media, and if you look later on the report in business interests, I believe there are at least two cases -$I$ will be corrected if $I$ am wrong -- where as part of their business activities outside the police, they provided some assistance in relation to the media.

In other words, here are some connections that can be perfectly appropriate and correct, but it's useful to be aware of them. That is the point.
Q. Then in the following paragraphs you deal with the variable procedures around recording interactions and conversations with the media and the lack of relationship between policies, procedures on the one hand and practical application on the other. Page 18

You make a recommendation towards the top of page 31, the next page, where you say it's your view that forces and authorities should record all interactions between police employees and media representatives:
"Time and date of the meeting, brief details of purpose, content and persons involved should be recorded, and appropriate mechanisms should be in place to audit these records."
So presumably there you're including off-the-record conversations?
A. I'm including -- I know I keep returning to it. I'm referring to briefings that are not reported, indeed, definitely. This is a recommendation for ACPO and others to consider in order to try and establish some consistency to how this is dealt with.
Q. And presumably in order to avoid the complaint of overbureaucracy, you're looking only for a brief epitome of the conversation; is that correct?
A. Personally, I would go for the brief as possible, but different individuals would have a different appetite for these things. I think the point is that you were showing that you had a contact and that's not something you're ashamed of, and -- later on I would like to return to the basis, though, for those contacts and that Page 19
might help inform how one would want to note anything like this.
Q. You make the point at the bottom of the page that these specific policies should be seen against the backdrop of wider ethical policies, and you draw analogies from the New South Wales experience, which is one of the exhibits to your witness statement, which does draw that nexus; is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Then the next page, you're looking for a national media policy to include appropriate levels of social interaction relationships alongside practical guidance. So the policies should be the same regardless of whether you're in the Metropolitan area or wherever; is that the point you're seeking to drive at?
A. I -- I think what's intended here is the framework is the same. Clearly, different environments will have different -- and events will have different levels of intensity and -- in the way any framework or policy is applied, will require different levels of training, different considerations, different views on vulnerabilities, depending where you are and what is happening. But what we're looking for is a common frame of reference, and by the way, I do not -- again, I'd like to return to this. The last thing I would wish to Page 20
do is constrain the relationship between the police and the press. That would defy reality.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. The problem is to find the right balance, isn't it?
A. Exactly, sir.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Encourage a relationship but in the
context of transparent and open dealings which are not
in any sense covert and which don't carry with them even
the perception of inappropriate hospitality or the like.
A. That's the general end game, sir.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, it's easy to state. The problem is trying to do it.
A. I do have, you know, a -- some thoughts on that and perhaps we can return to them at the end to try and frame that.
MR JAY: After that paragraph in bold lettering, you observe that police authorities are, in your view -- this is the implication -- not carrying out much oversight in this area, and you're looking for more from them and from the new bodies post November; is that right?
A. Yes. Underlying all of this is the legitimacy issue, the legitimacy of the police, and I think, you know, the probity of the police is a hugely precious, important issue, and it should be the subject of some governance at some point. It is in other organisations, that
A. Yes.
Q. -- and probably is of marginal relevance to us, save for what you say about the Police National Computer, which we're going to deal with as a separate sort of chapter of your evidence in due course.

You do have something to say about social networking, which you may already have covered, the bottom of page 36. You recommend that all forces need to have a policy in place.
A. Yes. Yes, Mr Jay, a number have, but this -- you known, particularly as the demographics of the police change, this is becoming a much, much bigger issue.
Q. The problem here is twofold. Do I have it right: one, photographs -- and we've heard a bit about that last week from Mr Baker -- and secondly, perhaps more obviously, disclosure of inappropriate information via this medium?
A. Well, some people are declaring that they are police officers. Some people declare -- making some commentary about their organisation. This may be a personal view. I hope to address this issue with ACPO shortly. I mean, Page 22
arguably, some would say, have less to lose than the police.
Q. Chapter 3, starting on page 34, this is going much wider than the media --

Page 21

I think they should have a view about this, because this comes back to: there has to be some separation between personal life and professional life, and certainly a measure of separation for people who want to be police officers.
Q. And of direct concern to this Inquiry, the paragraph level with the upper hole punch, page 38 . I think it's page 04413, where you speak of evidence of relationships or at least dialogues being facilitated through social networking sites between officers and journalists from the national media, particularly evident in the online conversations being held on Twitter.

## You say:

"Whilst such conversations are transparent and may be viewed by any interest party, the nature of this communication channel enables journalists to cast their net more widely for sources and quotes."
In one sense, as you say, it's all entirely transparent, but on the other hand, if the police officer is communicating anonymously, as it might be on some occasions -- even if it's clear it is a police officer, it gives rise to obvious difficulty; is that correct?
A. It is. I mean, the example that comes to mind is Page 23
somebody commenting on some programme or Question Time.
If it's known they're a police officer, it could suggest that perhaps, you know, they had a political view, which is not really what we particularly want to hear from a police officer. Unless they make it darn clear that they are not a police officer or in police officer mode at that point in time, it becomes very difficult to start doing that -- disentangling that kind of thing.

Likewise, if people know one is a police officer and one is seeking advice on a good pub to have a drink at, at one level this is entirely innocent. You know, who cares? But in another level, particularly if it's not somebody who's just come into policing, you would think there are other ways to find this kind of information out, particularly other ways without people knowing you're a police officer.
It's -- but this -- I have to say this: I don't think the HMIC can be absolute arbiters of the right way on this, but I think what we need is a way, and we need to address these issues. Nor do I think we are the absolute arbiters on transparency, because sometimes I think transparency can be seen to suit particular sectors and I'm sure that would be the view of the media, for example, about the police. My point really is we ought to give people some points of reference to
deal with this age we're in. That's the essence of it.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: You could test it by reference to those who might express views which border upon the racist. I say "border upon" because obviously if it's criminal, that's quite different.
A. Yes.

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But although somebody could be
speaking in their personal capacity, if they express
views which are not consistent with their independent upholding of the law, then that creates a problem, however much they are careful to say that they're speaking in a personal capacity.
A. It does, sir, and that goes to the heart of it. If one -- for example, one of the reference points in here which must tie into any frame is: if your activity on here suggests that you are less than impartial, then in a sense you've undermined the main mission. That's basically the starting point into framing something like this, because that's really important clearly to the British public and part of the British policing model.
MR JAY: It locks in exactly with the very title of the report, "Without fear or favour".
A. It does.
Q. You make some recommendations about social networking sites on page 39, which no doubt are self-explanatory. Page 25

Chapter 4, "Gratuities and hospitality", which is page 40, 04415, I think. At the bottom of the page:
"All forces and authorities have a recording mechanism for gratuities and hospitality, but these are not consistently completed in most cases."

So are you saying there that they're very often not completed?
A. Can you just draw my attention to the --
Q. The very last paragraph on that page 40 .
A. Yes. We don't think they're always completed, and this may -- there may be innocent explanations for that, I imagine, because of the relatively trivial nature of the hospitality. However, the unevenness of the way it is recorded suggests it's because there isn't a system-wide approach to the whole thing.
Q. Then the next page, second paragraph on the page:
"Whilst not all staff members are formally aware of their force's specific policy or guidance, the review found that they were able to demonstrate a strong inherent moral compass and common sense approach to the boundaries of acceptability in tune with this local approach. This was particularly apparent amongst junior staff."

On one level, that may be said to be a somewhat anomalous conclusion, because you would expect the
senior staff to be more attune to the moral issues, owing to greater experience, but maybe, save, for cases of frank corruption where money passes hands, there isn't much of a risk of substantial gifts and hospitality being provided to senior staff? Is that right? Or are you making a different and deeper point there?
A. Mr Jay, I doubt it's that deep a point, but what I do think is this: there is a serious point here that a lot of people join the police, a huge lot of people, and they join it on a vocational basis. It is -- they join it for the mission, and it is a very noble mission, to -- you know, encapsulated in the Queen's Police Medal: "To guard my people". They don't come that much more noble than that.
And I think this is -- if never quite expressed in that way, this is a driving force for a lot of people, and so when our staff at HMIC put scenarios to them, they are pretty much able to thankfully determine right from wrong and whether something is inappropriate or not. This is not to say that more senior staff can't, but the point is that more senior staff perhaps, depending on what role they're in, may be more exposed sometimes to more obvious conflicts of interest.

The exception to this are junior staff in work in Page 27
particular specialised units, squads, particular parts of policing, but this finding about a common sense approach that most of you would -- most of us would hope for, is, I think, something of great comfort.
Q. And the scale of the problem is indicated by the paragraph which lies just above the lower hole punch, beginning:
"A review of force hospitality registers across England and Wales supplied to the HMIC for the last five years showed 9,500 entries, of which less than 1 per cent [in other words, 68 entries] of gratuities and hospital were received from the media."
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's been corrected, hasn't it?
A. Yes. I believe Mr Baker has updated that.

MR JAY: Yes, he did, pardon me.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Because it was over a period of time and the 68 has become 298.
A. That's correct, sir.

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's right?
MR JAY: I missed that one.
A. It was about the completeness of the record in relation to the Metropolitan Police.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, timing. It's whether you're with comparing like with like.
A. Yes, and fully bringing the Metropolitan Police into the

| 1 | picture. |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | MR JAY: Even with that revised statistic, we get a feel for |
| 3 | the problem against the wider issue of hospitality |
| 4 | across the country. |
| 5 | You recommend on the next page, page 42, in the |
| 6 | emboldened type, the need for a national standard as |
| 7 | well as recording practices which illustrate both what |
| 8 | is accepted and what declined, so the full nature of the |
| 9 | relationship is transparent. |
| 10 | A. Indeed. I think I should make it clear that this isn't |
| 11 | in the shape of $£ 5$ is okay but $£ 5.50$ is not. I think it |
| 12 | is -- this would be, I hope, more grounded in what is |
| 13 | appropriate in the circumstances. It will be more of |
| 14 | that character, because otherwise we will be chasing our |
| 15 | tails. |
| 16 | Q. Thank you. Then there's a case study on the next page. |
| 17 | You have a mnemonic gift. That, of course, is applying |
| 18 | to hospitality in general, not just hospitality from the |
| 19 | media? |
| 20 | A. Yes. |
| 21 | Q. Chapter 5 I don't think is going to be of direct |
| 22 | interest to us, nor really chapter 6, save for a small |
| 23 | point in chapter 6 on post-service employment, which is |
| 24 | page 51 on the internal numbering, which I think is |
| 25 | page 04436. You've identified an issue here with |
|  | Page 29 |
| 1 | restraint of trade and recommend that some specialist |
| 2 | legal advice be obtained first, which is no doubt |
| 3 | sensible. But you're not directly addressing the |
| 4 | revolving door issue as between the police and the press |
| 5 | or indeed vice versa; is that correct? |
| 6 | A. I think what we're endeavouring to show is that our |
| 7 | revolving door between the police and the press or |
| 8 | between the police and the security sector or between |
| 9 | others where there may be a conflict of interest is |
| 10 | difficult ground, because of the present legal position |
| 11 | as I understand it. |
| 12 | We did take the trouble of looking at -- in the |
| 13 | wider arena, at institutions like the advisory committee |
| 14 | on business appointments, which is a short cooling-off |
| 15 | period and then limitations on lobbying and the like. |
| 16 | I would have thought, though, if there was a will, it |
| 17 | must be possible to progressively adopt some acceptable |
| 18 | standards so that people do not think that people -- |
| 19 | particularly as there is more private sector contact |
| 20 | with the police, that people are not moving -- |
| 21 | negotiating contracts, as it were -- let's take the |
| 22 | worst scenario -- on this week, and next week retiring |
| 23 | or resigning and moving into the private sector and |
| 24 | whatever. I'm simply doing it in the abstract rather |
| 25 | than particularly the media. It's the same broad idea. |

A. Indeed. I think I should make it clear that this isn't in the shape of $£ 5$ is okay but $£ 5.50$ is not. I think it is -- this would be, I hope, more grounded in what is appropriate in the circumstances. It will be more of that character, because otherwise we will be chasing our tails.
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restraint of trade and recommend that some specialist legal advice be obtained first, which is no doubt sensible. But you're not directly addressing the revolving door issue as between the police and the press or indeed vice versa; is that correct?
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Page 30

We do think that this is an issue, but it needs some careful consideration as to how one could put any kind of frame on it.

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, one size might not fit all.
A. Quite.

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: The more senior the officer, the more appropriate it may be to require a cooling-off period, but it may be that different rules ought to apply to the extent to which former officers can effectively use the contacts which they have acquired to access information or support or anything else to assist them in working outside the police.

Equally, the other way around: if the police are going to employ representatives of the press in their press and media relations departments, it's very important that that doesn't carry with it some favoured nation status or some perception of a back door.
A. Quite, sir. It is an issue and it has the potential, if not gripped in some way, to become even more significant than perhaps it has been in this Inquiry, and that's why we draw attention to the dilemma.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Even more so if there is, as is being discussed, outsourcing of what are traditional police areas of activity.
A. Yes, and that will not be good for the private sector or Page 31
particular media outlet or the police, so there is a good reason to put some shape on it.
MR JAY: I move forward to chapter 8, Sir Denis, "Governance and oversight". On the internal numbering, page 55. I think it's page 04430.

You make it clear -- "corporate governance", of course, is a term this Inquiry has been using consistently, quite a lot in Module 1. It's more, in your view, than systems and processes. It requires those in charge of the organisation and who represent it to be consistent in demonstrating appropriate behaviours and promoting its values in pursuit of its objectives. So it's leadership behaviour setting the example, and that example will then be seen by those lower down and followed. Those are the key points I think you're making on that first page.
A. Yes, they are. They are stewards of the reputation of the organisation.
Q. At the top of the next page, page 56, you say you consider that:
"Chief office teams should review their corporate governance and oversight arrangement to ensure that they are fulfilling their function in helping promote the values of their force and the delivery of its objectives, and that they are, through their actions and

Page 32
behaviours, promoting the values of the organisation and making sure good corporate governance is seen as a core part of everyday business."

I think that's one of your principal recommendations at the end?
A. It is.
Q. Can I ask you, please, about managing the risks, page 57. What, in essence -- this is obviously a preventive strategy. What, in essence, are you considering and recommending there, Sir Denis?
A. Well, it -- there are patterns and lessons to be learnt in the way relationships can develop, and something that started relatively innocently can become more problematic. It's bound to be associated with particular kinds of posts, the targeting of individuals and particular kinds of posts, and with individuals' own obligations, whether they're financial -- for example, currently it's been assessed about 8.8 per cent of police officers and staff are financially stressed.

There are ways of looking at people who work for your organisation and what they do, and looking at the potential to safeguard, as it were, them, to prevent things happening, and during the 1990s, when it was looked at in relation, as it were, to conventional corruption, criminal activity, they profiled the shape Page 33
of this so that there was, if you like, an intelligence profile of the most vulnerable areas.

I guess what we're looking at is if you want to avoid conflicts of interest, if you want to avoid a slippery slope, it is worth considering how you profile vulnerabilities of your organisation and its relationships with whatever other people or sectors you engage with.
Q. Thank you. Your recommendations, chapter 9. You pick up a number of themes we've already examined. The principal recommendations are listed page 62. I think is page 04437.

You're looking, in the emboldened characters:
"Robust systems to ensure risks arising from relationships, information disclosure, gratuitous hospitality are identified, monitored and managed. Clear boundaries and thresholds."

Then you're looking for consistent and service-wide policies. Recommendations in relation to training courses. Chief officer teams reviewing corporate governance. We've just looked at that.

Then, towards the bottom of the page:
"HMIC expects the service to have detailed proposals
in the above areas ready for consultation with all relevant parties by April [of this year]."

Page 34

Then you're going to carry out a further assessment ahead of that consultation, but in time for the new regime coming into force, which I think it will on 1 November; is that correct?
A. It is. I should just probably explain that although this may look very police-y in the way it is addressed here, we did extensive work outside the police and, particularly given the Bribery Act and all of the issues going on in the private sector, what we found consistently were the best in the public sector and the private sector is that they had four features: there was a framework that people could easily relate to; it can't be over-complex or people basically will not follow it; there had to be some education, whether you're working for British Petroleum or you're working for the police, about the issue and vulnerability; there had to be -and we've alluded to this earlier -- some kind of intelligence system, some way of looking to see what's happening in relationships and the rest of it; and there had to be some sanction, clearly, if things didn't -buy those are consistent featureless, looking across the best private and public sector, and so these, in a number of ways, relate to that.
I have to say that I think I would take that general reference point, but in relation to the press, having Page 35
watched how things have developed since $I$ joined as a very young constable a long time ago in the Metropolitan Police, I would want to then take that and I'd want to customise that for the benefit of your Inquiry, more particularly about dealing with the press. Some of these conflicts of interest are new kids on the block. Basically, a few years ago, you worked for the police and that was it, and actually you could be sacked for working outside the police, moonlighting in any sense.

But the issues with the press are enduring, and going back to your mission on this Inquiry, I am mindful of that in thinking about coming up with a solution. So whilst that is useful in the most general terms for dealing with conflicts of interest and broadly for the media, I think I'd want to customise that, and I have some thoughts about that.
Q. Thank you. May we begin to develop those thoughts, Sir Denis? I know you've given consideration to the issue, I suppose, of diagnosis, what went wrong, and you've subdivided that into a number of separate rubrics, but in your own words, please, and in order to summarise some of the points you've made -- I think Lord Justice Leveson and I have seen the additional note you've prepared and no one else has. It's more

Page 36


| 1 | legitimate in itself, to want to look -- they win |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | sometimes in recovering these errors. |
| 3 | I think that good results are important, but the way |
| 4 | you get those good results into the media or the way you |
| 5 | deal with bad news has to be by the standards and values |
| 6 | of the police. They must have their own anchor points |
| 7 | in dealing both with the good and the bad, and I think |
| 8 | the desire for results is usually laudable, but the |
| 9 | whole thing about the police, rather like justice, is |
| 10 | how you do it is at least as important as the result you |
| 11 | get, and I think that's got lost a little along the way. |
| 12 | And it hasn't just got to be good for the police. |
| 13 | This is why you have to be able to deal with the bad |
| 14 | news. It has to be good for the public. You know, good |
| 15 | for the victim, back to where we were earlier on with |
| 16 | critical incident training. |
| 17 | This has been a long, hard lesson, you know, and |
| 18 | I hope this can be compressed for people in the future. |
| 19 | Maybe I've been a slow learner, but I have seen this |
| 20 | unwind, as it were, over the years. |
| 21 | I do hope that part of what the Inquiry can do is |
| 22 | assert the importance of the legitimacy for the police. |
| 23 | It's an essential building block. Everything else tends |
| 24 | to fall away if the how you deal with things is seen to |
| 25 | be wrong, and when people pursue results, sometimes not Page 41 |
| 1 | everybody will see the value of going the extra mile. |
| 2 | If they attach value to legitimacy, they will. |
| 3 | MR JAY: Thank you. Now, under the subheading "Current |
| 4 | investigations" in your speaking note, as it were, you |
| 5 | address a number of issues. Maybe we can go straight to |
| 6 | paragraph 12. Can I invite you to deal with that point, |
| 7 | please? |
| 8 | A. I should say the speaking note is informed by two moreme |
| 9 | evidential pieces, Mr Jay, in your terms. One is |
| 10 | a piece of work we asked the MPIA to do on police |
| 11 | reform, a summary of how things land, as it were, work, |
| 12 | and the second is with Cambridge University on |
| 13 | legitimacy. So it is not mercifully just the thoughts |
| 14 | of myself; it is more informed than that. |
| 15 | The point, at 12, which actually arises from this |
| 16 | research is that you can have lots of guidance, you can |
| 17 | have lots of policy, and you can even have a measure of |
| 18 | regulation, but the point is in this particular case |
| 19 | they have not been effective in the prevention, |
| 20 | detection or reaction to illegal interception of |
| 21 | information, and that's a broader finding around: formal |
| 22 | policies and guidance are all very well and they're |
| 23 | useful up to a point, but they're not enough necessarily |
| 24 | to get things done, get things implemented. |
| 25 | In fact, as I've said, investigative journalism |

Page 42
revealed this particular case, and lawsuits and hearings of this Inquiry are revealing more about what we know today.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So it's a cultural thing, as much as anything?
A. Um ... it --

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Or a mindset.
A. Yes. I think -- I actually prefer the second to the first, in the sense that the way we to business -- in other professions, if I may say so, from the little I know of the law or medicine or some of the things that my friends and acquaintances -- a lot of how they do business is hard-wired in at the very start. For example, in medicine, confidentiality on records or the like.

This hard-wiring -- there is, of course, training for the police and there is some of this that happens, but the hard-wiring can't come from guidance alone, and I will come to that later. I think you have to reinforce it on a number of fronts in order to land your point about confidentiality or whatever it is that you hold precious in that profession. That's the point. And in the fast-moving, noisy world of the police, where everybody expects a kind of instant television-type result -- or certainly in the next half hour or hour, Page 43
everything will be wrapped up, pursuit of results, then a lot of this legitimacy work, concerns, can easily get knocked out of the way unless it's reaffirmed in a number of ways.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But this is a much, much bigger point than just the issue that we're talking about. I mean, I've made the point before that one of the consequences of television programmes like CSI is that they create the perception that everything can be solved forensically, when every single police officer knows, (a) it can't be, and (b) there aren't the resources to do it, even if it could, and therefore there is an educative role as to what is in fact achievable, which it's critical for the police to be involved in, not least to demonstrate why they need the support of the public, with the ultimate aim of promoting confidence in the system -- the criminal justice system and the maintenance of law and order throughout the country. Or is that too broadbrush?
A. No, it's not broadbrush; it's the most fundamental thing. The British policing model is based on the notion of policing by consent, and you absolutely depend -- there has not been a major inquiry I've ever been involved in that hasn't actually, probably, in the end, been much less broken -- occasionally, there's

| 1 | a forensic breakthrough of brilliance, but the huge bulk | 1 | I accept that. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | of it is people said, "There's just something I thought | 2 | A. No, no. |
| 3 | you should know", or they tell somebody who you hope to | 3 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I hope to receive that in due course, |
| 4 | goodness sake will draw it to the right attention and | 4 | but that's different. Right. |
| 5 | from that you solve the case and protect them better, | 5 | A. It's some thoughts which I think you've asked others to |
| 6 | and that's the fundamental exchange. | 6 | provide. |
| 7 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Or not even solve it, but you get | 7 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Certainly. |
| 8 | icks in a wall. You get a piece of a jigsaw. There | 8 | A. And then we'll have hopefully a decent dialogue and get |
| 9 | are lots of analogies which one could pick out | 9 | a strong end product. |
| 10 | A. Yes, and that's why this engagement, so that people | 10 | I think that the police do -- the senior police |
| 11 | understand what you're trying to achieve, is so | 11 | officers and the junior police officers I talked to |
| 12 | important and why the last thing one wants to do is | 12 | understand the need for a legitimate relationship with |
| 13 | close the whole thing down. That would be a serious | 13 | the media. However, you have to look at where that gets |
| 14 | mistake. | 14 | pressurised, and that tends to be where there's |
| 15 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm sure that's right, so the | 15 | competition for information, particularly on top-end |
| 16 | question then becomes -- | 16 | cases; that is, in police parlance, murder, especially |
| 17 | A. How do we do it, sir. | 17 | the most difficult murders which are not immediately |
| 18 | MR JAY: Your paragraph 13, in particular the perception | 18 | solved. If you think of Soham, Milly Dowler, and then |
| 19 | point -- | 19 | big events like 7/7 and the like. There is a history |
| 20 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: He's going to tell me how to do it | 20 | about the police management of information around those |
| 21 | A. Sir, I'm not going to tell you how to do it. I know my | 21 | top-end issues which has had a lot of learning in it |
| 22 | place. I know my pay grade. | 22 | over the last 20 or 30 years. Very intense competition |
| 23 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I wouldn't make assumptions if I were | 23 | which, of course, as commercial pressures bite, becomes |
| 24 | you, Sir Denis. | 24 | higher as the stakes get higher. |
| 25 | A. I have considered some possible causes that lie behind Page 45 | 25 | Police priorities -- you've already heard from the Page 47 |
| 1 | some of this and we've alluded to them earlier, and then | 1 | head of counter-terrorism that different parts of police |
| 2 | I've considered what can be done, but this is absolutely | 2 | have different pressures, and I think if you were to |
| 3 | restricted to what I know and what I've been able to | 3 | talk to a lot of junior officers, they would probably |
| 4 | find by those pieces of research and the work with | 4 | pretty uniformly say their first duty is to protect |
| 5 | Cambridge that I have considered. So it is as good and | 5 | life. They're not always doing that, but this is all |
| 6 | bad as that, basically, and they are merely some | 6 | part of the -- of why they join, in order to protect |
| 7 | suggestions on the road, because we are definitely | 7 | people and so on. |
| 8 | pilgrims on the road to finding how to do this better, | 8 | I think there have been a lot of priorities over |
| 9 | and I can be led by you in that or we can just run | 9 | recent years to achieve results in relation to crime |
| 10 | through the causes. Whichever suits you, sir. | 10 | reduction, and in achieving those results, they've had |
| 11 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, I'll let Mr Jay carry on. | 11 | to take views, as you said, sir, about where priorities |
| 12 | MR JAY: You probably want, Sir Denis, to run through the | 12 | are allocated, and they are doing that against |
| 13 | possible causes before we get to possible solutions. | 13 | a background -- I should just mention, by way of |
| 14 | A. Yes. | 14 | example, again to help contextualise it for your |
| 15 | Q. On your fifth page -- but can I just ask you to | 15 | solution or the ultimate solution one aims for, there's |
| 16 | summarise -- | 16 | 15,000 incidents reported to the Metropolitan Police |
| 17 | A. Yes, I will. Conscious of time. | 17 | every day, roughly about 3,000 to the West Midlands and |
| 18 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: What we'll do is, if that's all right | 18 | about 900 to Surrey. So they have to pick their way |
| 19 | with you, we will publish this note as an annex to your | 19 | through this as well as go these things well. So |
| 20 | evidence, if we may. | 20 | there's a juggling act going on. |
| 21 | A. Sir. And the only sort of (inaudible), I would say, at | 21 | I think there's an issue about role tension and |
| 22 | this stage, reflecting on it, that it's as good and bad | 22 | understanding. I am familiar -- and I overheard what |
| 23 | as that. | 23 | Cressida Dick said today about murder inquiries, where |
| 24 | I mean, what I have seen -- | 24 | actually there's quite a rehearsed way of dealing with |
| 25 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not necessarily your final word; Page 46 | 25 | things ins reviews, but I think there's room to rehearse Page 48 |

12 (Pages 45 to 48)

|  | more strongly the obligations and police around investigation compared to the media. |  | have three components, which I could outline if it's |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3 | The three reference points government tend to us | 3 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I think you can, but I think we'd |
| 4 | when they're looking at information are confidentiality, |  | ter just give the shorthand writer just five minutes, |
| 5 | integrity and availability. Clearly, there is a shared | 5 | we could, if that's all right. Thank you |
| 6 | interest in availability. Where that may differ is in |  | (3.34 pm) |
| 7 | integrity and confidentiality, and $I$ am not sure that |  | break) |
| 8 | that has been as well develop |  | (3.39 pm) |
| 9 | need to be in relation to a solution on the other side | 9 | MR JAY: Sir Denis, the section "What can be done?". You've |
| 10 | of this, because this is the commodity, the currency, | 10 | ragraph 29 , which is the point abo |
| 11 | you will, that both have to work on: information. | 11 | ision of the relationship between police and press, |
| 12 | That means looking at how well these big inquir | 12 | I think you were about to develop the remaining |
| 13 | these specialised units, how they view their obligations | 13 | points you have under this heading. |
| 14 | around information. The ob |  | A. Yes, Mr Jay. These are some considerations |
| 15 | Mr Jay, or myself, we will have expectations from th | 15 | e right relationship, and I think that's |
| 16 | police about how they keep things that they will find | 16 | obably the best one can say about them, but they're |
| 17 | out about us in difficult moments confidential. It will | 17 | sed on the idea that you put some kind of framework of |
| 18 | be precious. It may be more precious, times, than | 18 | egrity in place and then you support it in a number |
| 19 | everybody in the police has always understood. | 19 | which I'll return to in a moment. |
| 20 | There is an absence of a radar for information | 20 | considerations in that would be: in their |
| 21 | disclosure and conflicts of interests, and I hope I haveremer | 21 | ractions with the media, there must be a legitimate |
| 22 | rehearsed that sufficiently already, and by that I do | 22 | licing purpose, whether it's a constable |
| 23 | not simply mean having a ledger; I mean using the kind | 23 | chief constable, and it should be more than |
| 24 | of software and the kind of modern techniques that have | 24 | ionship-building and relate to the core values and |
| 25 | been applied to protect and monitor within, to look at Page 49 | 25 | standards of policing. That's why I think it's Page 51 |
| 1 | what information is going out of the or |  | , |
| 2 | Otherwise you have no intelligence base to watc | 2 | ow, there's a -- part of the challenge is there ar |
| 3 | patterns. | 3 | ral sets around from the attestation, which I think, |
| 4 | There are some issues around interpreti | 4 | you are familiar with it, you know, is quite moving, |
| 5 | but I am confident, sir, you will point the way on that, | 5 | the way through to -- covers professional conduct to |
| 6 | and that's been raised in your Inquiry. But that's a | 6 | tement of professional values. My instinct is that |
| 7 | important thing for police in prioritisation terms. | 7 | ey're all worthy and as long as they crystallise what |
| 8 | Then I conclude, I guess, that if you take the | 8 | we hope from the police, they're a reference point in |
| 9 | checks and balances in the British policing model, | 9 | ether you actually have a legitimate policing purpose, |
| 10 | they've all got answers to give you. Not just the | 10 | ich is likely to prevent crime and help people and |
| 11 | operators, but the people in governance mode. By that, | 11 | Ip the investigation, than not. But that's currently |
| 12 | I mean people in police authority, the future of the | 12 | subject for discussion with ACPO and others, and I'm |
| 13 | PCCs, the police and crime commissioners, those in | 13 | peful that there will be something forthcoming. |
| 14 | regulation. Collectively, we didn't manage to stop | 14 | ncer |
| 15 | this. | 15 | econd consideration is how this relationship -- |
| 16 | So we then get to: well, what can we think about | 16 | if you like, that's the what. The second consideration |
| 17 | doing? What ideas? Well, I take the view that there | 17 | is how; the manner in which the relationship is |
| 18 | does need to be a significant revision in the way the | 18 | conducted. In essence, I think it should operate |
| 19 | relationship operates, but I would absolutely want | 19 | out favouritism and with integrity, and I say this |
| 20 | reassert with you: not actually in order to shrink the | 20 | is about integrity of the mission policing. |
| 21 | relationship but to put it on the right footing. | 21 | So that kind of questions exclusive contact. |
| 22 | Now, getting it right means putting, to me, as | 22 | It doesn't eliminate it, but it questions it. So it has |
| 23 | a starter at least -- and we are having discussions with | 23 | real bite in that sense, and it also accepts that |
| 24 | colleagues in ACPO and elsewhere -- some kind of | 24 | because of the police mission to investigate, you will |
| 25 | framework for integrity in those dealings, which would <br> Page 50 | 25 | consider what's presented to you, as it were, even if Page 52 |

the media are presenting it to you as a real prospect.
Now, what will need to happen underneath that is some very practical things for people who perhaps won't have all the time to watch this Inquiry or read all of these papers. That can be converted -- "without favourite, with integrity" -- to something a police force does about the range of contact it thinks is acceptable, about records, about briefing, authorisation -- I think you follow the drift -- so it establishing some boundaries. That's what's hinted at in the main report, but now I'm getting more specific around this particular issue for this Inquiry.

And then the third consideration is the police handle information and access to it. They must seek to avoid a conflict of interest, given their obligations around confidentiality in particular but unexclusively.

I think that those three points will help. If developed, can help. I'm quite prepared to accept -and there is a dialogue going on with people in the Police Service and elsewhere -- that this actually may be a prompt for a better set of ideas, but they're designed to be specific, although they may appear at first blush rather general.

Then what $I$ would say is that the degree of application and support will depend on whether, as it Page 53
were, you're in the eye of the storm or you're in the busiest part, which is -- frankly is the Metropolitan Police, global city and all of that, with all of the range of activities and opportunities and so on that exist there, compared to somewhere else. But I think they should bounce off the same broad framework.

The work on police reform, risky business that often -- too often, in my own experience, falls short of expectation, and I make that point because it will need support from those in governance role. The governance support for legitimacy, as well as other things, has to be there, otherwise nobody's probing. This reduces the challenge.

There has to be something too about regulators looking to see whether they can do better. We're certainly willing to do, that, and clearly operators need to implement.

The one piece I haven't sort of elaborated on out of where I started that's perhaps useful -- and I can develop the rest of it if you wish -- is this: this public interest issue is around us all the time. It is a difficult one to crack, this. PCC had a set of public interest considerations which, at first look, looked reasonable in many respects but didn't quite survive the contact at battle.

Page 54

What I do know is this, though: in order to prevent, as it were, the likelihood of an officer who feels something is going wrong ever feeling they can have contact because we've set up such an austere set of arrangements that they can never go and speak to somebody else -- whistle-blow if you want to use one word, or have a conversation -- we should be prepared to consider, depending on what they're revealing, whether there is a public interest issue in it, maybe within the police.

I could extend that, but in practical terms it would also mean for me that if you're dealing with -- and I alluded to this earlier, with the inquiry into leaks in government. At the top end, if you're dealing with something that's going to generate lots of debate about conflict of interest, for whatever reason, maybe you need some kind of review group to help challenge your operators as to whether what they're really doing is in the public interest, just in case they're very busy or they're very preoccupied and they might lose their way on the public interest.
Now, there is a process at the moment called goldgrouping. This is not the same as what $I$ have in mind. Gold group is a bunch of other officers, some of whom may be working on the thing, the project, and maybe some Page 55
brought in from outside. I'm talking about bringing into that, to help inform that, to challenge it, to test it, some authoritative people from outside. You wouldn't be doing this every day of the week, but then you're not doing these cases every day of week. So we have to be prepared to think of ways of not freezing down the public interest in, as it were, the truth emerging or whatever words one wants to use.

I think I should pause there, because I've been talking at you for a while.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Let me see if I understand that. Are you suggesting that there should be some mechanism whereby an officer or anybody else who is particularly concerned about one aspect should be able to report that concern and have it considered seriously without having to go to the press and run the risk of a conflict of loyalty? Is that the idea or have I misunderstood it?
A. No, you haven't misunderstood it, but I -- and I would also think -- well, what we end up having to do here in order to avoid, as it were, freezing contact with a free press and all of that, one ends up trying to square this circle. And at the heart of the circle, apart from the issue of police legitimacy, is the public interest, which may be bit more than the police interest, as it were.

[^0] Page 58

Police and Crime Commissioner and that may be so, but they may well get some comfort from having, as it were, a group of people, if you like, non-execs, whatever phrase one wants to use, people who are experienced, authoritative in their own world, who can give them a view, to say, "I think it is worth you doing this", even though you have a lot of other pressures on.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And you say non-executive, not merely some other chief constables?
A. Well, other --

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I say "merely"; I don't mean that dismissively.
A. No, indeed. I think other chief constables can be very good at holding your feet to the fire, but it may not be enough in broader considerations, particularly when one gets into the media and politics, as I've already alluded to this issue in terms of trying to set up a protocol around the value of these kind of investigations and politics, where policing meets politics, but policing meets the media has the same tensions and difficulties, charging.

Now, I'm sorry I'm not offering you a solution, but I am trying -- I think that within the police and beyond, we'll have to think of ways of dealing with that public interest bit, otherwise we close down the reform Page 59
as well.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, I understand that the safety valve in some way, shape or form is a very important part of actually what the press do.
A. Mm.

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And I'm not trying to limit that important role of holding the powerful, in which number I include the police, to account. They do it for the politicians, they do it for the government, they do it for the judiciary, and they certainly should do it for the police. I've made the point they don't do it for themselves but that's a different point, and we can't lose that by whatever else we do.
A. Yes.

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: To some extent, it may be that the police have to be somewhat less defensive and embrace the problems facing the more inquisitive world that we live in and the greater amount of information that is both out there and capable of being put out there through social media outlets.

But that, as you say, is a hard-wiring issue or a mindset issue, which was the word you preferred to "culture" -- and I understand why -- which it's quite difficult to get a handle on and say, "Well, if you take this pill and that pill and the other pill, then it will
all come out in the end."
A. Well, what it might help you to do is not always make the right judgment but make as good a judgment as you can, and all professions have ethical dilemmas. The press come to you: "We've got a story about $X$ ", and this completely diverts the investigation. Do you stand off or do you intervene? And you're not going to get a checklist that will do that, but if you do have some kind of frame of reference where you can say, "I made it in order to do this", you are on the right path, I think. At least you have a chance of success, and in the information revolution you're talking about, I think there will be a lot more of these challenges and I hope that you would be able to help the police on that path.

One thing I would say about mindset -- I think it's about -- we're all coming to a new mindset about the age we're in and I'm sure you don't for a moment, because you know far too much about the police -- I mean, there are an awful lot of people in the police who are absolutely devoted to the mission, the -- in managing this change, acknowledging more bad news may be there and they have to deal with it, because they feel their mission is being tainted and it feels -- at times, they feel it reflects on them, when actually what's happening is we're all going through a shift in the access to Page 61
information and challenge and testing and scrutiny.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, this is exactly the same problem as faces the press where the behaviour of a few is believed to taint all, and why I've been repeatedly at pains to point out that I recognise the vast majority of entirely responsible journalism that is produced. It's a small corner that is creating so much trouble. Exactly the same for the police.
A. Yes, and so I suppose our role has been to try and look at the system and say, "Well, if the system isn't strong enough to deal with that morphing, that evolutionary thing that's going on, perhaps it needs some strengthening without closing the whole thing down", and hence this conversation.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, I understand that. MR JAY: Sir Denis, those were all the points I had on your note. The last topic this afternoon are questions which others are asking me to put to you in relation to the Police National Computer. I provided you with advance notice of these questions. You have the document to hand or at least the answers that you would wish to give.

The first question is: in your role as HMIC, you are aware of the audits of the PNC security, which are also available on the HMIC website, and in this paragraph --

Page 62
it's paragraph 38.4 -- you refer to transaction validation under your command in Essex, and you say that three to nine PNC intelligence transactions were being validated by supervisors on a daily basis.

The question is: is that your recommendation for the right level of transaction validation?
A. Mr Jay, I wonder if it would be helpful -- I think somehow or other our names must have got transposed. I think that's for Mr Baker. But what I suggest in relation to the PNC, if it's satisfactory to you, is we'll provide a written response.

I can broadly tell you what we do at PNC. Obviously I don't know all the details of Essex and I can tell you what the HMIC do and in essence, we did an intensive look at the PNC and leakage between 2005 and 2007, established some with the operators, as I would hope we can collectively do with this, established a stronger system with the support of the National Police Improvement Agency, and the thing is now capable of being monitored using software, back to our earlier point, so that the HMIC are able to relatively stand off. That said, we are still checking information, and the PNC issue has not disappeared off the radar.

What I could do, sir, is give you a written specific answer to the specific three questions, if that helps, Page 63
or I could recover the document now, whichever is easiest. I'm simply trying to contextualise what we've done. People have learnt the PNC. They've learnt to put systems around it. We have tested it for a period of time to help establish that. Then we stand back and monitor it infrequently, just to test that the system is working, which, in essence, if we can come up with some framework in relation to the broader question, is a role we may be able to assist in.

Is that sufficient, sir, or do you --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm perfectly content that you elaborate to such extent as you or Mr Baker feel appropriate in writing.
A. Sir.

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you.
MR JAY: Yes, thank you very much.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you, Sir Denis. There have been a number of loose ends left by your evidence, which you've actually identified. This thinking, I'm sure, is going on and still developing. I would be very grateful to learn of any further thoughts that you, either through HMIC or in conjunction with ACPO, have on a sensible structure, which copes with the issues that you've understood I'm addressing and you've understood, I hope, the broad recognition that I have provided to Page 64
you of where I see potential solutions.
In other words, I entirely endorse your view that over-restrictive tick-boxing exercises will be entirely unhelpful. It's much more a question of creating the framework within which everybody can understand the appropriate moral compass, which you've also identified, and so make sensible decisions, perhaps with the wider understanding that these events and other events have brought, that the public will comprehend things not going right, but will be less forgiving if they believe they've been the subject of some -- "cover-up" is too strong a word, but deliberate restriction of information, for whatever reason.

I hope that's helpful and agrees with the line that you yourself have been seeking to identify.
A. I think, hopefully, my line agrees with yours, sir, which is in the end you will carve a way forward on this, and we have the benefit of a great deal of hindsight, too, which not everybody had at the time when they made the decisions they made.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. Of course, it's very critical
that we can't just use the hindsight. One of the things that I am addressing, at least in my mind and eventually in writing, is the extent to which I am relying on hindsight rather than actually what was there to be seen
and, more significantly, why what was there to be seen wasn't seen, rather than just saying, "Well, in hindsight, I'd have done this, this and this." Hindsight is always perfect.
A. The only perfect science, sir.

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much, that's a very appropriate moment.

Mr Garnham?
MR GARNHAM: Before you rise, may I mention just one matter?
A number of those whom I represent have listened and reflected on the evidence they've heard being given to you during the latter part of this module. There are particular factual disputes, the relevance of which to the terms of your reference may be fairly marginal, but they are often matters that matter a lot to the individuals concerned.

The advice I have been giving them is that if there is a matter about which they feel strongly, rather than my raising it on the floor of this Inquiry, they should submit to you a short written statement that describes the piece of evidence they want to advance, that we should serve it on you and then you will make of it what you think is appropriate.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, I am very comfortable with that, Mr Garnham. I am equally happy for you also to
collect that together and then ensure that it is made available to me with the balanced view of those who instruct you as to the appropriate line. I'm not going to say you'll bind me, of course you won't, but I am very anxious that individuals feel that they've had their opportunity to say what they want to say, and I'm conscious that with the best will in the world I am not going to be addressing every single factual issue that has arisen in the course of this Inquiry, because to do so would lead to a report (a) that would take an extremely long time to write, and (b) would not achieve that which I am required to achieve, and I am conscious that actually in relation to some aspects of the police, it may be thought that the same absence of individualisation of concern, which I have afforded to journalists because of the police investigation and thereby to others, in fairness, has not been afforded to some police officers, and I am conscious of that. Of course, the reason is that this aspect of the module isn't dependent upon ongoing police investigation, but I understand why it might feel that some are being dealt with differently.
MR GARNHAM: Sir, I'm grateful for that and we will act on what you suggest. The trick, it seems to us, to be for us, and much more so for you, is to reconcile on the one Page 67
hand fair dealing with individual points of fact, but on the other, not disappearing into a labyrinth of factual disputes when you have a rather higher agenda to address.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, well, you've understood the problem. Of course, it's rendered more difficult by the fact that for some of these issues it is only by drilling into the detail that you actually understand where the balance should lie --
MR GARNHAM: Yes.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- and that must sometimes appear to those affected rather more focused than they had perhaps anticipated.
MR GARNHAM: Sir, yes. Thank you.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much indeed.
Right. We're making a habit of this, Mr Jay.
Tomorrow morning, 10 o'clock. Thank you.
( 4.07 pm )
(The hearing adjourned until 10 o'clock the following day)


| A | 67:8 | applied 20:20 | 55:4 | belief 7:12 | 11:20 37:17 | 47:7 54:16 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| able 3:12 5:10 | adjourned 68:19 | 49:25 | authorisation | believe 18:1 | 2:21 59:15 | 60:10 |
| 26:19 27:19 | admit 13:1 57:18 | applies 9:20 |  | 65:10 | 64: | ge 52:2 |
| 41:13 46:3 | adopt 30:17 | apply $31: 8$ | aut | ved 6 | broadly 36:15 | 4:13 55:17 |
| 56:14 57:15 | advance 62:19 | applying 29:17 | 6:3 59: | believes 14 | 63:12 | 56:2 62:1 |
| 61:14 63:21 | 66:2 | appointments | authorities 19:3 | beneficiary 9:1 | broke 37:6,11 | challenges 61:13 |
| 64:9 | advantages 9:24 | 30:14 | 21:17 26: | benefit 1:18 36:4 | broken 44: | challenging |
| absence 49:20 | advertise 17:22 | approach 6:25 | authority 39:7 | 65:18 | brought 6:5 56:1 | 13:15 |
| $67: 14$ | advice $24: 10$ | 12:17,17 15:23 | 50:12 | best $2: 19$ 35:10 | 65:9 | hance 61:11 |
| absolute 24:18 | 30:2 66:17 | 16:1 26:15,20 | availability 49: | 35:22 40:6 | build 1:25 3:2 | change 5:6 22:15 |
| $24: 21$ | advisory 30:13 | 26:22 28:3 | 49:6 | 51:16 67:7 | 4:8 | 37:10,24 61:21 |
| absolutely 40:16 | afforded 67:15 | appropriate 4:3 | available 9:23 | better 8:10 12:23 | building 4:11 | changed 1:16 3:1 |
| $44: 22 \text { 46:2 }$ | 67:17 | 18:19 19:8 | 62:25 67:2 | 45:5 46:8 51:4 | 41:23 | 4:8 |
| 50:19 61:20 | afternoon 62:1 | 20:11 29:13 | avoid 19:17 3 | 53:21 54:15 | bulk 10:15,18 | channel 23:17 |
| abstract 30:24 | age $25: 137: 14$ | 31:7 32:11 | 34:4 53:15 | beyond $38: 21$ | 45:1 | chapter 6:9,24 |
| accentuating | 61:16 | 64:13 65:6 | 56:20 57:10 | 39:17 59:24 | bunch 55:2 | 8:18 22:3,8 |
| 39:18 | agencies 2:8,16 | 66:7,23 67:3 | aware 11:9 | big 17:19 47:19 | bundle 6:7 | 26:1 29:21,22 |
| accept 47:1 | Agency 63:19 | April 34:25 | 14:21 18:2,2 | 49:12 | busiest 54:2 | 29:23 32:3 |
| 53:18 | agenda 68:3 | arbiters 24:18,21 | 26:17 38:4 | bigger 22:16 | business 18:13 | 34:9 |
| acceptability | ago 36:2,7 | area 5:20 20:14 | 62:2 | 44:5 | 18:16 30:14 | character 1:17 |
| $15: 22 \text { 26:21 }$ | agree 5:15 | 21:19 | awful 61:19 | bind 67:4 | 33:3 40:2,4 | $4: 8 \text { 29:14 }$ |
| acceptable 10:1 | agrees 65:14,16 | areas $31: 2434: 2$ |  | bit 8:6 15:17 | 43:9,13 54:7 | characters $34: 13$ |
| 30:17 53:8 | ahead 35:2 | 34:24 | B | 22:18 37:3 | busy 55:19 | charge 32:10 |
| accepted 29:8 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { aim } 44: 16 \\ & \text { aims } 48: 15 \end{aligned}$ | arena 30:13 <br> arguable 38:25 | b 44:11 67:11 <br> back 1:4,20 7:6 | $\begin{gathered} 56: 2459: 25 \\ \text { bite 47:23 52:23 } \end{gathered}$ | buy 35:21 | charging 59:21 <br> chasing 29:14 |
| accepts 52:23 | allegation 57:11 | arguably 22:1 | $\begin{gathered} \text { back 1:4,20 7:6 } \\ \text { 10:13 11:24 } \end{gathered}$ | block 36:7 41:23 | C | check 11:13,17 |
| 53:14 61:25 | allocated 48:12 | argue 13:17 | 3:2 31:17 | blows 58 | calamity 58:8 | $15: 6$ |
| account 9:5 | allow 8:25 | argument 58: | 6:12 37:15,20 | blunt | called 37:2 55:22 | checking 63:22 |
| 13:10 60:8 | alluded 35:17 | arisen 67:9 | 41:15 63:20 | blush 53:2 | Cambridge | checklist 61:8 |
| accurately 8:25 | 55 | a | 64:5 | board 2:6 | :12 46: | hecks 50:9 |
| achievable 44:13 | 59:17 | arising 34:1 | backdrop 20: | 21:20 | capability 16:12 | chief 32:21 34:20 |
| achieve 5:8 | alongsid 20:12 | arrangemen 32:22 | background 48.13 | body 11:17 <br> bold 21:16 | capable 60:19 <br> $63 \cdot 19$ | circle 56:22,22 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 45: 11 \text { 48:9 } \\ & 67 \cdot 1112 \end{aligned}$ | alternative 57:14 | arrangements | backwash 3:3 | border 25:3,4 | capacity $16: 11$ | circumstances |
| 67:11,12 <br> achieving 48:10 | alternatives $16: 7$ | 55:5 | bad 40:1,2,11 | bottom 13:23 | $25: 8,12$ | 29:13 |
| acknowledges | amount 5:5 16:3 | arrests 3:6 | $41: 5,7,1346: 6$ | 20:3 22:12 | $\text { care } 37: 19$ | $\text { city } 54: 3$ |
| 39:20 | 60:18 | ashamed 19:24 | 46:22 61:21 | 26:2 34:22 | careful 13:16 | clarify 8:20 |
| acknowledging | analogies 20:5 | asked 5:17 13:13 | Baker 6:8,25 | bounce 54:6 | 25:11 31:2 | clarity 15:21 |
| $61: 21$ | $45: 9$ | 42:10 47:5 | 7:13 22:19 | bound 33:14 | cares 24:12 | clear 7:19 9:3 |
| ACPO 19:14 | anchor 7:5 41:6 | asking 16:20 | 28:14 63:9 | boundaries 10:1 | carry 21:8 31:16 | 23:22 24:5 |
| 22:25 50:24 | anchors 8:6 | 62:18 | 64:12 | 15:22 26:21 | 35:1 46:11 | 29:10 32:6 |
| $52: 12 \text { 64:22 }$ | annex 46:19 | aspect 1:3 56:14 | balance 21: | 34:17 39:22 | carrying 21:18 | 34:17 |
| acquaintances | anomalies 17:4 anomalous 26:25 | 67:19 <br> aspects $67: 1$ | balanced 67. | 53:10 <br> brand 39:2 | carve 65:17 | clearer 4:21 <br> clearly 20:17 |
| $43: 12$ | anonymously | aspiration 39:17 | balanced 67:2 <br> balances 50:9 | branding 17:21 | Caryatid 3:17 <br> case 17:6 29:16 | $\begin{array}{r} \text { clearly } 20: 17 \\ 25: 1935: 20 \end{array}$ |
| $\text { act } 35: 848: 20$ | 23:21 | assert 41:22 | base 50:2 | break 51:7 | 38:7 42:18 | $49: 5 \text { 54:16 }$ |
| 67:23 | answer 8:14 | assessed 33:1 | based 44:2 | breakthrough | 43:1 45:5 | $\text { close } 45: 1359: 25$ |
| actions 32:25 | 12:15 63:25 <br> answers 50:10 | assessment 35:1 assist 31:11 64:9 | $51: 17$ basically | $45: 1$ <br> Bribery 35:8 | 55:1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { osed 57:24 58:2 } \\ & \text { osing 62:13 } \end{aligned}$ |
| actively 7:9 <br> activities 18 | 62:21 | assistance 18:17 | 25:18 35:13 | bricks 45:8 | 26:5 27:2 | colleagues 50:24 |
| 54:4 | anticipate | assistant 1:6,24 | 36:7 46:6 | brief 19:6,18,20 | 38:13 47:16 | collect 67:1 |
| activity $17: 17$ | 68:13 | 3:10,20,22,24 | basis 2:13 19:25 | briefing 53:8 | 56:5 | collectively |
| $18: 1 \text { 25:15 }$ | anxious 67: | assisting 38:1 | 7:11 58:1 | briefings 15:2,4 | cast $23: 1$ | 50:14 63:17 |
| 31:24 33:25 | anybody 13 | a | 63:4 | b | 38:1 | come 1:4 6:3 7:6 |
| 40:5 | 56: | association 18: | battle 54:2 | brilliance 45: | use 9:16 | 10:6 24:13 $27 \cdot 14 \quad 37 \cdot 15.21$ |
| add 5:14 | apart 56:22 apparent 26 | assumptions $45: 23$ | BBC | bringing $28: 2$ $56: 1$ | causes 45:25 | 27:14 37:15,21 |
| additional $11: 7$ 36.24 | appear 53:22 | attach 42:2 | becoming 22:16 | Bristol 14:14 | caution 10:22 | $61: 5 \text { 64:7 }$ |
| address 11:3 | 68:11 | attention 13:3 | bed 4:13 | British 25:20,20 | cautious 10:21 | comes 17:5 23:2 |
| 13:23 22:25 | appearing 13:11 | $6: 8$ 31:21 | beginning 28:7 | 35:15 44:21 | cent 8:9 28:11 | 23:25 |
| 24:20 42:5 | 17:5,11 | 45:4 | 37:9 | 50:9 | 3:18 | comfort 13:12 |
| $68: 4$ | appears 7:24 | attestation 52:3 | behalf 57:17 | broad 30:25 54:6 | centred 2:1 | 28:4 59:2 |
| addressed 35:6 | appetite 10:24 | attune 27 | behaviour 32:13 | $64: 25$ |  | comfortable |
| addresses 57:22 | 19:21 | audit 19:9 |  | broadbrus | certainly 4:21 | 66:24 |
| addressing 30:3 | application | audits 62:2 | behaviours 7:20 | $44: 19,20$ | 23:3 39:2 | coming 3:7 35:3 |
| 64:24 65:23 | 18:25 53:25 | austere 39:13 | 32:11 33:1 | broader 11:18 | 40:18 43:25 | 36:13 37:23 |

61:16
command 63:2
commentary 22:23
commenting 24:1
commercial 47:23
commissioner 1:24 3:10,20 3:22,25 5:18 11:23 12:2 59:1
commissioners 1:75:17 50:13
Commissioner's 11:4
committee 30:13
commodity 49:10
common 20:23
26:20 28:2
common-sense 15:23 16:1,5
communicating 23:21
communication 23:17
communications 14:5
companies 17:16
compared 49:2 54:5
comparing 28:24
compass 26:20 65:6
compelling 3:13
competence 39:7
competition
14:11 47:15,22
complaint 12:12 19:17
complaints 11:19 12:11
completed 26:5,7 26:10
completely 61:6
completeness 28:21
complex 16:14
components 51:1
comprehend 65:9
compressed 41:18
Computer 11:11 22:762:19
concern 7:14 23:6 39:4,5 52:14 56:15 57:15 67:15
concerned 9:16 15:11 17:20 56:14 66:16
concerns 44:2 57:14
conclude 50:8
conclusion 26:25
conduct 52:5
conducted 10:13
52:18
confidence 44:16
confident 50:5 confidential 11:10 49:17 confidentiality 43:14,21 49:4 49:7 53:16
conflict 30:9 53:15 55:16 56:16
conflicts 6:20,20 14:16 27:24 34:4 36:6,15 49:21
conjunction 64:22
connections 18:18
conscious 46:17 67:7,12,18
consent 44:22
consequences 44:7
consider 19:15 32:20 52:25 55:8 57:8
considerable 5:5
consideration 31:2 36:19 52:15,16 53:13
considerations 20:21 51:14,20 54:23 59:15
considered 45:25 46:2,5 56:15
considering 33:10 34:5
consistency 19:16
consistent 25:9 32:11 34:18 35:21
consistently 26:5 32:8 35:10
constable 36:2 51:22,23
constables 59:9 59:13
constrain 8:25 21:1
consultation 34:24 35:2
contact 19:23 30:19 39:14 52:21 53:7 54:25 55:4 56:20 58:1
contacted 11:5
contacts 19:25 31:10
content 19:7

64:11
contested 58:16
context 3:5 4:13 4:14,24 5:2,8 12:24 21:7 contextualise 2:11 48:14 64:2
contracts 30:21
conventional 33:24
conversation 19:19 55:7 62:14 conversations 18:23 19:11 23:12,15
converted 53:5
conveyed 16:13
cooker 58:4
cooling-off 30:14 31:7
copes 64:23
core 33:2 51:24
corner 62:7
corporate 2:6
15:20 16:3
32:6,21 33:2
34:20
correct 12:8 18:19 19:19 20:9 23:24 28:18 30:5 35:4
corrected 11:25 18:15 28:13
correctly $4: 24$
corruption 7:14 7:18,20,22 9:18 10:9 13:7 27:3 33:25 38:12
counter-terror... 48:1
counter-terror... 2:1
country $2: 1$ 14:12 15:8 16:1 29:4 44:18
country-wide 6:19,21
couple 14:13
course 1:5,16 2:6 4:17 5:19 6:7 6:12 11:7 12:9 22:9 29:17 32:7 38:4 43:16 47:3,23 65:21 67:4,9 67:19 68:6
courses 34:20
courts 13:11
covered 22:11
covers 52:5
covert 21:8
cover-up 65:11
co-ordinating
3:9,10
CPS 58:21
crack 54:22
create $44: 8$
creates 25:10
creating 62:7
65:4
Cressida 48:23
crime 48:9 50:13
52:10 58:7
59:1
criminal 25:5 33:25 44:17
criminals $38: 16$
critical 41:16 44:14 65:21
criticised 40:14
crystallise 52:7
CSI 44:8
cultural 43:4
culture 60:23
Cumbria 14:12 14:13
currency 49:10
Current 42:3
currently 33:18 52:11
customise 36:4 36:16
$\frac{\text { D }}{\text { daily } 63 \cdot 4}$
daily 63:4
darn 24:5
data 11:18,20 12:4
database $17: 17$
databases 17:9
date 19:6
daunting 38:2
day $8: 548: 17$
56:4,5 68:19
deal 2:7 5:11 8:15 13:25 18:21 22:8 25:1 39:3 40:10 41:5,13 41:24 42:6 61:22 62:11 65:18
dealing 1:10 4:16 36:5,15 39:22 41:7 48:24 55:12,14 59:24 68:1
dealings 13:12 21:750:25
deals 8:21 37:13
37:14
dealt 19:16 51:10 67:21
debate 55:15
decent 47:8
decide 57:6
decision 3:17

40:18 58:20
decisions 5:1 65:7,20
declare 22:23
declaring 22:22
declined 29:8
deduced 39:3
deep 27:8
deeper 27:6
defensive 60:16
defining 37:18
definitely 19:14
46:7
defy 21:2
degree 13:3
53:24
deliberate 10:9
65:12
delivery 32:24
demanding 2:22
demographics 22:15
demonstrate
26:19 44:15
demonstrating 32:11
Denis 1:3 3:15
6:3 8:18 13:23
32:3 33:10
36:19 45:24
46:12 51:9
62:16 64:17
dent 7:11
departments 31:15
depend 44:23 53:25
dependent 67:20
depending 20:22
27:23 55:8
deputy 5:18
derive 13:16,17
derived 12:13
described 4:24
describes 66:20
describing 16:9
designed 53:22
desire 41:8
detail 68:8
detailed 34:23
details 19:6 63:13
detection 42:20
determine 27:19
detract 3:21
develop 33:12 36:18 51:12
54:20
developed 16:24
36:1 38:21,25
39:2 49:8
53:18
developing 51:15 64:20
development 2:14
devoted 37:25 61:20
diagnosis 36:20 37:2,3
dialogue 47:8 53:19
dialogues 23:9
Dick 48:23
differ 49:6
differences 14:4
different 4:22 11:21 15:24
19:21,21 20:17 20:18,18,20,21 20:21 25:5 27:6 31:8 39:16 47:4 48:1,2 60:12
differently 67:22
differing 16:1
difficult 2:19 7:8 24:7 30:10 47:17 49:17 54:22 60:24 68:6
difficulties 6:13 59:21
difficulty $23: 23$
dilemma 31:21
dilemmas 61:4
direct 23:6 29:21
direction 4:3
directions 2:18
directly $13: 8$ 30:3
disappeared 63:23
disappearing 68:2
disclosure 10:14 11:8,15 22:20 34:15 49:21
discovered 12:3
discretion 39:8
discussed 31:23
discussing 10:7
discussion 52:12
discussions 50:23
disentangling 24:8
disloyal 57:7
disloyalty 57:11
dismissively 59:12
disputes 66:13
engage $14: 19$
$34: 8$
engaged $58: 15$
engagement
$45: 10$
England 28:9
enormous $16: 3$
ensure 4:24
$32: 2234: 14$
$67: 1$
entertaining
$15: 2016: 3$
entirely $3: 18$
$5: 1513: 14$
$23: 1924: 11$
$62: 665: 2,3$
entitled 2:14 3:9
entity 39:16
entries 28:10,11
enviably 7:17
environment 5:10 6:23 18:3 18:4
environments 20:17 58:16
epitome 19:18
equally 31:13 66:25
error 40:6
errors 41:2
especially $47: 16$
essence 25:1 33:8 33:9 40:24 52:18 63:14 64:7
essential 41:23
Essex 63:2,13
establish 19:15 52:1 64:5
established 4:18 4:19 11:5 13:6 17:18 63:16,17
establishing 53:10
ethical 20:5 61:4
events 1:4 20:18 47:19 65:8,8
eventually 65:23
even-handed 8:11
everybody $42: 1$ 43:24 49:19 65:5,19
everyday 13:11 33:3
evidence 6:21 9:18 15:19 22:9 23:8 38:9 46:20 64:18 66:11,21
evident 23:12
evidential 10:10 10:12 42:9
evolutionary 62:11
exactly $21: 5$


25:21 62:2,8
examined $34: 10$
example 17:1,19
23:25 24:24
25:14 32:13,14 33:17 43:14 48:14
exception 27:25
exchange 10:3 45:6
excite 13:3
exclude 10:3
exclusive 52:21 exclusiveness 15:11
executive $2: 21$
exercise $11: 16$
exercises 65:3
exhibits 20:6
exist 10:17 54:5
expect $26: 25$
expectation 8:8 54:9
expectations
4:19 49:15
expecting 12:9
expects $34: 23$ 43:24
experience $1: 12$
1:14 20:6 27:2
54:8
experienced 59:4
explain 12:16 18:9 35:5
explanations 26:11
explodes 58:6
explore 10:10 16:16
exposed 27:23 39:25
express 25:3,8
expressed 27:16
extend 55:11
extensive 12:4 35:7
extent 31:9 39:24 60:15 64:12 65:24
external 58:17
extra 3:19 42:1
extremely 39:13 67:11
eye 54:1
F
face $2: 17$
faces $62: 3$
facilitated $23: 9$
facing 60:17
fact 10:25 12:13
14:12 42:25
44:13 68:1,7
factual 66:13
67:8 68:2
failing 40:5
fair 1:21 13:14 $\quad$ force 2:22 10:5 27:17 28:8 32:24 35:3 53:7
forces 1:12 9:5 13:25 15:22 16:11,13,15,19 16:24 17:7 19:3 22:12 26:3
force's 26:18
forensic 45:1
forensically 44:10
forgiving 65:10
form 5:13 15:8 60:3
formal 42:21
formalised 15:9
formally 26:17
former 31:9
formulate 16:21
forthcoming 52:13
forward 16:23 32:3 65:17
found 12:8 15:19 16:11 26:19 35:9
foundation 10:10,12
four 8:22 10:4 13:25 35:11
frame 20:23 21:15 25:15 31:3 61:9
framework 20:16,19 35:12 37:13 50:25 51:17 54:6 57:25 64:8 65:5
framing 25:18
franchise 8:3
frank 7:20 27:3
frankly 7:10 9:13 13:2 54:2
free 56:20
freezing 56:6,20
frequently 15:10
friends $10: 7$ 43:12
front 10:18 38:1
fronts 43:20
fulfil 2:20
fulfilling 32:23
full 29:8
fully 28:25
function 32:23 38:19
fundamental 44:20 45:6
further 6:12 35:1 64:21
future $41: 18$ 50:12

68:1
fairly $66: 14$
fairness 67:17
faith 57:5
fall 10:15 41:24
falls 54:8
familiar 48:22
52:4
amily 10:8
far 12:4 61:18
ashionable 16.7 43:23
favour 6:4 25:22 favourably 7:25
avoured 31:16
avourite 53:6
avouritism
:25
fear 6.3 25.22
featureless 35:21
eatures 1:21 35:11
feel 5:25 29:2
61:22,24 64:12
66:18 67:5,21
feeling 55:3
feels 55:2 61:23
feet $59: 14$
fifth 46:15
Filkin's 37:13
final 46:25
financial 10:9 33:17
financially 33:19
find 13:4 14:23
16:3 17:7 21:3
24:14 46:4 49:16
finding 28:2 42:21 46:8
findings 7:1
fine $39: 12$
fire 59:14
firm 37:8,8
first 3:25 30:2
32:16 43:9
48:4 53:23
54:23 62:23
fit 31:4
five $2: 2$ 14:1 28:9 51:4
five-year 4:10
floor 66:19
focused 9:10 68:12
follow 35:13 53:9
followed 14:6 32:15
following 18:21 68:19
footing 50:21
gai
ga
G

ge
g
gain 10:9
game 21:10
Garnham 66:8,9
66:25 67:23
68:10,14
gelled 5:1
general 11:16
17:6 21:10
29:18 35:24
36:14 39:8
53:23
generate $14: 10$
55:15
geographical 2:2
getting 4:25 39:5
50:22 53:11
gift 29:17
gifts 15:24 27:4
give $3: 12$ 4:3
12:22 17:24
24:25 50:10
51:4 59:5
62:22 63:24
given 35:8 36:19
53:15 58:23
66:11
gives 23:23
giving 16:19
66:17
global 54:3
glove 57:17
go 2:9,25 11:23 12:18 19:20
42:5 48:19
55:5 56:16
57:17
goes 6:12 11:19
25:13
going 1:4 5:6,12 5:21 12:6
17:12 18:6 22:3,8 29:21
31:14 35:1,9 36:12 38:5 42:1 45:20,21 48:20 50:1 53:19 55:3,15 61:7,25 62:12 64:20 65:10 67:3,8
gold 55:22,24
good 13:19 24:10 31:25 32:2
33:2 39:11,12
39:18,18 40:25 40:25 41:3,4,7 41:12,14,14 46:5,22 59:14 61:3
goodness 37:25 45:4
gossip 10:22,24
governance
21:24 32:3,6 32:22 33:2
$34: 2150: 11$
$54: 10,10$
government $49: 3$
$55: 1460: 9$
grade $45: 22$
gradually $4: 11$
grateful $64: 20$
$67: 23$
gratuities $26: 1,4$
$28: 11$
hearings 43:1
heart 25:13 38:6 56:22
held 23:12
help 1:25 17:4 18:7 20:1 48:14 52:10,11 53:17,18 55:17 56:2 61:2,14 64:5
helpful 51:2 63:7 65:14
helping 32:23
helps 63:25
high 7:17 13:3
higher 47:24,24 68:3
high-profile 2:9
hindsight 1:19
65:19,22,25 66:3,4
hinted 53:10
hints 16:20
history 47:19
HMIC 11:5 14:3 24:18 27:18 28:9 34:23 62:23,25 63:14 63:21 64:22
hold 43:22
holding 59:14 60:7
hole 8:22 16:10 23:7 28:6
Holmes 40:13,20
hope 5:8 6:2 22:25 28:3 29:12 39:16 41:18,21 45:3 47:3 49:21 52:8 61:13 63:16 64:25 65:14
hopeful 52:13
hopefully $47: 8$ 57:5 65:16
hospital 28:12
hospitality 15:25 21:9 26:1,4,13 27:5 28:8 29:3 29:18,18 34:16
hot 8:2
hour 43:25,25
House 40:19
huge $7: 15$ 14:19 27:10 45:1
hugely 8:8 21:23
human 40:5,6


| identified 29:25 | 38:1 42:21 | 14:16 23:16 | 25:21 27:8 | knocked 44:3 | 20:18,20 | 33:20,21 34:3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 34:16 64:19 | 47:15,20 49:4 | 27:24 29:22 | 28:15,20 29:2 | know 1:5 5:13 | Leveson 3:14 | 34:13,18 35:18 |
| 65:6 | 49:11,14,20 | 30:9 34:4 36:6 | 32:3 42:3,9 | 6:4 7:16 8:1 | 4:23 5:7,15 | 35:21 37:21,21 |
| identify 16:12 | 50:1 53:14 | 36:15 37:18,18 | 45:18 46:11,12 | 12:15 13:19,20 | 11:22 12:25 | 49:4,12 54:15 |
| 65:15 | 60:18 61:12 | 38:23 49:6 | 49:15 51:9,14 | 14:13 18:12 | 13:14 16:9 | loose 64:18 |
| identifying 16:16 | 62:1 63:22 | 53:15 54:21,23 | 62:16 63:7 | 19:12 21:13,22 | 21:3,6,11 25:2 | loose-lipped 10:7 |
| illegal 13:2 42:20 | 65:13 | 55:9,16,19,21 | 64:16 68:16 | 24:3,9,11 | 25:7 28:13,16 | Lord 3:14 4:23 |
| illustrate 29:7 | informed 42:8 | 56:7,23,24 | Jay's 4:6 | 27:13 36:19 | 28:19,23 31:4 | 5:7,15 11:22 |
| illustrated 39:14 | 42:14 | 58:12 59:25 | jigsaw 45:8 | 37:25 41:14,17 | 31:6,22 36:24 | 12:25 13:14 |
| imagine 26:12 | infrequen | interested 7:9 | join 27:10,11,11 | 43:2,11 45:3 | 39:24 40:3,12 | 16:9 21:3,6,11 |
| immediately | 64:6 | interests 18:14 | 48:6 | 45:21,22 46:3 | 40:18 43:4,7 | 25:2,7 28:13 |
| 47:17 | inherent 26:20 | 38:24 49:21 | joined 36:1 | 52:4,14 55:1 | 44:5 45:7,15 | 28:16,19,23 |
| impacted 39:24 | inherited 3:2 | internal 6:10 | journalism | 61:18 63:13 | 45:20,23 46:11 | 31:4,6,22 |
| impartial 25:16 | innocent 24:11 | 8:16 14:1 | 42:25 62:6 | knowing 24:15 | 46:18,25 47:3 | 36:24 39:24 |
| implement 54:17 | 26:11 | 16:25 18:5 | journalist 10:23 | known 22:14 | 47:7 51:3 | 40:3,12,18 |
| implemented | innocently 33:13 | 29:24 32:4 | 37:6,10 | 24:2 | 56:11 57:1,10 | 43:4,7 44:5 |
| 42:24 | input 4:2,2 | internally $2: 15$ | journalists 12:20 | knows 13:21 | 57:13 58:3,6 | 45:7,15,20,23 |
| implication | inquiries 14:10 | Internet 17:23 | 13:1 23:11,17 | 44:10 | 58:10,14 59:8 | 46:11,18,25 |
| 21:18 | 14:14 48:23 | interpret 8:12 | 37:23 67:16 |  | 59:11 60:2,6 | 47:3,7 51:3 |
| importance 8:13 | 49:12 | interpreting | judgment 61:3,3 | L | 60:15 62:2,15 | 56:11 57:1,10 |
| 41:22 | inquiry 1:15 | 50:4 | judiciary 60:10 | labyrinth 68:2 | 64:11,15,17 | 57:13 58:3,6 |
| important 21:23 | 14:18 23:6 | intervene 61:7 | juggling 48:20 | lack 10:22 16:11 | 65:21 66:6,24 | 58:10,14 59:8 |
| 25:19 31:16 | 31:20 32:7 | investigate 52:24 | July 1:4 | 18:23 | 68:5,11,15 | 59:11 60:2,6 |
| 41:3,10 45:12 | 36:5,12 37:5 | investigation | junior 26:22 | land 42:11 43:20 | lie 45:25 68:9 | 60:15 62:2,15 |
| 50:7 52:1 60:3 | 38:4 39:17 | 38:11 49:2 | 27:25 47:11 | lapses 12:4 | lies 15:4 28:6 | 64:11,15,17 |
| 60:7 | 41:21 43:2 | 52:11 61:6 | 48:3 | large 4:2 | life 23:3,3 48:5 | 65:21 66:6,24 |
| Improvem | 44:23 50:6 | 67:16,20 | justice 3:14 4:23 | laudable 41:8 | likelihood 55:2 | 68:5,11,15 |
| 63:19 | 53:4,12 55:13 | investigations | 5:7,15 11:22 | law 25:10 43:11 | Likewise 24:9 | Lords 40:19 |
| improves 18:3 | 66:19 67:9 | 2:4 3:3 10:13 | 12:25 13:14 | 44:18 50:4 | limbs 3:19 | Lordships 40:19 |
| inappropriate | inquisitive 60:17 | 11:14 16:14 | 16:9 21:3,6,11 | Lawrence 38:4 | limit 60:6 | lose 22:1 55:20 |
| 16:12,17 21:9 | ins 48:25 | 18:10 42:4 | 25:2,7 28:13 | lawsuits 43:1 | limitations 30:15 | 60:13 |
| 22:20 27:20 | insights 1:5 | 59:19 | 28:16,19,23 | lead 67:10 | line 65:14,16 | lost 41:11 |
| Inasmuch 16:4 | inspiring 8:9 | investigation's | 31:4,6,22 | leadership 32:13 | 67:3 | lot 3:7 27:9,10,17 |
| inaudible 46:21 | instant 43:24 | 57:4 | 36:24 38:13 | leakage 63:15 | lines 10:4 14:1 | 32:8 40:4,6 |
| incident 41:16 | instinct 52:6 | investigativ | 39:24 40:3,12 | leaking 10:19 | listed 34:11 | 43:12 44:2 |
| incidents 48:16 | instituti | 2:25 | 0:18 41:9 | leaks 10:6 12:1 | listen 5:23 | :21 48:3,8 |
| include 20:11 | 57:6 | invite 42 | 43:4,7 44:5,17 | 16:14,17 55:13 | listened 66:10 | 58:22 59:7 |
| 60:8 | institutions | involved 19:7 | 45:7,15,20,23 | learn 64:21 | little 8:6 15:21 | 61:13,19 66:15 |
| includes 14:20 | 12:21 30:13 | 44:14,24 | 46:11,18,25 | learner 41:19 | 17:1 41:11 | lots 42:16,17 |
| including 19:10 | instruct 67:3 | involving 57:16 | 47:3,7 51:3 | learning 47:21 | 43:10 | 45:9 55:15 |
| 19:12 | integrity 6:14 | IPCC 11:19 | 56:11 57:1,10 | learnt 13:18 | live 60:18 | lower 8:6,22 |
| inconsistency | 49:5,7 50:25 | issue 1:16 6:16 | 57:13 58:3,6 | 33:11 64:3,3 | lives $38: 24,24$ | 16:10 28:6 |
| 15:1,5 | 51:18 52:19,20 | 12:17 14:23 | 58:10,14 59:8 | led 39:9 46:9 | living $14: 5$ | 32:14 |
| increases 58:4 | 53:6 | 21:21,24 22:16 | 59:11 60:2,6 | ledger 49:23 | lobbying 30:15 | loyalty 56:17 |
| independent | intelligence | 22:25 29:3,25 | 60:15 62:2,15 | left 64:18 | local 9:12,13 |  |
| 25:9 | 12:23 18:3 | 30:4 31:1,18 | 64:11,15,17 | legal 30:2,10 | 26:21 | M |
| indicated 28:5 | 34:1 35:18 | 35:16 36:20 | 65:21 66:6,24 | legitimacy 7:6 | locations 2:2,3 | main 25:17 |
| indirect 10:19 | 50:2 63:3 | 8:20 44:6 | 68:5,11,15 | 21:21,22 39:6 | locks 25:21 | 53:11 |
| individual 2:17 | intended 20:16 | 48:21 53:12 |  | 39:6 41:22 | London 6:23 | maintenance |
| 2:20 3:2 4:15 | intense 6:22 | 54:21 55:9 | K | 42:2,13 44:2 | 14:4 | 44:18 |
| 68:1 | 14:10,15 47:22 | 56:23 59:17 | keen 4:24 | 54:11 56:23 | long 36:2 41:17 | major 2:2 16:4 |
| individualisation | intensity 4:8 9:6 | 60:21,22 63:23 | keep 19:12 49:16 | legitimate 41:1 | 52:7 67:11 | 44:23 |
| 67:15 | 20:19 | 67:8 | key 32:15 | 47:12 51:21 | look 11:19 14:12 | majority 62:5 |
| individuals 9:10 | intensive 6:22 | issues 2:8 3:2 | kids 36:6 | 52:9 | 18:13 35:6 | making 7:18 |
| 15:22 18:11 | 63:14 | 6:14,21 12:24 | kind 8:5 14:14 | lesson 40:10 | 37:12,16 41:1 | 14:8 15:14 |
| 19:21 33:15,16 | intensively 13:10 | 13:8 14:6,16 | 15:13 17:7,12 | 41:17 | 47:13 49:25 | 22:23 27:6 |
| 66:16 67:5 | interaction | 24:20 27:1 | 17:15,17 24:8 | lessons 33:11 | 54:23 62:9 | 32:16 33:2 |
| inevitability | 10:23 20:12 | 35:8 36:11 | 24:14 31:2 | less-than-adeq... | 63:15 | 40:23 68:16 |
| 16:13 | interaction | 37:14,20 42:5 | 35:17 39:9 | 40:21 | looked 6:8 12:5 | manage 3:12 |
| inform 20:1 56:2 | 18:22 19:4 | 47:21 50:4 | 43:24 49:23,24 | lettering 21:16 | 13:9 17:7,18 | 50:14 |
| information 9:23 | 51:21 | 64:23 68:7 | 50:24 51:17 | let's 30:21 | 33:24 34:21 | managed 34:16 |
| 10:3,14 11:3,8 | Intercepting |  | 52:21 55:17 | level 8:21 9:5,12 | 38:8 54:23 | management 2:5 |
| 11:10,15,23 | 2:15 | J | 58:17 59:18 | 9:12 16:10 | looking 6:14 | 47:20 |
| 12:2,22 14:11 | interception | Jay 1:3 6:3 9:24 | 61:9 | 23:7 24:11,12 | 10:12 12:6,7 | managing 33:7 |
| 22:20 24:14 | 42:20 | 13:23 16:10 | kinds 1:15 33:15 | 26:24 63:6 | 19:18 20:10,23 | 61:20 |
| 31:10 34:15 | interest 6:21 | 21:16 22:14 | 33:16 | levels 7:17 20:11 | 21:19 30:12 | manner 52:17 |


| marginal 22:6 | 13:24 14:23 | 52:4 | note 20:1 36:24 | one-year 4:9 | 22:12 23:7,8 | 9:14 10:20 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 66:14 | 20:14 28:22,25 | MPIA 42:10 | 37:1 42:4,8 | ongoing 67:20 | 25:25 26:2,2,9 | 11:19 13:5,9 |
| arker 2:23 | 36:3 37:9 | murder 1:10 | 46:19 62:17 | online 23:12 | 26:16,16 29:5 | 14:18,19,20 |
| marketing 17:21 | 48:16 54:2 | 40:8 47:16 | notice 62:20 | open 21:7 | 29:5,16,24,25 | 15:8,12 17:20 |
| married 18:12 | middle 18:8 | 48:23 | noticed 38:21 | operate 39:7,21 | 32:4,5,16,19 | 17:22 18:12,12 |
| matter 10:25 | Midlands 48:17 | murders 47:17 | notifiable 18:8 | 40:11 52:18 | 32:19 33:8 | 22:22,23 23:4 |
| 38:6 66:9,15 | 58:7 |  | notion 44:22 | operates 50:19 | 34:11,12,22 | 24:9,15,25 |
| 66:18 | mile 42:1 | N | November 21:20 | operation 11:6,6 | 46:15 | 27:10,10,14,17 |
| matters 11:12 | Milly 47:18 | names 63:8 | 35:4 | operations 1:7 | pains 62:5 | 30:18,18,20 |
| 66:15 | mind 7:3 8:4 | narrower 6:16 | number 1:14 | operators 50:11 | painted 11:20 | 33:20 34:7 |
| mean 3:15 9:8 | 17:13 23:25 | nation 31:17 | 12:21 17:16 | 54:16 55:18 | papers 12:4 53:5 | 35:12,13 38:22 |
| 10:17 15:3,3 | 37:21 55:23 | national 9:12 | 18:10 22:14 | 63:16 | paragraph 8:20 | 40:15 41:18,25 |
| 22:25 23:25 | 65:23 | 11:11 20:10 | 34:10 35:23 | opinion 7:3 | 8:22 9:25 11:4 | 45:2,10 48:7 |
| 39:6 44:6 | mindful 36:12 | 22:7 23:11 | 36:21 37:10,23 | opportunities | 14:25 15:19 | 50:11,12 52:10 |
| 46:24 49:23,23 | mindset 43:7 | 29:6 62:19 | 42:5 43:20 | 54:4 | 18:7 21:16 | 53:3,19 56:3 |
| 50:12 55:12 | 60:22 61:15,16 | 63:18 | 44:4 51:18 | opportunity 3:12 | 23:7 26:9,16 | 58:1 59:3,4 |
| 57:9 59:11 | minority 7:15,15 | natural 39: | 60:7 64:18 | 6:2 67:6 | 28:6 42:6 | 61:19 64:3 |
| 61:18 | minutes 51:4 | nature 1:13,25 | 6:10 | options 16:16,21 | 5:18 51:10 | people's 38:24 |
| means 17:15 | miscarriages | 15:13 23:16 | numbering 6:10 | order 3:12 17:19 | 62:25 63:1 | 38:24 |
| 49:12 50:22 | 38:13 | 26:12 29:8 | 6:11 8:16 14:2 | 19:15,17 36:22 | paragraphs | perceived 9:7 |
| 57:23 | missed 14:9 | necessarily | 18:6 29:24 | 43:20 44:18 | 18:21 | perception 6:17 |
| measure 7:7 | 28:20 | 17:14 42:23 | 32:4 | 48:6 50:20 | parallel 2:3 | 9:15 12:1 21:9 |
| 13:12 23:4 | misses 14:3 | 46:25 |  | 55:1 56:20 | pardon 28:15 | 31:17 40:20 |
| 42:17 | missing 40:8 | need 2:14 5:9 | 0 | 61:10 | parlance 47:16 | 44:9 45:18 |
| meat 6:9 | mission 8:10 | 22:12 24:19,19 | object 11:16,21 | organisation | part 4:14 8:14,16 | perceptions 8:13 |
| mechanism 26:4 | 25:17 27:12,12 | 29:6 37:19 | objectives 32:12 | 9:11 17:13 | 9:3 12:17 | 9:15 |
| 56:12 57:14,21 | 36:12 38:1 | 39:12,13 44:15 | 32:25 | 22:24 32:10,18 | 17:11 18:15 | perfect 66:4,5 |
| 58:16 | 52:20,24 61:20 | 47:12 49:9 | obligations | 33:1,21 34:6 | 25:20 33:3 | perfectly 18:19 |
| mechanisms | 61:23 | :18 53:2 | 33:17 49:1,13 | 50:1 | 37:9 39:21 | 64:11 |
| 17:8 19:8 | mistake 45 | 54:9,17 55:17 | 53:15 | organisations | 40:9 41:21 | performance |
| Medal 27:14 | misunderstood | ded 3:11 | observe 21:16 | 17:19 21:25 | 48:6 52:2 54:2 | 40:21 |
| media 8:19,24,2 | 4:6 56:17,18 | needn't 3:25 | obtained 11:11 | ought 13:19 | 60:4 66:12 | period 4:6 28:16 |
| 9:19 10:16 | Mm 60:5 | needs 3:13 4:7 | 30:2 | 24:25 31:8 | particular 1:11 | 30:15 31:7 |
| 14:7,19 15:20 | mnemonic 29 | 31:1 62:12 | obvious 2 | outlet 32:1 | 6:18 8:2 9:11 | 64:4 |
| 15:24 16:4,14 | mode 24:6 50:11 | negotiatin | 27:24 49:14 | outlets 60:20 | 12:7 24:22 | permit 39:25 |
| 16:18 17:5,6 | model 25:20 | 30:21 | obviously 8:4 | outline 51:1 | 28:1,1 32:1 | person 40:8 57:2 |
| 17:11 18:11,12 | 44:21 50:9 | neither 12:16 | 10:3 22:20 | outside 12:18 | 33:15,16 37:2 | personal 22:24 |
| 18:13,17,23 | modern 49:24 | net 23:18 | 5:4 33:8 | 18:16 31:12 | 38:5 42:18 | 23:3 25:8,12 |
| 19:4 20:10 | module 32:8 | network 2:1,14 | 63:12 | 35:7 36:9 37:3 | 43:1 45:18 | 38:23,24 |
| 22:4 23:11 | 66:12 67:19 | 3:11 4:9,17 | occasionally | 56:1,3 57:16 | 53:12,16 66:13 | Personally 19:20 |
| 24:24 28:12 | moment 13:15 | networking | 44:25 | outsourcing | particularly 9:10 | persons 19:7 |
| 29:19 30:25 | 37:4 51:19 | 22:11 23:10 | occasions 23:22 | 31:23 | 17:22 22:15 | perspective 5:22 |
| 31:15 32:1 | 5:22 61:17 | 25:24 | occurred 7:10 | overbureaucra... | 23:11 24:4,12 | Petroleum 35:15 |
| 36:16 39:10,20 | 66:7 | ever 27:16 55:5 | occurring 37:5 | 19:18 | 24:15 26:22 | photographs |
| 41:4 47:13 | moments 49:17 | new 3:1 4:9 14:7 | offer 17:24 | overdo 38:17 | 30:19,25 35:8 | 22:18 |
| 49:2 51:21 | momentum 1:22 | 14:17 20:6 | offering 59:22 | overheard 10:8 | 36:5 38:3 | phrase 59:4 |
| 53:1 59:16,20 | money 7:20 10:4 | 1:20 35:2 | office 3:1 32:21 | 48:22 | 47:15 56:13 | pick 34:9 45:9 |
| 60:20 | 27:3 | 36:6 39:2 | officer 11:1 | overseeing 2:4 | 59:15 | 48:18 |
| medicine 43:11 | monitor 49:25 | 1:16 | 23:21,23 24:2 | oversight 21:18 | parties 8:19 | picture 11:21 |
| 43:14 | 64:6 | news 9:1,11 | 24:5,6,6,9,16 | 32:4,22 | 34:25 | 12:23 29:1 |
| medium 22:21 | monitored 34:16 | 39:18 40:1,2 | 31:6 34:20 | overview 6:8 | parts 28:1 48:1 | piece 18:4 42:10 |
| meeting 19:6 | 63:20 | 0:11,25 41:5 | 44:10 55:2 | over-arching | party 23:16 | 45:8 54:18 |
| meets 59:19,20 | monitorin | 41:14 61:21 | 56:13 57:3 | 8:21,23 | passed 10:8 | 66:21 |
| member 2:5 | 16:16,25 | newspaper 9:13 | officers 3:17 | over-complex | passes 27:3 | pieces 42:9 46:4 |
| members 14:21 | moonlighting | nexus 20:7 | 5:24 14:20 | 35:13 | passing 7:20 | pilgrims 46:8 |
| 26:17 | 36:9 | nine 63:3 | 22:23 23:5,10 | over-restrictive | path 61:10,14 | pill 60:25,25,25 |
| mention 4 | moral 2 | noble 27:12,15 | 31:9 33:19 | :3 | patrol 18:4 | place 3:19 8:1 |
| 66:9 | 65:6 | nobody's 54:12 | 47:11,11 48:3 | owing 27:2 | pattern 18:1 | 11:2 19:8 |
| mentioned 3:20 | morning 3:20 | noisy 43:23 | 55:24 58:19 | o'clock 68:17,19 | patterns 33:11 | 22:13 45:22 |
| mentioning 2:10 | 68:17 | nonreportable | 67:18 |  | 50:3 | 51:18 57:2 |
| mercifully 42:13 | morphing 62:11 | 15:9 | off-the-record | P | 56:9 | played 38:7 |
| merely 46:6 59:8 | Motorman 11:6 | non-execs 59:3 | 15:2,4 19:10 | page 6:10,11 | pay 45:22 | please 8:20 9:8 |
| 59:11 | 11:24 | non-executive | Oh 13:14 | 8:15,18 11:3,3 | PCC 11:17 54:22 | 16:23 18:7 |
| Met 2:6 | move 32:3 39:17 | 59:8 | okay 29:11 | 13:23 14:1 | PCCs 50:13 | 33:7 36:22 |
| Metropolitan | moves 57:25 | Northumbria | ones 13:5 | 18:5,6 19:2,2 | penultimate 8:14 | 42:7 |
| 1:13 6:18 9:21 | moving 30:20,23 | 14:14 | one's 39:14 | 20:3,10 22:3 | people 7:17 8:7 | pm 1:2 51:6,8 |

68:18
PMC 17:1
PNC 62:24 63:3 63:10,12,15,23 64:3
point 2:18 4:6,12 5:3,10 7:5 9:14 13:24,25 14:3 14:4,8,8 15:13
16:2,4 18:20
19:22 20:3,15
21:25 24:7,24
25:18 27:6,8,9
27:22 29:23
35:25 37:16
38:5 40:3,5,12
40:17,22 42:6
42:15,18,23
43:21,22 44:5
44:7 45:19
50:5 51:10
52:8 54:9
58:11 60:11,12
62:563:21
pointed 6:25
points $24: 25$
25:14 32:15
36:23 41:6
49:3 51:13
53:17 62:16
68:1
police 1:12,13
2:16 6:13,14
6:16,18 7:5,11
7:16 8:8,23,24
9:18,21 10:25
11:9,11,15
12:1,7 13:7,24
14:20,24 15:1
16:24 18:16
19:4 21:1,17
21:22,23 22:2
22:7,15,22
23:4,20,22
24:2,5,6,6,9,16
24:24 27:10,13
28:22,25 30:4
30:7,8,20
31:12,13,23
32:1 33:19
35:7,15 36:3,8
36:9 37:4,9,16
37:19 39:1,4,9
39:21 40:2,4
40:24 41:6,9
41:12,22 42:10
43:17,23 44:10
44:14 47:10,10
47:11,16,20,25
48:1,16 49:1
49:16,19 50:7
50:12,13 51:11
52:8,24 53:6
53:13,20 54:3
54:7 55:10
56:23,24 57:18

58:19 59:1,23
60:8,11,16
61:14,18,19
62:8,19 63:18
67:13,16,18,20
police-related 11:8
police-y 35:6
policies 15:25
18:24 20:4,5
20:13 34:19
42:22
policing 1:9 5:5
5:22 24:13
25:20 28:2
44:21,22 50:9
51:22,25 52:9
52:20 59:19,20
policy 18:8 20:11
20:19 22:13
26:18 42:17
political 24:3
politicians 60:9
politics 59:16,19 59:20
poorly 5:3
posed 8:15
position 30:10
positive 16:15 39:19
possible 7:8 19:20 30:17 45:25 46:13,13
post 21:20
posts $33: 15,16$
post-service 29:23
potential 14:16 31:18 33:22 65:1
potentially 57:24
powerful 60:7
practical 18:25 20:12 53:3 55:11
practices 29:7
precious 21:23 43:22 49:18,18
prefer 43:8
preferred 60:22
preoccupied 55:20
prepared 36:25 40:10 53:18 55:7 56:6 57:7
preparing 12:19
present 30:10
presented 38:9 52:25
presenting 53:1
press 6:14,16,22 13:11 21:2 30:4,7 31:14 31:15 35:25 36:5,11 39:20 51:11 56:16,21

60:4 61:5 62:3
pressure 58:4,4 58:23
pressures 1:6,11 47:23 48:2 59:7
pressurised 47:14 presumably 9:20 19:10,17 pretty 27:19 38:22 48:4
prevent 33:22 52:10 55:1 prevention 42:19 preventive 33:9 principal 9:1
33:4 34:11
principle 8:21,23
priorities 47:25 48:8,11
prioritisation 50:7
private $30: 19,23$ 31:25 35:9,11 35:22
proactively 16:12
probably 1:21 22:6 35:5 40:22 44:24 46:12 48:3 51:16
probing 54:12
probity 21:23
problem 6:18,19 10:17 11:22 21:3,11 22:17 25:10 28:5 29:3 62:2 68:6
problematic 33:14 37:18 57:23
problems 12:7 60:17
procedures 17:3 18:22,24
process 55:22
58:12
processes 32:9
produced 62:6
product 47:9
profession 43:22
professional
23:3 52:5,6
professions 43:10 61:4
profile 34:2,6
profiled 33:25
programme 24:1
38:6,11
programmes 44:8
progress 2:25
7:8
progressively

| 30:17 | 52:22 62:17,20 | reconsider 2:24 | 52:17 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| project 4:10 | 63:25 | record 19:3 | relationships |
| 55:25 | quite 3:14 4:15 | 28:21 | 8:19,23 9:6,9 |
| promote 32:23 | 4:25 5:24 | recorded 19:8 | 9:19 10:1 |
| promoting 32:12 | 17:18 25:5 | 26:14 | 16:13,17 20:12 |
| 33:1 44:16 | 27:16 31:5,18 | recording 18:22 | 23:9 33:12 |
| prompt 53:21 | 32:8 40:4,25 | 26:3 29:7 | 34:7,15 35:19 |
| proposals 5:9 | 48:24 52:4 | records 3:6 19:9 | relationship-b... |
| 34:23 | 53:18 54:24 | 43:14 53:8 | 51:24 |
| proposition 5:16 | 58:22 60:23 | recover 40:7,9 | relatively 7:21 |
| prospect 53:1 | quotes 23:18 | 64:1 | 26:12 33:13 |
| protect 45:5 48:4 |  | recovering 41:2 | 63:21 |
| 48:6 49:25 | R | reduces 54:12 | relevance 22:6 |
| protective 16:25 | racist 25:4 | reduction 48:10 | 66:13 |
| protocol 59:18 | radar 17:15 | refer 63:1 | relevant 3:24 |
| provide 5:18 | 49:20 63:23 | reference 20:24 | 34:25 |
| 17:16 47:6 | raise 8:4 17:13 | 24:25 25:2,14 | reluctance 39:25 |
| 63:11 | 57:14 | 35:25 49:3 | relying 15:23 |
| provided 3:18 | raised 50:6 | 52:8 61:9 | 65:24 |
| 18:17 27:5 | raising 66:19 | 66:14 | remaining 51:12 |
| 62:19 64:25 | range $14: 6,19$ | referrals 11:7 | rendered 68:6 |
| providing 57:13 | 53:754:4 | referring 15:24 | reopened 38:10 |
| pub 24:10 | ranges 7:19 | 15:25 19:13 | 38:11 |
| public 6:24 7:3,7 | rare 7:21 | reflect 1:20 | repeatedly $62: 4$ |
| 7:24 8:9 9:2,7 | rarely 16:15 | reflected 66:11 | report $2: 13$ 3:8 |
| 17:19 25:20 | rationale 13:9 | reflecting 46:22 | 5:19 6:3,12 9:1 |
| 35:10,22 37:17 | reached $2: 18$ | reflects 61:24 | 12:19 18:13 |
| 37:18 38:23 | reaction 42:20 | reform 5:6,13 | 25:22 53:11 |
| 41:14 44:16 | reactive 12:5 | 42:11 54:7 | 56:14 67:10 |
| 54:21,22 55:9 | read 53:4 | 59:25 | reported 19:13 |
| 55:19,21 56:7 | readily 57:18 | regard 8:10 | 48:16 |
| 56:23 58:12 | ready $34: 24$ | 13:18 | reports 2:11 6:7 |
| 59:25 65:9 | reaffirmed 44:3 | regardless 20:13 | 11:4 |
| public's 7:12 | real 7:11 14:6 | regime 35:3 | represent 32:10 |
| publish 2:11 | 52:23 53:1 | regional 13:24 | 66:10 |
| 46:19 | reality 21:2 40:1 | registers 28:8 | representatives |
| published 3:8 | really 1:17 4:25 | regrets 1:19 | 19:5 31:14 |
| punch 8:22 | 8:16 9:11 | regulation 42:18 | reputation 7:11 |
| 16:10 23:7 | 12:24 15:13 | 50:14 | 32:17 |
| 28:6 | 16:2 24:4,24 | regulators 54:14 | require 4:2 |
| purpose 19:7 | 25:19 29:22 | rehearse 38:3 | 20:20 31:7 |
| 51:22 52:9 | 37:5 40:15 | 48:25 | required 4:2,5 |
| pursue 3:9,17 | 55:18 | rehearsed 48:24 | 67:12 |
| 41:25 | reason 5:16 32:2 | 49:22 | requires 32:9 |
| pursuit 32:12 | 55:16 65:13 | reinforce 43:20 | research 42:16 |
| 44:1 | 67:19 | relate 11:12,14 | 46:4 |
| put 3:19 4:13 | reasonable 3:18 | 35:12,23 51:24 | residual 7:16 |
| 13:8 27:18 | 54:24 | relates 11:10 | resigning 30:23 |
| 31:2 32:2 38:1 | reassert 50:20 | relation 1:22 2:4 | resolve 58:21,21 |
| 50:21 51:17 | recall 38:5 | 3:15 7:9 11:22 | resources 44:11 |
| 60:19 62:18 | receive 47:3 | 17:19 18:17 | 58:24 |
| 64:4 | received $28: 12$ | 28:21 33:24 | resourcing 16:14 |
| putting 2:23 | recognise 62:5 | 34:19 35:25 | respects 54:24 |
| 50:22 | recognition | 48:9 49:9 | response 63:11 |
|  | 64:25 | 62:18 63:10 | responsibilities |
| Q | recommend | 64:8 67:13 | 2:21 3:21,24 |
| qualitative $7: 1$ | 22:12 29:5 | relational 17:9 | responsible 3:22 |
| quantitative 7:1 | 30:1 | 17:17 | 62:6 |
| Queen's 27:13 | recommendati... | relations 6:13,16 | rest 35:19 54:20 |
| question 4:22 | 19:1,14 63:5 | 31:15 39:11,12 | restraint 30:1 |
| 6:15 7:2 8:4,14 | recommendati... | relationship 2:7 | restricted 2:13 |
| 12:11,15 17:13 | 25:24 33:4 | 18:11,24 21:1 | 3:8 14:23 46:3 |
| 24:1 45:16 | 34:9,11,19 | 21:6 29:9 | restriction 65:12 |
| 62:23 63:5 | recommending | 39:15,18,19 | result 16:15 |
| 64:8 65:4 | 33:10 | 47:12 50:19,21 | 41:10 43:25 |
| questions 52:21 | reconcile 67:25 | 51:11,15 52:15 | results 40:25 |


| 41:3,4,8,25 | satisfactory | 45:13 58:7 | slap 18:7 | stage 46:22 | suggested 37:13 | teams 32:21 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 44:1 48:9,10 | 63:10 | seriously 56:15 | slightly 11:1 | stakes 47:24 | 38:9 | 34:20 |
| retain 2:21 | save 22:6 27: | 57:16 | slippery 34:5 | stand 1:22 61:6 | suggesting 56:12 | techniques 49:24 |
| retired 5:17,18 | 29:22 | serve 66 | slope 34:5 | 63:21 64:5 | 57:21 | technology 14:7 |
| retiring 30:22 | saw 37:7 | served | slow 41:19 | standard 29:6 | suggestion 15:16 | elevision 44:8 |
| return 19:25 | saying 26:6 66:2 | service 2:16 6:19 | small 29:22 62 | standards 30:18 | suggestions 46:7 | television-type |
| 20:25 21:14 | scale 1:14 28:5 | 8:24 9:21 10:6 | smart 40:16 | 41:5 51:25 | suggests 25:16 | 43:24 |
| 51:19 | scenario 30:22 | 15:1 34:23 | smoothly 5:1 | 52:1 | 26:14 | tell 1:7 17:14,25 |
| turned 2:25 | scenarios 27:18 | 53:20 | social 10:23 14:7 | start 24:8 40 | ide 38 | 45:3,20,21 |
| returning 19:1 | scienc | services 17 | 14:19 17:5 | 43:13 | 24:2 | 63:12,13 |
| reveal 39:25 | scrutiny 14:15 | service-wid | 0:11 22:10 | started 11:2 | uits 46:1 | telling 18:2 |
| revealed 12:4 | 62:1 | 34:18 | 23:10 25:24 | 33:13 54:19 | summarise | ten 1:17 |
| 43:1 57:24 | second 26:16 | serving 14 | 60:20 | starter 50:23 | 36:23 46:16 | tend 49:3 |
| revealing 14:22 | 37:12 42:12 | set 11:18,20 | society 39:2 | starting 22:3 | summary 42:11 | tended 10:15,18 |
| 43:2 55:8 | 43:8 52:15,1 | 53:21 54:22 | softer 7:22 | 25:18 | summer 7:10 | tends 41:23 |
| review 4:20 | secondly $4: 1$ | 55:4,4 58:18 | software 17:3 | state 21:11 | supervisors 63:4 | 47:14 |
| 26:18 28:8 | 22:19 | 59:17 | 49:24 63:20 | statement 9:20 | supplied 28:9 | tension 48:21 |
| 32:21 55:17 | section 6:8 51:9 | sets 52:3 | Soham 47:18 | 20:7 52:6 | support 3:10 | ensions 59:21 |
| 58:17 | sector 12:19 30:8 | setting 32: | solution 36:13 | 66:20 | 4:18 7:16 12:3 | tentatively 16:22 |
| reviewing 34:20 | 30:19,23 31:25 | shape 5:13 29:11 | 38:18 48:15,15 | statistic 29:2 | 31:11 39:8 | term 7:18 15:4 |
| reviews 48:25 | 35:9,10,11,22 | 32:2 33:25 | 49:9 59:22 | status 31:1 | 44:15 51:18 | 32:7 |
| revised 3:11 29:2 | sectors $24: 23$ | 60:3 | solutions 46:1 | step 37:3 | 53:25 54:10,11 | terms 11:16 |
| revision 50:18 | 34:7 | share 1:6 | 65:1 | stewards 32:1 | 63:18 | 15:12 36:14 |
| 51:11 | secured 12:10 | 16:23 | solve 45 | stop 50:14 | supported 5:13 | 37:17,17 38:21 |
| revolution 61:12 | security 16:25 | shared 10:5 49:5 | solved 44:9 | storm 54:1 | suppose 7:5 8:13 | 39:10 42:9 |
| revolving 30:4,7 | 30:8 62:24 | Sherlock 40:13 | 47:18 | story 37:6,11 | 15:16 36:20 | 50:7 55:11 |
| right 9:15,22 | see 7:2,10,14 8:7 | 40:20 | somebody | 39:5 61:5 | 62:9 | 57:7 58:13 |
| 11:24 12:25 | 11:17,20 12:21 | shift 61:25 | 24:1,13 25:7 | straight 42 | suppres | 59:17 66:14 |
| 20:8 21:4,20 | 13:21 35:18 | short 30:14 51:7 | 37:17 45:3 | straightforward | sure 3:14 4:25 | terrible 58:8 |
| 22:17 24:18 | 42:1 54:15 | 54:866:20 | 55:6 57:16 | 38:22 | 24:23 33:2 | terrorism 1:16 |
| 27:6,19 28:19 | 56:11 57:9,1 | shorthand 51: | somewhat 26:2 | strategy 3 | 40:14 45:15 | 1:23 2:15 |
| 39:15,19 45:4 | 57:22 65:1 | shortly | 39:1 60:16 | street 8:5 | 49:7 61:17 | terrorist 2:4 3:3 |
| 45:15 46:18 | seeing 8:5 | show 17:10 30:6 | sorry 59:22 | streng | 64:19 | terrorist-related |
| 47:4 50:21,22 | seek 8:25 13:17 | showed 28:10 | sort 4:9,10 10 | strengthening | Surrey 48:18 | 3:6 |
| 51:5,15 61:3 | 17:9 53:14 | showing 19:23 | 22:8 46:21 | 62:13 | survive 5:9 54:24 | test 25:2 56:2 |
| 61:10 63:6 | seeking 20:15 | shrink 50:20 | 54:18 | stress 4:7 | system 3:7 17:4 | 58:24 64:6 |
| 65:10 68:16 | 24:10 65:15 | si | so | stressed 33: | 35:18 44:17,17 | tested 64:4 |
| rigour 5:9 | seen 12:14 20:4 | significant 1:14 | sources 23:1 | strong 7:16 | 62:10,10 63:18 | testing 17:2 62:1 |
| rise 23:23 66:9 | 24:22 32:14 | 31:19 37:10 | South 20:6 | 26:19 47:9 | 64:6 | text 7:24 |
| risk 27:4 56:16 | 33:2 36:24 | 50:18 | speak 15:12 23:8 | 62:10 65:12 | systems 16:24 | thank 6:24 9:17 |
| risks 33:7 34:14 | 37:7 41:19,2 | significa | 55:5 | stronger 4:20 | 17:1,2 32:9 | 15:15 18:5 |
| risky 54:7 | 46:24 58:10 | 66:1 | speaking 25:8,1 | 57:25 63:17 | 34:14 64:4 | 29:16 34:9 |
| road 46:7,8 | 65:25 66:1,2 | simil | 37:1 42:4,8 | strongly 49:1 | system-wide | 36:18 42:3 |
| Robust 34:14 | self-evidently | simply 4:11,14 | speaks 8:17 | 6-18 | 26:15 | 51:5 64:15,16 |
| 2:9 27:23 | 6:15 | 12:8,18 30:2 | 40:19 | struck |  | 64:17 66:6 |
| 44:13 48:21 | self-exp | 49:23 64:2 |  | str | T | 68:14,15,17 |
| 54:10 60:7 | 25:25 | single 44:10 67: | sp | 64:23 |  | thankfully 8:8 |
| 62:9,23 64:8 | senior 3:16 5:2 | $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { s i r }} 1: 33: 155: 3$ |  |  | 29: | 27:19 |
| room 48:25 | 27:1,5,21,22 | 6:2,3 8:18 | speciali | subdivided | 62:4 | themes $34: 10$ |
| , | 31:6 47:10 | 11:13 12:16 | 30:1 | 36:21 | tainted 61:23 | theories 40:15 |
| roughly 48:17 | sense 16:13 21: | 13:4,18,23 | specific 5:1 20:4 | subheading 42:3 | take 5:25 9:5 | they'd 12:5 |
| route 58:2,19 | 23:19 25:17 | 21:5,10 25:13 | 26:18 53:11,22 | subject 21:24 | 13:4 30:12,21 | thing 4:9,15 17:7 |
| utine $4: 18$ | 26:20 28:2 | 28:18 31:18 | 57:21 63:24,25 | 52:12 65:11 | 35:24 36:3 | 20:25 24:8 |
| brics 36:22 | 36:10 43:9 | 32:3 33:10 | spectrum $7: 19$ | submit 66:20 | 37:19 48:11 | 26:15 37:12 |
| les 31:8 | 52:23 | 36:19 40:2 | :21,2 | subsidiary $2: 3$ | 50:8,17 60:24 | 41:9 43:4 |
| run 46:9,12 | sensible 4:3 30:3 | 45:17,21,24 | spoken 12:20 | substantial 1:23 | 67:10 | 44:21 45:12,13 |
|  | 64:23 65:7 | 46:10,12,21 | 13:5 | 7:15 27:4 | taken 16:23 | 49:14 50:7 |
| running 14:17 | sen | 48:11 50:5 |  | success 5:14 | 57:15 | 55:25 57:8 |
|  | sent | 51:9 57:7 | spur 37:24 | 61:1 | talented 2:19 | 58:22 61:15 |
| S |  | 62:16 63:24 | squad 58:7 |  | talk 48:3 57:3 | 62:12,13 63:19 |
| cked 36:8 | separate $3: 13$ | 64:10,14,17 | squads $28: 1$ | sufficient 64:10 | talked 47:11 | things 3:11 4:5 |
| safeguard 33:22 | 11:1 22:8 | 65:16 66:5 | square 56:21 | sufficiently | talking 44:6 56:1 | 4:20 5:11 8:5 |
| fety 58:12 60:2 | 36:21 | 67:23 68:14 | staff 10:6 14:21 | 49:22 | 56:10 61:12 | 10:7 11:2 |
| sake 45:4 | separation 23:2 | sites 23:10 25:2 | 26:17,23 27:1 | suggest 16:22 | tangible 14:4 | 13:20,21 15:11 |
| sanction 35:20 | 23:4 | situation 40:8 | 27:5,18,21,22 | 24:2 63:9 | targeting 33:15 | 17:3,10 19:22 |
| sandwiches 16:5 | serious 1:10 27:9 | size 1:13 31:4 | 27:25 33:19 | 67:24 | tea 16:5 | 33:23 35:20 |


| 36:1 37:5 | 28:16 35:2 | Um 43:6 | validation 63:2,6 | 52:5 55:20 | 54:7 | 2 8:18 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 38:22 41:24 | 36:2 38:12,12 | unauthorised | valuable 5:21 | 60:3 65:17 | worked 36:7 | 2.05 1:2 |
| 42:11,24,24 | 38:14,20 39:1 | 10:14 11:15 | value 7:3 42:1,2 | ways $24: 14,15$ | working 13:15 | 20 47:22 |
| 43:11 48:19,25 | 46:17 53:4 | uncomfortable | 58:23 59:18 | 33:20 35:23 | 31:11 35:14,15 | 2005 63:15 |
| 49:16 53:3 | 54:21 58:18,18 | 37:24 38:1,19 | values 32:12,24 | 44:4 51:19 | 36:9 55:25 | 2006 1:20 2:16 |
| 54:11 57:18,23 | 64:5 65:19 | Underlying | 33:1 41:5 | 56:6 59:24 | 64:7 | 3:15 4:13,21 |
| 65:9,22 | 67:11 | 21:21 | 51:24 52:1, | wearying 38:2 | world 14:5,17 | 2007 3:5 63:15 |
| think 1:9,18,21 | times 5:11 37:8 | undermined | valve 58:12 60:3 | website 62:25 | 43:23 59:5 | 2008 2:25 3:8 |
| 3:5,16 4:20 | 38:2 49:18 | 25:17 39:6 | variable 18:22 | week 22:19 | 60:17 67:7 | 2009 1:4,20 3:23 |
| 5:17 6:10,20 | 61:23 | underneath 53:2 | varied 13:9 | 30:22,22 5 | worst 30:22 | 4:13,21 |
| 6:21,24 8:9,16 | timing 28:23 | understand 4:23 | various 2:8,15 | 56:5 | worst-possible | 21 6:10 |
| 11:24 13:1,19 | title 25:21 | 5:2,22 11:13 | vast $62: 5$ | weighing 57: | 38:16 | 25 8:15 |
| 14:10,13 18:4 | today 43:3 48:23 | 11:14 15:6 | versa 30:5 | welcome 6:1 | worth 2:10 34:5 | 27 8:18 |
| 18:6 19:22 | Tomorrow 68:17 | 30:11 38:18 | viable 58:22 | well-rehearse | 59:6 | $2811: 3$ |
| 20:16 21:22 | top 1:9 14:1 19:1 | 40:16,22 45:11 | vice $30: 5$ | 17:2 | worthy 52:7 | 29 14:1 51:10 |
| 23:1,8 24:13 | 32:19 55:14 | 47:12 56:11 | victim 41:15 | went 2:23 12:3,8 | wouldn't 45:23 | 298 28:17 |
| 24:18,19,20,22 | 58:15 | 60:2,23 62:15 | video 38:7 | 36:20 | 56:4 57:19 |  |
| 26:2,10 27:9 | topic 62:17 | 65:5 67:21 | view 5:18 10:5 | weren't 12:9 | wrapped 44:1 | 3 |
| 27:16 28:4 | top-end 47:15 | 68:8 | 17:12 19:2 | West 48:17 58:7 | write 67:11 | 3 22:3 |
| 29:10,11,21,2 | touched 1:3 | understandable | 21:17 22:24 | we'll 7:6 46:18 | writer 51:4 | 3,000 48:17 |
| 30:6,18 31:1 | trade 30:1 | 3:18 10:25 | 23:1 24:3,23 | 47:8 59:24 | writing 64:13 | 3.34 51:6 |
| 32:5,15 33:4 | traditional 31:23 | understanding | 32:9 49:13 | 63:11 | 65:24 | 3.39 51:8 |
| 34:11 35:3,24 | training 20:20 | 6:17 15:7,7 | 50:17 59:6 | we're 20:23 22:8 | written 38:7 | 30 18:6 47:22 |
| 36:16,23 37:16 | 34:19 41:16 | 16:6 48:22 | 65:2 67:2 | 25:1 30:6 34:3 | 63:11,24 66:20 | 30-plus 39:11 |
| 37:19 38:20,25 | 43:16 | 65:8 | viewed 23:16 | 44:6 54:15 | wrong 9:14 12:8 | 31 19:2 |
| 39:12 40:24 | transaction 63:1 | understood 4 | views 5:20 13:7 | 61:16,17,25 | 18:15 27:20 | 34 22:3 |
| 41:3,7,11 43:8 | 63:6 | 10:2 49:19 | 20:21 25:3,9 | 68:16 | 36:20 41:25 | 36 22:12 |
| 43:19 47:5,10 | transactio | 64:24,24 68:5 | 48:11 | we've 1:3 6:7 | 55:3 | 38 23:7 |
| 47:18 48:2,8 | 63:3 | undertake 2:12 | virtual 14: | 22:18 34:10 |  | 38.4 63:1 |
| 48:21,25 50:16 | transparency | undertaken $4: 1$ | visible 9:9 | 35:17 37:21 | X | 39 25:25 |
| 51:3,3,12,15 | 24:21,22 | undertaking 2:3 | visit 57:3 | 46:1 55:4 61:5 | X 61:5 |  |
| 51:25 52:3,18 | transparent 21:7 | undertook 1:25 | vocational | 64:2 |  | 4 |
| 53:9,17 54:5 | 23:15,20 29:9 | 2:13 7:13 | vulnerabilities | whichever 46:10 | Y | 4 6:7 26:1 |
| 56:6,9,19 57:3 | transposed 63:8 | unevenn | 0:22 34:6 | 64:1 | 4:25 | 4.07 68:18 |
| 59:6,13,23,24 | treating 7:25 | 26:13 | vulnerab | whilst 1:18 23:15 | years 1:17 14:13 | 40 26:2,9 37:22 |
| 61:11,12,15 | trick 39:23 67:2 | unexclusiv | 35:16 | 26:17 36:14 | 28:10 36:7 | 42 29:5 |
| 63:7,9 65:16 | trivial 26:12 | 53:16 | vulnerable | whistle-blow | 37:22 39:11 |  |
| 66:23 | tr | u |  | 55:6 | 1:20 47:22 | 5 |
| thinking 36:13 | :7 | unfairly | W | White | 48:9 | 11,21 |
|  | tru | unfriendly 39:13 | Wales 20: | Whittan | yields 16:15 | 5.50 29:11 |
| thinks 53 | Trufflene | unhelpful 65:4 | wall 45:8 | 12:3 | young 36:2 | 51 29:24 |
| third 37:16 | truly 13:19 | uniformly 48:4 | want 5:25 17:22 | widely 6 |  | 55 32:4 |
| 53:13 | trust 7:12 | uninitiated 18:9 | 20:1 23:4 24:4 | 23:18 | 0 | 56 32:19 |
| thought 2:10 4 | trustworthy 13:6 | units 28:1 49:13 | 34:3,4 36:3,4 | wider 6:11 20 | 04396 6:11 | 57 33:8 |
| 13:5 30:16 | truth 56:7 | University 42:12 | 36:16 38:17 | 22:3 29:3 | 04400 8:16 |  |
| 45:2 67:14 | try 12:18 13:20 | unusual 4:15 | 39:9 40:2 | 30:13 65 | 4402 8:18 | 6 |
| thoughtful 10:20 | 19:15 21:14 | unwind 41:20 | 41:1 46:12 | willing 54:16 | 04405 18:6 |  |
| 13:6 | 40:7,9 62:9 | unwrapping | 50:19 55:6 | willingness | 04413 23:8 | 62 34:11 |
| thoughts 12:20 | trying 21:12 | 14:18 | 66:21 67:6 | 57:17 | 04415 26:2 | 68 28:11,17 |
| 21:13 36:17,18 | 45:11 56:21 | updated 28:14 | wants 45:12 56:8 | win 41:1 | 04430 32:5 | 68 28.11,17 |
| 42:13 47:5 | 57:10 59:17,23 | upholding 25:10 | 59:4 | wish 1:5 20:2 | 04436 29:25 | 7 |
| 64:21 | 60:6 64:2 | upper 23:7 | wasn't 4:2 | 54:20 62:21 | 04437 34:12 | 7/7 47:19 |
| threat 1:25 | tune | use 7:18 15:2 | 66:2 | witness 20:7 |  | 7/747.19 |
| three 2:2 4:10 | twitter 14:18 | 7:9 31:9 39:8 | watch 50:2 53: | wonder 63:7 | 1 | 8 |
| 17:7 37:4,20 | 23:13 | 49:3 55:6 56:8 | watched $36: 1$ | word 46:25 55:7 |  |  |
| 49:3 51:1,20 | two 1:21 3:19 | 58:18 59:4 | Watson 40:14,15 | 60:22 65:12 | 32:8 35:4 | $8.8 \text { 33:18 }$ |
| 53:17 63:3,25 | 9:10 18:14 | 65:22 | 40:21 | words 18:18 | $1068: 17,19$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8.8 \text { 33:18 } \\ & 89 \text { 8:9 } \end{aligned}$ |
| thresholds 34:17 | 42:8 | useful 18:19 | way $2: 73: 55: 13$ | 28:11 36:22 | $12 \text { 42:6,15 }$ | 89 8:9 |
| tick-boxing 65:3 | twofold 22:17 | 36:14 42:23 | 5:23 13:15 | 56:8 65:2 | $13 \text { 45:18 }$ | 9 |
| tie $25: 15$ | type 29:6 | 54:19 | 16:9 20:19,24 | work 1:22 2:5,12 | 15,000 48:16 |  |
| tightens 57:25 |  | usually 11:18 | 24:18,19 26:13 | $2: 243: 23 ~ 4: 8$ $5 \cdot 227 \cdot 13$ | 175 3:6 | 9,500 28:10 |
| time $1: 12,12,22$ $1: 242: 12,17$ | U |  | 27:17 31:13,19 | 5:22 7:13 | 1969 37:7 | $900 \text { 48:18 }$ |
| 1:24 2:12,17 | ultimate 44:16 | utterly | 33:12 35:6,18 | 10:18 27:25 | 1990s 33:23 | -00 48.18 |
| $5: 414: 618: 4$ | 8:15 | V | 41:3,4,11 43:9 | $4$ |  |  |
| 19:6 24:1,7 | 58:6 | validated 63:4 | 48:24 50:5,18 | 46:4 49:11 | 2 |  |


[^0]:    LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes.
    A. Ideally, there would be some place or some person an officer could talk to, visit: "I think that that investigation's been suppressed."

    Now, hopefully they have enough faith in their own institution to do it. However, if they decide to be in, sir, in your terms, disloyal, we should be prepared at least to consider that in weighing this thing up. Do you see what I mean?
    LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, I was trying to avoid an allegation of disloyalty --
    A. Yes.

    LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- by providing them with an alternative mechanism to raise concerns and, if you like, to be able to see that the concern is taken seriously by involving somebody outside. But that would have to go hand in glove with a willingness, on behalf of the police, the more readily to admit where things haven't gone as well as they might have done, wouldn't it?
    A. It would, and I'm not suggesting a specific mechanism, but I can see that unless one addresses that then some of the -- some of the means by which problematic things get revealed would be closed down potentially, because one moves to a stronger framework which tightens down Page 57
    the basis for contact and then you have people who would say, "Now you've actually closed off the route."

    LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, and then what happens is that the pressure cooker just increases the pressure --
    A. And blows.

    LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- until ultimately it explodes in a West Midlands serious crime squad or some other terrible calamity.

    ## A. Indeed.

    LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Which nobody has actually seen early enough and gripped. Is that the point?
    A. Yes. So it's a public interest safety valve process in those terms.

    ## LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes.

    A. But also for those who are engaged at the top end in these most contested environments, there's a mechanism for them, with some kind of external review group -- we use that. Others do from time to time. Not just a set of police officers, or -- if they're en route to a decision, there's not just something that they can resolve with the CPS, as it were, where we can resolve quite a lot -- is this thing viable or whatever else. The value of doing this, given all the pressure and resources, they can test it.

    Now, there's an argument that should be with the

